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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the research is to understand how unit managers react to and are able to 
engage with a newly devised centralised performance measurement system (PMS) based on 
the balanced scorecard (BSC). The theoretical contribution of this study is to establish the 
behaviours which may contribute to or hinder the way in which the BSC is accepted and used 
at a unit level. The knowledge gained and tested in actual practice will prove invaluable. This 
will not only allow managers to identify and therefore react to areas of probable negativity, 
but also allow them to encourage and endorse the more positive aspects. 
The observed research which adopts a process of collaborative inquiry covers a period of 10 
months and adopts a longitudinal case study approach. During this time, emphasis is paid 
upon the role of the reviewing senior manager and those managers responsible for the unit 
scorecards, examining their initial exposure to and deployment of the scorecard, along with its 
use in eight of the seventeen delivery units. , 
The findings identify that three core elements exist within a performance environment. These 
consist of the performance strategy, its PMS and the performance encounter where 
performance improvements are ultimately realised. Within the centre core there exists both an 
emotional and behavioural reaction determining either the success or demise of the overall 
perforinance management and its measurement system. 
The research concludes by evaluating the lessons derived from the interactions within the 
performance environment. The study focuses on how considerations such as personal control 
and influence, when linked to understanding, knowledge and contribution impact on the level 
of perceived ownership and accountability felt by individuals. By addressing these areas 
organisations are able to ensure a more successful use of a centrally devised BSC approach 
across its exposure, deployment and usage. 
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KEYWORDS 
ADM All Due Mail KPI (measuring all letters for delivery have departed a unit for 
delivery to customer premises). 
ADOM Assistant Delivery Unit Manager (managed by DOM in multi-managed unit). 
ANALYST Responsible for performance information and analysis for a designated 
function. 
AMT Area management team (team of senior managers responsible for an 
operational area). 
APAM Area performance and planning manager (responsible for area performance 
information and analysis. 
AOM Area operations manager (responsible for a multi functional operational area). 
BSC Balanced Scorecard (performance management process). 
CS1 Customer satisfaction index (external measure of customer satisfaction). 
CWU Communication workers union (employees union). 
CMA Communication managers association (managers union). 
DELIVERIES Function responsible for delivering customers letters. 
DISTRIBUTION Function responsible for transport and logistics. 
DOM Delivery office manager (responsible for the management of a delivery unit). 
EOS Employee opinion survey kpi (measurement of employee satisfaction). 
FTD Fit to deliver (national project to enable changes to indoor working to support 
savings and improved efficiencies in delivery units). 
FOXHOLES Terminology for a dysfunctional interface between functions and work areas. 
KPI's Key performance indicators. 
MAILSORT Discounted business letters. 
MIPP Managing the integrated product pipeline (in process measurement process). 
MC Mails cost kpi (unit operational budget v costs). 
MCM mail centre manager (responsible for the management of mail centre 
function). 
NCM Network collection manager (responsible for the management of area 
collection operation). 
PIPELINE Operational area containing collections, processing and delivery functions. 
POMM Post office management model (performance management system). 
PRESSTREAM discounted business letters. 
PROCESSING Function responsible for sorting letters prior to sending to deliveries. 
RC Repeat complaint kpi (where a customer finds it necessary to complain again 
against a previous complaint). 
SECTOR operational delivery area containing a cluster of units under a senior manager. 
SICK % Sick performance kpi (number of staff off against hours to run unit). 
SOM Sector operations manager (senior manager responsible for the management of 
a cluster of delivery units). 
TO Time out kpi (time employees depart a unit to commence delivering letters). 
UPB's Unit planning briefs (national and area improvement initiatives). 
WUC'S Weighted unit cost kpi (measurement of a unit's efficiency). 
3 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ... . .......................................................................................................................................................... 2 
KEYWORDS ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 
CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................................... 4 
TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................................................................................... 6 
APPENDICES 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
6 
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................................................. 7 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
......................................................................................................................................... a 
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................................................ 8 
CHAPTERI INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 9 
1.1 RESEARCH ISSUE - ORGANISATIONAL BARRIERS AND EMERGING RESEARCH FOCUS ........................... 11 1.2 RESEARCH FOCUS - IMPROVING PRACTICE .......................................................................................... 15 
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS ................................................................................................................................... 16 
1.3.1 Positioning of Current Theory and Practice ................................................................................. 16 
1.3.2 How The Research Will Contribute To Theoretical And Practitioner Knowledge ...................... 20 1.3.3 The Importance and Role of the Co-Participant .......................................................................... 21 1.4. RESEARCH STRUCTURE - ENGAGING THE CO-PARTICIPANTS ................................................................ 25 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................. 28 
2.1 INTRODucnoN -A POSITIONING OVERVIEW ........................................................................................ 28 
2.2. STRATEGY-N4ANAGEMENT-MEASUREMENT ......................................................................................... 30 
ZZI Strategy ........................................................................................................................................... 30 
ZZ2 Performance Management .......................................................................................................... .. 
33 
ZZ3 Performance Measurement .................. I ...................................................................................... .. 
37 
2.3 MEASUREMENT Focus ....................................................................................................................... .. 41 
2.4 THE DYNAMICS OF MEASUREMENT (TRADE-OFFS, CAUSE AND EFFECT, LEAD AND LAG) .................... .. 48 
2.5 THE EMERGENCE OF A BALANCED APPROACH TO PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT ............................ .. 54 
2.6 THE BALANCED SCORECARD .............................................................................................................. .. 57 
2.7 IMPACT AND REACTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS TO MEASUREMENT ............................................................ .. 64 
Z 7.1 Emotions and Attitudes ................................................................................................................ .. 71 2.7.2 Cultural Influence on Measurement ........................................................................................... .. 
75 
2.8 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK .................................................................................................................... .. 79 2.9 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LITERATURE .................................................................................................. .. 86 
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... .. 92 
3.1 THE RESEARCH FOCUS REVISITED ...................................................................................................... .. 92 3.2 A METHODOLOGICAL DEBATE ........................................................................................................... .. 93 3.3 ADOPTING THE ACTION RESEARCH ROUTE ........................................................................................ .. 96 3.4 THE RESEARCH DESIGN ...................................................................................................................... .. 98 3.4.1 Validating The Use OfAction Inquiry As My Chosen Research Method 
................................. .. 
98 
3.4.2 My Role as the Researcher ........................................................................................................... 100 
3.4.3 Ethical Issues and Politics ........................................................................................................... 102 3.4.4 Co-Participants Confidentiality - Applied Coding Ethics - Use of Transcripts ........................ 105 3.4.5 Recruitment of Research Participants ......................................................................................... 108 3.4.6 Eliminating Bias, Personal Impact and Validating Emerging Data .......................................... 110 3.5 APPLIED METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ................................................................. 114 3.5.1 Scorecard Exposure and Deployment ......................................................................................... 115 
4 
3.5.2 Scorecard Usage ........................................................................................................................... 119 3.5.3 Engaging with the Data ............................................................................................................... 123 3.6 TESTING THE APPROACH .................................................................................................................... 131 
CHAPTER 4 SCORECARD POSITIONING .................................................................................................. 133 
4.1 THE DELIVERY UNIT SCORECARD ...................................................................................................... 134 
4.2 THE MANAGER'S TASK ....................................................................................................................... 
137 
4.3 How PREPARED ARE THE MANAGERS FOR A UNIT SCORECARD9 ....................................................... 139 
CHAPTER S MANAGERS' INITIAL EXPOSURE TO THE UNIT SCORECARD ......................................... 
143 
5.1. EXPOSURE POSITIONING - DEVELOPING A RAPPORT WITH EXTENDED MANAGERIAL TEAM ............... 143 
5.2 ENGAGING WITH THE CO-PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................ 145 
5.3 INITIAL PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE ABILITY To ENGAGE WITH MEASURES ................................... 147 
5.4 AGREEING PERFORMANCE BEHAVIOURS ............................................................................................ 154 
5.5 REFLECTIONS ON MANAGERS INITIAL EXPOSURE TO UNIT SCORECARD ............................................. 160 
S-5.1 Why did individualsfeel as they do? ............................................................................................ 160 
5.5.2 Practitioner Implications Emergingfrom Exposure Phase ....................................................... 164 
CHAPTER 6 DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SCORECARD ..................................................... 169 
6.1 DEPLOYMENT POSITIONING ................................................................................................................ 
169 
6.2 ENGAGING VATH THE CO-PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................. 170 
6.3 ENGAGING WITH THE UNIT SCORECARDS ............................................................................................ 
172 
6.3.1 Undertaking Initial Root Cause Analysis .................................................................................... 
175 
6.3.2 Root Cause Analysis: its Impact on Initial Performance Gaps .................................................. 
179 
6.3.3 Closure of Performance Gaps ...................................................................................................... 
182 
6.4 REFLECTIONS ON MANAGERS DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE UNIT SCORECARDS .................... . 191 
6.4.1 Personal Ownership .................................................................................................................... . 
191 
6.4.2 Robustness ofScorecards into the Usage Stage .......................................................................... 
195 
6.4.3 Usefulness of Computer Based Performance Management System ........................................... 
198 
6.4.4 Practitioner Implications Emergingfrom Deployment Phase .................................................. . 
202 
CHAPTER 7 SCORECARD USAGE ........................................................................................................... . 
204 
7.1 USAGE POSITIONING .......................................................................................................................... . 
204 
7.2 ENGAGING WITH THE CO-PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................ . 
204 
7.3 INITIAL INSIGHT INTO PRACTITIONER ENGAGEMENT .......................................................................... . 
205 
7.4 THREE MONTHS INTO BSC USAGE .................................................................................................... . 
229 
7.5 NINE MONTHS INTO B SC USAGE ....................................................................................................... . 
242 
CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS ................................................................................................. 
259 
8.1 CONTRIBUTION - How THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE HAS BEEN ExPANDED ........................................ 
259 
8.1.1 Lessons to be Learned (Strategic Alignment and the Centrally Deployed PMS) ....................... 
260 
8.1.2 The Impact of a Centralised PMS on Front Line Managers ...................................................... 
262 
8.1.3 How Managers Rationalise the Performance Environment ....................................................... 
263 
8.1.4 Resulting Emotional and Behavioural Reactions ....................................................................... 
265 
8.1.5 Motivation to Improve Performance ........................................................................................... 
270 
8.1.6 How Managers Rationalised Performance Improvements ......................................................... 
271 
8.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE ............................................................................................................. 
272 
8. ZI The Impact of Previous Experiences ........................................................................................... 
273 
8.2.2 Embedding Accountability and Ownership In a Centralised PMS ............................................. 274 
8.3 GUIDELINES FOR ORGANISATIONS ...................................................................................................... 
279 
CHAPTER9 BRINGING MY RESEARCH TO A CONCLUSION . ................................................................. 
286 
9.1 REVISITING THE RESEARCH ANS ....................................................................................................... 
286 
9.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH - ADVANCEMENT OF PRACTITIONER PRACTICE ........ 
287 
9.3 ADVANCING MY OWN PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE ................................................................................ 
290 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................................... 291 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1- The Multiple Dimensions Of Quality, Time, Cost And Flexibility .................................................... 45 Table 2- Characteristics Of Performance Measures ......................................................................................... 46 Table 3- Critical Dimensions Of Performance .................................................................................................. 47 
Table 4- Typology For The Evaluation Of Strategic PM Development Approaches .................................. .. 48 Table 5- Trade-Off-Concept ............................................................................................................................. .. 52 Table 6- Overview Of Important Behavioural Factors .................................................................................. .. 70 Table 7- Emotional And Behavioural Traits Emerging From Performance Literature .............................. .. 74 Figure 1 -The Performance Environment ....................................................................................................... .. 80 Table 8- Individual Coding Profile ................................................................................................................... 107 
Table 9- Primary Data Collection Methods ..................................................................................................... 115 
Figure 2- Coding Template ............................................................................................................................... 124 Figure 3- Coding Etiquette ................................................................................................................................ 127 Figure 4- Coding Example (Patterns And Themes) ........................................................................................ 128 
Figure 5- Coding Learning Curve . ................................................................................................................... 130 Figure 6- Royal Mail Scorecard Engagement ................................................................................................. 133 
Table 10 - The Delivery Unit Scorecard ........................................................................................................... 134 
Table 11 - Shareholder Scorecard ..................................................................................................................... 135 
Table 12 - Customer Scorecard ......................................................................................................................... 136 
Table 13 - Employee Scorecard ......................................................................................................................... 136 
Table 14 - Identification Of Unit Kpi Tasks ..................................................................................................... 138 
Figure 7- Usage & Impacts Of Fixes/Actions ................................................................................................... 188 
Figure 8- Delayed FTD Impact ......................................................................................................................... 252 
Figure 9- The Behavioural And Emotional Impact On The Performance Environment ............................ 266 
Figure 10 - Accountability And Ownership Curve .......................................................................................... 277 
Figure 11 - Quality Improvement Process Wheel ............................................................................................. 338 
Figure 12 - Royal Mail Business Excellence Model .......................................................................................... 340 
Figure 13 - Integrated Product Pipeline ............................................................................................................ 342 
Figure 14 - Post Office Management Model (Pomm) ...................................................................................... 343 
APPENDICES 
I Behavioural Statement 305 
2 Confidentiality Statement 306 
3 Interview Schedule 307 
4 Bi Monthly Survey 310 
5 57 Reasons To Work With Maxqda2 314 
6 Initial Performance Gaps And Movement Table 318 
7 Organisational Root Cause Analysis (RCA) Sheet 319 
8 UPB Usage And Impact Table 320 
9 Organisational Unit Planning Tool 321 
10 Organisational Unit BSC 322 
11 Deployed RCA And Unit BSC 323 
12 Survey Results 327 
13 Leeds Suitability For Deployment Review Outcome 328 
(March 16th 2001) 
14 Evaluation Into Managers Previous Experiences Of 330 
Performance Measurement 1988-2001 
15 Paper Presented At The Third International Conference 345 
On Performance Measurement, 17-19 July 2002 
6 
PREFACE 
As a researcher and practitioner, it soon became apparent that the field I was entering 
contained very few previous investigations undertaken from the perspective of those being 
measured from which to draw. In developing my own conceptual understanding, I initially 
found myself drawn to the work of a number of prominent researchers. I would like to offer 
my profound thanks to these individuals, as their work has been influential in nurturing and 
developing my own practitioner understanding and approach, as well as providing a valuable 
grounding for my own research. 
Firstly, I would like to thank the University of Cambridge research group, whose extensive 
research and publications, provided me with a good grounding in performance management 
and understanding underpinning my research (Neely, et al., 1994; Neely et al., 1995; Neely, et 
aL, 1997; Neely et al., 2000; Neely 1999; Bourne 1999; Neely and Bourne 2000). 
Secondly, I wish to my supervisors, whose support, guidance and encouragement enabled me 
to publish a joint paper, which I presented at the Third International Conference on 
Performance Measurement and Management (See footnote 1). 1 entered the conference 
confused and isolated but left focused and inspired by Andre de Waal's (2002a) paper titled 
"The role of behavioural factors in the successful implementation and use of performance 
management systems ". 
Footnote (1) The initial ideas, quotations and subsequent findings from the investigations undertaken in the third level of 
engagement sequentially influenced a joint journal article (Baughan et al., 2002) and conference presentation undertaken by 
myself and one of my supervisors in Boston, USA. After a significant degree of reflection and discussions with my 
supervisors, I feel it has been necessary to entwine key elements of the paper into the fabric of this thesis. I have then 
expanded these to build on the papers' findings to provide a greater degree and depth of analysis and interpretation that was 
not possible in the original paper. Please refer to Appendix 15 for a copy of the paper in question. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In February 2001, as part of my role as a senior operational manager for Royal Mail Letters, I 
was required to implement a nationally devised unit Balanced Scorecard (BSQ within an 
operational sector, which consisted of 17 individual delivery units. Prior to this deployment, 
national and area functional (processing, delivery and distribution) scorecards comprising three 
measurement dimensions (shareholder, customer and employee) had been in use for 
approximately two years, during which time key performance indicators (KPIs) had been 
identified and standardised. To support the final stage of downward deployment within the 
organisation, a small number of national unit trials across the country were undertaken during 
2000. As a result of the trials, the deployment of centrally (nationally) imposed associated 
targets and measures at a delivery unit level commenced in both my own and other delivery 
sectors. 
In adopting what is considered a staged approach, Royal Mail believed that the BSC would not 
only have been suitably tested and embedded at both national and area levels, but would also 
have been evaluated and adjusted prior to cascading into the lower frontline operational units. 
It was envisaged that the resulting standardisation would provide a direct line of sight across 
the various organisational scorecard layers, thereby linking stakeholder goals to objectives, 
targets and vital actions. Consequently, not only would unit managers be in a position to 
understand more fully the organisational strategy, but also their own involvement, from which 
individuals would be better able to actively prioritise and focus appropriate actions against 
underperforming KPIs. As part of the closure of these gaps, individuals were required to 
implement a number of mandatory national projects, most notably the Fit To Deliver project - 
requiring fundamental changes to indoor working practices, underpinned by either area or local 
initiatives to close any outstanding areas of underperformance. 
The observational research covered a period of ten months and adopted a longitudinal case 
study approach, focusing on the delivery strand of the scorecard, with both the processing and 
distribution scorecards remaining outside the scope of the research undertaken. During this 
timeframe, emphasis was placed on my role as senior manager and on the other delivery 
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managers who reported to me, regarding their initial exposure to and deployment of the 
scorecard, along with its use in eight of the seventeen delivery units. Through a process of 
collaborative inquiry, this study aimed to: understand how managers reacted to and were able 
to engage with a new performance measurement system (PMS) based on the BSC; and to 
establish the behaviours which may contribute to or hinder the way in which the BSC was 
understood, accepted and used. The research concluded by reviewing the theoretical 
contributions made and by presenting the acquired practitioner knowledge in the form of 
implementation guidelines for organisations to follow. 
To gain an in-depth understanding of the research background and to better understand the 
previous experiences of the co-participants' encounters with centrally imposed PMS, 
Appendix 14 reviews the shifting focus of the performance management methods applied 
within Royal Mail between 1989 and 2000. It is possible from these discussions to extract the 
degree to which these approaches have been successful and in turn adequately prepared 
individuals for a new unit BSC level approach. 
A key element of the research involved an extensive review of the researcher's own personal 
development, in addition to identifying an appropriate research framework through a literature 
review. Based upon this model, an evaluation was undertaken to establish how the researcher 
and his managers reacted and engaged with the scorecard and its associated KPIs, with the 
primary focus placed upon the interactions with each other during the period of co-participant 
observation. 
My initial readings revealed a research field that contained limited previous empirical research 
investigations. As both a researcher and a practitioner, there was an awareness that an 
engagement at this level posed extreme implications regarding the research design. The 
researcher therefore needed to also acknowledge his responsibilities and accountabilities 
towards the organisation, research participants and the generation of practitioner and 
theoretical knowledge. Throughout the research, the application of a cyclical process of 
participative engagement ensured that nothing and no one was compromised. This cyclical 
process enabled the necessary adjustments for the research and thereby provided a positive 
10 
enviromnent and basis for others to follow. The following sections explore the author's 
position, identifying the urgent need for further exploration within this research area, and 
providing an overview of any emerging research issues. This overview also includes a 
breakdown of the research questions under investigation. 
1.1 Research Issue - Organisational Barriers and Emerging Research Focus 
At the same time as the scorecard deployment, I was required to amalgamate one other smaller 
Leeds Delivery sector consisting of seven units into my existing sector to produce a larger 
sector of seventeen units to be under my control. This change in structure, together with a 
number of new managers moving into the sector, generated a number of psychological and 
perceptual barriers. I had already encountered these issues in my current and previous 
management teams, and was therefore aware and sensitive to these facts. 
During discussions held with both sets of managers in the lead up to the scorecards' 
deployment (in January 2001), it became clear that individuals' previous experiences or 
engagement with a structured performance management approach had at times been unfocused 
and disjointed, with different performance measurement styles and approaches applied across 
sectors and units. Previous projects and improvement initiatives in Royal Mail had generated 
criticisms and comments during informal discussions, with some team members asking "will it 
change anything? - or claiming "here we go again anotherflavour of the month project ". 
I found myself wondering whether any differing reactions from other managers would present 
themselves, where it was reasoned that perhaps such managers may see any extra work as 
simply distracting them from what they perceived as their day job. On the other hand, would 
they see new opportunities to engage in a standard approach to support them in the 
achievement of their operational task? Questions such as these have continually intrigued me 
over the last twelve years, forming the basis for the majority of the assignments undertaken as 
an undergraduate and MBA with a specific focus applied to the researcher's MBA thesis. (See 
footnote 2 overleaf). 
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Upon commencement of the DBA, my decision was to maintain the same level of focus, 
integrity and involvement. Issues such as available time, access to data and focusing on and 
incorporating the key aspects of both personal and team management practices into the 
research subject became paramount considerations. 
I felt that by following this philosophy, professional practice could be advanced in order to 
support and improve the lives and level of understanding of those involved in or influenced by 
the research. Applying this approach also enabled the close alignment to Dulmanis et al's., 
(1999: 1) criteria for collaborative and applied DBA research through involving what they 
prescribe as four key stakeholders: "organisational sponsor, research practitioner and 
participants - and the wider "scientific community ". 
In reality it was this advancement and sharing of knowledge between stakeholders involved in 
the research as well as being provided with a unique opportunity to move beyond the 
traditionally theoretical based academic PhD's that made the DBA programme appealing. 
This provided me with a level of research legitimisation in relation to its usefulness and 
application at both a practitioner and organisational level where the DBA is recognised as 
being well suited to emerging management research and practitioner pressures that 
undoubtedly surface or diversify in organisational settings. My own practitioner experiences 
support these complexities in a number of inter linked dimensions. - 
The issue of legitimising my own research initially caused me some considerable problems. 
As a senior manager in Royal Mail, one of my key responsibilities is the alignment of clearly 
defined measures linked to objectives imposed by the organisation on my management team. 
As a newly promoted Sector Operations Manager (SOM) in Bournemouth back in October 
1997,1 soon became aware of the importance and impact of performance measurement 
through performance reviews. These reviews were conducted with the author's senior 
manager, as well as with subordinate managers. As time progressed, I became increasingly 
frustrated with the 
(Footnote 2) The author's MBA thesis titled; 'An Evaluation on the Effectiveness of the MIPP process within Royal Mail to 
Change the Internal Culture and Reduce Dysfunctional Conflict', submitted in April 1996 - initiated an underlying interest in 
cultural and psychological issues relevant to management practice. 
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inconsistencies found in its application and focus across the business, and increasing diversity 
of unfocused measurement dimensions. It quickly became apparent that this continually 
changed depending on the emergence of influences exerted by a dominant function, process or 
individual that in turn nurtured a spectrum of emotional and behavioural reactions. In 
retrospect, this was the starting point of my interest in the subject -I found myself continually 
asking why these reactions occurred, and what could be done to limit their emergence or 
indeed effect on individuals and teams as a whole? 
This situation continually frustrated managers and limited the level of influence or impact we 
were able to exert in our own operational areas. It appeared that the business had no 
conceptualisation, or indeed realisation of the adverse impact of dysfunctional behaviours or 
psychological reactions, that could emerge in a changing and at times threatening and 
confusing environment (Baughan, 1996). Between 1997 and 1998, my ability to mitigate these 
effects was severely limited due to local pressures applied from senior management 
colleagues. Considerations such as functional barriers and personalities worryingly surfaced 
across what was clearly a large defensively focused and tuned network structure. I found 
myself continually reflecting on and trying to change a situation that continued until my 
transfer to the north of England in December 1998. 
On arrival in my new operational area in Huddersfield (January 1999), the same problems with 
a lack of standardisation of performance management and functional conflict were still 
evident. This provided further evidence of inconsistencies and variation of approaches in the 
business. This problematic issue continued within the author's management team for a fin-ther 
year. In February 2000,1 saw the trial of a standardised unit scorecard across the organisation 
as a major opportunity that would support the alignment and management of clear objectives 
and targets in my own operational area. This also provided an opportune vehicle to research 
how managers reacted to the standardisation and focus offered by the scorecard. It was felt 
that my long'and frustrating exposure to inconsistencies; functional conflict and lack of 
standardisation were finally nearing an end. This was my initial research vehicle. The ability 
to engage in this trial however soon developed problems. I was severely restricted by being 
unable to gain agreement from the national project managers for my units to be involved in or 
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engage with the new approach. This was because my own operational units were not included 
in the nationally agreed list of trial sites. 
Perceptions and political barriers developed amongst some project managers. The view here 
was that involvement of non-supervised trial units could potentially jeopardise the success of 
the approach in the agreed trial sites. Certain confidential channels also informed the author 
that some people saw me as a potential threat that might uncover issues that could jeopardise 
the national project by identifying problems that might be difficult to resolve. I also was in a 
position to ask potentially difficult or uncomfortable questions. 
This setback was extremely challenging and frustrating, delaying my ability to initiate any 
level of engagement with the very personal and emotional subject area under pursuit. At the 
time, the reaction of the national team was surprising. This was my first officially sponsored 
role, where it was necessary to focus on a particular issue or account for the studies undertaken 
and provide updates regarding how the studies were progressing. I felt that my involvement in 
the trials would be a good opportunity to link my studies to a major change initiative as well as 
provide some level of payback for the funding received. This initiative however, failed to 
reach any substantially helpful outputs. To complicate the issue further, I subsequently 
experienced three managerial role changes (between July 2000 and February 2001) until 
settling into the larger Leeds SOM role I still currently held. Upon reflection, I can now see 
that the problems I experienced with not being allowed to participate in the trial, alongside my 
subsequent managerial changes, unintentionally supported my current research interest. 
The period between March 2000 and February 2001 when I was able to commence the 
introduction of the BSC into my own units provided a unique opportunity not always available 
to researchers from outside organisations. My closeness and ability to assess relevant 
published documentation and to interview key strategic policy makers from within the 
organisation enabled the opportunity to develop and test my own level of understanding of the 
progression of the performance management trials prior to its implementation across the 
business in February 2001. This was a productive period, as it enabled me as discussed in 
appendix 14 to review previous performance management approaches applied to the business. 
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This opportunity also meant that behavioural and emotional assumptions derived from the 
emerging trial unit scorecard before its deployment and subsequent actual use were tested. 
1.2 Research Focus - Improving Practice 
Importantly, with the completion of the trials in December 2000, the business urgently 
required the deployment of the scorecard to the remaining delivery units over the 2 months 
leading up to the 2001 fmancial year commencing in April 2001. This deployment formed the 
key foundation and ensured that performance improvements could be realised across all units 
over the coming year. My own engagement in the process was unrestricted and compulsory, 
forming one of my key personal objectives for the coming year, and therefore finally 
legitimised my chosen direction from an organisational perspective. I felt that this provided a 
fundamental and uniquely focused opportunity to link personal professional practice and self- 
development with the wider team through the implementation and use of the scorecard. This 
was discussed with my line manager and team members who thankfully (in January 2001), 
sanctioned the applied cooperative nature of the research to be pursued over the following ten 
months. 
From the discussions undertaken in appendix 14,1 concluded that this would not be a simple 
process. Managers within Royal Mail had become increasingly aware of performance inter- 
relationships, having encountered various forms of PMSs in what is recognised as a large 
multi-functional network structure. From this, I was able to anticipate that the following 
organisational barriers would emerge: 
Despite this exposure, problems already existed regarding managers' understanding, 
acceptance and ability to use PMSs which were essentially viewed as being centrally 
imposed upon them. 
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> Previous attempts at deployment alongside my own encountered experiences implied 
that this was a recurring problem affecting Royal Mail's sustained use of such systems 
within its management structure. 
1.3 Research Aims 
The investigation undertaken aimed to understand why managers react as they do when 
exposed to performance managements systems, and through the adoption of an action inquiry 
methodology, the research conducted (over a sustained period) attempted to encourage a more 
positive outcome amongst my own managerial team. This would be achieved by exploring the 
encounter from the perspective of these managers actually responsible for optimising the unit 
based BSC. 
The aims of the research therefore were: 
> To gain a deeper understanding as to how front line managers perceive and react to a 
new performance measurement system (PMS) based on the BSC. 
> To establish those progressive attitudes and behaviours that may contribute to, or 
hinder the way in which the BSC is understood, accepted and used by managers. 
> To provide guidance in the form of recommended development guidelines for 
organisations to follow regarding the sustainable use of a BSC at a front line unit level. 
1.3.1 Positioning of Current Theory and Practice 
As an operational manager, the virtue of adopting a portfolio of integrated performance 
measures (or balanced scorecard as prescribed by Kaplan and Norton, 1992), makes sense in 
the management of any team. Kaplan and Norton (1992) focus on the use of scorecards, as a 
means to pursue performance improvements, arguing that a balance of both financial and non- 
financial measures is necessary. The scorecard is designed to pull people toward the overall 
vision needs to be achieved. 
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It is recognised that the desire to move individuals towards this state of awareness and 
engagement has clear behavioural ramifications, if deployment is to be achieved (Dinesh and 
Palmer, 1998). Within the scorecards' development, Kaplan and Norton (1992) recognised the 
need to move away from the adverse controlling association between previous performance 
measurement systems and behaviours. This implied that the scorecard nurtured a more 
positive inter-relationship and engagement by replacing the more common rigid controlling 
approach to managing actions and behaviours with what the authors saw as a more goal- 
oriented approach linked to an organisation's 'strategy and vision. The proposition 
reaffirming the balanced scorecard's potential mechanism to support and underpin strategic 
and cultural change is still very much at the forefront of a theoretical debate pursued by Kaplan 
and Norton (2000). 
In reading Kaplan and Norton's (1992) paper, the following three assumptions forwarded by 
the authors proved to be especially interesting, and provide the strategic level of focus 
regarding the controlling influence exerted by the BSC on the behaviours of managers that this 
research aims to answer: 
"Yhe scorecardputs strategy and vision not control at the centre. It establishes goals but 
assumes that people will adopt whatever behaviours and take whatever actions are 
necessary to arrive at those goals " (Kaplan and Norton 1992: 79). 
"Yhe scorecard forces managers to focus on the handful of measures that are most 
critical" (Kaplan and Norton 1992: 73) 
"Managers understand, at least implicitly, many interrelationships" (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992: 79). 
While these statements make sense and are appealing to academics, senior managers and 
strategists, it would seem that they are not always successful when directly applied in an 
organisational context or living situation. In my early examination of the literature strong 
evidence emerged that both supports this consideration and underpins my own experiences and 
chosen research direction in a number of specific areas. 
My own DBA studies and professional practice had nurtured an understanding of the 
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importance and benefits to be derived from performance management. It has also increasingly 
raised my awareness from the literature that the vast majority of performance measurement 
implementations (Lewy cited in McCunn, 1998; Neely and Bourne 2000; Bourne et al., 2002; 
fail or are limited in their 'effectiveness or expectations' (Schneiderman 1999). This confirms 
my own experiences with PMS. The level of organisational and theoretical objectivity and 
awareness of existing and recurring problems in relation to performance management is open 
to a degree of critical reflection. Fisher (1998) for example, focuses on the work of KPMG 
Management Consulting who criticised organizations for continually making the same 
mistakes in scorecard implementation. This level of condemnation does not reside solely in 
the practitioner domain and extends into academia, where Huczynski (cited in Holloway, 
2000: 7) indicates that there is a "lack of examination or critique of past failures and 
successes, and dismissal of theoretical ideas ". 
In trying to bring substance and meaning to this debate, a level of focus has evolved in recent 
literature and research circles in trying to unravel and understand why these problems exist in 
performance management. In particular, the following two prominent themes have emerged. 
Firstly, practitioner and academic knowledge has remained in the system design, deployment 
and implementation stages of performance measurement (Neely et al., 1995,1997,2000 and 
Bourne et al., 2000), with limited exploration over time, into its actual use by managers. 
Importantly for this research, the level of focus nurtured a number of comprehensive reviews 
of the literature on measurement design, leading to Neely et al's., (1997) measurement design 
framework and Hudson et al's., (200 1: 1100) later classification of the 'critical characteristics 
ofperformance measures'. These publications help provide a comprehensive understanding of 
underlying concepts, frameworks and most importantly, areas of performance conflict, 
misunderstandings and lack of research - particularly as they relate to the actual use of 
scorecards after their implementation. 
Secondly as a practicing operational manager who has experienced performance measurement 
at a number of different levels, the impact of measurement on individuals and resulting 
behaviours increasingly emerged in my initial literature searches as a consideration deemed as 
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important in the use of performance management systems. From these sources, a number of 
identifiable factors I consider important have been identified. 
Lipe and Salterio (2000: 284) investigated MBA students in a case study experiment to assess 
the 'cognitive difficulty' experienced by some managers in using the BSC, concluding that 
managers tended to be drawn to using 'common' financial and lagging measures at the demise 
of 'unique' non financial or leading indicators of performance. Importantly the authors 
recognised the linkages between individual's psychological reaction, decision making process 
and 'task characteristics' with the research participants performance assessments reverting to 
the basic use of financial and lagging measures to the detriment of the unique leading and non 
financial measures. The authors concluded that this level of decision-making and cognitive 
differences between individuals could result in varying degrees of use of the performance 
management system. In this instance, the strategic balance of the scorecard will therefore be 
diminished, as organisations will not see the emergence or realisation of the 'expected benefits 
ofBSC'deployment. 
Using research methods of qualitative interviews and questionnaires, Malina and Selto (2000) 
also evaluated the effectiveness of the BSC within a large international organisation. . The 
research concluded that the degree of 'positive outcomes' obtained from the BSC were 
attributable to the effectiveness of the applied approach as a controlling framework. More 
importantly, the authors supported their findings through the proposition that ýpositive 
outcomes' were more likely to occur when, employees were motivated and their behaviour 
aligned to strategy. Malina and Selto (2000: 72) also concluded that individuals "did not object 
to tough, but attainable goals. " This implies that achievability and relevance, in what is 
recognised as a controlling environment, can be dominant factors in nurturing a positive 
psychological contract in relation to the perceived accountability of individuals towards 
performance objectives. 
At the time of my investigation, only a limited amount of research had explored the 
behavioural ramifications of these interactions. A noticeable exception is the work of De Waal 
(2002a, 2002b) who by putting forward a valuable case study, provided insight into 18 
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positive behavioural factors, all of which were considered to be important in the development 
and subsequent use of a performance management system. 
1.3.2 How The Research Will Contribute To Theoretical And Practitioner Knowledge 
The impact of these considerations will be further analysed through a critical analysis as this 
thesis develops. However at this stage, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
findings offer a fundamental focus providing a basis for my own evolutionary understanding. 
The more I read and engaged with the author's findings and reflected upon my personal 
experiences as a manager, the more it seemed that PMS and behaviours were linked. In 
essence, I felt that these two closely interlinked factors provided the organisational and 
psychological binding between design, deployment and implementation through initial use and 
more importantly the continued use of PMS by managers. 
Having felt that something within the available research frameworks was amiss, I often 
reflected upon my pervious experiences of performance management and therefore re-visited 
existing literature. Although the existing research had offered a direction to follow in the form 
of De Waal (2002a, 2002b) it only seemed to provide a detached and superficial case study 
perspective. This was due to what I believe to be the adoption of a 180-degree inward view in 
relation to the researcher (who is not part of the change encounter) drawing and reflecting 
upon the experiences of others from an outside vantage point. I realised, that in order to 
achieve a greater degree of validity, an ongoing and integral account of the changing reactions 
and feelings of those practitioners experiencing the PMS change was necessary. 
Consequently, I accepted that I had to broaden my approach in order to achieve a reverse effect 
with regard an outwardly focused 180-degree practitioner interpretation. This would then draw 
upon the changing perceptions and experiences of a number of managerial co-participants as 
they would be exposed to and required to use the centrally imposed BSC. I consider the 
adoption of such an approach critical, as it provides what I realise is an increasingly robust and 
valuable 360-degree practitioner world-view to the research environment encountered. 
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Adopting this approach provides a number of important theoretical and practitioner 
opportunities: 
> Firstly, to test existing theoretical ideas by undertaking a cross-examination of 
current literature and concepts from which it is possible to re-evaluate and expand 
upon both the positive and negative human (behavioural and emotional) 
dimensions of PMSs. 
> Secondly, by applying the theoretical and practitioner knowledge gained. The 
research aims through the contribution offered by the co-participants to build upon 
managerial practice, developing a practical working framework, which will enable 
organisations to both understand and envisage likely behavioural and emotional 
reactions to a PMS. 
Use of this model devised from and tested in actual practice will prove invaluable. As it will 
not only allow managers to identify and therefore react to areas of probable negativity, but also 
allow them to encourage and endorse the more positive aspects. 
1.3.3 The Importance and Role of the Co-Participant 
The real problem I now found myself facing centred squarely in the realms of identifying any 
previous research applied at this level, as well as finding support for research in the 
methodological direction under pursuit. Initial answers to these questions were first needed, if 
both theory and practice were to be extended and tested and knowledge (beyond the existing 
criticisms and boundaries) was to be exposed. In trying to bring meaning and objectivity to 
these issues I found myself drawn to Holloways' (2000: 13) assertion regarding the lack of 
research in this field, in particular her reflection that: 
"More challenging questions about the interests served byperformance measurement, 
and the potentialfor unintended impacts on behaviour, surface rarely even among the 
academic community". 
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This was not the only identifiable criticism that influenced my initial realisation of the current 
state and lack of research. There exists an emerging prominence in research circles regarding 
the argument for the progression of practitioner and academic knowledge in a number of 
different behavioural dimensions and directions. Neely et al., (2000: 113 1) for example support 
Holloway's (2000) argument for research in this area and provide an informative and 
descriptive view regarding the problems facing performance measurement, practitioners and 
researchers through their view that: 
"The real challenges for managers come once they have developed their robust 
measurement system, for then they must implement the measures. As soon as they seek 
to do so, they encounterfear, politics and subversion. Individuals begin to worry that 
the measures might expose their shortcomings. Differentpeople seek to undermine the 
credibility of the measures in different ways. Some seek to game the system. Others 
seek to prevent it ever being implemented" Research into these issues, and 
particularly how they can be addressed is much needed". 
The practitioner engagement applied to this research will undoubtedly encounter some or all of 
the dysfunctional issues highlighted by Neely et al., (2000) and as such seeks to provide 
answers to how they emerge, as well as how they can be managed. In pursuing this goal, a 
number of important considerations need to be included, particularly in the realms of 
understanding why these emotional and behavioural interactions occur at the level of the 
measurer, and more importantly for those being measured. In a similar context Boume et al., 
(2000: 759) provides what I feel is a further useful insight at an organisational context, where a 
director reflects on the behavioural problems associated with individuals interacting with 
measures: 
"Aere are two real problems with im lementing the measures. Yhe first was getting p 
the management tofeel happy with the measures. It is easy tofeel threatened by them 
and they needed to be persuaded that it was good for the business and not a 
threatening activity. Yhe measures should help them and not hinder them in their task 
This was the main obstacle". 
The discussions positioned have provided a logical grounding into the problems associated 
with measurement and support a strong argument for research into the behavioural impact of 
measurement, but the progression and level of research into this important area as previously 
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discussed is open to criticism (Holloway, 2000). We can also be ask, what benefit would an 
organisation or indeed a consultant gain through hanging out its dirty washing or past failures? 
This realisation could, to some extent explain Bourne et al., (2000: 759) citation of Demings' 
(1986) earlier criticism against which it was commented that resistance to measurement is 
rarely made available for publication. These criticisms provide the researcher with empirical 
support for the argument that little advancement in this academic or practitioner field has been 
achieved since Demings' (1986) original proposition. This view clearly underpins both Neely 
et al's., (2000) research consideration and Holloway's (2000: 3 1) fifth recommendation where 
she positions "taking the critical agendaforward, " through her suggestion that: 
"Research which looks at performance measurement from the perspective of the 
measured rather than the measurers, and seeks to understand the limits or extent to 
which common interests can be pursued through careful performance measurement 
design or other enabling mechanisms 
It is clear from both authors' comments that there is a level of commonality and direct linkage 
between the two suggested research statements. This linkage provides further legitimisation for 
my chosen research direction and areas of investigation. Any interaction of this nature will 
clearly require a significant level of practitioner involvement and engagement at varying levels 
in the research process, which (due to its unique focus), does not come without a level of risk. 
This view is adequately supported in the literature through a recognition by Bourne et al., 
(2000: 759) that any studies involving researching levels of resistance to performance 
measurement will undoubtedly be complex and 'difficult to observe' as "resisting individuals 
will take care to conceal their actions ". Neely et al., (2000) point out that any research of such 
an intrusive and at times politically sensitive focus will encounter levels of political and 
operational reluctance, as well as cultural resistance to either participate in or communicate 
any research findings. As a practitioner, these pressures initially affected my ability to engage 
in my chosen research direction and on reflection, go some way to explain why Demings' 
(1986) criticisms for the lack of published research is still a relevant one. This suggestion 
would underpin De Toni and Tonchia's (2001) view that the main academic and practitioner 
focus and research has remained within the domain of case studies and surveys. This criticism 
has been addressed above, in relation to existing research in the behavioural studies available. 
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We might expect that the literature would readily include significant references regarding the 
adverse effects of deployment of Balanced Scorecards. This however is not the case. Goulin 
and Mersereau (2000: 49) suggest that the focus of the literature has been significantly 
weighted away from trying to identify the issues that might arise, preferring to focus instead on 
explaining the process to be followed, as well as successes and advantages to be gained by 
organisations through introducing BSCs. As part of the debate, the authors discussed what 
they saw as problems associated with the development of case studies, which they suggest in 
the majority of instances involves 'collaboration between the authors and consultants who 
installed the system'. This led the authors to 'raise the question of objectivity. 
This raises an interesting debate. Who is the main beneficiary in relation to the implementation 
of a new PMS? Is it the consultant who has deployed a system gaining another successfid 
deployment to his/her CV, but moves on without seeing through its actual use, or is it the 
managers who are left with something that does not work? I must admit I was not surprised to 
see that McCunn (1998) focused on this very issue indicating that this problem is very much 
an area in need of consideration. As a practitioner, the question of objectivity as it applied to 
my own organisation is an issue I originally discussed as part of my MBA studies and more 
recently encountered through the drive to deepen understanding through further research. As 
practitioners and consultants (both internally and externally), we need to break away from the 
perception that once a project or model is deployed we have been successful and can tick a box 
and move onto other things with little or no realisation, or indeed time put aside to understand 
the consequences of its actual use. We need to ask 'why did this happenT and 'what can I do 
to resolve iff 
The discussions so far have demonstrated that there is a distinct lack of academic and 
practitioner understanding or knowledge of the positive and negative effects or influences, 
measures have on either the measurer or those individuals being measured in any BSC 
implementation. As practitioners, we could defend ourselves by claiming a level of 
unawareness of the situation. This is not a unique and singular viewpoint. Tipping (1998, 
2000: 8) further develops the debate through a simple message for practitioners to reflect upon 
through his suggestion that: 
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"Much of the benefits to be derived from performance measurement systems is from 
going through the process and evaluating the feedback from the users. Yhe clear 
message is 'Just do it"' 
It makes sense that until we fully understand why these past failures or successes develop and 
react to the feedback of those actively involved in the process of measurement we will be 
destined to have limited success in imbedding or ensuring any actual successful 
implementation of performance measurement. 
1.4. Research Structure - Engaging the Co-Participants 
As previously discussed, the purpose of the research undertaken is to provide a practitioner 
based understanding of the extent to which eight research participants and myself can, through 
a process of collaborative inquiry, behaviourally and emotionally engage with and work within 
the unit scorecard and associated KPI's over a 10 month period. This would provide a 
valuable and uniquely positioned practitioner based view of the research undertaken. In order 
to achieve this end state, three levels of inquiry are followed utilising internal documents, 
group and individual discussions, personal reflections as well as multi-methods of data 
collection (taped interviews, questionnaires, facilitated focus groups). 
The aim of the cycles was to understand the emergence of functional and dysfunctional 
emotional and behavioural issues as prescribed by Bourne et aL, (2000) and Neely et d, 
(2000) and to assess how they impacted on the research issue under investigation. The 
reflections and experiences from these interactions are assessed in terms of their effectiveness 
at both an operational and personal setting, with fin-ther adjustments and iterations of change 
and evaluation undertaken. The research group initially comprised of the senior manager (i. e. 
the author) and seventeen unit managers as research participants to cover the initial exploration 
of individuals' understanding of the BSC and measurement dimensions. As the research 
progressed into the actual usage of the scorecard, the level of co-participant involvement was 
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reduced to eight unit managers. The process of integration between the different levels of 
engagement in the cyclical process takes the following format: 
The first level of investigation is descriptive in nature, exploring my own personal 
development, the identification of the research problem, and my subsequent exposure to and 
evaluation of key literature and gaps in existing academic and theoretical knowledge, from 
which a suitable research framework was developed and discussed. 
The second level of inquiry focuses on the actual deployment, implementation and use of the 
unit scorecard with a particular emphasis upon understanding the degree to which, over time, 
individuals can work with (and are influenced or affected by) both the scorecard and its KPIs. 
In progressing on this route, a number of mutually interlinked sub levels of investigation are 
considered: 
The initial stage in the engagement is both exploratory and reflective in nature, 
focusing on initial perceptions and worries of the seventeen managers (in 
February 2001), as they were exposed to the pending unit scorecard and 
associated KPI's prior to attending a deployment workshop in March 2001. 
The identified outputs were then re-evaluated in relation to the degree that these 
concerns were either realised or misconceived, as managers progressed through 
the workshop and into the implementation of personal scorecards and KPI 
targets across delivery units in April 2001. At this stage, it was deemed 
necessary to recruit a core of eight research participants, from the original 
seventeen staff members. This was due to lack of available time, work 
constraints and an uneasiness from some co-participants to continue in what 
was soon realised by certain individuals as a very personal and self reflective 
experience, which some found increasingly uncomfortable. The eight 
volunteers ultimately enabled and supported a greater degree and depth of 
analysis as the research participants and I jointly moved into the final stages of 
the research. 
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At this level of focus we critically explored and reflected upon the actual daym- 
to-day use of the personal scorecards and related KPIs, focusing on the 
emerging experiences and concerns of the eight research co-participants and 
myself over a six-month period. The timeframe under observation in this phase 
covered the period from April 2001 until January 2002. 
The third level of engagement reviews the effectiveness of the scorecard and KPI's over 
the ten-month period. Attention here focuses on how perceptions, emotions and 
experiences changed over the period under observation, the extent to which the initial 
concerns had been realised. I also address the level and intensity of practitioner 
engagement with the KPIs achieved. 
The research investigation concludes with a critical assessment of the identified research 
findings at three levels: academic and organisational, researcher and co-participants, and 
reflection on and discussion as to how these experiences have contributed to and 
influenced the advancement of theoretical and practitioner understanding within and 
between the different levels of applied engagement and knowledge. Recommendations for 
further research are then discussed, in light of the obtained findings. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction -A Positioning Overview 
An early examination of the literature has revealed that little has been written about the current 
research field. Indeed I was venturing into an area that had not been exposed to any extensive 
exploration at either a practitioner or academic level. This observation has been supported in 
the previous section in two specific areas. Firstly, a clear recognition exists within academia 
that limited research has been undertaken concerning how managers perceive or react when 
exposed to performance measurement (Holloway 2000, Neely et aL, 2000). Secondly, the 
majority of the existing literature focuses on the design and implementation stages of 
performance measurement systems (Neely et aL, 2000), with limited exploration of the actual 
usage or indeed its impact on those who are exposed to it. As a result there appears to be a 
paucity of research in this area, where the current research initiative intends to address this gap 
in the literature 
These considerations raise important research opportunities within current practice and support 
the validity of the main research focus of this thesis, particularly if as practitioners and 
academics we reflect back on Neely et al's., (2000) comments on the dysfunctional impact of 
measurement. The authors' discussions forms a strong foundation for this research, and has 
influenced my own practitioner thinking through the attempt to understand and support other 
managers as they are exposed to a cross section of imposed balanced scorecard performance 
measures. 
As discussed earlier, the focus of this current research is specifically aimed at understanding 
how managers react to and engage with imposed measures brought about by the Balanced 
Scorecard. Initial understanding of current thinking in this field was developed through 
readings of a number of researchers at Cambridge University who have been influential in the 
performance measurement field (Bourne et aL, 2000; Neely et aL, 1994; Neely et aL, 1995; 
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Neely et al., 1997; Neely et al., 2000; Neely, 1999; Boume, 1999; Neely and Boume, 2000; 
Boume et aL, 2002). 
To nurture self-awareness I needed to understand the key concepts explored in these 
publications. These initial readings were ftirther supported by other sources from the wider 
academic and practitioner literature. The areas addressed here in particular ranged from 
positioning the relationship between strategy, performance management and measurement, and 
more specifically discussing the interrelationships and pressures between the balanced 
scorecard, performance improvements, measurement tensions and managerial behaviours. 
Having identified the initial gaps in the literature, the following sections will critically expand 
upon these issues in a number of key areas specifically as they apply to the research 
undertaken. The chapter will conclude with the positioning of a conceptual framework 
derived from the literature that will be utilised and expanded as the primary research 
progresses through cyclical processes. 
1. Literature Focus 
Strategy-Performance Management-Performance Measurement 
Dynamics ofMeasurement 
Emergence ofa Balanced Approach to Performance Management 
The Balanced Scorecard 
Impact ofMeasurement on Behaviours 
Cultural influence on behaviours 
2. Research Framework Derived from the Literature 
9 Research Framework 
Although the main focus of the literature review remains within the realms of reviewing how 
managers react to measures using the Balance Scorecard approach, the researcher is aware of the 
wider implications and ramifications of the research on other Performance Measurement 
approaches. To include all of these variants however, would dilute the critical nature of the 
review, so necessary linkages have been included in the confines of the literature and a critical 
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evaluation is included in the research conclusions, which discusses possible research 
opportunities as they impact on other literary disciplines. 
2.2. Strategy-Management-Measurement 
Both the academic and practitioner fields have extensively debated and researched the areas of 
strategy, performance management and measurement. The very nature of this focus provides a 
diversity of languages, terminologies and definitions, each of which are heavily influenced by 
numerous approaches and models (Nickols 2000). This level of complexity results in the 
emergence of widespread confusion and contradictions. Platts (1990: 5) focuses on this 
problem and argues that it is necessary to establish a level of common understanding of 
'terminologies and defmitions' as they apply in the research process and citing Sawyer (1973) 
who argues that "the important thing is not exact definition; it is to know whatyou are talking 
about". In trying to understand the role of performance measurement as applied to this current 
research initiative, it is desirable to explore and define the role of measurement within strategy 
and performance management, as it is open to varied degrees of interpretation and 
understanding. 
2.2.1 Strategy 
Although the literature within the strategy domain is diverse and varied, the following section 
solely aims to focus on strategy as a means of exploring and positioning the key elements and 
linkages as they apply throughout the different levels of an organisation. This provides a sound 
foundation upon which the subsequent review can rest upon. 
The current term 'strategy' is derived from the original Greek word 'strategia, which 
translates to 'generalship. In today's language, it simply translates into what I see as a 
detailed plan developed and deployed to overcome enemy opposition or achieve a given task 
through the alignment and provision of superior labour and resources. The conceptualisation of 
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strategy and planning can be traced to the late 1940's, where it has been supported through an 
embryonic migration into the business community, nurtured by the repetition of military 
personnel after the Second World War. The strategy and planning process has a number of 
distinctive holistic considerations that clearly focus on and support the development of 
strategic direction and deployment within current organisational. thinking. This initial 
positioning can be attributed to the work undertaken by Drucker (1954) cited in Platts (1990: 6) 
through his focus on strategy as providing the means to answering two fundamental questions: 
1) "what is our business? " and 2) "what should it be? " In other words, the former addresses 
the present situation facing the business, whilst the latter question encourages us to think about 
the future direction of the business. 
The definition provides an initial descriptive view within management practice and as such 
provides a generalised grounding of the key conceptualisation of strategy. Andrews (1980: 18- 
19) more recently however, offers a more detailed explanation through his exploration of 
strategy, where: 
"Corporate Strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and 
reveals its objectives, purposes, or goals, produces the principle policies and plansfor 
achieving those goals, and defines the range of business the company is to pursue, the 
kind of economic and human organisation it is or intends to be, and the nature of the 
economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, 
employees, customers, and communities". 
The explanation not only clearly provides both a concise and descriptive view of the strategy 
process, but also builds upon the previous statements, particularly regarding the recognition of 
the levels of complexity present in corporate strategy. This level of understanding is important 
as it provides a useful insight into the varying degrees of diversity and influences that impact 
upon the strategic process. This includes the positioning of key considerations regarding 
ýpatterns of decisions' and 'plans' suggesting a varying degree of focus and application in 
organisations. Significantly, this was an area later explored and expanded upon by Mintzberg 
(1978,1994) through his suggestion that strategy is used in different ways by organisations 
influenced by plans, patterns, positions and perspectives. It is here that strategies are 
formulated or emerge over time impacted on by what are seen as changing realities and 
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intentions. Nickol (2000: 2) supports this linkage and comments that Andrews' (1980) 
definition anticipates Mintzberg's (1978,1994) attention to 'ýpattern, plan andperspective ". 
This depth of interaction is not solely confined to a corporate level. In Andrews' (1980) 
definition, separate explanations have been used to explain the difference between Corporate 
and Business strategy. It is however significant to note that strategy penneates below these 
two discreet levels. Hofer and Schendel's (1978) earlier exploration of the hierarchy of 
strategy, supports this consideration (cited in Platts, 1990: 6 and Platts and Gregory, 1989: 6) 
where they identified three discreet strategy levels: 
Corporate Strategy What set of business should we be in? 
Business Strategy How should we compete in XYZ business? 
Functional Strategy How can the function contribute to the competitive advantage of 
the business? 
On reflection, it is interesting to see that within the definition forwarded by Andrews (1980) 
the use of goal setting and objectives form an integral element of the strategic development 
and deployment process. This therefore suggests a means by which people linkages can be 
established between the different levels. This concept receives support from two key areas in 
the literature. Firstly that measurement is an action (McCunn, 1998) which provides a line of 
sight between an organisation's strategy and its 'business unit actions' (Keegan et aL, 1989); 
and secondly that it is achieved through a consistency (Mintzberg, 1978) of decision making 
and action, supported by a series of focused measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1993) against 
which achievement can be monitored and adapted. 
Strategy formulation frameworks and models initially developed in the 1970's and 1980's by 
pioneers such as Mintzberg, (1978) and Andrews (1980), provided the initial foundations 
focusing on analysing environmental 'opportunities and threats' and internal 'strengths and 
weaknesses' in the development of strategies and their related planning processes. A key 
element of these frameworks focused on the need to explain both the goals of an organisation 
and how they planned to achieve the goals once set. Clear referrals to this original positioning 
can be noted within the definitions positioned by Andrews (1980). 
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Recently this topic has resurfaced and generated some significant interest. Neely and Adams 
(2001: 3) focus on what they see as two important issues: 1) 'derive your measures from 
strategy' and 2) 'nobody stops to question it'. The rationale behind these statements stemmed 
from the recognition by the authors that a fundamental flaw exists in current understanding and 
practice regarding strategy and performance measurement, against which the authors conclude 
that "to derive measures from strategy is to misunderstand fundamentally the purpose of 
measurement and the role of strategy". This point, is expanded through the following 
statements: 
Regarding the role of strategy: "Strategy is not about destination. Instead, it is about 
the route you choose to take - how to reach the desired destination ". 
On the purpose of measurement: 'ýperformance measures are designed to help people 
track whether they are moving in the direction they want to. They help managers 
establish whether they are going to reach the direction they set out to reach ". 
These definitions support earlier Hofer and Schendel's (1978) (cited in Platts, 1990: 6 and Platts 
and Gregory 1989: 6) earlier argument that strategy and goal setting are separate processes and 
question some of the more traditional perspectives of the linkages between strategy and 
measurement. More importantly, the quotations used by Neely and Adams (2001: 3) clearly 
recognises and builds on these considerations through demonstrating how clear line of sight 
linkages between individuals and performance measurement can be achieved as well as 
providing the linkage between the hierarchy of strategies previously defined by Hofer and 
Schendel. 
2.2.2 Performance Management 
Since its original definition, the meaning of performance management has diversified into 
many varied definitions each open to numerous interpretations, meanings and applications. 
Slottje (2000: 1) suggests that, 'ýperfbrmance management is a term used by everyone to 
discuss every issue" and "will never have one definition". Montebello (1999: 1) by contrast 
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comments that, "one reason performance management is so widely used is the scope and 
variety of thepurposes it can be used". 
The idea of Performance Management as we now recognise it developed during the 1970's at 
the same time as significant advances in strategic thinking. The development of performance 
management is also traced to the original work undertaken by Aubrey Daniels. Importantly 
Slottje (2000), as part of his research, decided to gain an insight into how this direction 
developed through contacting a number of key individuals for their reflective feedback. 
Jamie Daniels, Aubreys' brother commented to Slottje that they (Aubrey Daniels Associates) 
had initially positioned their model within a 'Behavioural Management' or 'Behavioural 
Modification' framework. They soon adopted the term 'performance management', due to 
unwillingness at the time to use the term 'behaviour'. The significance of this is interesting 
and suggests that a level of conflict and misunderstanding existed between the behavioural 
sciences and management disciplines during a period of intense diversity and change in theory 
and practice. Similarly, Alyce Dickinson in discussions with Slottje (2000: 5) provides an 
enlightening view on this issue when she reflected on a number of conversations she had with 
Aubrey Daniels: 
"The name change was initiated by thefact that business clients did not understand or 
relate to the term 'Organisational Behaviour Management'for at least two reasons. 
One; they believed that their children 'behaved' while employees and workers 
ýperformed'. Two: 'Behaviour' was always associated with 'bad' or inappropriate 
behaviour ". 
Two further reflective comments support this interesting observation; 
Jamie Daniels comments that, "the times were not javourable for using the word 
Behaviour. People reacted very negatively to the idea of changing other's behaviour". 
Bill Hopkins outlines that 'ýpeqple then didn't understand what we meant when we 
talked about behaviour and companyfocus was often on measures reflecting results of 
behaviours ". 
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The recognition that behaviours both positive and negative impact on strategy, management 
and measurement is now well recognised and documented within the literature. As such, it is 
sufficient to conclude that the conflicts present in the 1970's do not currently exist in their 
previous form. The awareness of behaviours as they apply within performance management 
has raised other issues as they impact on performance management and individuals, 
particularly from an ethical viewpoint. An interesting paper published by Winstanley and 
Stuart-Smith (1996: 66) titled 'ýpolicing performance: the ethics ofperformance management" 
explores the impact of ethics on performance management through applying an action learning 
methodology. They conclude that four key considerations need to exist in any effective 
performance management approach: 1) "respectfor the individual" 2) "mutual respect" 3) 
'ýprocedural fairness" and 4) "transparency of decision making". These are all key issues 
instrumental to this current research initiative and are applied to my own practitioner approach 
(see appendix (1) behavioural statement). 
On reflection, these four areas closely align with and are a direct consequence of behavioural 
influences and interactions. They could explain why during the 1970's, there was an adverse 
reaction to acknowledging their existence within the predominately financial based 
performance measurement approaches readily adopted at the time. Winstanley and Stuart- 
Smith (1996: 66) support this view and assert that traditional performance management 
approaches could be seen as 'forms of control which are used to police performance ". The 
issue of control still plays a significant part in any performance measurement system, yet the 
level and intensity to which it is applied is a topic that is open to some level of debate, with 
Boume (1999: 23) agreeing that "measuring performance focuses attention" but he concludes 
by asking 'what behaviour will the measure nurture and is it desirableT 
This is further expanded by Mohnnan et al., (1993: 198), who include an element of control by 
stating: 'ýperfbrmance management is the set of processes that have to be done in order to 
make sure that what people do and work at in the organisation will obtain the results that the 
organisation needs". More recently, Strebler et al., (2001: xi-3) focus on two relevant 
considerations that provide a readily acceptable method whereby performance is managed 
within a business context: 
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Firstly, through the citation of Hendry et al., (1997) view that performance management is 
seen as "a systemic approach to improving the individual and team performance to deliver 
business objectlves'ý Secondly, it concerns "performance review (PR) systems andprocesses 
as tools, to deliver performance management". These views clearly focus on (and underpin the 
recognition of behaviours in) current practice, and support the notion of linkages between 
individuals and strategy within their meaning, and as such provide a logical explanation into 
how strategy can be linked with performance management. Bititci et al., (1997: 523) classifies 
this interaction as a 'closed loop control systein'through their explanation that: 
"Theperformance management process is the process by which the company manages 
its performance in line with its corporate andfunctional strategies and objectives. The 
objective of this process is to provide a proactive closed loop system, where the 
corporate and functional strategies are deployed to all business process, activities, 
tasks and personnel, andjeedback is obtained through the performance measurement 
system to enable appropriate management decisions ". 
Having established the implicit nature of the performance management process, it is useful to 
consider the underlying assumptions that support the basic logic and steps to be undertaken 
within the cycle process. Storey and Sisson (1993) cited in Stiles et aL, (1997: 56) provide a 
useful view of this through their comments that performance management consists of three key 
processes: 
The setting of objectives, derived from corporate and business unit (or divisional) 
strategies 
The evaluation of performance 
The linkage between evaluated performance, development and rewards, in order to 
reinforce behaviour 
This view is supported through Winstanley and Stuart-Smith's (1996: 67) suggestion that there 
is an explicit and implicit nature to performance management and measurement that can be 
broken down into three distinctive core elements: 1) "setting the objectives, " 2) "managing 
performance to objectives" and 3) "measuring performance against objectives ". (See footnote 3 
overleat) The management of these three processes falls within the domain of performance 
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reviews and is a subject that has been extensively researched. Strebler et al., (2001) focus on 
some key aspects derived from previous research to initially position a number of 
considerations within the IES report titled "Perfonnance Review: balancing objectives and 
content" focusing particularly on the following problems associated with the application of 
performance management: 
" It lacks strategic focus 
" It gives conflicting messages between encouragement and control 
" It has a limited impact on business performance 
" It stretches managers who often lack the skills and motivation to deliver it 
effectively 
* It is participation in the review meeting which matters most for employees rather 
than its outcome 
* The importance of employee commitment is increasing 
* There is an emphasis on development, and increased disillusion with the link to pay 
Source: Strebler et aL, (2001: ix) 
2.2.3 Performance Measurement 
It is readily accepted that some form of performance measurement is an integral element of any 
performance management process (Boume, 1999). This view is supported through Viken's 
(1995: 1) comments that 'ýperfbrmance management in general is tightly tied up to 
measurement'. Bititci et al., (1997: 523) provide a useful reflection on how this is achieved 
through their explanation that "there is an information system which enables the closed loop 
deployment andjeedback system. nis information system is the performance measurement 
system ". 
Footnote 3 Previously referenced sources of behavioural impact on measurement see: Kaplan, (1994); Kaplan and Norton 
(1992,1993, (1996ab); Neely et at, (1994,1997); Viken (1995); Bourne et at, (2000); Tipping (1998,1999); Neely and 
Bourne (2000); Bourne (1999) and De Waal (2002abc). 
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It is recognised that performance measurement frameworks such as Management By 
Objectives (MBO) (Drucker 1955), Total Quality Management (TQM), Performance 
Measurement Matrix (Keegan et al., 1989), Performance Measurement Questionnaire (Dixon 
et al., 1990), the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan and Norton 1992) and more recently the 
Performance Prism (Neely et al., 2001) provide the frameworks whereby these linkages are 
achieved. All of these approaches have one thing in common; a framework measures a given 
dimension over a selected timeframe. This view is positioned within Hatry's (1999: 1) 
definition of measurement as "measurement on a regular basis of the results (outcomes) and 
efficiency ofservices orprograms ". 
In reviewing the literature, it is surprising to see the depth of focus and comments commonly 
used to describe particular views as they affect measurement and measures. In particular, some 
views include: 
"Garbage in, garbage out" (Hatry, 1999: 1) 
" "at gets measured gets managed" (Schmenner and Vollmann, 1994: 5 8) 
"Kat gets measured gets done" (Bourne, 1999: 23) 
""at you measure is what you get" (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Stiver and Joyce, 
2000: 22). 
The precise meaning of the quotations clearly portray a level of conflicting meanings and 
design problems that can be associated with both the daily management and undertaking of 
measurement activities and their respective measures. These views are not solely confined to 
the use of commonly recognised acronyms. Adverse reactions and views also exist in an 
organisational context. To position this effectively, it is useful to consider the comments 
highlighted by Neely (1999: 206) in the paper "The Performance measurement revolution: why 
now and what next? " 
Firstly, a manager explained to the author that, "we measure everything that walks and moves, 
but nothing that matters". Secondly, Neely (1999: 206) notes that, "performance measures are 
also often poorly defined. It is not unusual to observe two people heatedly arguing over some 
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dimension of performance and later find that the root cause of their disagreement was the 
imprecise definition of a measure ". 
These comments are crucial, and suggest a level of disconnection between the performance 
measures and the hierarchy of strategies. It is interesting to note that Neely (1999: 206) 
focused on this issue by expanding and citing Lynch and Cross's (1991) argument that 
performance measures "are rarely integrated with one another or aligned to the business 
processes". This view goes some way to explain the first two statements and would later 
support Neely et al., 's (1997: 113 6) "golden rule" when he pointed out that "there is no point 
measuring someone on something over which they have no control". In trying to understand 
how measures are "integrated" and "aligned" within performance measurement, it is useful 
to consider Neely et al., s (1995: 80-81) initial definitions that focused on three key process 
explanations: 
Performance Measurement can be defined as a process of quantifying the 
efficiency and effectiveness of action (see note 3). 
A Performance Measure is defmed as a metric used to quantify the efficiency 
and/or effectiveness of an action. 
A Performance Measurement System can be defined as the set of metrics used to 
quantify both the efficiency and effectiveness of actions (see note 3 on page 37). 
The simplicity of these identified processes and actions are clearly conveyed by the implicit 
nature of the authors' descriptions that they have supported, by additional explanations 3 and 
4, to embed a level of understanding in the paper. The individual process definitions show that 
extensive use is made of the terms 'efficiency and effectiveness, which the authors supported 
through the use of two explanations: 
"The terms effliciency and effectiveness are usedprecisely in this context. Effectiveness 
refers to the extent to which customer requirements are met, while ejficiency is a 
measure of how economically thefirm's resources are utilised when providing a given 
level of customer satisfaction " (Neely et al., 's 1995: 80). 
"It not only identifies twofundamental dimensions ofperformance, but also highlights 
the fact that there can be internal as well as external reasons for pursuing specific 
courses ofaction - (Slack 1991 cited in Neely et al., 's 1995: 80). 
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It is interesting to see that the terms efficiency and effectiveness has nurtured other viewpoints. 
Bowman and Asch (1991: 15) in particular comment that, "the problem of measuring the 
organisation's performance (in terms of its effi'ciency and effectiveness) is largely a matter of 
subjective judgement". They also explain that organisations can obtain levels of efficiency 
through efficient utilisation of resources, yet at the same time be ineffective through falling 
profits linked to failing to meet customer requirements or expectations - in reality failing to 
achieve a balance across the scorecard. 
in a later paper Neely and Bourne (2000: 6) focus on the importance of understanding the 
relevance of efficiency and effectiveness in performance measurement through exploring how 
the performance measurement process could be made more efficient and effective: 
"The efficiency issue is associated with simplicity and automation. Yhe trick is to 
measure as little as possible, but to ensure that you are measuring the things that 
matter. The effectiveness question is a completely separate topic, because many 
organisations quite simply fail to extract value from the performance measurement 
data ". 
When the authors further expanded the question of 'effectiveness' they explained that the term 
was further affected by managers failing to 'analyse the data' through unawareness of or 
failure to use appropriate 'tools and techniques, or when used to 'understand the messages 
inside the performance data'. Significantly it was also suggested that when improvement 
activities were introduced, they were not always "linked to the performance data; " an issue 
they explained was compounded by problems associated with "assessing whether any 
improvements that are seen are rapid enough or linked directly to the actions they have 
taken " (Neely and Bourne (2000: 6). (See footnote 4 and 5) 
Footnote (4) Quoted from authors' publications. This action can be expressed either in the actual efficiency and/or 
effectiveness of an action, or in terms of the end result of that action. 
Footnote (5) In this context, the term metric refers to more than simply the 'formula' used to calculate the measure. For a 
given performance measure to be specific it is necessary to define among other things, the title of the measure, how it is to be 
calculated (the formula), who will be carrying out the calculation, and from where they will get the data. Terminology used 
(Neely et aL, 1995.110) can be initially positioned and explained in the terms of 'efficiency and effectiveness'. 
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The above comments would suggest that performance review processes are either not in place 
or are ineffective in their application. It is interesting to note that the authors did not explore 
the role or impact of 'closed loop control systems' previously discussed by Bititci et al., (1997) 
or include appropriate 360 degree feedback systems in their paper, in relation to managing or 
limiting the impact or effect of these concerns. 
Strebler et al., (2001: xi) undertook a research study regarding the application of performance 
review (PR) systems. The authors investigated how the approach was applied in seventeen 
organisational settings. A key element derived from the research was the recognition that 
motivational impact or buy in was a major factor that affected individuals, which in turn was 
heavily influenced by the effectiveness of the cascade of objectives in organisations. The 
authors commented on this point through their view that "targets can be SMART, but if they 
seem unfair, or if they are imposed, they lose their motivational impact ". 
2.3 Measurement Focus 
One feature of performance measures resides in the diversity of interpretations and meanings 
of each specific measurement dimension, each with its own particular focus and preferred key 
performance indicator. The actual composition or component parts of each performance 
measure is a topic discussed by Gilbert (cited in Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979) who argues 
that ideally each chosen measure needs to be comprised of four basic Performance entities; 
quality, quantity, timeliness and cost. 
This view does however need to be reconsidered in light of an increasing awareness that 
according to Feurer and Chaharbaghi (1995: 69) "the hierarchy of measures cannot reflect the 
whole value system of the organisation which combines the goals of all stakeholders. " The 
author further suggests that it is necessary to provide a measurement hierarchy 'for each 
gro up of s takeh o Iders ". 
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This consideration clearly links back to Neely and Adams' (2001) previously positioned 
argument regarding strategic route versus measurement direction, and when considered in 
conjunction with Feurer and Chaharbaghi's (1995) observation, suggests that measurement 
dimensions and focus will need to be adapted to cater for varying stakeholder groups in an 
organization. The risk is that the balance between different stakeholder priorities might cause 
conflicts of interest and focus to occur, thereby jeopardizing a balanced application of the BSC 
across the organisation. 
When viewed at this level, the term stakeholder needs to be expanded to include interested 
parties such as shareholders, fimctional employees, suppliers and regulatory bodies, each of 
whom could generate possible levels of conflict between the measurement entities themselves 
and across selected or implemented measurement portfolios. The importance of gaining a 
competitive advantage is well documented. In positioning this particular subject, Stalk (1988) 
focuses on the importance of gaining a competitive advantage by suggesting that time based 
competitiveness provides the key strategic weapon which allows manufacturing to gain a level 
of competitive advantage. Stalk (1988: 4 1) supported his argument through his view that "time 
is the equivalent of money, productivity, quality, even innovation ". 
Garvin (1987: 101-109) in contrast focuses on the relevance of quality as a means to gain a 
competitive opportunity, suggesting that eight separate manageable quality dimensions exist, 
categorized as 'ýperfbrmance, features, reliability, conformance, durability, serviceability, 
aesthetics andperceived quality". This view links to Wheelwright's (1981) suggestion that 
quality underpins success, both in terms of dependability and flexibility. Results of this are 
lower costs. Significantly, Garvin (1987: 104) notes that some of the individual segments 
would be "mutually supporting" across the various dimensions while others would "not" 
support each other and as such "an improvement in one may be achieved only at the expense of 
another". This view clearly links to Skinner's (1969) well recognised "trade-off model" and 
is adequately supported through Garvins' (1987: 104) who comments that "the challenge to 
managers is to complete on selected dimensions" of performance, thus implying a level of 
compromise and trade-off against performance. 
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As previously stated, the more historical performance dimensions reside in the domains of 
quality, time, cost and flexibility. More recently, Dangayach and Deshmukh (2001: 910) re- 
confirmed that these dimensions still exist as 'competitive performance priorities' yet within 
their review of the dimensions it is interesting to note that innovation has been included, thus 
expanding the original four to five, and recognising more recent manufacturing factors or 
considerations. 
Varying views and interpretations regarding measurement dimensions heavily influence the 
literature. Keegan et al., (1989: 45-50) suggest that performance measures could be 
categorized into two distinctive types; those related to cost and non-cost performance 
measures. Each of these would have both an internal and external measurement focus. In 
positioning the alignment of the measures they comment it is best to 'start broad, not bottom- 
up' and initially to focus on five performance measures: quality, customer satisfaction, speed, 
product or service cost and cash flow. A weakness of the approach is the suggestion that: "if 
in doubt, establish five overall performance measures and let others derive from this set". 
Although the authors suggest the means whereby this could be achieved, such as 
understanding the "main cost drivers" and "asking operating managers what they really look 
at when making decisions", there is little exploration regarding operational situations where 
this has been practically applied. De Toni and Tonchia (2001: 59) take a similar view in 
relation to performance measures suggesting that dimensions of "cost performances" exist, 
such as 'ýproduction costs and productivity" and "non-cost performances measures" focusing 
on time, flexibility and quality. The key point from the framework is the level of hierarchical 
sub measures supporting the main measurement focus and the use of different measurement 
sub dimensions to ensure a robust level of cross-integration. Within the manufacturing 
literature, Leong et al., (1989: 114-115) undertake a review of the "key competitive priorities" 
from a number of literary sources commenting that "a composite view yields thefollowingfive 
competitive priorities: quality, delivery, cost, flexibility and innovativeness ". They explain 
that empirical support exists to support the first four dimensions in the realms of "competitive 
priorities, " developing their comments to explain that awareness exists that appropriate 
measurements support 'given competitive priorities'. The authors also note that less empirical 
evidence exists to support the utility of these measurements, particularly as the main focus has 
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resided in understanding measurement priorities rather than the utility or usefulness of the 
measurements themselves at a business unit level. Tunalv (1992: 21), later provides a 
reflective view of this impact identified during a study of 184 Swedish manufactures through 
his comment that: 
"business units with a manufacturing strategy consider quality, lead time and 
flexibility asfundamental issues that should be emphasized in manufacturing". 
Slack et al., (1995) had a comparative view to Leong et al., (1989) detailing five similar 
operational performance objectives in relation to quality, speed, flexibility and cost, but 
include dependability in place of reliability. The authors also comment that, "all thesefactors 
individually give a partial view of the operation's cost performance, and many of them overlap 
in terms of the information they include" (Slack et al., 1995: 730). These ideas clearly 
underpin Gavin's (1987) view of managers, who need to operate across different dimensions 
and Skinner's (1969) notion of trade-offs. It also suggests areas where questioning the 
usefulness of measures arises, particularly where information flows overlap, as this could 
potentially provide contradicting messages. 
Other industrial sectors have different views regarding measurement dimensions. In a review 
of the service industry Fitzgerald et aL, (1991) comment that performance measures could be 
divided into two distinctive groups; firstly results orientated measures (such as 
competitiveness and financial performance), and secondly those measures that are 
determinants of the results (such as quality, flexibility, resource utilisation and innovation). 
These different views clearly indicate the level of complexity in the literature regarding the 
nature and focus of different performance dimensions. The variety of knowledge is clearly 
evident in this field. Neely et aL, (1995) focus on this problem and propose a useful matrix 
which they use to classify the most common sub dimensions of performance identified from 
the literature into four performance categories of quality, time, flexibility and cost. The main 
strength of the framework is that it was developed after an extensive review of literature 
sources available at the time (See Table I overleao. 
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It clear that this framework builds on a previous article by Neely and Wilson (1992: 47) where 
a similar framework is positioned under the terms of "generic dimensions ofquality, time, cost 
andflexibility". In the earlier example however, the issue of profit is included under the cost 
dimension, as is the awareness that the dimensions could have either an "internal or external 
level of importance. 
Table 1- The Multiple Dimensions Of Quality, Time, Cost And Flexibility 
Quality Time Flexibility 
Ql: Performance TI: Manufacturing lead time F I: Material quality 
Q2. Features T2: Rate of production introduction F2: Output quality 
Q3: Reliability T3: Deliver lead time F3: New product 
Q4: Conformance T4: Due-date performance F4: Modify product 
Q5: Technical durability T5: Frequency of delivery F5: Dehverability 
Q6: Serviceability F6: Volume 
Q7: Aesthetics Cost F7: Mix 
Q8: Perceived quality C I: Manufacturing cost F8: Resource mix 
Q9: Humanity C2: Value added 
QO: Value C3: Selling price 
C4: Running cost 
C5: Service cost 
Source: Neely et aL, (1995: 83) 
Although the matrix does provide a useful insight into the four performance areas, it fails to 
identify two important measurement considerations. Firstly, soft measures such as 
motivational considerations included in Fitzgerald et al's., (1991) results and determinants 
framework and other increasingly important employee and customer metrics, which have 
subsequently been linked into a model at a later date (Hudson et aL, 200 1). Secondly it fails to 
highlight the effects of stakeholder measures appropriate to shareholders, suppliers or 
regularity bodies, although the second two could be included within the Q4 conformance 
measure. This however was not evident at the time the matrix was devised, but is clearly 
evident in Neely and Adams' (2001) later Performance Prism. 
In a later paper, Neely et al., (1997) develop a further framework, positioning twenty-two 
recommendations regarding how performance measures should be designed. As in the 
previous matrix, the strength of the framework was its creation from ten key identified 
literature sources. These were directly incorporated into the model and developed further 
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through the suggestion as to "what a good performance measure constitutes" classified as a 
"performance measure record sheet". This therefore provided depth of understanding and a 
consolidation of key views and ideas. More recently, these models have been the subject of a 
detailed and reflective review undertaken by Hudson et aL, (2001) on the areas of 
measurement duplication and the critical characteristics of the measures themselves. The 
authors focused on the twenty-two recommendations forwarded by Neely et al., (1997) 
commenting that in their own review of the 'sets' they identified that 'many of the 
characteristics are du licated or are deemed to be desirable' (Hudson et al., 2001: 1100). 
From this review two key issues emerge: 
Firstly, the removal of any instances of identified 'duplication' enabled the authors to position 
a revised set of seven 'critical characteristics' which they suggest underpin the design of 
performance measures (see table 2). This framework provides a logical and empirically tested 
means by which an analysis can be undertaken regarding how applied measures in 
organisations support and link into these characteristics. 
Table 2- Characteristics Of Performance Measures. 
Characteristics Reference 
Derived from strategy Globerson, 1985; Maskell, 1989; Dixon et al., 1990; Lynch and 
Cross 1991; Neely et al., 1996a 
Clearly defined with an explicit purpose Globerson 1985; Neely et al., 1996a 
Relevant and easy to maintain Maskell 1989; Lynch and Cross 1991 
Simple to understand and use Maskell 1989; Lynch and Cross 1991; Neely et al., 1996a 
Provides fast and accurate feedback Globerson 1985; Dixon et al 1990; Maskell 1989; Neely et al 1996a 
Link operations to strategic goals Lynch and Cross, 1991 
Stimulate continuous improvement Lynch and Cross 1991; Maskell 1989; Neely et al., 1996a 
Source: Hudson et aL, (200 1: 110 1). 
Hudson et aL, (200 1) develop these dimensions to include the increasingly cited dimensions of 
finance, customer satisfaction and human resources. This expands upon Neely et al's., (1995) 
original framework from four to six dimensions by building in increasingly important soft 
measures within the customer (Eccles, 1991) and employee performance dimensions. The 
importance of this is clearly displayed by Hudson et al's (2001: 1101) explanation that the six 
dimensions 'can be seen to cover all aspects of the business. This view is underpinned within 
46 
the framework through the inclusion of both internal and external performance dimensions, 
along with 'cultural aspects of the working environment' clearly incorporated and classified 
'within the human resource dimension' shown (Please refer to Table 3). 
Table 3- Critical Dimensions Of Performance 
Quality Time Flexibility Finance Customer 
Satisfaction 
Human 
Resources 
Product Lead Time Manufacturing Cash Flow Market Share Employee 
performance effectiveness relations 
Delivery Delivery Resource Market share Service Employee 
reliability reliability utilisation involvement 
Waste Process Volume Overhead Image Workforce 
throughput flexibility cost 
time reduction 
Dependability Process time New product Inventory Integration with Employee 
introduction performance customers Skills 
Innovation Productivity Computer Cost control Competitiveness Learning 
systems 
Cycle time Future growth Sales Innovation Labour 
cfficiency 
Delivery Product Profitability Delivery reliability Quality of 
speed innovation work life 
Labour Efficiency Resource 
efficiency utilisation 
Resource Product cost Productivity 
utilisation reduction 
Source: Hudson et al., (2001: 1102). 
Hudson et al., (2001: 1101) recognise the clear danger of stipulating descriptive views on 
performance, commenting that the dimensions are only indicated as a prescriptive overview, 
and as such should only "encourage the holistic consideration of these areas when developing 
measures to support the company strategy". This theme was significantly expanded by the 
authors, and led to the development of a revised model classified as a 'typology for the 
evaluation of strategic PM development approaches'. This was based on both the 
characteristics and dimensions frameworks previously discussed. Please refer to Table 4 
overleaf. 
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Table 4- Typology For The Evaluation Of Strategic PM Development Approaches 
Development process requirements Performance measure 
characteristics 
Dimensions of performance 
Need evaluation/existing PM audit Derived from strategy Quality 
Key user involvement Clearly defined/explicit Flexibility 
purpose 
Strategic objective identification Relevant and easy to Time 
understand 
Performance measure development Simple to understand and use Finance 
Periodic maintenance structure Provide fast, accurate Customer 
feedback 
Top management support Link operations to strategic Satisfaction 
goals 
Full employee support Stimulate continuous Human resources 
Clear and explicit objectives improvement 
Set timescales: 
Source: Hudson et al., (2001: 1102). 
This model provides the researcher with a number of opportunities. Firstly, the findings 
presented during the analysis and evaluation of ten key performance measurement frameworks 
against each of the three major headings and their sub dimensions provide an empirically 
tested grounding from which a review of existing performance measurement systems can be 
undertaken. Secondly, both the characteristics and dimensions positioned provide a robust 
means whereby an evaluation can be based which supports and assesses how managers react to 
and behave when exposed to performance dimensions. 
2.4 The Dynamics of Measurement (trade-offs, cause and effect, lead and lag) 
The actual design of performance measures is a topic that has generated considerable interest 
and debate in practitioner circles, nurturing the varied acronyms previously highlighted and 
discussed above. It is therefore logical to conclude that the actual selection of the required 
metrics in any measurement system is a process that presents its own particular problems. 
Neely et al., (2000: 1123) focused on this area comments that "deciding actually what to 
measure- is however much more involved". Intrying to resolve this issue, it is useful to focus 
on De Toni and Tonchia's (2001: 53) view that two fundamental questions needed to be 
answered in the actual design and formalisation' of measurements - namely deciding 'what 
will he measured' and (cited White 1996) determining 'how it will be measured'. Initial 
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answers to these questions can be seen in both Neely et al's., (1997) twenty two 
recommendations and Hudson et al's., (2001) characteristics and critical dimensions of 
performance measures discussed in the previous section (see footnote 6). 
It is however not as simple as purely providing answers to these two questions; practitioners 
need to understand the impact of any chosen measure in any given system. Schmenner and 
Vollmann (1994: 58 and 64) focus on this problem stating that: 
"Considerable resources have been dissipated by pursuing advances in the wrong 
measures, and well meaning managers have been thoroughly ftustrated by the 
pressures of the system to do so ". 
"It is far better to measure the right thing inexactly and in timely fashion than the 
wrong thing with greatprecision and well after thefact ". 
Schmenner and Vollmann. (1994: 5 8) classify these problems or "errors " as wrong or right 
measures focusing on the following descriptions to explain the differences between the two 
different types: 
1) "Using the wrong measure to motivate managers so that they spend time 
improving something that has few positive, and perhaps many harmful 
consequencesfor the company" and, 
2) "Failing to use the right measure, so that something important for the company 
stays neglected". 
It is interesting to note that in the same paper the authors referred to Dixon et al's., (1990) 
earlier classification or labelling of the same problems as 'fialse alarms" and "gaps". 
Schmenner and Vollmann (1994: 58) focus on these errors and suggest that the main 
management task must focus on "eliminating thefalse alarms " and wrong measures and align 
the right performance measures to 'fi'll in the gaps ". Traditionally trade-offs were viewed as a 
trade-off between cost verses quality or dependability verses flexibility (Skinner, 1969). Once 
Footnote (6) witMn the paper De Toni and Tonchia (cited in White, 1996) referenced the second question "how 
will it be measured? " 
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chosen, performance measures are also affected by the concept of performance trade-offs as 
organisations strive to "conceptualise the improvement process" (Da Silveira and Slack, 
2001: 949) within its manufacturing or operational task. The debate regarding the concept of 
trade-offs is well documented and established in Skinner's (1969) trade-off model with various 
views present in the literature regarding both its existence and application, (Skinner, 1969 and 
Newing, 1994) or indeed its relevance in manufacturing operations (Schonberger 1986; 
Collins and Schmenner, 1993). 
Slack et aL, (1995: 870) see the trade off process as a means of 'trading of one aspect of 
performance with another' to gain a level of increased performance in another area or 
performance dimension. An activity they position as the "trade-offparadigm " managed in the 
concept of a pivoting see saw action (Slack 1991; Slack et aL, 1995), balancing performance 
objectives to maximize a desired level of competitiveness or performance in a desired 
performance direction. In practice, the ultimate aim is to limit the level of adverse impact in 
one element of the trade-off but still achieve the desired performance improvement in the 
other. Earlier, Wheelwright (1981) propose a similar view, noting that the real task facing 
managers is the need to identify the means whereby increases in quality could be achieved at 
the same time as reducing operating costs. Slack etaL, (1995: 870) assert that improvement is 
achieved in the short term where "one performance objective can be traded offwith another". 
For example, this could be achieved through: 
LOWERING COMPLAINTS verses INCREASD COSTS 
via QUALITY CHECKS. 
The authors also suggest that for a longer-tenn improvement effect, the best results in both 
performance areas could be achieved by simply "raising the pivot" thus simultaneously 
increasing performance in both (A) and (B). Both these approaches do however have 
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significant managerial implications and were not fully explored in any depth in the paper. In a 
later paper Da Silveira and Slack (2001: 951) developed these areas further, commenting that 
previous "studies provide little clue about why and how trade-offs may (or may not) exist, how 
their nature is perceived by managers and how they deal with them ". Da Silveira and Slack 
(2001: 949) focused on this concern in 5 case studies, commenting that: 
"The idea of trade-offs is not the problematic issue for practicing managers that it is 
for academics, indeed it is an easily understood concept which describes the 
operational compromises routinely made by managers. The significance of specific 
trade-offs within any organization is likely to be governed by twofactors; the degree of 
importance of the trade off, in terms of the impact it will have on overall operations 
competitiveness [and] the "sensitivity" of the trade-off. Sensitivity is the degree of 
change that will be caused to one element of the trade-off when changes are made to 
the other". 
importantly the authors concluded their paper by positioning three distinct questions that 
needed to be considered: 
1) How should trade-offs be conceptualised? 
2) Which trade-offs are significant for any specific operation? 
3) How should the process of overcoming trade-offs be approached? 
It was recognised that a level of difficulty existed in providing initial answers to these 
questions; however the authors position nine useful considerations that provides an insight into 
the management of trade-offs (please refer to Table 5 overleaf). 
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Table 5- Trade-Off-Concept 
Trade-offs are not the problematic issue for practicing managers as opposed to academics. 
Ile "trade-off' is an easy understood concept, which describes the operational compromises routinely 
made by managers. 
The acceptability of the trade-off concept does not imply that they are seen as immutable. 
On the contrary, trade-offs are seen as focusing attention on the areas of an operation most in need of 
improvement. 
Notwithstanding this, some trade-offs are more clearly governed by identifiable resource and capability 
constraints than others. 
Also, some types of operations ('process' types) find it easier to identify trade-offs than others. 
Trade-offs, when identified, can be overcome (but not eliminated) by changing the resources and/or 
capabilities of an operation in such a way as to improve its relevant performance attributes. 
Trade-offs within operations differs in two significant respects. Each will have a different degree of 
importance in so much as overcoming the trade-off will impact the operations competitiveness. Also each 
will have a different degree of sensitivity in so much as changing one part of the function of the trade-off 
will have a greater or lesser effect on the other. 
It is a legitimate matter of speculation whether the importance and sensitivity of trade-offs, taken together, 
could form the basis of any prioritisation in tackling trade-offs. 
Source: Da Silveira and Slack (2001: 962). 
Within the recommendations it is recognised that trade-offs are easier to manage in 'ýprocess 
operations". Armistead and Rowland (1996) focus on this particular issue in relation to 
'understandingfunctional and process trade-offs' in the context of moving from a functional 
to a process based approach. In managing this fundamental change, Armistead and Rowland 
(1996: 45) comment that initially there would be an element of "trading off some of the 
functional benefits offunctions in the short term" suggesting that there six distinct problem 
areas exist, which managers needed to be aware of- 
1. Customer focus versus utilisation of skills 
2. Process versus functional silos 
3. Empowerment versus imposed control 
4. Fuzzy matrix versus clarity of structure 
5. Process knowledge versus discipline expertise 
6. Loyalty and motivation versus cost reduction. 
Source: Managin g Business Process BPR and Beyond, Armistead and Rowland (1996: 48-49) 
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Although the existing literature is diverse in nature it still fails in two specific instances. 
Firstly, the move from functional to process operations presents its own unique problems, 
particularly in the area of in-process (shift and work area) and intra-process (interchanges 
between operational interfaces) trade-offs. It would be reasonable to conclude that both overt 
and covert trade-offs proliferate and evolve between the different interfaces within the 
dimensions mentioned by Armistead and Rowland (1996) and Da Silveira and Slack (2001). 
Yet there is a distinct lack of referral or indeed distinction or recognition that overt and covert 
trade-offs exist or can ultimately evolve between these varied and distinct operational levels. 
Secondly, although the literature abounds with varying views regarding the relevance or 
indeed irrelevance of trade-offs, there exists a distinct lack of integration with other 
measurement issues, particularly regarding how leading and lagging measures or cause and 
effect relationships influence or impact on performance trade-offs. The existing literature 
seems to treat the different concepts as separate entities, suggesting a major deficit in current 
academic and practitioner understanding. 
A balance needs to be maintained whereby appropriate leading measures that identify future 
results or lagging measures focusing on past performance underpin and support the desired 
improvement trade-off in performance. Graham (2001: 23) explored the implications of 
'balancing leading and lagging indicators' and suggest that: 
"Financial measures are lagging indicators, because even quarterly information must 
accumulate over a quarter or two before it conclusively shows whether there are major 
problems. In contrast, well-chosen leading indicators foreshadow success or failure 
beforefinancials can reflect them ". 
Ghayini and Nobel (1996: 65) support this view through their comments that 'fiinancial reports 
are lagging metrics that are a result of past decisions" and that lagging metrics are 
"inj7exible, expensive and contradict continues improvement". Kaplan and Norton (1996c: S5) 
express the problem in a slightly different way through their view that: 
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"measures are balanced between outcome measures, the resultsfrom past efforts, and 
the measures that drivejuture performance". 
How these measurement dimensions are applied will significantly influence the understanding 
and ongoing management of trade-offs between different performance dimensions and 
individuals. There is little identifiable evidence however, where this has been applied to any 
degree. The main focus has remained in the domain of balanced scorecards and superficially 
positioning the cause and effect relationships (See Graham, 2001; Morraj et aL, 1999; Kaplan 
and Norton 1996a, 1996b; Tipping, 2000; Sedecon, 1999 and Shulver et aL, 2000). These 
areas are fully expanded in a later section of the literature review. 
2.5 The Emergence of a Balanced Approach to Performance Measurement 
Before an in-depth evaluation of the BSC is undertaken, it would be beneficial to position 
some of the influencing factors, which led to its initial development and popularity in current 
practice. It is readily accepted and well documented that the management of performance has 
followed two distinctive time phases, each influenced by a dominating performance dimension 
prevailing at the time (Mannochehri, 1999; Neely, 1999; Bourne et aL, 2000; Neely and 
Bourne 2000 and Ghalyini and Noble, 1996). In further reviewing the impact of these phases, 
it is useful to position two main factors explored by the authors, which adequately summariscs 
the main academic views regarding how performance measurement has evolved over these 
periods. 
Firstly, between the 1880's and the late 1980's the main performance focus was dominated by 
the more traditional financial accounting and audit based measurement systems. Secondly, 
pressure to change these systems only started to emerge after "companies began to lose market 
share to overseas competitors who were able to provide higher quality products with lower 
costs and more variety " (Ghalayini and Noble, 1996: 63). 
This statement supports the earlier view expressed by Eccles (1991: 132), where; 
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"During the 1980's, many executives saw their companies' strong financial records 
deteriorate because of unnoticed declines in quality or customer satisfaction or 
because global competitors ate into their market share ". 
The causes for this downturn are varied and have been widely researched and discussed, 
(Keegan et al., 1989; Eccles, 1991; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Neely, 1999; Bourne et, al., 
2000) yet the more readily accepted problems or limitations centre on a number of key 
common considerations. Most notably, the measures themselves are criticised for their 
historical nature (Dixon et al., 1990) looking backwards (Low and Siesfeld, 1998; Bourne, 
1999; Tipping, 2000) on past performance outcomes (Eccles 1991). 
Low and Siesfeld (1998: 26) summarise the indicative nature of this problem through their 
comments that 'financial results are backward - looking" and "essentially a post-mortem " 
choosing to measure performance against set objectives as opposed to actually managing 
performance. In a similar context, Winstanley and Stuart-Smith (1996) by reflecting on the 
literature in the finance, accountancy, auditing and public sector management, criticise 
fimancially based models for focusing on objective setting against which performance is 
measured, with little consideration on managing actual performance. Although the comments 
adequately position the main criticisms directed at financial measures, there does however 
exist a number of other problems that either link into those areas already discussed, or are 
separate entities in their own right. Within a wider context, Bourne (1999: 21) brought 
together eight identifiable main strands or 'criticisms'of financial measures noting that: 
1. Focusing on external financial reporting needs rather than the needs of managing the 
business. 
2. Encouraging emphasis on the short term. In the short term it is easier to increase profits by 
reducing cost rather than increasing revenues; often it is spending on other projects, which 
are important for the future, which are the first to be hit. 
3. Being backward looking, they tell you how well you performed last month, quarter or 
year, without any indication of how you will perform in the future. 
4. Being internally focused, concentrating attention on internal efficiencies rather than on 
what is happening in the market place. 
5. Encouraging local optimization through achieving the overhead recovery rate at the 
expense of satisfying the customer. 
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6. Encouraging minimisation of variance rather than continuous improvement. 
7. Lacking strategic focus. 
8. Not being relevant to most people working in the company. 
Within organisations the ramifications of the issues highlighted have far reaching implications. 
This is particularly evident in Neely et al's., (2000: 1121) reflection that 'ýperformance 
measurement systems [in the past] have traditionally adopted a narrow or uni-dimensional 
focus". The limiting and indeed uncompromising implications of these situations could as 
suggested by Wheelwright and Banks (1979), provide the vehicle to encourage the pursuit of 
short-term decision-making to the detriment of long-term corporate strategies. It may also 
provide the medium to support the emergence of potential levels of dysfiinctional behaviour as 
forwarded by Fry and Cox (1989) and Neely et al., (1997) to evolve throughout organisational 
structures and sub-structures. 
Clearly the level of problems discussed, provide an insight into the challenges facing 
organisations as they approached the late 1980's and an ever more changing complex 
manufacturing task. There is clear evidence that the traditional accounting systems in place at 
the time were both damaging (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980 cited in Bourne et al., 2000: 756) 
and unsuited to the task in hand (Keegan et al., 1989; Bititci et al., 1997; Neely, 1999; Neely 
and Bourne, 2000). In a later publication, Kaplan and Norton (1992: 7 1) focused back on this 
very issue commenting that 'yInancial measures worked wellfor the industrial era, but they 
are out of step with the skills and competencies companies are trying to master today". The 
reaction to this pressure for change saw a number of balanced performance approaches 
developed during the late 1980's and early 1990's. These new approaches focused on utilising 
a mix of financial and non-financial measures as a means to provide a balanced picture of how 
organisations were performing. A change as diverse as this however, did not come without 
some level of resistance, risk or indeed lack of understanding of how non- financial measures 
could be selected or used to support the performance process. More recently, Schneiderman 
(1999: 8) focuses on the problems associated with non-financial measures and comments that: 
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"Kile financial metrics have undergone more than a century of development and 
refinement, non-financial metrics are relatively new to the scene. Little wonder that 
there are no standards and that current practice yields definitions that often have 
serious, even fatal flaws ... Yes, the metrics may improve, but all too often, the 
underlying processes don't". 
The performance measurement literature readily accepts that the concept of both a ýportrblio of 
integrated performance measures' and BSC can be directly linked to Kaplan and Norton's 
(1992) publication "Yhe Balanced Scorecard Measures Yhat Drive Performance ". 
2.6 The Balanced Scorecard 
If asked to name a performance measurement framework, most managers would probably 
answer "the balanced scorecard". This is not surprising. Numerous external consultancy 
bodies actively nurture and support this approach (Neely et al., 2000) and within key 
publications at academic and practitioner levels (Kaplan and Norton, 1992,1993,1994,1996a, 
1996b, 1996c). Neely et al., (2000) point out that this is by no means the only framework in 
existence, which incorporates, in a balanced approach, both financial and non-financial 
measures. Other frameworks to name but a few include the performance measurement matrix 
(Keegan et al., 1989) and the performance prism (Neely and Adams, 2001). 
A full discussion of these frameworks is not intended in this current research initiative as the 
main behavioural focus needs to reside in the balanced scorecard, but the findings will provide 
future research opportunities in relation to understanding how different approaches affect 
behaviours. The scorecard devised by Kaplan and Norton (1992) utilises a balance of critical 
financial and non-financial measures to move or pull individuals towards the organisational 
strategic vision. To support this transformation into meaningful objectives Kaplan and Norton 
(1992: 72) outline four specific areas, focusing on both measures of past results and future 
performance, where particular questions in relation to these respective areas are highlighted 
overleaf: 
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Perspective Related Question 
Financial How Do We Look To Our Shareholders? 
Internal Business "at Must We Excel At? 
Innovation and Can We Continue To Improve and Create 
Learning Value? 
Customer How Do Our Customers See Us? 
The separate measurement dimensions are clear and precise, with individuals as both the 
enablers and drivers of performance improvements. In moving individuals towards the 
strategic vision, Kaplan and Norton (1992: 79) further suggest, as previously stated that three 
considerations were the main drivers in supporting this focus and as such these are major 
considerations under review in this thesis, where 
" Measures are designed to pull people toward the overall vision 
" The BSC forces managers to focus on the handful of measures that are most critical 
" The BSC helps managers understand many interrelationships 
Neely et al., (2000: 1121) later criticised Kaplan and Norton's (1992) original paper for failing 
to explore issues such as design, deployment or the critical factors that constituted a robust 
scorecard in any depth. Neely and his colleagues (2000: 5) did however recognise that the 
issue of how to formulate a scorecard was to some extent addressed by Kaplan and Norton 
(1993) in a later publication through the positioning of an eight-step process. This focused on 
the building ofa balanced scorecard through a series of three cycle interviews and workshops, 
culminating in its implementation, supported with ýperiodic reviews. 
Importantly in the same document, Kaplan and Norton (1993: 13 8) recognised the uniqueness 
of the task-facing organisations when applying this process commenting that, "each 
organisation is unique and so follows its own path ". Kaplan and Norton (1994: 48) further 
expanded this advice, through initially positioning the developmental stages of a BSC focusing 
on the Rockwater case, where they categorise three distinct Phases: 
1) Designing the BSC 
2) The commitment phase 
3) Using the BSC as a management process 
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The key message coming from the case study was to show how strategy could be linked to 
employee actions. However the important question regarding actual design was not fully 
described in any depth by the authors until they positioned the (Kaplan and Norton 1996a) 
following four design stages: 
" Translating the vision 
" Communicating and linking 
" Business Planning 
" Feedback and learning 
With further depth provided through the positioning of six design stages: 
Translate strategy into action 
" Select linked measures 
" Link financial objectives to life cycle 
" Select a mix of customer measures 
" Focus internal processes on meeting expectations 
" Focus on investments for the future 
The specific stages fail to identify some of the rudimentary considerations now readily 
accepted as forming a key component of the design of any measurement system such as data 
source, frequency and consistency of measurement and the calculation of the identified 
measures (see Bourne 1999: 21). Later Stivers and Joyce (2000: 23-24) focus on the specific 
areas highlighted in Kaplan and Norton's (1996a) six-stage process during the development 
and implementation of a 'balancedperformance management system, introduced into a health 
centre in 1997. A number of lessons were learnt during this implementation. Stivers and 
Joyce (2000: 28) commented that the performance system is a dynamic, behavioural tool, and 
that 'what you measure is what you get. It is important therefore to 'start at the top, identify 
and 'get the right measures' as well as getting the 'buy-in and commitment'of 'everyone in the 
organisation'. The authors also recognised that initially organisations focused improvement 
activities on 'measurement gaps' and needed to adjust any approach to 'develop the necessary 
processes . 
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The recommendations concluded by highlighting the importance of 'starting with a pilot site' 
as well as raising awareness that organisations need to be conscious that 'resistance to change' 
could impact on any implementation, particularly in the areas of individual 'accountability' 
and how feedback is provided 'to individualsfor directing action'. The main drivers outlined 
by Kaplan and Norton (1992) and discussed earlier, suggest that the three distinctive actions 
will support and nurture a move away from the more traditional financial control systems. Yet 
words such as force' and ýpull' in their very meaning signify some level of controlling 
influence. Mooraj et al., (1999: 486) develop this idea further through their suggestion that the 
balanced scorecard "offers managers the possibility to combine all types of control systems " 
to measure achievement or outcome of current strategy, "whilst enabling time and energy to be 
spent on the formulation of tomorrow's strategies". The authors further suggest that the 
balanced scorecard "eliminates the needfor managers to choose which control system to use 
at any given time" through the inclusion of "boundary, interactive and diagnostic control 
systems" in its development and use (ibid). This notion underpins the idea that the controlling 
element of the scorecard supports and guides actions to achieve the desired operational and 
organisational strategy as discussed by Kaplan and Norton (1992; 1996b). Clearly corTectly, 
designed scorecards should support this outcome. However, what impact would a poorly 
designed scorecard have? An interesting insight into this issue is provided by Kaplan and 
Norton (I 996b: 65) through their reflection that: 
"A properly constructed Scorecard should tell the story of the business units'strategy. 
The measurement system should make the relationships (hypotheses) among objectives 
(and measures) in the various Perspectives explicit, so that they can be managed and 
validated". 
In contrast, they explain that: 
o "I f the vision is wrong, thefact that it is well executed becomes irrelevant. 
"Yhe scorecard creates shared understanding. It creates a holistic model of strategy 
that allows all employees to see how they can contribute to organisational success. If 
the model is wrong, individuals and departments will unknowingly sub-optimize their 
performance. 
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"The scorecard focuses change efforts. If the right lead indicators are identified, 
investments and initiatives will drive desired long-term outcomes. If not, investments 
will be wasted. " 
"The scorecardpermits organised learning at the executive level. By making the cause 
-and- effect hypotheses among objectives and measure explicit. - p77 
The second statement is only partially correct as there is clear evidence within the managing 
change and culture literature that individual's behaviour could be overtly influenced by the 
measures they are exposed to. The management of this interaction is crucial. Significantly, 
Bourne (1999: 23) forwards two reflections, which he suggests need to be considered in the 
design of measures, therefore inducing "the kind of behaviours which support the achievement 
of the business objectives". Firstly, "what behaviour will resultfrom the introduction of this 
measure and secondly, is this behaviour desirable? " Both of these key considerations could 
be influenced or seen as either the emergence of overt or covert trade-offs. An insight into the 
detrimental effect this could have is clearly seen in the fourth area addressed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1996b: 77). Shulver et al., (2000: 550) also explore this area through their comments 
that cause-and-effect relationships and their linkages are only considered ýPost-hoc' after the 
selection of strategic objectives. They further propose that to gain the full potential and 
benefits from the cause-and-effect relationship, the evaluation needs to be undertaken prior to 
linking scorecard measure with strategy. Within a similar context, Mooraj et al., (1999: 483) 
comments that, "identifiable cause-and-effect relationships are an important aspect of the 
balanced scorecard when choosing appropriate indicators ". This therefore involves 
supporting the pre-evaluation of the impact of proposed actions across the different scorecard 
segments. This allows for the identification of 'appropriate measures' and the 'alignment of 
actions to the strategic goals'. Unfortunately this is not without its problems. Sedecon 
Consulting (1999: 4) focus on the need for accurate "verification of the cause-and-effect 
relationship by objective analytical tqOls " within organisations, suggesting that this is a major 
weakness currently affecting organisations. The areas identified go some way to explain the 
initial concerns expressed by Ghalayini and Noble (1996: 77) that the balanced scorecard is 
'ýprimarily designedfor senior managers to provide them with an overall view ofperformance 
therefore "it is neither intendedfor, nor applicable at, thefactory level". 
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Kaplan and Norton (1996b: 53) by contrast disagree that multiple measures both financial and 
non-fi. nancial can at times be ambiguous and confusing, leading to conflicting messages and 
signals regarding the organisation's strategy, vision and values. To position their argument, 
they focused on the need for pilots to manage the full battery of infonnation' necessary to fly 
a modem airline developing their explanation to show the importance of its application in the 
business environment (Kaplan and Norton 1996b, c). I agree with the authors regarding the 
complexity present in environments such as an airliner and in today's organisations at a 
strategic level. I also agree that senior management requires the full battery of 
instrumentation to guide theirjoumey'. 
Concerns do however exist which support my own view that the level of complexity involved 
in the scorecard might impact on and limit its full deployment throughout the different 
organisational structures. Mannochehri (1999: 7) however, suggests how these concerns could 
be addressed through educating the user: 
"Often when the measures are not used, it is due to managers' lack of understanding 
regarding the impact of their actions and the decisions on the measures. Also, 
managers might be confused about how to combine and reconcile the financial and 
non-financial measures ". 
Schneiderman (1999: 8) offers a different perspective on the problem suggesting that: 
"If the goal is too low, we will underachieve relative to our potential. If the goal is too 
high, we will underperform relative to other's expectations ". 
Clearly reactions such as these pose a significant threat to any successful scorecard 
implementation and raise questions regarding how measures facilitate or restrict both 
intellectual capital and learning (Shulver et al., 2000; Sedecon Consulting 1997). To explain 
the learning and feedback process Kaplan and Norton (1996a) focus on both the single and 
double-loop theories. This is to demonstrate how the scorecard could be used to link strategy 
to appropriate actions by following four distinctive processes providing the means whereby 
learning and knowledge could be developed. The single-loop learning process incorporated the 
initial three stages of 'translating the vision' and 'communicating and linking' leading to 
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'business planning'. during which 'the objective remains constant'. The double-loop learning 
element of the scorecard provides the fourth element where feedback and learning' enables 
the business to react as 'conditions change'. Clearly a system as diverse and inter-linked as 
that positioned does not come without some level of risk or complexity. This consideration is 
adequately addressed by Ghalayini and Noble (1996: 77), through their citation and reference to 
Gregory (1993) in which he stated that "clearly much work would need to go on below the 
level of the 'scorecard' to provide systems which could deliver generally rather aggregated 
measures ". 
In the same year Kaplan and Norton (I 996a: 8 0) provide an insight into how the alignment and 
cascade of the scorecard could be achieved through three distinctive information/measurement 
levels, supporting their explanation with an example classified as a 'personal scorecard' 
including: 
Corporate objectives and measures 
Corporate targets into targetsfor each business unit 
[nere the] company asks individuals and teams to anticipate which of their own 
objectives would be consistent with the business unit and corporate objectives, as well as 
what initiatives they would take to achieve their objective ". 
Within the personal scorecard at the third level, individuals and teams were asked to explain 
and describe how their own objectives would support and underpin the strategic and business 
unit, in particular focusing on what initiatives they would pursue to meet their objectives. This 
does raise some questions, as clearly within the first two stages practitioners can identify a 
recognised process that provides a line of sight throughout the different levels in the 
organisation. The third level is open to debate with some organisations imposing specific 
objectives and targets to achieve the desired line of sight, while others support a process of 
consultation and negotiation. 
An area as controversial as this will generate conflicting ideas. Alternatively, Schneirderman 
(1999: 8) comments that scorecard goals should not be negotiated but based "on knowledge of 
the required corrective actions, or absent that knowledge the capabilities of the improvement 
process. " Schneiderman developed this. discussion further by suggesting that where 
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connections could not be achieved 'fuzzy linkages between scorecards can be made". In the 
same year, Niven (1999) re-confirms that to create a line of sight in an organisation, linkages 
need to be realised throughout the different levels. The latter proposition however, could affect 
the stability and robustness of a line of sight between objectives. This could particularly be the 
case, if we consider what Shulver et al., (2000) term as the emergence of ýpost-hoc'cause-and- 
effect interactions, which could lead to the emergence of adverse levels of frustration, 
confusion and apprehension between the different levels and individuals. Clearly the method 
and means of cascading the scorecard throughout the different levels is the subject of some 
controversy and discussion. Particular examples are available, although as previously stated 
they fall within the domain of case studies. (See footnote 7) 
2.7 Impact and Reactions of Individuals to Measurement 
The literature readily accepts that performance measurement (at either an individual or process 
level) ultimately has behavioural implications for those exposed to or required to use the 
system. Authors proposing this view include Kaplan and Norton, (1992,1996a, 1996c); Neely 
et aL, (1997,2000); De Waal (2002a, 2002b, 2002c); Epstein and Manzoni, (1997); Neely, 
(1999); Slottj e, (2000) and Neely and Bourne, (2000), to name but a few. 
An informative insight regarding this interaction is provided by Bourne (1999: 23) through his 
suggestion that "measuring performance explicitlyfocuses attention " which he implies in turn 
"influences behaviour". Similarly, Neely (1999: 212), discusses what he sees as a powerful 
link between performance measures and strategy, commenting that if alignment is correct, the 
data provided by the measures indicates, "whether the strategy is being implemented" as well 
as encouraging "behaviours consistent with the strategy". The transition to or indeed 
maintenance of this desired state of alignment and integration between strategy, measures and 
individual objectives is recognized as dynamic and difficult to maintain (Stiles et al., 1997). 
Footnote (7) Kaplan published two approaches explored within the "Mobir' series of case studies, where he classifies the 
"Super Bowl" and 'Tersonal" approaches with a particular emphasis on strategy, communication and employee feedback 
within the organisation. An example of the latter approach has been previously discussed 
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Issues such as changes in strategic focus, (Stiles et al., 1997) ability to impact on or influence 
measures, levels of understanding and complexity (Dimesh and Palmer, 1998) as well as 
poorly defined measures (Neely, 1999), emerge as themes, applying behavioural pressure on 
individuals' level of engagement and psychological reactions to measurement systems. Viken 
(1995: 7) adeptly summarizes these inter-relationships into what may be seen as engagement 
through (measurement) and resulting consequence (behaviours) through his reflection that "as 
long as results are targeted, behaviours are going to be involved". 
Similarly, Neely et al., (1997: 113 6) propose that, "the way performance is measured - affects 
how people behave". These considerations point towards what I recognise as a level of 
awareness from the literature that in all interactions there will ultimately be consequential 
behavioural issues emerging as either a positive, neutral or negative outcome. It needs to be 
understood that this interaction can also fluctuate between the different levels of engagement 
and psychological recognition dependent on both past and present experiences of those 
exposed to, or required to use the measurement process. 
Importantly within these two papers, the actual measurement process is discussed with Viken 
(1995: 7), focusing on the sequential act of measurement citing the work of Daniels (1989) who 
indicates that "both results and behaviours " need to be identified and measured, where 
"results should always be measured first". Neely and his colleagues (1997: 1136) take the 
debate one step further arguing for what has previously been discussed as the 'golden rule' of 
performance measurement whereby they propose that "there is no point measuring someone 
on something over which they have no control". 
Within a similar context De Waal (2002c: 16) later suggests that; 
"Passive performance measurement needs to be replaced with pro-active, results orientated 
performance management in order to create performance driven behaviour". 
Four reflections underpin De Waal's (2002c: 16) argument that where behavioural engagement 
is nurtured 
1) Yhe objectives of all management levels have to be aligned with the mission and 
strategy of the organization. 
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2) Yhese objectives are translated into clear expectations regarding the performance of 
employees. 
3) Employees know how to fuyz'l the expectations and they know what kind of support 
they can expectfrom management. 
4) The set of human resource instruments (performance review, incentives, training and 
development) are attuned to the realization of the organizations objectives. 
Failure to pay attention to the previous suggestions would nurture levels of negativity and 
neutrality from either side of the measurement spectrum. An insight into the possible 
emergence of dysfunctional situations or behaviours is clearly evident in De Waal's (2002b) 
assertion that managers are frequently overlooked when new performance measurement 
systems are set up, As a result of this, managers can be "incited to display counterproductive 
behaviors " (De Waal, 2002b: 3 3). Likewise Neely et al., (1997: 1132) discuss the problems 
associated with poorly "designed performance measures" and comment that "they can result 
in dysfunctional behaviour". Importantly as previously discussed above, Neely et al., 
(2000: 113 1) summarises these conflicts where; 
"The real challenges for managers come once they have developed their robust 
measurement system, for then they must implement the measures. As soon as they seek 
to do so, they encounterfear, politics and subversion. Individuals begin to worry that 
the measures might expose their shortcomings. Differentpeople seek to undermine the 
credibility of the measures in different ways. Some seek to game the system. Others 
seek to prevent it ever being implemented". 
In trying to understand why these issues might occur, in my review of the literature I have 
found myself repeatedly drawn to Viken's (1995: 4) paper and his extensive review and citation 
of the work of Daniels (1989), which includes a referral to four barriers to measurement: 
1: "People think that somejobs cannot be measured. " 
2: "People think that measures are hard to work with. 
3: "Traditional thinking of measurement [is seen] as an antecedentforpunishment. 
4: "That applying measurement systems is time consuming and takes time away from 
other more important issues ". 
Stiles et aL, (1997: 60-61) in addition, discuss three distinct problem areas, which arise in 
relation to achieving the aligmnent and linkage between organizational strategy, values and 
setting of objectives, identifying that; 
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Firstly, "the short-term demands of the business meant that in some cases, the targets 
expressed in term of corporate values were given low priority by managers who saw the real 
goal as satisfying budgetary orfinancial targets. This resulted in a virtual two-tier value 
system, with many employees still clinging to the old beliefframework (forget the message 
about quality-produce the income ) ". 
Secondly, "the experience of change which all the firms were undergoing rendered some 
targets set at the beginning of the year inappropriate or unrealistic before the year end" 
Thirdly, "the issue of who sets the objectives was important to the perceived effectiveness of 
target setting" , In the case study, "companies objectives were generally set by the employee's boss, not as the result of negotiation. The objectives, therefore, tended to be viewed as 
imposed, and there was a consequent dijficulty in employees being motivated by them ". 
The points raised by the authors are dynamic and informative, and provide a robust and 
rounded overview of pressures impacting on behaviours with similarities and linkages evident 
in both groupings. In this respect it is felt that the areas positioned are important, as any one or 
combination of these perceptions or experiences could nurture instances of dysfunctional 
behaviour as previously discussed by Neely et aL, (2000). 
The need to understand the reasons behind these barriers is becoming increasingly apparent 
with Bourne (1999: 23) proposing two fundamental questions: 1) "what behaviour will result 
from the introduction of this measure? " and 2) "is this behaviour desirable? " At an 
engagement level, Holloway (2000: 11) provides an informative description from a 
psychological and perceptual viewpoint of the increasing motivational impact of performance 
measurement through her reflections that "most managers are now seIr-conscious about their 
own performance and how it is associated with corporate level successes andfailures ". This 
reflection clearly links back to Neely et al's., (2000) identification of dysfunctional 
behaviours. Are there any other reactions, which, we could expect? 
The extent to which individuals are aware of these inter-relationships and pressures is 
becoming increasingly apparent with De Waal (2002c: 9) suggesting that "as mostpracticing 
managers know, measures drive management behaviour" particularly if as he suggests, they 
are underpinned by "reward systems. " As an enabler this does not come without some level of 
behavioural and psychological risk, which is recognized by Winstanley and Stuart-Smith 
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(1996: 70) who propose that some individuals may seek to play the "system" thereby "being 
rewardedfor meeting performance objectives, while still undermining performance overall". 
Further support for this view can be seen in Neely et al's., (2000) dysfunctional positioning, as 
well as in Neely et al's., (1997: 32) citation of Hopwood's (1984) suggestion that measurement 
systems involving humans have a behavioural consequence whereby individuals will "'modify 
their behaviours in an attempt to ensure positive performance outcomes even if this means 
pursuing inappropriate courses ofaction ". 
On the opposite side of the behavioural and engagement spectrum Kaplan and Norton 
(1996b: 77) focus on instances where they foresee "individuals and departments [who] 
unknowingly sub-optimize their performance, " nurtured through what they argue to be 
wrongly designed scorecard models. In reality sub-optimism problems do not solely reside 
simply in the domain of wrongly designed models, for the design could be appropriate but 
problems then occur with the actual identification, alignment and achievement of individual 
and team objectives. Neely et al., (1997: 1133) provide a different angle to the debate, 
criticising organizations for failing to consider the 'behavioural ramifications' in the design of 
measures. They support this argument through an observation of a conflict of issues in a case 
study environment where they conclude that: 
"Yhe problems in this business was not that the measures were wrong per se, but that the 
behaviours they were likely to induce in thisparticular setting had not been considered". 
in both Schneiderman (1988,1999: 8) papers, a critical discussion is undertaken in relation to 
these problems explored by the author's reflection that when goals are set, both "the 
knowledge and means of achieving them needs to be understood, " which he implies in the 
majority of cases is not in existence. This leads Schneiderman (1999: 8) to propose that in 
situations such as these "if the goal is too low, we will underachieve relative to our potential" 
and on the opposite side of the argument that "if the goal is too high, we will under perform 
relative to other's expectations ". 
The role and involvement of individuals has increasingly emerged in the previous debates and 
reflections as a key-enabling factor. Importantly, Kaplan and Norton (1996b: 77) described the 
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scorecards enabling an enviromnent of 'shared understanding' in which they propose that, 
"employees are able to see how they can contribute to organizational success". 
Schneiderman (1999: 9) expresses a similar perspective, in concurring that the deployment and 
management of scorecards is a 'major activity' whereby "goals needed to be disaggregated 
and deployed downward". This provides individual employees with the means to understand 
the wider organizational picture, an enabling factor which Schneirderman (1999: 9) suggests 
will allow individuals to "share in the knowledge of their contribution to the organizations 
overall success ". The key message that seems to be emerging from both Kaplan and Norton 
(1996b) and Schneirderman's (1999) positioning, is that any disparity, friction or 
misinterpretation between the elements of 'understanding, knowledge and contribution' would 
potentially provide the triggers whereby psychological and behavioural problems occur at 
either a covert or overt level. 
The following authors provide an insight arising across these areas. Mannochehri (1999: 7) 
explains that: 
"Often when the measures are not used, it is due to manager's lack of understanding of the 
impact of their actions and the decisions on the measures [where] Managers might be 
confused about how to combine and reconcile thefinancial and non-financial measures ". 
Neely (1999: 206) provides a different angle, focusing on issues related to poorly defined 
measures identified during a case study where he reflects that: 
"It is not unusual to observe two people heatedly arguing over some dimension of 
performance and laterfind that the root cause of their disagreement was the imprecise 
definition of a measure ". 
In a recent study of three organisations, De Waal (2002a, 2002b: x) focuses on identifying key 
behavioural factors, which he suggests, "contributed to the successful implementation and use 
of a performance management system ". In the development of the model De Waal (2002a, 
2002b: 61) initially identifies and classifies 40 behavioural factors that arguably displayed a 
positive contribution in relation to the "starting (S), development (D) and use stage (U) " of the 
performance management system under review. The research concludes that from the original 
40 factors, 18 emerged as requiring 'special attention'. Please refer to Table 6 overleaf, 
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Table 6- Overview Of Important Behavioural Factors 
Classification Area of Attention to Behavioural Factors 
Scheme Part 
Managers' understanding -A D4 Managers understand the meaning of KPI's. 
Performance good understanding by managers D7 Managers have insight into the relationship between 
management of the nature ofperformance business processes and CSF's/KPI's 
system management. U7 Managers' frames of reference contain similar KPI's. U21 Managers' agree on changes in the CSF/KPl set. 
Managers' attitude -A positive S2 Managers agree on the starting time. 
Controlled attitude ofmanagers toward S4 Managers have earlier (positive) experiences with 
system performance management, performance management. 
toward a performance U13 Managers realize the importance of CSF's/KPI'&/BSC to 
management system and toward their performance. 
project U14 Managers do not experience CSF's/KPI's/BSC as 
threatening. 
Performance management D9 Managers' KPI sets are aligned with their responsibility 
Controlling system alignment -A good areas. 
system match between managers' D13 Managers can influence KPI's assigned to them. 
responsibilities and the U9 Managers are involved in making analysis. 
performance management system. U15 Managers can use their CSF's/KPI's/BSC for managing 
their employees. 
Organisational Culture -An U23 Managers' results on CSF's/KPI's/BSC are openly 
Internal organisational culturefocused on communicated. 
environment using the performance U22 Managers are stimulated to improve their performance. 
management system. U8 Managers trust performance information. 
U17 Managers clearly see the promoter using the performance 
. management system. Performance management D16 Managers find the performance management system 
External system focus -A clearfocus, of relevant because it has a clear internal control purpose. 
environment the performance management D17 Managers find the performance management system 
system on internal management relevant because only those stakeholders' interests that are 
and control. important to the organisations' success are incorporated. 
Source: De Waal (2002a: 162) 
importantly within the framework the author identifies the use stage which, subsequently 
emerged as the "most important to the success of the performance management system. " He 
supported his argument with the reflection that as the stages are 'executed sequentially' each 
stage has to be completed prior to moving on to the next stage with the final usage stage 
requiring continuous monitoring "to ensure regular use of the performance management 
system ". The author concludes with the realization that the complexity and scope of the 
research may have excluded ýpotentially important' behavioural. factors, where it is reasoned 
that fixther research is was required. 
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2.7.1 Emotions and Attitudes 
As discussed above, individuals' reactions to and engagement with measures and measurement 
systems will ultimately generate or nurture functional or dysfunctional reactions and attitudes 
at either a neutral or negative level. It necessary to draw upon the cognitive and behavioural 
literature found within the customer service dimension to underpin the limited examples 
provided by the performance management literatures. 
in understanding how these mindsets occur, it is useful to reflect on what Osgood (1949) cited 
in Cheetharn and Chivers (2001: 262) terms 'negative transfer' against which the authors 
focused on how past learning and experiences impacted on the learning of a new skill. 
Similarly, in a study of the customer experience in the service industry, Li1jander and Standvik 
(1997: 155) comment that 'ýpast experiences may affect perceived emotions positively or 
negatively, " expanding their explanation to show that what was viewed as the "last strawfor 
one customer", might not be the case with another individual who might tolerate a given 
situation. Importantly within the paper, the authors also highlight the urgent need for a more 
qualitative approach to understanding emotional dimensions and the dynamic environment 
within which they emerge. 
Although these occurrences and recommendations relate to the external customer 
environment, human nature would suggest that similar emotions and attitudes would transpose 
into an internal organisational and customer environment exposed to measurement. This 
would therefore provide justification for the progression of the authors' recommendations 
within the confines of my current research agenda. The means whereby the processing and 
interpretation of information by individuals is undertaken is an intricate and complex process 
affected by numerous experiences, situations and events. Johnson and Zinkhan (1991: 6) 
provide a descriptive view of the complexity of this interaction through their consideration 
that: 
"Ae evaluation and use o information are coloured by one's emotional response to specific f 
situations. Affect also influences memory accessibility and recall. Personal experiences 
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involving intense emotional reaction, positive or negative, are both more assessable to recall 
and more speedily recalled". 
hnportantly they provide (ibid: 8) greater depth of understanding to their explanation through 
the citation of the work of Robinson (1990) to highlight that: 
"Emotion-laden experiences are more likely recalled than more recent experiences that are 
emotionally neutral ". 
Throughout the discussions, direct linkages can be made with cognitive (thinking), affective 
(feeling) and behavioural theories (Lessern and Baruch 1999) as well as Cheetharn and Chivers 
(2001) exploration of the retrieval of past experiences and impact of 'negative transfer' 
against these experiences. It is within the customer satisfaction domains (Stauss and Neuhaus 
1997; Johnson and Zinkham, 1991) that the research primarily in relation to emotions, 
attitudes and behaviours draws from and is expanded within the methodology section in 
relation to the positioning of the methodological approach applied in this thesis. It is however 
useful at this stage to understand within the literature review how the relevant stages interact. 
This is best viewed through Durhan et al., (1989: 5) who devised a framework based on the 
general attitude model suggesting that: 
"Attitude toward change in general consists of a person's cognition about change, affective 
reactions to change, and behavioural tendency toward change. Attitude toward a specific 
change consists of a person's cognitions about change, affective reactions to that change and 
behavioural tendency toward that change". 
The explanation (although detailed in nature), clearly shows the complexity of the human 
conceptualization process, flowing through the thinking and feeling stages of an interaction 
which in turn, subsequently impacts on and influences individual's varying degrees of positive 
and negative reactions in relation to their behavioural attitudes and mindsets. The diversity of 
this subject is a topic that is exposed to a vast variation of models, approaches and 
interpretations within which what people think and feel about something can be hard to 
distinguish. The extremities to which these swings are likely to occur in relation to the 
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research undertaken is best viewed against Stauss and Neuhaus's (1997: 242-243) description 
of five cognitive and affective "customer satisfaction types: " 
1: Optimism - Confidence 
2: Steadiness - Trust 
3: Disappointment - Indecision 
4: Protest - Opposition 
5: Indifference - Resignation 
Further understanding of emotional reactions likely to be encountered is provided by LiIjander 
and Strandvik (1997) through their focus on seven emotional characteristics which they see as 
ranging from the positive states of 'happy, hopeful and positively surprised' through to levels 
of negativity in relation to the feelings of 'angry, depressed, guilty and humiliated'. 
Both sets of groupings from the authors provide a valuable insight into clearly identifiable 
cognitive types and emotional states. It is useful however to consider the emergence and 
positioning of relevant behavioural and emotional states from within the performance 
management literature. As discussed earlier, De Waal (2002a, 2002b) positioned 18 
behavioural factors seen as important in the "successful implementation and use of a 
performance management system, " thereby providing an extensive grounding of the positive 
states needed in performance management. To understand the negative side it is necessary to 
draw upon the literature previously discussed, to allow patterns to be identified. This has been 
consolidated into Table 7 (overleaf) and will be critically assessed in greater depth in 
conjunction with the work of De Waal (2002a, 2002b), in the later positioning of a suitable 
research framework. 
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Table 7- Emotional And Behavioural Traits Emerging From Performance Literature 
Source Emotional and Behavioural CHARACTERISTICS 
Kaplan and Norton (2004) Cultuic 
Neely et al., (2000) Culture, politics, difficulty and consequence of measurement, effort 
and time to access data, problems with applying process 
De Waal (2002b) Understanding, attitude, culture 
Strebler et al., (ý00 I Targets perceived as unfair, imposed, reducing motivational impact. 
Dangayach and Deshmukh (2001) Culture 
Malina and Selto (2001 Disagreement, tension. 
Neely et al., (2000) Encounter fear, politics, subversion, expose shortcomings, some seek to undermine 
measures or play the system whist some seek to prevent it being implemented. 
Bourne et al., (2000) Threatened, hinder, changing power bases 
Lipe and Salterio (2000) Cognitive difficulty in using BSC 
Stivers and Joyce (2000) Culture 
ATKINSON and HOLDEN (2000) Culture, values, time consuming, bureaucratic 
Mooraj et al., (1999) Culture, values 
Neely and Bourne (2000) Frustration, time lag, no rationale or logic for measures, lack of understanding of 
priorities, politics, threatened by measures, big stick, culture of blame, play 
numbers game, management use of measurement data to score points over other 
managers and illustrate why they are failing to perform, individuals do not want 
measurement data to become available. 
Clemente and Greenspan (1999) Culture 
Sedecon Consulting Q 999) Politics, cultural differences 
Mannochehri (1999) Lack of understanding, confusion 
Neely (1999) Arguing over poorly defined measurement dimension 
Schneiderman (1999) Frustration 
_ Hatry (1999) Accountability 
Niven (1999) Skepticism, intimidation 
Dinesh and Palmer (1998) Complexity, time 
Neely et al., (1997) Individuals encouraged to peruse inappropriate methods of behaviour due to 
calculation method 
Stiles et al., (1997) Old belief system, imposes objectives, lack of negotiation, disenchantment, un- 
achievability of objectives, job security, lack of motivation, resentment, yearly 
raised objectives, appraisal system, reward, career development. 
Epstein and Manzoni (1997) Protectionism of turf and power base, increased transparency, threat 
Winstanley and Stuart-Smith (1996) Play the system; individuals are treated as ends to themselves or means to an end. 
Kaplan and Norton (I 996b) Confusing, values (all relate to traditional performance measures) 
Ghalayini and Noble (1996) Difficult to understanding, frustrating, dissatisfaction, irrelevant, complex, 
motivation (all relate to traditional performance measures) 
Daniels (1989) 
cited in Viken (1995) 
Perception that jobs cannot be measured, measures arc hard to work with, 
measurement is an antecedent for punishment, time consuming taking time away 
from other more important things. 
Schmenner and Vollmann (1994) Frustration 
Eccles (199 1) Culture 
Schneiderman (1988) Frustration, resentment 
Source: Compendium adapted from within the literature 
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2.7.2 Cultural Influence on Measurement 
The definitions addressed in Table 7 clearly demonstrate an increasing emergence of culture as 
a consideration from the late 1990's onwards with referrals contained in numerous 
publications. Please refer to footnote 8 below. These occurrences are even more critical if we 
reflect on Schein's (1984) assertion that as managers of people we need to make sense of the 
culture within which individuals operate in. This is a research consideration that is becoming 
increasingly evident in more recent research (Neely et aL, 2000; De Waal 2002a, 2002b, 
2002c) therefore underpinning my own decision to include a section on culture in the literature 
review. 
I would also suggest that historically in relation to my own experience and previous (MBA) 
research, the evidence points to the fact that Royal Mail does not follow Scheins' (1984) 
recommendation. Cultural issues are likely to be experienced during the research process. A 
consideration which I do not position lightly, yet is worryingly underpinned by Ellis (1998: 
224), is the assertion that cultural factors where seen as the "root cause of many of the 
problemsfacing the organization, " within which he concludes that there exists a culture and 
sub culture that is strong and slow to change supporting the states of "continuity, stability and 
adherence to procedure". Importantly the author asserts that these factors do not mutely 
support the entry into an increasingly risky commercial and uncertain competitive 
environment. Ellis (1998: 23 1) proposes that managers: 
01 
... are 
faced with a gargantuan task of enticing a culture that is positively resistant to 
change, to be come responsive and adaptable and capable of accepting the 'new rules of the 
business' without tearing itsetfopart ". 
From this publication two fundamental questions arise against which this current research 
initiative intends to answer: 
Footnote 8 Literature sources discussing culture in Table 7 (Clemente and Greenspan 1999; Neely and Bourne 2000; Mooraj 
et al., 1999; Atkinson and Holden, 2000; Stivers and Joyce, 2000; Dangayach and Deshmukh, 2001; De Waal 2002a, 2002b; 
Neely et al., 2000). 
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1) Firstly, does this cultural state or resistance to change still exist restricting the ability of the 
organisation to deploy and use a unit based scorecard, or has it changed sufficiently to 
support managerial acceptance of the process? 
2) Secondly, in relation to Kaplan and Norton's (1992) assertion that a balanced scorecard 
underpins strategy and vision through measurements designed to pull individuals toward 
the overall vision, to what extent can such an initiative be realised? 
Importantly, Atkinson and Holden (2000: 10) identify the cultural linkage in balanced 
scorecards, which they portray as 'unlocking the secret. In developing this concept they 
criticize existing performance management models for being bureaucratic, implying that they 
describe a "one way is best" approach: 
"Clarity between enablers and results is often unclear, the processes for diagnosing the 
required changes being time consuming, confusing and bureaucratic and the means to 
examine and improve existingprocesses are less than tangible or credible ". 
To counter this gap, the authors focused on the linkages between vision, values, culture and 
behaviours, proposing that the link between visions and KPI's needs to be more easily 
understood where, "each layer drives the la er below, " y in such a way that vision and values 
are in harmony, so that rational and 'coherent strategies and goals'can be developed. 
A similar stance is seen in Sadri and Lees' (2001: 853) later proposition that to be effective an 
organisation's culture "must be aligned with employee values and be consistent with the 
environment in which the organisation works, " concluding their argument with the 
consideration that 'ýpositive cultures can provide a significant competitive advantage ". 
Significantly in the same context, Greenberg and Baron (1997) provide empirical linkages 
back to the cognitive literature through their identification of attitudes, values and expectations 
as constituting a corporate culture. To maintain this level of equilibrium or alignment across 
the different dimensions is a volatile and difficult balance to achieve and (more importantly), 
to sustain. As Torrington et aL, (1989) suggest, if organizations do not fully comprehend or 
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understand their own cultures a misalignment between action and culture may bring about 
inadequate action. Sedecon Consulting (1999) on the other hand, highlight the risk in relation 
to trying to compare units with cultural differences, which could cause incorrect decisions to 
be taken and directions pursued. The difficulties associated with introducing and embedding 
change as part of any improvement activates can be seen in Atkinson and Holdens (2000: 6) 
descriptive view of changes were: 
"Change is sustained only when people in the organization take ownership. It is unlikely to 
happen by accident or default. Yhe direction and reasonsfor change need to be bound within 
the culture so that change becomes the culture and is considered as health and natural, " 
Stivers and Joyce (2000) discuss the issue of accountability (a key aspect of any scorecard). 
These authors propose that if a culture is receptive to change, then a move to increased 
individual accountability may not be a major issue. However, they highlight the fact that if this 
is not the case, then increased accountability could seem threatening, again raising my own 
concerns when I reflect back to Ellis' (1998) entrenched view of the culture in Royal Mail. 
When reading these articles I found the following comment from Atkinson and Holden's 
(2000: 9) particularly helpful in encompassing my own experiences as the real drivers of 
everyday human behavioural, emotional and psychological reactions. As well as the messages 
being conveyed in the previous author's explanations: 
"We value what we do, and we do what we value ". 
In trying to understand how this reflection and the issues discussed impact on managerial 
behaviours, it is useful to consider a number of the key themes from the cultural and 
motivational literatures as they apply to the research. Firstly, in the cultural domain, Mooraj, et 
aL, (1999: 487) identify and discuss three cultural levels or dimensions which they suggest 
will impact on the Balanced Scorecard concluding that: 
The primary impact of "national culture" affects how organizations develop their "approach 
to financial performance, " influenced through the dominance of one off two "cultural 
paradigms " 1) "stakeholder approach " and 2) "shareholder wealth, " both of which they 
suggest "will have an influence not only on the development of the Balanced Scorecard, but 
also on its acceptance ". 
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"At an 'occupational culture' level the authors recognized that the Balanced Scorecard would 
be impacted on by "what" are seen as "traditions. " In developing the debate further they 
commented that some professions have uniquely "defined cultures" which they suggest are 
constituted of "unstated inforinal rules. " The authors propositioned that Balanced 
Scorecards that endeavour "to usefornial indicators to change behaviour and go against these 
traditions " are "likely to be unsuccessful. " 
The final cultural level resides within an "organizational" context. Within this dimension the 
authors concluded that Balanced Scorecards could be impacted upon both negatively and 
positively by organizational cultures. 
In a paper published in the same month, Clemente and Greenspan (1999: 12) provide a similar 
yet more descriptive account of culture entwined in what they see as the 'three basic 
determinants'of culture: 
Structurally; "culture is determined b the size, age and history of the company, the Y 
industry in which it operates; the geographic location; and whether it is a product or service 
provider". 
Politically, "culture is defined by the distribution or power and the primary modes of 
managerial decision making. A company's political composition sets the tone that impacts 
employees'activities and contributes to how peoplefeel towards their role ". 
Emotionally; "culture is defined as the collective thought, habits, attitudes, feeling, and 
patterns ofbehaviour". 
It would be logical to conclude that tensions exist between and within the different cultural 
levels. Importantly Mooraj et aL, (1999) focus on this turbulence and the dominance of the 
national and occupational cultures over organizational culture, citing Collins and Porras (1994) 
to show that this tension can be reversed in situations where strong organizational cultures 
exist. 
The level of cultural influence, integration and impregnation throughout all organizational 
levels is well documented. Bowman and Asch (1987: 297) imply that "elements of culture will 
rangefrom attitudes and opinions ... endorsed by senior management through to the canteen 
facilities ". If these instances are considered further and in conjunction with the emotional and 
behavioural situations contained in Table 7, then they could easily fall and be categorised 
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11 , 
against what Handy (1981 cited in Bowman and Asch 1987: 297-298) prescribes as his four 
types of organizational culture: power, role, task andperson. 
Support for this debate - as well as the means whereby cultural states are identified - is 
discussed by Schein (1981,1984) where culture exists as the basic assumptions and beliefs that 
members share in an organization and as such they permeate and can be assessed at a number 
of different levels which he classifies into sub sets recognized as 1) visible artefacts and 
creations, 2) values and ideology that govern behaviour and 3) underlying assumptions. As 
part of the debate, Schein (1981,1984) explains that to fidly understand culture as well as 
group values and overt behaviours, it is necessary to look into the underlying assumptions 
which although generally are at an unconscious level, establish how we perceive, think and 
feel. 
2.8 Research Framework 
The initial section of this thesis identified the gaps in current practitioner and academic 
knowledge, and the research focus of the current investigation. The output from this section 
was closely linked with the preceding discussions and the literature review. In this section I 
draw upon my own personal experience as a manager, and seek to rationalise the key findings 
from these preceding discussions, developing and positioning a holistic case for an appropriate 
research structure. It is within the developed framework, linking performance strategy, 
performance measurement system, and the performance experience to both behavioural and 
emotional consideration that the specific issues of concern are to be analysed (see figure 1 
overleao. 
79 
Figure I- The Performance Environment 
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Emotional and Behavioural 
Reactions 
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Source: Adapted from within the literature. 
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I believe the benefits to be derived from adopting this approach are twofold. Firstly, it has 
enabled me to develop my own interpretation of the theoretical themes as they apply to actual 
practice, against which a provisional framework (Performance Environment) has been 
compiled. Secondly, through the involvement of a number of my managers as co-participants, I 
will be in a position to critically test and review the initial assumptions from which the 
framework was developed. Taking both of these benefits into account, I feel that this approach 
provides greater potential for interpretation than theoretical based alternatives. 
Whilst the actual nature and task of an individual's engagement within the unit based 
scorecard (performance experience) is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5,1 believe it is first 
necessary to position and explore the performance environment along with the 
interdependencies within which the co-participants will be required to operate. My rationale 
for this is that I believe an important consideration exists within the environmental context, 
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whereby performance strategy, its measurement system, along with the performance 
experience activities represented in the framework are emotionally and behaviourally 
interlinked. As such the theory explored focuses on these interconnections as they cannot be 
considered in isolation due to substantial interaction and iteration. 
Performance Strategy: It has been clearly established that the means by which organisations 
deploy strategy and manage their objectives and tasks, as well as control performance through 
a review procedure, should be considered part of the performance management process (Bititci 
et al., 1997: 23). This is represented in my own framework in the form of a BSC, underpinned 
by selected KPIs and associated measures relating to the Shareholder, Customer and Employee 
performance dimensions. 
In the case of the implementation of performance management systems like the balanced 
scorecard, we might expect the problems to be evident to a greater extent in large 
organisations. Here, full scale deployment can be attempted, as prescribed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1996b), who envisage three very distinct information/measurement levels within an 
organisation, and support their explanation with an example of a 'personal scorecard'. In this 
example, at the third level individuals and teams where most of the research encounter occurs, 
are asked to describe how their own objectives would support both the strategic and business 
unit objectives and targets, and what initiatives they would pursue in order to ensure these 
where achieved. Accordingly the centrally devised strategy deployment process applied by 
Royal Mail closely aligns to Kaplan and Norton's (1996a: 80) recommended dissemination 
with: 
corporate objectives and measures (Royal Mail National). 
corporate targets into targets for each business unit (Delivery, Processing and 
Distribution BSCs). 
> business unit targets interpreted by individuals and teams into their objectives. 
Clearly the desired outcome as shown is to disseminate (Niven, 1999), segregate and 'cascade 
downwards' (Schneiderman, 1999) objectives and measures to achieve a line of sight 
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throughout the different scorecard levels. How managers and their teams at the unit level react 
both behaviourally and emotionally is expected to have a critical impact on the overall 
effectiveness and success of the performance strategy, its measurement system and overall 
performance management across the organisation. 
It is widely held that at all levels a correctly designed BSC is critical, and should demonstrate a 
clear balance between both financial and non-financial measures and their associated KPIs. 
Kaplan and Norton (1972: 72-79) have stated that when this is the case, individuals are not 
only positively controlled and drawn towards the overall strategic vision by focusing on a 
number of carefully selected measures contained on personal (unit) scorecards, but also 
develop a greater understanding of the resulting interrelationships. They then argue (see 
Kaplan and Norton 1996b: 65) that when this is not the case an opposite adverse effect is likely 
to occur. 
Reflecting back on the literature, there are many examples which provide some insight into 
why the latter situation may ultimately surface, particularly with regards to a large network 
organisation. Sedecon Consulting (1997: 4-6) discusses problems associated with 'verification 
of cause-and-effect relationships between strategic objectives and measures, and in turn 
decisions relating to which trade offs to pursue over others'. With this in mind, the more 
probable areas where misunderstanding, defensiveness and conflict are likely to be 
encountered in the centrally imposed performance strategy, will undoubtedly reside where 
network interfaces and functions occur within the performance environment. 
Performance Measurement System: As with performance strategy, it has been well 
established that the means by which individuals are managed within a strategic performance 
process falls within the domain of a measurement system. As previously discussed, the 
literature suggests that this should not only provide a clear 'line of sight linkages between the 
various business levels' (Keegan et aL, 1989), but also clarification regarding measurement 
deftitions, focus and results. 
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The question of which form this constitutes, has been the subject of much scholarly debate. It 
is however, possible to clarify both content and context by referring to the invaluable work of 
Neely et al, (1997) and Hudson et al, (200 1), who through a process of extensive consolidation 
identified what they saw as the core elements of such a PMS. It is with these recommendations 
in mind that our experiences can be best examined within the framework of the design 
characteristic of a 'good' performance measurement system (ibid). A PMS should be: 
> Derived from strategy 
> Clearly defined with an explicit purpose 
> Relevant and easy to maintain 
> Simple to understand 
> Provide fast and accurate feedback 
> Link operations to strategic goals 
> Stimulate continuous improvement 
Performance Engagement: Schneirderman (1999: 8-9) concurs that inconsistencies, 
resistance or misconceptions between the elements of 'understanding, knowledge and 
contribution' are critical, yet are recognised as problematic. This becomes even more evident 
across the above seven characteristics when individuals are faced with the leading/lagging time 
period during which measurement and actions materialise, resulting trade offs are decided 
upon, and consequences of the decisions and actions of themselves or others emerge. 
It can be argued that for this to be effective there is a need not only for 'individual and mutual 
respect, ' but also 'procedural fairness, and 'transparency of decision making' (Winstanley and 
stuart-Smith (1996: 66). 1 consider that the presence of these states through the various levels 
of the BSC will not be confmed to one particular phase (exposure, deployment and use) but 
highly likely be replicated, becoming increasingly important as individuals encounter and 
advance through each of the stages. 
The importance of this is evident when we, acknowledge that any move towards increased 
accountability, which performance management seeks to provide, can be seen as threatening if 
it has not been experienced previously (Stivers and Joyce 2000). Keeping this in mind there is 
a good deal of evidence from the literature to suggest that this is not the case; provided, for 
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example by Viken (1995: 7); Neely et aL, (1997: 6); Stiles et aL, (1997: 4-5) and Neely et aL, 
(2000: 13). Taking all of the above into consideration it seems clear that Schneirdennan 
(1999) based his primary assumptions on the setting of organisational goals, with limited 
detailed expansion into what impact these factors might have, as individuals increasingly 
interact with their KPIs and performance is progressively managed over the performance 
period. Reflecting on my own practitioner experience, I am of the opinion that current 
thinking on the issue is fundamentally flawed. It seems clear to me that initially both sides of 
this spectrum are of equal importance, but I believe that after targets have been set a dominant 
swing will subsequently emerge towards the latter, where individuals interact with their 
performance task, personal scorecards, and review procedure throughout the year. 
Consequently, after the initial setting of scorecard targets I anticipate that the considerations 
discussed will come to play an increasingly significant role in any analysis subsequently 
undertaken. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that when both strategic integration between the various 
BSC levels and the discussed PMS design characteristics' are present within a positive 
perspective, individuals are more likely to react proactively. I feel that each of these 
perspectives provide valuable insights which will inform the research undertaken. I believe my 
use of this approach is consistent with Bourne (1999: 23) and his assumption that 'measuring 
performance explicitly focuses attention' and that as a result 'behaviour is influenced'. 
impact of Behaviours and Emotions: Having established both the management process and 
measurement system, along with what are seen as prerequisites to support their successful use, 
we now need to turn to the behavioural attributes believed to be necessary. It is, however, 
extremely clear from the literature that at the time the research was carried out, this guidance 
was extremely limited in its nature, with only De Waal (2002 a, b, c) having explored the issue 
in any depth. The importance of De Waal's ground breaking research for my own cannot be 
overstated, due to his identification of '18 behavioural factors, ' which he suggests, if present in 
a positive stance, will 'contribute to the success of any commencement, deployment and use' 
(ibid) of a PMS- 
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As a practitioner, I see clear linkages back to the system framework of Hudson et aL, (2001), 
with regards the 'understanding, relevance and stimulation of performance, ' and also when 
both models, which I believe are mutually supportive, are viewed together. The previously 
discussed areas of 'understanding, contribution and knowledge' increasingly emerge as 
probable triggers encouraging either a positive or negative interaction between both the 
behavioural and system domains. 
I believe this, establishes an important point of entry which I can utilise to good effect to 
understand and appreciate the behavioural implications attributable to the exposure, 
deployment and use of the unit BSC. However, I was conscious of the danger of restricting my 
focus, and decided on the need to identify additional probable cognitive and behavioural 
characteristics identified in the literature. I therefore took guidance from both Neely et aL, 
(1997) and Hudson et aL, (2001) with regard to the consolidation of literary discussions, 
developing a compendium of emotional and behavioural traits. It is against this catalogue 
(shown in table 7, p. 74) that I am able to test the assumptions of both groups of authors, and 
also gain some insight and understanding into the changing situations I am likely to encounter. 
From this encounter I predict that at some point in the performance environment either a 
positive or negative attitude or an emotional reaction will emerge that will influence 
behaviour. As discussed in the literature, I believe this can be viewed from two perspectives. 
Evidence suggests that individuals are likely to recall and reflect upon previous experiences 
whether they be 'positive or negative' (LiIjander and Standvik 1997), thus resulting in a 
possible 'transfer effect' (Johnson and Zinkhan 1991; Cheetharn and Chivers 2001). 'In 
addition, a new experience resulting from either immediately encountered stimuli or a gradual 
exposure to either one or many situational triggers may lead to a similar reaction. 
Consequently, I believe that experiences resulting from past, present or future encounters will 
influence the extent to which the scorecard is both viewed and accepted, and ultimately, the 
level of success enjoyed in engagements across, as well as between, the respective KPIs. This 
proposition is supported by Neely et aL (1997: 1136), who have previously argued that 'the 
way performance is measured' will 'affect how people behave. ' This clearly brings into 
question both 'the resulting behavioural outcome and the extent to which it is 'appropriate' 
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(Bourne 1999: 23). When considered in its entirety, the resulting setting provides the 
enviromnent so important to the research engagement. I believe my use of this approach is 
consistent with Bourne (1999: 23) and his assumption that 'measuring performance explicitly 
focuses attention' and that as a result 'behaviour is influenced' 
Together, the performance framework and inter-relationships discussed allow me to take what 
I consider to be a more grounded practitioner based viewpoint. This was made possible by 
drawing from my own practitioner experience to examine current theoretical thinking and what 
I consider to be the gaps in our knowledge. From this I feel that my approach, and that of the 
co-participants, can be critically assessed, and subsequently adapted. The following 
methodology chapter focuses on the design method used to operationalise the framework 
discussed, in order to support my engagement with the co-participants in a live practitioner 
environment. 
2.9 Developments in the Literature 
Due to the timeframe of the research undertaken, I was conscious that subsequent to my 
original review of the literature, framework development and engagement with the co- 
participants, that theoretical and practitioner knowledge would have advanced in a number of 
topical areas. Although these are outside of the scope of the research, they are nevertheless 
important, reinforcing not only a number of findings emerging from the research but also the 
discussed guidelines for organisations to follow. As such, I believe it is prudent to provide a 
descriptive overview of the following emergent concepts: 
Deployment and Cascading of the BSC 
Motivational Consequences 
Linking Rewards to Measures 
Deployment and Cascading the BSC. - Across the literature, it increasingly emerges that when 
deploying a BSC, organisations need to adopt a process whereby objectives and measures, 
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derived from an organisation's strategy, have to be effectively cascaded through the various 
levels. (Moullin et aL, 2007: 285; Assiri et aL, 2006: 946 and Kaplan 2005: 41) The benefits of 
an efficient cascade process to an organisation are well documented. As Decoene and 
Bruggeman (2006: 434) argue, an effective cascade will 'seek to link performance measures to 
a business strategy' leading to what Kaplan (2005: 44) defines as 'alignment through the 
organisation. ' 
Fundamental to achieving this state, Kaplan (2005: 44) focuses upon each of the lower levels in 
turn commenting that these must adopt a process of 'interpretation and customisation to 
specific encountered situations' from which Moullin et aL, (2007: 285) and Assiri et aL, 
(2006: 946) explain 'contributions against the overall targets' need to be clearly defined. It is 
therefore accepted that any cascade will commence from the top radiating downwards, 
however it is recognised (Roest 1997: 163) that it is important to 'include a bottom up 
perspective' in order to ensure as explained by Moullin et aL, (2007: 285) that: 
"Yhe strategies of the organisation reflect the realities of individual departments and 
ofservice users. " 
Consequently, Decoene and Bruggeman (2006: 445) strongly propose that in any cascade, 
although it is necessary to 'translate functional objectives from strategic corporate objectives' 
this should be done with 'limited comprehensive directives' from higher levels regarding how 
to actually achieve them. It is argued by the authors that adoption of this approach will not 
only have a 'motivating effect by empowering lower levels of managers' but also that 
organisations are more likely to benefit from individuals' 'specific knowledge and abilities' 
which may not have emerged if a directive approach had been applied. Adoption of such an 
approach would reduce the possible emergence of Roest's (1997: 164-165) criticism that: 
"One of the major contributors to the problem was the fact that the distance from 
vision to on-the-ground troops was too vast. " 
The risks associated with failing to either adopt or undertake an effective cascade are clearly 
apparent. Decoene and Bruggeman (2006: 444) for instance focus on the fact that if operational 
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objectives aren't translated from strategic objectives, managers may be unable to comprehend 
the nature of the task, and as such, may possibly conceive it as meaningless. Consequently, 
Roest (1997: 164-165) suggested earlier: 
"That the measurement will not be grounded in the strategic objectives of thefirm and 
therefore may drive behaviour in the wrong direction. " 
More recently emerging from her own later reflections, Rooney (2006: 345) suggests that the 
problem is still present: 
"Executive management teams often create company visions and strategies with a 
closed-door approach and then expect employees to execute the plan. nis practice 
results in a lack of ownership and high level of distrust. " 
Importantly when the previous discussions are considered, De Waal (2007a: 182-185) advises 
that 'high performing organisations' not only need to 'create clarity and a common 
understanding' but also importantly, 'everybody' clearly 'understands it' along with the role 
they have to play. Interestingly, developing the debate still fin-ther within the concept of 
'shared understanding' De Waal (2007a: 184) explores the need for 'transparency, openness 
and trust' referring to the term 'uniting the tribe' to explain the need to establish not only a 
collective identity but also a 'shared sense of community' and co-operation. Similarly, based 
on observations made Bititci et aL, (2006: 1344) builds upon this advice, arguing that: 
"Performance measurement is a cross-functional issue. It therefore, requiresjoined-up 
thinking at all levels of the organisation. A functional mind-set can seriously 
undermine the success ofa performance measurement system. " 
It is possible to deduce from the direction offered that both individuals and teams have an 
important role to play within any cascade, where it is suggested by Decoene and Bruggeman 
(2006: 432) that if a 'BSC is to have a positive motivational effect it is necessary for it to be 
strategically aligned'. Clearly, this underpins Moullin's (2007: 181) argument for clear 
measurement clarity to avoid not only possible confusion but also importantly to ensure that 
focus remains directed on 'what matters' and that 'individuals go in the right direction. ' 
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Motivational Consequences: The motivational aspect of both the cascade and alignment 
processes within any deployment has continually surfaced, although to provide a more rounded 
view it needs to be considered more fully. The motivational impact of linking rewards to 
measurement metrics is well recognised (Milne 2007: 28) and will be briefly examined in the 
following session. However, to provide depth of understanding it is first necessary to 
understand not only the likely encountered barriers to motivation in any deployment and 
cascade but foremost the motivational enablers, which will undoubtedly continue in the usage 
stage of any PMS. 
I consider a critical enabler of this to have been defined by Robson (2005: 145), who argues 
that 'individuals within any performance measurement system they are involved in, must 
experience a psychological state of being in-control of the system' and are therefore able to 
exert an influence on performance. As a result of this positive state I believe the emergence of 
proactive levels of ownership and accountability amongst managers is more likely to occur. 
Conversely, Decoene and Bruggeman (2006: 444) counter argue that if individuals are unable 
to exert an influence and/or control the performance measures, reduced motivation emerges as 
they view the PMS as uncontrollable. Considering the view expressed in conjunction with the 
previous discussions, it is reasonable to assume that perceived levels of ownership and 
accountability may likewise be adversely affected, which will subsequently influence how 
managers react to and view any cascade and usage of a PMS. 
I 
Evidence from more recent literature justifies this view. Moullin (2004: 111) for example 
reflects on the 'counter-productive nature of measures if they are perceived as irrelevant, 
unrealistic, inappropriate, or unfair'. In addition if 'managers believe they are misguided due 
to not having been included in formulating the actual measures they may respond negatively 
and not as was intended' (Moullin 2004: 111). Consequently, when both are considered 
Moullin suggests that managers: 
"Mayfocus on the measures given at the expense of other more importantfactors, they 
may try to get around the system, or they may sub-optimise or concentrate on short- 
term issues. "(ibid: I 11) 
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In addition, Bourne et aL, (2005: 385) builds upon the possible behavioural consequences 
through the reflection that: 
"Hen the cause was not apparent or could not be simplyfixed, action was delayed. 
Linking Rewards to Measures: The previous powerful reflections highlight the problems 
associated with measurement were as Catasus et al., (2007: 516) suggests simply 'providing 
measurements' alone does not guarantee actions will follow, although it is argued the act of 
measurement does 'act as an indicator between actual mobilisation and action'. 
The motivational and behavioural benefits of linking rewards and recognition directly to a 
'limited number of clearly identified measurement metrics to encourage a more positive 
outcome in a 'good implementation' (Allio 2006: 262) of a PMS are well recognised. Milne 
(2007: 28) in her own study concludes that the process of reward and recognition can positively 
exert motivational stimuli, influencing in turn both interest and performance. Consequently, 
Allio (2006: 263) earlier argues that aligning rewards with metrics will not only reinforce but 
promote from individuals those behaviours which are expected by an organisation. ' This is not 
to say that reward and recognition initiatives are purely suitable for use at an individual level. 
Milne (2007: 33-37) promotes their use across teams if suitably designed, but through the 
citation of Milkovich and Wigdor (1991) highlights the danger regarding potential 'loss of 
motivation due to perceived feelings of 'free-riding' of fellow colleagues. These are not the 
only problems to be aware of and resolved. In addition, not only does Decoene and 
Bruggeman (2006: 444) discuss problems associated with the performance of one team being 
dependant on the performance of another but also Du Plessis (2007: 93) highlights issues 
relating to individuals hoarding knowledge to gain a competitive over colleagues. 
It is possible to gain a valuable insight into how individuals and I believe teams rationalise the 
performance environments they encounter and as such focus subsequent action. Decoene and 
Bruggeman (2006: 436-444) provide direction in this area through quantifying both the effect 
of extrinsic and intrinsic reward and motivation sequence explaining that extrinsic rewards 
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will exert an effect; whereby individuals will attribute their task motivation to the extrinsic 
reward in preference to their own intrinsic motivation. Conversely, the authors counter-argue, 
if extrinsic rewards are removed and/or control or influence is unattainable, intrinsic 
motivation likewise will be affected, with less extrinsic effort directed towards the associated 
task (Ibid). When this viewpoint is considered and compared against both Bourne et aL, 
(2005: 385) and Moullins' (2004: 111) previous discussions it becomes increasingly evident to 
the researcher that such triggers most probably influenced to varying degrees the emergence of 
both the motivational and behavioural. problems positioned by the two sets of authors. 
It is clear that although De Waal (2007a: 182) along with Kaplan (2005: 44) advocates the need 
for an effective 'reward and incentive system' within a 'successful implementation. ' The 
previous discussions supports Robson's (2005: 141) assertions that 'such systems can cause 
levels of conflict, ' which clearly need to be considered in any deployment and cascade 
undertaken. 
Although the devised framework was developed prior to knowledge gained from more recent 
literature. I believe any future use of my own framework will benefit from researchers 
reflecting upon the discussions undertaken. In particular, attention needs to be directed towards 
the important role of deployment and cascade in any proposed use of the BSC, as well as how 
linking rewards to measurement metrics exerts a motivational behavioural influence in any 
PMS usage. As has been identified in recent literature, these aspects also surfaced throughout 
the research undertaken, thereby strengthening the argument that their inclusion must form an 
integral part in any future framework. 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.1 The Research Focus Revisited 
The research specifically aims to investigate from a frontline managerial perspective the extent 
to which my managers and myself can, over a period of time, emotionally and behaviourally 
engage with a unit based balanced scorecard. Specific areas of investigation include: 
> To gain a deeper understanding as to how front line managers perceive and react to a 
new performance measurement system (PMS) based on the BSC. 
> To establish those progressive attitudes and behaviours that may contribute to, or 
hinder the way in which the BSC is understood, accepted and used by managers. 
> To provide guidance in the form of recommended development guidelines for 
organisations to follow regarding the sustainable use of a BSC at a front line unit level. 
To be successful at this level of engagement, there is clear evidence that the research needed to 
be viewed from the perspective of those directly involved in or impacted on by the scorecards 
under investigation (Neely, et al., 2000; Bourne et aL, 2000; Holloway 2000; Tipping, 2000). 
To achieve this level of interaction, I felt it was important to nurture the involvement of the 
individual managers as co-participants in the investigation, as any other applied approach 
would simply dilute or indeed inhibit the process of gathering meaningful data. Importantly 
Holloway (2000: 3 1) provides a logical direction from which I am able to draw upon in relation 
to how I am able to acquire this level of engagement through her suggestion that: 
"greater involvement of practising managers as partners in collaborative research [is 
desirable and] not just as survey or case study fodder. neir use of qualitative research as 
part of their normal work can also befruitful in the performance measurementfield ". 
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3.2 A Methodological Debate 
At this stage in the development of my own research design I had what I felt was a level of 
empirical support for research in this field. I also felt that I possessed a good understanding of 
the initial focus and problems I could expect to face in my own investigations. I also 
perceived my research as ftilfilling what Ellis and Kiely (2000b: 2) describe as a need to focus 
on "real problems that are happening here and now" in organisations, but the dilemma 
remained - how would I achieve the level of engagement and intensity suggested by Holloway 
(2000)? 
In trying to make sense of these considerations, I found myself reflecting on the state of 
management research in relation to the "effectiveness and meaning of management" research 
techniques (Hatchuel, 2001). As a researcher I was particularly drawn to Buckley and 
Chapman's (1997: 287) criticism of existing research for failing to understand that knowledge 
or experience extends beyond the researcher's immediate environment or knowledge base and 
that "managers' formulation of their own problems might be interesting in their own right. " 
As part of this debate, the authors asked researchers to critically reflect on and ask themselves 
66whose knowledge and experience is more valuable? " (ibid). Is it the researcher or the 
participants who are actually involved in the research process under observation? 
As a researcher and more importantly a practitioner, I strongly agree with these insights. I feel 
they offer a route through which a true level of engagement and generation of real and 
meaningful practitioner based knowledge can be acquired, thereby providing me with what I 
see, as a robust methodological direction to understand emotional behaviours and attitudes. 
Support for my engagement and focus at this level is evident in the content of Reason and 
Torbert's (2001: 14) argument that: 
"Research1practice is not only about collecting empirical information but about a wide 
range of information based on the experiences of those involved in intuitive inquiry 
into values and purposes, conceptual inquiry into the frames and sense-making we as 
actors bring to the situation and practical, sensuous inquiry into our actions as 
individuals and members ofgroups and communities ". 
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As I reflected on the consequences of this, I realised that an enquiry at this level requires a 
methodological approach that supports what is clearly a complicated and continually evolving 
as well as inter-related series of encounters and actions. Consequently I think that my enquiry 
is best approached through Melrose's (1996: 52) descriptive view of 'value laden' 
investigations as 'critical research, ' in which she suggests a level of practitioner engagement is 
achieved through not only interest: 
"in the value positions and beliefs of the group, but the researcher [also] abandons any 
pretence of neutrality and often evokes specialist knowledge to stimulate the group into 
examining the ethics, morality andpolitics oftheir situation". 
This quotation, which I have decided to include in its entirety due to its importance, portrays 
the missing link in current workplace-based research in relation to enabling Buckley and 
Chapman's (1997) recommendations. This forms the basis through which I have modelled my 
own engagement and that of my managers as research participants. By this stage I had found 
my level of focus, but my next consideration resided in which methodological approach is best 
suited to this type of behavioural and emotionally rich research environment? 
My first consideration centred on the traditionally based positivistic paradigm with its 
methodological base in the scientific domain focusing on what Coughlan and Coghlan, 
(2002: 223) see as the "creation of universal knowledge, " or as defined by Melrose (1996: 50) 
"technical knowledge and generalisations". I soon realised that this level of application and 
focus would have a number of adverse implications for my chosen approach suggesting that 
research underpinned by a positivist orientation would be ill suited to support the level and 
intensity of the organisational and personal engagement I needed to initiate and peruse. My 
reasoning is informed by several points. 
The data gathering method applied in the research focuses on the evolving personal 
"experiences and meanings attributed to the events" (Skinner et aL, 2000: 165) in relation to 
the emotions, values and behaviours of a number of individual research participants, including 
myself. In addition, Susman and Evered (1978: 583) argue against the positivist mode of 
inquiry in this type of engagement proposing that it "limits its methods to what it claims is 
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value-free, logical and empirical" conducted in what the authors see as an environment of 
"detachment" and "neutrality" where the researcher is an "independenf' and "objective 
researcher. " 
Clearly if we review these considerations in conjunction with Melrose's (1996: 50) criticism of 
positivism for tending to ignore human beliefs and values, as well as what Reason and Torbet 
(2001) describes as an essential need to remove "the biases of the human researcher", then the 
adoption of a positivist outlook would be inappropriate. I consider that my interpretive and 
involved approach to data gathering in what is recognised as a socially complex environment 
of 'richness and diversity' (Holdaway, 1996: 12) would also seem inappropriate if applied in 
the positivist mode of enquiry. 
I was also aware that I needed to move beyond what has already been seen as a rigid positivist 
focus to the generation of "technical knowledge and generalisations" (Melrose, 1996) and 
engage at the level of improving actual professional practice and knowledge in a work-based 
situation through generating theory out of practice. The ability of the positivist approach to 
generate knowledge at this level has been debatable where Susman and Evered (1978: 585) 
further argue that there exists a fundamental: 
"crisis of epistemology, [whereby] positivist approaches to science [are] deficient in 
their capacity to generate knowledgefor use by members of organisationsfor solving 
the problems theyface ". 
I was encouraged to find additional reinforcement of this view in Schon's (1983b) later 
proposition that although practical knowledge exists to some extent in positivism it does, 
however, 'not fit neatly, ' into the positivist domain. This led me to my second consideration - 
how do I transcend into this higher level of practitioner-based knowledge production? Gibbons 
et aL, (1994) specifically focus on this question through their suggestion that management 
research is experiencing a fundamental shift away from the more traditional mode 1 theoretical 
and scientific based model of knowledge generation. I chose instead to adopt a more 
appropriate mode 2 practitioner-based approach focusing on 'trans-disciplinary' and 
practitioner application in relation to generating theory out of knowledge. Support for this 
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migration is also clearly evident in the work of Tranfield and Starkey (1998) who criticise the 
mode I model as 'elitist', arguing that the more 'pluralist' mode 2 approach provides a more 
appropriate link between theory and practice. Importantly Starkey and Madan (2001: S5) 
provide further support for this argument and the direction I have selected, through their 
reflection that: 
"In the MIK approach it is conventional to speak of science and scientist, while the 
as irations ofMK2 relevance to practice make it more relevant to speak of knowledge p 
andpractitioners 
My position by the very nature of my engagement in work related issues and the development 
of practice and theory from a practitioner-based team working environment can be categorised 
as falling in what has been described as the mode 2 approach to the generation of knowledge 
(Tranfield and Starkey, 1998; Tranfield 2002b). I was confident at this stage of my research 
design that I had identified specific level of knowledge generation. I was still however aware 
that I needed a suitable methodology to support the approach, for I was very conscious that as 
Tranfield (2002a: 381) explains mode 2 in its own right does not depict a 'methodological 
technique'. 
3.3 Adopting the Action Research Route 
As one engaged in the research as a practitioner and researcher, the DBA programme has 
nurtured my awareness of the benefits to be gained from engaging in an action research 
approach. In particular, I have become increasingly aware of the usefulness of action research 
as a suitable methodology for investigating the emergence of complex psychological and 
organisational inter-relationships requiring interventions and outcomes. 
As I focused on the methodological technique to be adopted, I realised that action orientated 
engagements clearly require the design of an appropriate research methodology. An 
appropriate research methodology firstly, underpins and engages practitioners in what Kiely 
and Ellis (1999: 33) describe as "a cyclical process of action and reflection, " with a view to 
planning and applying further action as the research progresses (Daudelin, 1996). Secondly an 
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appropriate research methodology achieves additional depth of interpretation by stepping back 
and reflecting on the experiences of those involved, therefore nurturing Schon's (1995: 30) 
epistemological realisation of "reflection and knowing in action7'. Importantly, Tranfield and 
Starkey (1998) provide firm encouragement for the use of action orientated strategies in 
management research. In addition, Eden and Huxham (1995) and Ellis and Kiely (2000a, 
2000b) provide epistemological substance and direction by distinguishing and exploring four 
action inquiry strategies: action research, participatory action research, action learning and 
science. 
As a researcher, I reasoned that action research as prescribed by Susman and Evered, (1978) 
provided me with a robust and practical epistemology, whereby practitioner engagement in the 
form of collaborative inquiry could be initiated and adapted in what has been shown as an 
increasingly complex individual and organisational environment. I saw this as ultimately 
enabling me to generate what Reason and Bradley (2001) prescribe as knowledge that is 
practical, relevant and useful in the daily lives of individuals. Support for my engagement as 
an action researcher at this level of complexity, volatility and uncertainty I feel, is evident in 
Eden and Huxham's (1995: 527) descriptive view of an action researcher as: 
"Working with members of an organisation over a matter which is ofgenuine concern 
to them and in which there is intent by the organisation members to take action based 
on the intervention. " 
Coughlan and Coghlan (2002: 23 8) underpins Eden and Huxhams' (1995) views and provides 
further support for my selected approach through reflections whereby: 
"AR is a form of science which differs from experimental physics but is genuinely 
scientific in its emphasis on careful observation and study of the effect of human 
behaviour on human systems as they manage change ". 
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3.4 The Research Design 
The need to adopt an appropriate method of data collection, analysis and interpretation was 
paramount. My decision was strongly influenced by both the scientific shortcomings 
previously discussed, and the need to generate practical knowledge, focusing on the 
behavioural, emotional and values of those involved in the research. 
3.4.1 Validating The Use Of Action Inquiry As My Chosen Research Method 
This is not to say that I am fully discounting quantitative techniques, as there is evidence to 
support the notion that in certain circumstances, their use can support what is commonly know 
as triangulation (Platts, 1990; Burton, 1996). Quantitative techniques can therefore be 
employed via triangulation to help provide a degree of reliability underpinning qualitative 
results. In my own case, I have chosen to apply quantitative methods through the use of both 
bi-monthly perception surveys, as well as the correlation of emerging performance data to 
enable cross-checking of emerging qualitative results. This was however not the only means 
and use of research triangulation and verification available to me. 
Within the qualitative domain, Eden and Huxman (1995) propose that action research by its 
very nature approaches "the research question from as many angles as possible". This provides 
me with what the authors suggest as a unique avenue through which to progress the process of 
triangulation beyond a simple means of cross-checking data, common to other research 
methods. The means through which I found it possible to achieve this higher level of 
interpretation and triangulation of data, against which my own research is modelled, was 
positioned by Eden and Huxman (1995: 356) through the citation of Harre and Secord's (1976) 
proposition that action research needs to seek out opportunities to provide levels of 
triangulation between: 
The observation of events and social processes 
Accounts each participants offers and 
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0 Changes in their accounts and interpretation of events as time passes. 
I feel that the interconnection within and between these levels could be viewed as relatively 
easily to conceptualise, but as is frequently common with human emotions and behaviours, I 
suspect this is clearly not always the case. Eden and Huxman (1995) as discuss this 
interconnection, commenting that levels of data triangulation or agreement between the 
different perspectives are not expected to emerge. This might seem surprising, but their 
rationale is centred on the fact that as there was an intentional desire to uncover multiple views 
between the different perspectives, any agreement emerging between the varying dimensions 
could be more surprising to a researcher, than if instances of disagreement did exist. When I 
first encountered this worldview I was somewhat confused, yet the more I thought about it, I 
increasingly realised that these variations of reactions were exactly the situations and intensity 
of focus I needed from my research. I also reasoned that as Eden and Huxman (1995) argue, 
such a worldview acts as the dialectical catalyst for the emergence of new concepts, which 
they argue need to be exploited and fully explored. 
To obtain this level of insight, I have made extensive use of a personal journals, workshops, 
semi-structured interviews, focus groups and the reflections and experiences of those involved 
in the research emerging from the data to identify and understand why these triangulation 
linkages either do or do not occur. On a personal level, I found the recording of my 
observations in the journal extremely beneficial. As I found, it encouraged me not only to 
obtain a level of awareness in relation to what Rowley (2003: 135) sees as "encouraging 
reflection and insights into both the cognitive and behavioural elements" of what I was 
experiencing, but as Bould (2001: 9) argues I need to extract the "meaning from them". The 
combination of these methods provided me with both a significant and robust qualitative 
approach to the process of data collection, but also conversely enabled the diversity of 
emerging data to be compared and understood more fully, through the applied use of the 
quantitative methods discussed above. I saw this as providing me through a process of 
triangulation what I consider as a robust degree of validity to the emerging and subsequently 
presented research data. 
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3.4.2 My Role as the Researcher 
I was aware that my position as both a researcher and senior manager in these interactions 
raises a number of responsibilities and questions in relation to my role. As a result of this 
realisation I strove to enrich the research, but also if necessary, adjust my own practice and 
behaviour so as not to jeopardise it. Holian (1999: 5) focuses on the dilemma I was facing 
were she discusses the very real issue of 'personal impact' which, I realise due to the applied 
nature of the research undertaken, I will inevitably exert and/or encounter on a daily basis as a 
co-participant interacting with my managers. As I considered my role more fully, I realised I 
would as explained by Holian (1999) be entering into a 'researcher and senior manager' role 
conflict situation. Here I would be continually required to balance and switch between the 
different roles. I therefore considered that role switching would surface as a crucial ethical 
consideration to be resolved. 
This was of particular concern as I realised that as a researcher, I was interested in how 
individuals, (and I include myself in this equation), could engage and interact with a scorecard. 
I therefore needed to understand the effects this environment would have on the cogitative 
emotions, attitudes and behaviours of all parties (Holloway et aL, 1996). As a fully 
participating actor alongside my managers, I was under no illusion that difficult relationships 
might emerge as a result of these interactions. Conversely however, I was still very conscious 
that I was a senior manager with a job to do, and would at times have to participate in 
uncomfortable conversations with individuals and make unpopular decisions. Consequently, I 
realised that these situations experienced in either of the roles would either enrich the resulting 
data acquired leading to Eden and Huxman's (1995) 'dialectic' catalyst. Along the continuum 
in a worse case scenario the research relationship could potentially be severed. 
Reflecting on my professional practice and specific role in the research, it became clear that I 
needed to encourage the former level of interaction, but reduce the possible emergence of the 
latter adverse situations. I clearly consider these as bringing into the inter-relationship 
equation with my co-participants, the previously discussed dysfunctional topics in relation to 
politics (Neely et aL, 2000) as well as power and control (Winstanley and Stuart-Smith 1996). 
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I increasingly realised these factors may adversely influence the degree and level of trust and 
respect I am striving to obtain. As a fully engaged co-participant in the process of exposure, 
deployment, and use of the scorecard, I specifically saw my own role as falling into three very 
well defined and inter-related dimensions: 
> Firstly, as previously defined by Melrose (1996: 52), 1 have set aside any 
feelings or thoughts of 'neutrality' as part of the continued engagement. This 
engagement involved drawing on the beliefs, emotions and actions of all 
participants through the application of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
to support a critical 360-degree 'value laden' perspective. 
> Secondly, Melrose (1996: 52) additionally argues for the use of 'specialist 
knowledge' to stimulate interactions. In my own case, extensive use was made 
of performance coaches in both the exposure and deployment workshops, as 
well as for the more experienced managers to underpin my professional practice 
as I lead the groups. 
> Finally, as a number of the managers progress from the deployment and into the 
continued use of the scorecard, I have drawn from the personal reflections of 
the two performance analysts. These analysts formed an integral part of the 
monthly performance reviews to provide an additional layer of interpretation 
and knowledge. 
Refocusing on the challenges facing me, I considered that the most appropriate solution in 
relation to the role conflict question was to address the dilemma with my research participants 
in the exposure workshop. I reasoned this would in demonstrate my receptivity to their 
concerns. In addition, this would also communicate the flexibility in my practice to support 
positive engagement throughout the exposure, deployment and later more volatile and 
controversial scorecard use stages. At this point, I decided to undertake some preliminary 
discussions with some of the more senior members and stakeholders of my team prior to the 
exposure workshop. As I reflected on the resulting discussions, I reasoned that the 
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development and agreement of a set of behavioural ground rules focusing on the expectations 
and worries of all parties, was the most logical way to address the situation. This lead to an 
agreed way of working emerging (appendix 1) from the exposure workshop that not only 
supported my initial engagement with the co-participants, but also provided a robust 
foundation from which emerging practice in the use stages of the scorecard was able to be 
reviewed and adjusted by all participants. 
In addition, I saw this approach as providing me with a suitable 360-degree means through 
which it was possible to re-assess and adapt my professional practice via surveys and focus 
groups undertaken by an independent facilitator. I felt that this provided a suitable medium 
through which confidential reflections in relation to my own practice and behaviour and in turn 
conflicting pressures in my dual role, could be identified by an impartial party for me to react 
to consider. 
In hindsight, I can see that when the behavioural agreement is considered alongside the 
statement of research confidentiality and participation (appendix 2 and I respectively), it 
provided a powerful tool that enabled a very personal piece of research to be completed and 
the practice of my managers and I to be continually monitored and adjusted. 
3.4.3 Ethical Issues and Politics 
VVhist I have already assessed the impact of organisational politics at the beginning of the 
thesis regarding its restrictions on my initial ability to engage in my chosen research direction, 
I do however feel that it is only correct to acknowledge both its existence and the very real and 
devastating effect of'senior managers blocking research (Rowley, 2003). This occurs when 
national projects, managed by senior managers can be perceived as under scrutiny, with a 
resultant restriction of the projects in an organisational setting. Initial personal experience, I 
feel clearly underpins Rowley's (2003: 135) conclusions that "gaining assess, networks and 
using data are all intensely political acts". This is a significant statement on the part of the 
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author, that I concur is either a powerful enabling or restricting force on the progression of 
organisational research initiatives. 
I was not surprised that on the completion of the unit trials, these political pressures and 
restrictions in their previous form were subsequently removed. This thereby legitimised my 
research direction due to the comforting fact that the use of the unit scorecard constituted my 
major business and personal objective for the coming year. I also feel that the previous senior 
managers moving to different roles in the organisation, also supported it in some way and 
therefore I did not present a ffirther threat to them. Importantly, these changes subsequently 
provided my line manager with the authority to agree that I could proceed with the research I 
had chosen to pursue, as well as to negotiate access and the involvement (Rowley 2003) of 
area support managers and my team. A personal act on my line manager's part provided me 
with the depth of involvement I required, as well as readily accessible access to invaluable 
sources of data (Rowley 2003), experience and support in the form of the financial analysts, 
performance coaches and an operations performance manager. 
Although there was no direct requirement for me to provide feedback to the organisation, I felt 
that as the professional practice of the sector team was an integral element of the research 
(along with the performance of the sector KPIs), this would form the basis of my monthly one- 
to-one performance reviews. I therefore consciously took the opportunity to discuss the 
progress made, as well as mutually resolving any stakeholder problems, which in hindsight did 
not really emerge as serious topic, with my line manager. I felt that by following this 
approach, that in the context of my direct organisational sponsor, I provided what Rowley 
(2003: 136) describes as the "need to keep stakeholders informed". This is not to say that I was 
as naive as to expect all political pressures to have been removed, for the literature (as 
previously discussed), continually shows the correlation between organisational politics and 
embedded culture, which influence the process of managing performance (Sedecon 
Consulting, 1999; Neely et aL, 2000; Neely and Bourne, 2000). 
I am fully aware of the extent of these tensions, having realised these through my own career 
experiences that exist in both the traditions and are abundantly in existence throughout Royal 
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Mail as well as the 'power dynamics' (Rowley, 2003) that radiate throughout and between the 
different organisational. layers and personal practices. I therefore strongly consider that their 
very existence forms an integral part of the investigation through which I have tried to 
understand and manage the influences via the behavioural contract, survey and focus groups. 
At this stage, I had acquired consent from the organisation to proceed to involve a number of 
co-participants drawn from my team in a critical piece of research focusing on the personal 
values, beliefs and emotions of the individuals I intended to include as co-participants. It 
would however be unethical for me to presume that all managers would be comfortable or 
agree to engage in the research or indeed accept my conflicting role as both researcher and 
their manager. As Rowley (2003) explains, I needed to extend the process of gaining 
permission beyond the level of the organisation to include the individuals who I had been 
given consent by my sponsor to involve. 
Reflecting further on my specific ethical responsibilities with regards to gaining the 
involvement of my intended co-participants, important considerations which I, have 
subsequently actioned emerged, such as obtaining individual personal consent (Walker and 
Haslett, 2002) and guaranteeing the confidentiality and protection of all participants (Gill and 
Johnson, 1991). To arrive at this level of personal commitment, in early January prior to the 
first workshop, I decided that as part of a regular management meeting to invite the two 
performance coaches and analysts to position both my proposed research, as well my desire to 
involve those present as co-participants. 
As I prepared for the meeting, I realised that I had a number of factors in my favour, which 
Holian (1999) discusses in relation to having previous history and relationships with the group, 
as well as knowing the key stakeholders. As I considered my position in this debate, I decided 
my best course of action was to utilise what I hoped would be the positive side of these 
enablers. I therefore sought to draw on my existing relationship with my present team to 
support not only their involvement, but that of the new managers joining the sector. 
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I was also already aware prior to the meeting that the two additional senior managers (as the 
major opinion formers from each of the groups) felt comfortable as participants. This was due 
to my initial raising of the topic with them during casual conversations. I was also aware from 
talking to them and from my own experience that I could not solely rely on this support or my 
previous relationships, to guarantee the involvement of the remainder of the managers. My 
reasoning for this was that from previous encounters, outside influences were always present 
in the form of the Communications Managers Association (CMA) Area Representative. 
I therefore decided that to counter this potential barrier, it would be sensible to involve the 
CNIA representative. I realised this representative not only had the attention of the managers, 
but also as their union representative, was a major influencing factor whom they would 
inevitably look to for advice. I subsequently discussed my intended involvement of both sets 
of managers and also enlisted the support of the representative. This involvement was not only 
in relation to rubber-stamping the research, but also in presenting and agreeing the 
confidentiality statement as well as future behavioural frameworks developed as part of the 
exposure workshop. I saw this as a powerful means through which managers could be 
encouraged to participate in the research. 
3.4.4 Co-Participants Confidentiality - Applied Coding Ethics - Use of Transcripts 
To facilitate a positive and active debate in the meeting, both the CMA representative and I 
(separately and jointly), presented the prepared confidentiality and involvement statement in 
appendix 2.1 was aware that I needed to outline the personal actions and commitments I 
would be making to participants, especially with regards to the publishing of the research 
outcomes (Oates, 1996). This raised additional barriers to be resolved in relation to the non- 
identification within the written thesis of specific contributions from those agreeing to 
participate in the research. I had pre-empted this area and presented the process I intended to 
utilise in relation to the coding of individuals, which was encouragingly agreed upon and has 
been utilised throughout the presentation of data to protect participant's identities. 
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The following discussions aim to outline the expanded coding profiles utilised in the process 
with regard to both the recruitment and grouping of the participants against these codes in the 
subsequent section. I also think the coding profile illustrated in the table overleaf, provided me 
with additional benefits. The coding table provided me with a robust means to underpin the 
data codes discussed later in this chapter, due to its ability to provide a means to not protect 
individuals and also to focus on the unit differences. Thus for example, I could identify the 
differences between units in one case (with one manager coded as 'S') and multi-managed 
units (two cases coded as W), prefixed with a personal identification number. 
The use of these codes to highlight verbal contributions in relation to the front-line managers is 
solely applicable in the later usage stage of the research. This stage is in relation to both the 
individual interviews and bi-monthly perception surveys as in the exposure and deployment 
workshop verbal contributions have been simply categorised as 'individual' to allow full 
participation from those present. Additionally, I found this provided a logical means of 
presenting the verbal contributions due to difficulties experienced during the exposure and 
deployment workshops, with the identification of individuals during the transcription of 
documents in a group-recording environment of 17 managers. I did not encounter this 
problem in either the analyst or individual interviews undertaken as part of the usage stage, 
where transcripts where coded against the individual co-participants. 
I have however been able to derive additional benefits from the use of these codes in the 
deployment workshop. Here I found it possible to extract robust data in relation to the level of 
engagement achieved against the scorecard activities undertaken by those agreeing to progress 
into the usage stage. I have consequently therefore applied the same coding highlighted in 
table 8 overleaf, to supplement the general comments emerging from the group during the 
taped discussions, to provide further substance and depth to the presented data. 
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Table 8- Individual Coding Profile 
Role Co-Participant 
Coding Profiles 
Singleton (S) Multi Managed (M) Coach (C) Analysts (A) Assigned 
Code 
f)ch%cr-% \Ianagcr I 
-Yelivery Manager 2 S S2 
Delivery Manager 3 S S3 
Delivery Manager 4 M ml 
Delivery Manager 5 M M2 
Delivery Manager 6 M M3 
Delivery Manager 7 M M4 
Delivery Manager 8 M M5 
Perfonnance Coach I C IC 
Performance Coach 2 C 2C 
Performance Analyst I A IA 
performance Analyst 2 A 2A 
I was encouraged to note that the meeting concluded with those present agreeing the contents 
and format of the confidentiality statement at the outset of the research process. Agreement 
was also reached regarding the use of the tape recorder during the exposure and deployment 
phase. I found that by following this approach I was able to proceed towards the exposure and 
subsequent deployment workshops with well-defined and pre-agreed research groupings. I was 
further encouraged by the participants indicating their willingness to progress into the usage 
stage for the tape recording process. 
I did however think that due to the 'value laden' (Melrose, 1996) and very personal, emotional 
and behavioural nature of the investigation that my responsibilities extended beyond simply 
agreeing the statement and use of the tape recorder. I therefore purposively repositioned the 
statement, future behavioural agreement and use of the tape recorder at both the beginning and 
end of each specific activity involving any form or means of interaction or data gathering. I 
reasoned that this would help to reinforce the personal commitment I had made to my co- 
participants. A personal act on my part, which I felt, significantly supported the monthly 
survey and independent focus group, as well as underpinning Walker and Haslett's (2002) 
reflection for the need of a researcher to gain consent for the use of a tape recorder. 
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3.4.5 Recruitment of Research Participants 
As previously stated, I had two specific aims in the management meeting. Firstly, I was keen 
to position the research, agree upon the confidentiality statement, as well as the coding process 
prior to the exposure workshop. Secondly I wanted to gain the commitment of those present to 
participate in the research in the lead up to the exposure workshop. 
As the meeting progressed beyond agreeing the confidentiality statement and proposed 
individuals coding dimensions, I realised that the decision to involve both the CMA and 
opinion formers was paying dividends, with all individuals encouraged by the openness and 
commitments made. This consequently led to varying degrees of personal consent and 
commitment expressed from all those present to participate in the research. As I focused on 
the level of agreed participation, I realised that the reasons behind the differing levels of 
participation centred on the following prominent factors, which I saw as the first instances of 
role conflict emerging in my practice and underpinning my discussion to approach the topic of 
a behavioural agreement: 
1. Individuals feeling uncomfortable regarding exposure to what some saw could be 
perceived as personal criticisms of weakness on their part. 
2. Unease in discussing emotional and behavioural feelings with their line manager in a 
one-to-one situation. 
3. Despite the application of coding to protect confidentiality, some still felt 
uncomfortable with the concept if they went into the usage stage of the scorecard. 
4. Some individuals felt unable to commit to participating in interviews subsequent to the 
exposure and deployment workshops, due to what they felt was an additional workload 
and time constraint. 
5. It was also felt by some that the research was purely intended to progress my own 
career and as such, I was not worried about participant's views. I was encouraged that 
this was a singularly expressed view, not support by the remainder present. 
As I discussed both the implications of these with those present and how best to resolve them 
within the parameters of the ethical agreements made, two distinctive front-line research co- 
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participant groupings emerged. As discussed, these discrete groupings are represented in the 
data analysis by either being shown as 'individual' or in the case of those agreeing to proceed 
into the usage stages by W or 'S' with a prefixed number. 
Firstly, all seventeen managers agreed to participate in the exposure and deployment 
group activities protected by what some saw as a safe and impersonal workshop 
environment where anonymity could be protected. This left those individuals who 
initially felt uncomfortable, feeling less vulnerable during the exposure and 
deployment stages of the scorecard into the sector. 
> Secondly, from the original seventeen managers, eight previously categorised in the 
coding profile who felt comfortable participating in a one-to-one interaction with 
myself, agreed to continue as co-participants into the use and review stages of the 
scorecard engagement. Interestingly, this group formed a cross-section of managers 
with both varying degrees of experience and responsibility in relation to a number of 
managers running the units from across both sectors supporting the success of the 
actions taken to bring the research groups together. As previously discussed, it was 
possible to extract valuable data from these managers in relation to their engagement 
with the scorecard at the deployment workshop. 
I have also been able to acquire additional depth through the involvement of the two 
performance coaches and analysts defined earlier as 'coach/analyst, at both the exposure and 
development workshops with the two analysts continuing to participate in the remainder of the 
research at all performance reviews, as well as participation in separate interviews. As part of 
the involvement of these individuals, I was extremely conscious that both sets of specialist's 
roles required their active involvement in the scorecard implementation. 
As such, I did not want participants to feel that they where either obliged to participate in the 
research, or be perceived by the other co-participants as organisational spies. I therefore 
needed them to be recognised and accepted as fully functioning and involved members of the 
research team. I felt that by involving them in the management meeting that their consent to 
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participate in and involvement would be recognised and accepted by the remainder of those 
present as the most suitable means of addressing this issue. I was pleased to see that those 
present gave their consent for their involvement. 
3.4.6 Eliminating Bias, Personal Impact and Validating Emerging Data 
The level of engagement I required did however present other problems which I realised need 
to be addressed as it is recognised that engaging at this level is not totally risk free with 
Thomas-Bernard (1996) suggesting that their exists the possibility that the more dominant 
individuals in the group might influence or indeed restrict and inhibit the participation of 
others. 
This was a factor, which at the outset did cause me some concern in relation to the exposure 
and deployment stages, with their over reliance on group interactions and activities to generate 
data. I do however feel that my decision to involve both the major opinion formers and more 
senior managers in the workshop activities significantly reduced its Possible emergence and 
potential negative impact. I also saw this decision as helping to reduce any potential for the 
more vocal and assertive individuals in the group activities to dominate any debate as I rely on 
the opinion formers and CMA representative to draw others into the conversation. In the 
independently conducted workshops, this was not so much of a problem, as the individual 
conducting the activity was a fully trained facilitator with the necessary skills to support a full 
participation from those present. 
Additionally I was aware that my own exposure and engagement as a researcher during data 
gathering and analysis, presented a further unique problem in relation to my interpretation of 
the environment and interactions I was initiating and encountering. Importantly I am able to 
draw from Carters' (2002: 144) own previous DBA experience in this area. Here she 
encountered the same personal dilemma in relation to the possibility of her inadvertently 
extracting only that data that confirmed a particular view. Carter (2002: ) cited Kruegers' 
(1993) recommendation in making available infon-nation to the attendees to address what see 
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saw as the problem of her own objectivity. Similarly, I found myself focusing on the same 
concern and agreed as part of the recruitment stage, to ensure that an accurate level of 
understanding and interpretation was achieved, where all findings would be openly discussed 
and continually agreed as part of the ongoing data gathering exercises and review process. 
Scorecard Exposure and Deployment. This took the form of revisiting the findings and 
recommendations emerging from the flip chart feedback from the syndicate exercises. I also 
provided a verbal summary of my own personal reflections and notes taken during the sessions 
as a key part of the closure process. By following this process this enabled me to expand on the 
observations made, and also it encouraged both active debate around the outputs from the 
sessions, as well as confirming mutual understanding between the co-participants and myself. 
Additionally I felt the openness provided a further benefit, as it reduced the likelihood of 
anyone perceiving or thinking that I was making secret notes in myjournal observations. 
In all cases, the syndicate feedback due to time constraints was transcribed by typists 
immediately after the data gathering process. I was extremely conscious for the need for 
accuracy due to a third party involvement. I therefore revisited each of the completed 
transcripts against the tapes, before making then available to the participants for comments and 
any amendments they felt necessary. I subsequently reviewed the exposure as part of the 
deployment workshop and the latter in my next management meeting. I was encouraged to see 
that no changes or additional suggestions were forthcoming confirming the accuracy of their 
content and the transcription method I had decided to use. 
Scorecard Usage. Due to the time span as well as the number of separate data gathering 
exercises pursued outside of the normal business activities, I decided that a number of different 
activities were necessary to provide validity and to underpin the data gathering processes 
followed. I was however aware in reaching this decision of the important topic of managerial 
workload, as this had been raised as a concern during the recruitment of the co-participants. I 
realised that if I did not address this topic, then involvement might possibly decrease, as the 
research progressed over the year. I therefore decided my best course of action was to revisit 
both the area of focus to look at, as well as the methods I wanted to apply and take the 
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question directly to the co-participants who had agreed to continue into the usage stage. I felt 
that by following this approach if individuals saw again what they where committing to, they 
would not only feel closer to the research, but also understand their future commitments in 
relation to the time to complete the research activities, therefore limiting the possibility of 
clashes of interest. 
I was encouraged to see that it was subsequently agreed that any additional workload and time 
commitments to complete the activities could be best managed through the surveys being 
issued bi-monthly interspersed by two interviews at the three and nine month stages. I saw this 
as supporting the research aim as it provided not only a robust interlinked span of data 
gathering but involvement that continually engaged with the co-participants over a 9-month 
period. I also subsequently found that by discussing the topics of focus and method, as well as 
the frequency of data gathering, I was able to achieve a success rate of 100% of scheduled 
interviews was completed, as well as a return rate of 95%, against the bi-monthly surveys with 
only two missing due to unforeseen annual leave. These results provided me with not only a 
high degree of grounding (and in turn significance to the results gained), but also underpins the 
important need for researchers to involve the co-participants in agreeing both the method and 
timing of data capture in organisational research. In relation to cross-checking and validating 
the emerging data, three distinct processes where followed. 
Firstly, I undertook a similar process in relation to transcribing and providing copies of the 
typed transcripts of the eight individual interviewees and analysts for their comments and 
amendments, but surprisingly as previously occurred, none surfaced over either of the three or 
nine month interview stages. Secondly, to underpin my professional practice as well as the 
data emerging from the interviews, I was conscious of the need to continually track the 
interview schedule changes in the co-participant's perceptions of their engagement with the 
scorecard. I was also conscious of the need to review the views regarding the behavioural 
commitments we had agreed upon. I decided the best approach was to use five standardised 
perception surveys in their questioning focus/format and issued bi-monthly after a completed 
performance review between May 2001 and January 2002.1 subsequently found this provided 
a robust means through which I could identify and track not only the key themes emerging 
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from the interviews, but also opportunities to change my professional practice to underpin the 
success of the scorecard engagement of both the co-participants and myself. Thirdly, I was 
however aware that these two methods of data gathering following immediately after a 
performance review, could at times be testing in relation to the practitioner debate experienced 
and performance outcome, then required a very personal reflective interaction with myself as a 
researcher in relation to an interview or issued survey to be completed later. 
As such, I was still mindful at this stage of the previous issues Carter (2002) raised in relation 
to my objectivity. I was even more conscious that due to the personal one-to-one interaction 
experienced by the co-participants, the question of objectivity and resentment was more likely 
too manifest itself amongst the interviewees. I felt this was a distinct possibility if feelings of 
'control, power and inter-relationships' (Winstanley and Stuart-Smith 1996: 69) materialised 
due to what they saw or perceived as a difficult performance review. I was under no illusion 
that this might subsequently influence responses, as individuals might carry forward their 
feelings into the data gathering exercises undertaken during the usage stage of the 
investigation. As I progressively engaged with both the co-participants and emerging data, I 
became aware that these emotional and behavioural responses as well as performance 
measurement related considerations offered an ideal opportunity to enrich the research, as they 
provided me with the previously positioned 'dialectic catalysis' (Eden and Huxman, 1995). 
As these situations emerged, I realised that I needed to gain a clearer insight and behind the 
emergence and possible presence of these considerations, as well as the required strategies to 
limit their impact. I however accepted that as the interviewer and survey facilitator, I was too 
close to the data gathering and its analysis, which could in turn restrict my ability to clearly 
analyse the acquired data. I also felt that as the assessor in the performance review, this could 
restrict any potential feedback from the co-participants in relation to why these might be 
present and how they needed to be resolved. 
In response to this, I accepted that I needed to step back and gain an impartial view to provide 
me with the opportunity to cross-check and expand on the acquired data. I saw this as 
providing me with a depth of analysis seldom achieved. I decided to progress this activity as 
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explained through the use of two independently facilitated workshops. After discussions with 
the facilitator, it was agreed that I should refrain from attending and setting any guidelines or 
in-depth questions in the sessions. We jointly saw this as the most suitable means of removing 
any possible peer pressure or biases that might inadvertently be conveyed. 
It was felt that the use of a simple open question was the most suitable trigger to encourage 
unprompted views and reflections from those present. Such questioning would address the 
perceptions of both the research findings and the management behaviours at the 3 and 9 month 
stages. Although I wanted to identify additional sources of data, I also needed to both test and 
clarify my emerging interview and survey findings with the co-participants, but also identify 
any changes the group wanted to make, to support either the scorecard engagement or my own 
practitioner practice. I therefore felt it was necessary to make the facilitator aware of the main 
themes emerging from the interviews as well as the surveys so that he could if needed, use 
these topics as prompts if they did not naturally develop from those present. 
These outputs were subsequently consolidated and summarised by the facilitator and discussed 
with myself in an informal setting which, supported by his observations and reflections, 
allowed a critical comparison of my conclusions from an impartial perspective. I also agreed 
with the research group that as part of this process, any subsequent changes to my own 
professional practice, group behavioural commitments or scorecard engagement, would be 
included as part of the ongoing monthly performance reviews. Progression against any 
changes to practice or behaviours were then subsequently monitored via the survey and 
interview process before being fin-ther sense checked using the same open questioning applied 
in the second and final independent focus group. 
3.5 Applied Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
My primary aim as previously discussed and explained by Skinner et aL, (2000), has been to 
apply qualitative methods. More specifically, this entails the use of focus groups, interviews 
and personal reflections on the experiences as well as the meanings the co-participants and 
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myself place on our interactions in the scorecard environment. I have also asserted the 
importance of applying a quantitative survey and relevant organisational documentation in the 
form of scorecards, performance review documents and performance date as additional means 
for providing further interpretation, triangulation and validity of the resulting data. The 
following table illustrates both the sequential process of data collection, as well as the linkages 
between the applied qualitative and qualitative methods. The reader's attention is drawn to the 
completed scorecards for the year 2001-2002 emerging from the deployment workshop 
(illustrated by the brown arrow), which as discussed, I reviewed in March 2001, prior to the 
new financial year commencing. 
Table 9- Primary Data Collection Methods 
Quantitative Qualitative Quantitative 
Month Performance Group Activity Individual Individual 
BSC Period Surveys Interviews 
Reported Results 
ary 01 10 
uary 01 11 Exposure Workshop 
1h 01 
12 4- Deployment Workshop 
101 1 
01 2 1 
01 3 First Set 
01 4 2 
ast 01 5 First Focus Group 
ember 01 6 3 
iber 01 7 
: mber 01 8 4 
-mber 01 9 
ary 02 10 5 Second Set 
uarv 02 11 Second Focus Grow Second Set 
3.5.1 Scorecard Exposure and Deployment 
My decision to utilise focus groups in both the exposure and deployment stages of the 
scorecard, supported by my own personal log as the main source of data collection was as a 
direct response to the previously positioned concerns and reactions of the agreed research 
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groups. The literature supports my choice to follow this route at this stage of the research in a 
number of relevant areas. 
Firstly, the use of these types of groups is becoming progressively more evident in the social 
sciences, particularly in the interviewing of research participants (Oates, 1996). Secondly, 
O'Donnell (19 8 8: 71-73) not only recognises interviews as providing qualitative data extracted 
from an in-depth interaction, but argues for their relevance in extracting opinions and attitudes, 
as well as understanding concerning the key issues facing the group. Thirdly, (and importantly 
for my own engagement), Oates (1996: 39) further positions through the citation of Kitzinger 
(1994) the importance and use of focus groups in sensitive areas were it is suggested "safety in 
numbers and the company of others who share similar experiences" can provide a safe and 
comfortable environment to encourage individuals to openly participate. 
Concurrence for this view is similarly to be found in O'Donnell's (1988: 72) earlier 
explanation that; 
"The group setting encourages greater spontaneity and candour, fewer inhibitions, and 
greater anonymity and security than individuals mightfeel in one-to-one interactions ". 
This advice related directly to the concerns I was encountering from some of my co- 
participants which, when considered in conjunction with the latter considerations, provided me 
with a robust direction to follow. I therefore decided to approach both the exposure and 
deployment workshops and their respective focus group activities within the recommended 
group setting, applying the same consistent approach and level of focus across each session. I 
realised that this would address the worries of those co-participants that felt uneasy engaging 
at an individual level via the provision of a suitably safe, stable, and consistent environment 
for the seventeen participants and support managers to participate as a group. 
also felt it was necessary to specifically design the group activities so as to nurture what 
Hines (2000: 10) defines as 'phenomenological interaction-centred focus groups' supported by 
key opinion formers who encouraged individuals to share and participate in each other's 
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previous experiences and concerns leading to shared understanding. I saw this as enabling me 
to extract the degree of depth I required in relation to what Thomas-Bemard (1996) describe as 
a more representative and valuable overview, which they suggest would be less likely to obtain 
via individual discussions. This view is similarly expressed by Erkut and Fields (1987: 74) 
who observe that "several people's judgements are better than one". 
Thomas-Bemard (1996: 23) provide additional substance to the debate through her 
consideration that focus groups provide a valuable means through which individuals in a group 
setting can be enticed to engage in an "interaction around specific questions related to the 
research ". This was precisely the interaction I required. I supported this interaction through 
the positioning, (and working through during the later parts of the exposure and development 
workshops) the following relevant open-ended questions focusing back on the activities the 
co-participants had undertaken during the previous 2 hours. 
EXPOSURE FOCUS: 
What do you 
scorecard, its 
coming year? 
DEPLOYMENT FOCUS: 
see are the positive and negative aspects of the 
measures and targets you have been set for the 
To what degree have you been able to engage with the scorecard 
and close any gaps to support your achievement of your set targets? 
I decided to use this particular method of open questioning, as from previous experiences I 
recognised it as not only encouraging free speech but also providing a robust means whereby it 
is possible without the use of preset categories, which may restrict the level of interaction 
gained to encourage a wider debate. An open-questioned approach would therefore help to 
acquire a more valuable insight into complex topics. I was however aware that the posed 
questions would only provide a reflective perspective of the current level of engagement 
achieved specific to the workshop activities undertaken, as well as indications as to the 
emotional and behavioural consequences of working these through. I realised that if I was to 
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achieve a cycle process of past and forward reflection as well as subsequent further action, I 
needed to underpin each primary topic with a secondary open debate. I sought to nurture this 
debate through the use of the following question posed in both workshops: 
What do you feel we need to do to resolve or limit the impact of the issues 
we have discussed? 
I saw the combined use of both the primary and secondary questions as supporting the initial 
two cycle processes of Kiely and Ellis' (1999) 'reflection and action': 
Firstly, during the exposure workshop by reflecting on the initial concerns of the co- 
participants from which appropriate actions emerge. 
Secondly, in the deployment phase where the effectiveness of these actions is assessed 
and subsequent changes are agreed, continually reviewed and updated as the research 
enters into the usage stages of the scorecard. 
Importantly encouragement for my use of the methods discussed is similarly expressed by 
Oates (1996: 39) who sees focus groups as useful forums were individuals can be encouraged 
to express their views and experience from which meaningful debates and challenges as to 
why particular views are held (or indeed differ), can be nurtured and encouraged from within 
the group. As previously discussed in relation to the exposure workshop, this provided me 
with an emotional and behavioural dialectic depth of analysis regarding the workshop 
activities. I required this added depth in order to better understand not only the robustness of 
the scorecards and their related measures, but also the use of the national, area and local 
initiatives to close performance gaps. This raised important practitioner key skills 
considerations, such as the ability of managers to undertake a robust root cause analysis to 
understand why a performance gap might be present in the first place. In addition the degrees 
of capability and competence in identifying and agreeing remedial action and forecasting its 
immediate and future impact to close the gap, was also raised. All managers progressed 
through these activities as part of the deployment workshop. 
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Importantly, I found it possible to arrive at this level of practitioner understanding. I achieved 
this in two ways. Firstly, via my personal observations supported by those of the specialists 
during the deployment workshop, as managers engaged in the activities required. Secondly I 
critically reviewed the completed scorecard documents of those individuals who agreed to 
continue into the usage stage. I found it was possible to assess not only the levels of key skills 
present amongst the group, but also the robustness of the scorecards as the co-participants 
entered into the usage stage. Particular areas of focus extractable from the completed 
scorecards included: 
" Robustness of Root Cause Analysis to identify reasons for under performance 
" Identification of appropriate remedial actions to close gaps 
" Use of national/area/unit improvement initiatives to close identified gaps 
" Understanding impact of actions included on scorecards 
" Ability to forecast short, medium and long- term effects 
" Usability of BSC, its KPIs and related measurement dimensions 
" Fit for purpose of scorecards and actions to meet performance tasks for the coming 
year 
Completion of this activity to the progression of the remainder of the research was paramount, 
as it provided me with the base data in the form of completed scorecards with agreed actions. 
Here I found it possible to continually monitor progression against the KPIs and associated 
measurement dimensions and undertake an ongoing review of the success of the original key 
skills and actions originating out of the deployment stage. Moreover, the emotional and 
behavioural implications of engaging with the scorecard and facilitator when performance 
improvements are either realised or unrealised as well as subsequent actions are necessary. 
3.5.2 Scorecard Usage 
As previously stated, I applied qualitative methods during the usage stage. A qualitative 
approach was characterised by a combination of individual interviews and questionnaires, 
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supported by the independent focus group. I continually supported my engagement in these 
activities with the actions previously discussed regarding confidentiality, use of data gathering 
methods and confirmation with the co-participants regarding accuracy of data gained. I also 
revisited the research aims in both a verbal and written fonnat respectively, on the 
commencement of each period of data collection, as well as including clear instructions on the 
questionnaire with regard to its completion, clarifying any questions and return. 
Use of Interviews -I am able to draw support from McNiff (1988) regarding my decision to 
use two interviews, which she sees as providing extremely valuable sources of data. Similarly, 
Stroh (1996a: 61) underpins this view in his statement that qualitative interviews offer "very 
rich sources of data which could not have otherwise been accessed". 
To access this data at key points, I undertook a semi-structured interview with each of the co- 
participants to understand how the engagement with the scorecard and BSC facilitator was 
progressing. I undertook this interaction in the form of the seven open questions highlighted 
below, as I had decided to further utilise the open questioning technique after recognising its 
suitability during the workshop to nurture what Stroh (1 996a: 52) has previously positioned as 
an 'argued response'. I also decided that I would include two fin-ther open questions asking 
simply for other concerns or comments from the interviewees. I saw this as providing a 
number of major benefits in relation to opportunities to discuss any areas the co-participants 
felt I had potentially missed, issues that might be worrying them, as well as provide an 
opportunity to reflect on any of the previous questions and elicited responses. 
I scheduled the interview immediately after a completed performance review at the three and 
nine month points of scorecard engagement. I saw this timing as important. I accepted that 
it 
met the issue of workload previously discussed, and I realised that the co-participants practice, 
emotions and behaviours around the seven key areas shown overleaf would 
be fresh in both 
their minds. I therefore needed to capture, understand and in turn adapt practice. 
1. Over the last 3/9 months, you have been set targets and objectives for the coming year. What 
is your view of these targets and objectives? How do you feel about them? 
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2. What would be your overriding concern (if any) about the targets and objectives? 
3. What do you think we are going to have to do to make sure that your individual and group 
targets and objectives are met? 
4. What bothers you most regarding being able to meet your objectives and targets? How can we 
address these? 
5. You have recently taken part in a number of activities supporting the implementation of 
performance management. For instance, workshops, and syndicate exercises, development of 
sector behavioural statement and more recently the sign-off meeting. What are your thoughts 
and opinions of these activities? Can we improve on them? 
6. As a sector, we have now deployed performance management at a unit level. What is your 
current view of the approach? How do you feel? How do you think we can improve the way 
we work? 
7. As a sector, we have developed and agreed upon a behavioural statement, what are your 
thoughts and opinions of this statement? 
I was however conscious from the pre testing (discussed at the end of this chapter), that I could 
not solely rely on the open questions to provide the reflective depth required. I therefore 
utilised the discussion guide presented in appendix 3. This guide not only led me logically 
through the nine questions, but also provided me with additional depth through the inclusion 
of areas of interest identified in the coding template. I discuss this further in the following 
section. I found the guide an invaluable tool, as it enabled me to Prompt for areas of interest 
when they did not naturally emerge in the discussions, keep track of the topics I wished to 
discuss, as well as probe through referring back to the guide and asking further open questions, 
until I felt a particular topic of discussion was concluded. 
Use of Questionnaires - As previously stated, my discussion to utilise a questionnaire 
distributed at the end of a bi-monthly performance review, with myself for completion away 
from the review, was directly influenced by a number of considerations. As discussed, I saw 
these as relating to workload were I was providing opportunities for managers to consider 
away from the review process more fully their response to the questions I 
had positioned "in 
their own time" (Burton, 1996: 20). 1 feel this not only encouraged a more responsive and 
reflective reaction to the questionnaire due to my absence, 
but provided me with a robust 
method to underpin the interviews by continually engaging with the co-participants over the 
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research period. 
In applying this method, I have as Burton (1996: 19) suggests, ensured that the questionnaire 
(included in appendix 4) was clear and soundly structured. I saw this as providing me with a 
uniform format that was simple to understand and complete over the research period which, 
due to its continued use in the same format, style and questioning, allowed me to monitor 
trends and more fully understood them. In turn this enabled me to adapt my practice as well as 
the practices of my co-participants. My adopted style of questioning fell within the format of 
the ten closed questions below, which is recognised as the most suitable approach (Burton, 
1996: 19 and Stroh, 1996a: 52) in questionnaires. I feel my use of these complemented the open 
questions I used in the interviews, as they provided me with both additional depth and 
perspective of the engagement with the scorecard and myself as their manager. 
I. I fully understand the objectives and targets I have been set 
2.1 feel that the targets and objectives I have been issued are relevant 
3. The targets and objectives I have been set are realistic 
4.1 feel I have ownership of the issued targets and objectives 
5. The targets and objectives I have been set are achievable 
6.1 feel accountable for the targets and objectives I have been set 
7.1 understand what I need to do to achieve my objectives and targets 
S. I fully understand my role in performance management 
9. Performance management helps me in my managerial task 
10. The performance review was undertaken within the sector behavioural commitment 
To engage with the questionnaire, the co-participants were required to indicate by circling one 
of 5 responses ranging on a scale from Agree Strongly (1) to Don't Know (5) to indicate how 
they felt against each of the questions in turn. I was aware that if possible I needed to extract 
the reasons behind the marking shown. I encouraged the provision of reasons for particular 
responses via the inclusion of a comment box against each question as well as a general 
comment box at the end of the questionnaire. 
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3.5.3 Engaging with the Data 
During the process of developing the methods of data collection, I realised that I faced some 
fundamental questions relating to how I would identify and extract the data from the activities, 
and ultimately how I would use it once I had it in my possession. Reflecting upon the 
literature, it was encouraging to see how I could benefit from previous research undertaken 
(De Waal, 2001; Bourne et aL, 2002) which related to the performance management and 
measurement field, where extensive use of coding has been utilised to provide answers to these 
questions. 
At this stage I felt I had empirical support for the use of coding. However I realised that I still 
needed to form a configuration and substance to underpin my intended coding approach, from 
which I could base my model. Importantly, King (1998) provided me with a suitable template 
coding structure. This structure involved maintaining a balance between initially having too 
many codes which may distort analysis or conversely too few codes. King (1998: 119: 133) 
suggests this could potentially leave a researcher "lacking clear direction or feeling 
overwhelmed by the mass of rich and complex data". I subsequently decided I needed a 
balance between these two propositions. I therefore modelled my own template, similarly to 
Locke (2000) in relation to utilising previous work to provide an initial direction to inform the 
final template I have illustrated in figure 2 overleaf, 
First Level. Regarding 'deployment' and 'use', I adopted De Waal's (2002a, b, c) high level 
coding stages, but replaced his use of the term 'starting' with 'exposure' to separate and 
define my own teams' sequential encounter with the BSC. In order for additional depth of 
analysis to be undertaken, I included a further definition of 'system' to enable me to 
incorporate along with the behavioural influence the performance strategy, PMS and 
performance interaction contained in the performance framework into the coding matrix. 
Second Level. With both the research stages and system defined, it was now necessary to 
provide depth through the identification and assigrunent of pre-defined dependant sub-codes 
against each of the higher categories. As with the first level, I drew upon the previous work of 
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De Waal (2002a, b, c) assigning against each of the three phases those designated 18 pre- 
selected (positive) behavioural factors, which the author considered necessary at each stage. 
Consequently at each stage of the research initial insights are provided against which text can 
be coded regarding probable behavioural, along with emotional triggers, likely to be directed 
by the co-participates towards the encountered cyclical perfon-nance environment. With the 
preliminary behaviours designated, I applied a similar approach assigning the seven recognised 
6critical performance characteristics' (Hudson et al., 2001) as sub codes under (system). This 
defined the behavioural stimuli radiating through the performance strategy, PMS and 
performance interaction contained within the performance environment's framework. 
Figure 2- Coding Template 
Behavioural and EnwOonal Fadors 
Code Emergent Free Codes sy-stern 
Frarms ofrOcrencc contain sintilar 
Code 
A&nre on the starting tirneý Understand the rneaning of KPIs KPIs 
L. arlierexpericnecs 
Flave insight into relationship Trust the peribnnance information between business process and KPI Code 
KPI sets are aligned with their Are involved in making analysis Code res nsibili areas 
influence the KPIs assigned to therr 
Realise the importance- of KP[ BSC 
i Code to their performance 
Relevant because it has a clear Do not experience KPUBSC as 
i Code internal control purpose threatening 
Find the PNILS rele%-ant because 
ordv those stakeholders' interests Can use their KPLUSC for 
that are important to the 
-png their employees 
orpLnisations success art: 
Code 
incorporated 
( lear-INI see the promoter using the 
Code PIMS 
Agree on changes in the KPI set 
Code 
Are stintilated to inprove their 
Code rfonnance 
Ld ts on KPI BSCare openly 
Code cated 
kccountabilitN. %chieNabilit), ontrol, Contract, (H)jectives, Ownership, Politics, Power. Relationship, Realistic. 
Codes 
. ..... . ..... . ..... . ..... . ..... . ..... . ..... 
. 
I)erived from strate*, Clearlý. defined Wth an explicit purpose, Relevant and easy to main(ain. Simple to understand and use, Provides fast and 
accurate feedback Unks operations to strategic grials, Stimulates continues improvement. 
Codes 
-- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- -- 
Source: Adapted from De Waal (2002a, b, c) 18 behavioural perquisites and Hudson et al's., 
(2001) performance system characteristics. 
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I 
As shown in the templates use of directional arrows, as a practitioner I do not expect any one 
of these factors to be a discreet behaviour or system characteristic confined to one specific 
phase, but rather to be continually in existence exerting an influence across the exposure, 
deployment and usage phases. As such, for example I expect being 'able to influence KPIs', 
(which is a level 2 behavioural/emotional code) under deployment, to also emerge as a 
consideration during both the exposure, where 'perceived influence' and usage regarding being 
able to 'actually influence' will emerge as a consideration. This is in contrast to De Waal 
(2002a: 163) who believes that those behaviours associated with both the exposure and 
deployment will diminish and become 'less significant over time, ' whereas those associated 
with usage are 'continuous' requiring sustained attention. I believe that even if the first two 
stages are viewed as successful, future engagement experiences influenced by the performance 
strategy and its PMS, may cause a recall of behaviours/emotions from earlier phases. As 
suggested, I do not consider this situation to solely reside in the behavioural domain but 
mirrored across the seven-system sub codes, with influences continually being exerted 
throughout all phases of the research. I consider the adoption of such an approach to provide 
the holistic dimension so important to the design of the template. 
Third Level. Through categorisation of emerging data as a negative or positive response 
against specific causes, it was possible from the second level to initiate and maintain the 
engagement. Subsequent action would where possible, be directed towards addressing the 
more dominant negative areas of influence, whilst maintaining and building upon the more 
positive aspects that emerge. 
I was however, aware of the danger of imposing a too rigid framework whereby I had, as 
suggested by Stroh (1996a: 59) actively allowed subsequent level 2 and 3 codes, assigned 
against a level I free code classification to naturally emerge across the research phases. 
These 
were influenced not only from the compendium of emotional and 
behavioural traits emerging 
and summarised from within the literature (on page 74) 
but also patterns and themes identified 
outside of both De Waal (2002a, b, c) and Hudson et 
d, (2001) frameworks as performance 
interactions are experienced. As with King (1998: 118), this allowed me to build upon the 
coding matrix through a process of continued modification and adjustments, culminating 
in the 
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previously illustrated final template. As the research progressed, I found that the evolutionary 
nature of the template into the usage stages also provided additional benefits. I therefore 
utilised the template to support the research in compilation of the interview guide, survey 
questions and focus group questioning, which were derived from areas of coding interest, 
which emerged from the data. 
Interpreting the Data. Once I had defined my template and codes, I required a critical and 
analytical means to link the codes with the data and in turn engage with it. This is a process 
which Stroh (1996b: 86) explains needs to be "informed and considered". I subsequently 
considered numerous approaches such as paper base systems, word processors and dedicated 
software packages such as Nvido, Nudist, MAX QDA and MAX QDA 2 before deciding on 
the latter. This decision was based upon the latter's enhancements over its earlier versions and 
my earlier experiences with the system, which meant I required limited additional training. 
Some of the major benefits of my use of the system from a personal perspective are as follows: 
" All data is held centrally in a project file, which can be easily backed up removing the 
need for excessive paper systems and separate files. 
" Inserted dedicated text groups against the exposure, deployment and use stages of the 
BSC. 
" Imported transcribed qualitative texts from the exposure and deployment workshops as 
well as the interviews and focus groups directly into the text groups in a RTF. 
importantly there was no need to pre-format and the added facility existed to edit data 
at anytime. 
" Used colour-tagging facility for text, codes and memos to improve usability of system 
and ease of interpretation. 
" Ease of assigning codes and sub-code to text segments, which I was able to utilise with 
the support of MaxDicto, to search for individual words, strings and phrases in 
individual or a number of transcribed documents simultaneously. 
" Ease of moving codes and text documents along with tagged actions by simply clicking 
and dragging. 
A more detailed listing of the functions of MAX QDA2 is provided in Appendix 5. 
In deciding to use a dedicated software package however, Stroh (1996b: 80) explains it is "easy 
to be seduced by computers". I interpreted this as needing to use one's mind when engaging 
with the data, analysing what the software provides and ultimately presenting the 
findings. I 
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feel I have achieved a level of engagement through adopting Walker and Haslett's (2002: 5 31) 
argument for undertaking a "process of reflection and change in mental models". In my case, 
this resided in the emotions, behaviours and practice of the co-participants and 1, as we 
progressed through the exposure, deployment and use of the BSC. 
I approached this level of engagement by assigning existing (and when necessary), new codes 
and sub-codes against words, sentences or phrases (Burton 1996: 65) emerging from the 
inputted data. I then engaged in a process of critical reflection and analysis, focusing on 
coding sequences and clusters emerging from the data to identify and understand the emotional 
and behavioural events, patterns and themes that might be present. I also sought to 
comprehend the reasons for their presence, relationships and any inter-dependencies. I have 
illustrated the integrated nature of this interaction in the following coding etiquette illustrated 
in figure 3. 
Figure 3- Coding Etiquette 
High Level (1) Codes 
Exposure - Deployment - Use 
System 
Free Codes 
tt 
Sub Level (2) Codes 
Sub Level (3) Codes 
4- Relationships -4 
Events Patterns Themes 
it is possible by reviewing the following (small section) of extracted textural data and coding 
sequence illustrated in figure 4, to convey not only 
how patterns and themes have been 
identified, but also how sense was made of them. As shown in figure 4 overleaf, twenty-eight 
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instances of coding occurred across the level (one) exposure phase. On its own however level 
one provides only a broad high-level overview, against which it is not possible to identify 
either the underlying patterns or themes required. As illustrated, for initial patterns and themes 
to first emerge it is necessary to further breakdown instances of tagged codes at the second 
level. When applied, it is possible to determine from the example shown that although 
agreement on the start time of the BSC invited attention, the area attracting the most 
significant interest resided in individuals' previous experiences of performance management. 
Figure 4- Coding Example (Patterns And Themes) 
Code System 
Level (1) Exposure Phase 128] 
Level (2) Agree on the starting time [4] 
Level (3) Neg 101 
Poss [4] ----- (Fewer objectives x 1) 
(Earlier objectives x 2) 
(Agreeing objectives x 1) 
Level (2) Earlier experiences PMS 1241 
Level (3) Neg [24] ---- 
ýý x 9) 
(National Involvement x 6) 
(Reward x 4) 
(Don't know objectives x 3) 
(Non Structure x 1) 
(Improvements x 1) 
Poss 101 
Although initial trends and patterns have clearly emerged, in their present level two form they 
are merely superficial, as they clearly fail to offer an opportunity to identify or to isolate 
underlying causes, and therefore provide only limited opportunities to focus attention. 
Introducing the level three coding sequence as previously discussed and illustrated in the 
above example, addresses this problem as it enables root causes to be categorised both 
positively and negatively, and their frequency recorded. Consequently, as can be seen those 
categories attracting either a lack of or high levels of interest naturally attract the most 
attention. 
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In the case of the example shown it is possible to progress the level of analysis beyond the 
previously positioned level 2 deductions. As it is now evident from the level 3 insights gained 
that individuals retained dominant feelings of negatively fuelled emotions, particularly 
regarding not only their lack of involvement in previous experiences with PMS, but also how 
they viewed prior national involvement. On a more optimistic note the issuing of earlier 
objectives, which the exposure and deployment workshops has provided, can be seen even at a 
limited level to suggest the presence of positive emotional and suggested behavioural reactions 
towards the new BSC. Consequently, the task facing the researcher, as highlighted in the 
following extracted coded segments, centres on encouraging the more positive emotional and 
or behavioural aspects (highlighted in yellow) to reduce or limit the effect of those (illustrated 
in green) which are negative. A similar process of deduction was applied throughout my 
interactions with the data. 
"Time scales are 1 because someone mentioned in the past they've gone over the 
ear, someone's sat down with you and said by the way these are your 
jjjj*w/icrc 
as now wc know ill advam c 11ýoll call go 
/Orward oll thal 
Source: First Syndicate Exercise 27"' February 2001. 
Dealing with Complexities. It would, however, be wrong to say that no problems were 
encountered. As I began to assign specific codes against text, I quickly realised that a 
significant degree of crossover of the level two codes was inevitable, occurring between the 
exposure, deployment and usage phases. In addition this was further demonstrated in the work 
of Hudson et al., (2001) and De Waal (2002a, b, c) as their frameworks contained similar areas 
of interest such as understanding, relevance and the stimulation of improvement for which I 
had assigned separate codes. I realised that assigning extracts of coded text against each of the 
above provided a valuable opportunity to identify inter-dependencies and relationships. 
I experienced few technical or practical problems during the early stages of coding. However, 
as research progressed and I coded an increasing amount of data, I 
became progressively more 
competent at using the system and recognising the emerging themes. I 
became aware that I had 
identified additional themes, but might also have inappropriately assigned or missed coding 
opportunities, particularly in relation to instances where extracted text may overlap with a 
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number of separate codes. I therefore found myself faced with the dilemma of whether to 
revisit previously coded documents, or continue and simply accept that I may have lost 
valuable data opportunities (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5- Coding Learning Curve. 
Recognition and 
skills level of coder 
Number of texts coded 
As I reflected on the situation, I decided that I could not afford to miss what might turn out to 
be rich data sources at such an early stage of the research. I therefore decided that after I had 
completed the coding of the sixth of the eight interview transcripts, constituting the first set of 
interviews, I would revisit and re-code the previous five. I believed that by adopting this 
approach I would restore a level of consistency to the coding bringing it up to the required 
standard. In coming to this decision, however, I was aware that I would only be able to take 
such a detailed approach once, as time limitations, as well as the sheer number of data sources 
involved, would make it impractical in the future. 
This, I believe, is a dilemma which future researchers will need to face. The experience gained 
suggests that it is not practical, prior to commencing the coding process, to decide when 
precisely a revisit of the data would need to take place. Each piece of research is unique in 
terms of the emerging themes and patterns, and the number of data sources and the skill of the 
coder will also influence any decision needing to be made. For these reasons, each researcher 
will need to decide his or her own particular course of action. 
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How to present the data. In extracting and in turn presenting the data and fmdings, I was 
aware that I would need both a high degree of focus as well as a logical method of discussion 
and presentation. I therefore decided that to meet these requirements I needed to adapt the 
approach suggested by Taylor, (2001: 38-39) whereby I have carefully selected relevant 
features from the data, and from these presented the more interesting or complete patterns 
identified. As suggested by Burton (1996: 65), 1 then as illustrated in my previous example 
used appropriate quotations to prove or disprove the theoretical and practitioner topics under 
investigation. 
I feel the usefulness of this approach is clearly apparent in the qualitative arena where textural 
information provides a sound base to apply this approach. I also however was encouraged to 
uncover the possibility of applying a similar approach in the quantitative survey via the pre-set 
codes in MAX QDA2 against which the responses where tagged. I then subsequently was able 
to provide the same depth of understanding of the evolving results. 
As a researcher I held a major responsibility, as I approached the time to write up my findings. 
I realised that I needed to clearly and logically lead the reader through the process followed, as 
well as my findings, conclusions and recommendations for future research. In meeting these 
requirements, I structured my thesis on the second of three styles positioned by Jackson 
(1996: 93) where I have selected "a number of themes around which to report the results". 
These themes specifically reside in the behavioural, emotional and engagement implications of 
managers exposure, deployment and use of an imposed scorecard in a large network 
organisation. 
3.6 Testing the Approach 
if I simply deployed the methods I intended to use without any form of testing or sense 
checking of the layout, design and the terminology, I was likely to encounter situations where 
their robustness and suitability to engage the co-participants would be lacking, and in turn risk 
losing the required data. I have previously discussed in some depth the actions I followed with 
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regard to the workshop activities, which I realised due to their very structured format, offered 
very limited opportunities for any degree of pre-testing and adjustment. I was however able to 
pre-test and adjust the open research questions included as focus group activities prior to the 
workshops and independent focus groups with the major opinion formers, to ensure both 
clarity of understanding and removal of any bias I might have inadvertently exerted or 
overlooked. I saw this as reducing any potential risks. 
This is clearly a risk for any organisational-based research, which utilises live action oriented 
organisational activities outside of the researcher's direct influence in relation to being 
involved in either their development or deployment. As such, I feel it must remain a key 
consideration for future research. I however found both the interviews and surveys less 
problematic, as they were directly under my own control. I therefore followed a similar testing 
process in each instance. Firstly, I produced draft surveys and interview guides which as 
discussed, I developed from the emerging codes with a particular focus on their layout and 
design in relation to the survey and terminology as it applied to both methods. I then 
provisionally tested these using a small cross-section of the co-participants to confirm initial 
understanding and usability from both a researcher and co-participant perspective noting any 
improvements regarding design, layout and terminology used. I subsequently found it 
necessary to make a number of slight changes in relation to the wording of some of the open 
questions on both the interview guide and survey. These amendments were made as it was felt 
certain questions initially portrayed some degree of ambiguity, which consequently might not 
prompt an open expression of an individual's views and opinions. 
Finally, after I had completed the modifications, it was necessary to revisit both the interview 
guide and survey with the same group of co-participants to confirm robustness. I then 
undertook two pilot surveys and interviews to test both their usability, as well the input data 
into MAX QDA. These proved successful providing me with the final interview guides and 
surveys used in the research. When linked to my previous involvement of the co-participants 
regarding focus, method and frequency (discussed on page 108 and 112), these interview 
guides and surveys led to the success rates achieved in the data collection. 
I 
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Chapter 4 Scorecard Positioning 
The mechanics whereby employees are engaged within the scorecard system centres on the 
principle of achieving a direct line of sight between the stakeholder goals, objectives, targets, 
and vital actions. This would require individuals at all levels to understand not only their 
involvement, but also their priorities and ultimately reaching agreement. To arrive at this 
precise level of understanding, individuals would be required to identify their current 
perforinance measured against the set target. Any identified variances along with their causes 
and appropriate recovery actions, would need to be identified with their impact summarised 
and forecasted onto the scorecard. This level of engagement would continue within an 
organisational imposed cycle process throughout the financial year as demonstrated in figure 6. 
Ownership of the scorecard as well as accountability for the closure of the gaps would rest 
with the individual scorecard owner where, progress would be reviewed monthly in an 
environment of 'mutual trust' with the focus remaining concentrated towards 'agreeing 
proposed actions' to close perforniance gaps and not 'identifying problems' (Parkinson, 
2000: 4). 
Figure 6- Royal Mail Scorecard Engagement 
Objectives & 
Targets Set 
Identify Gap to 
closed 
,I Undertake Root 
Review hnpact 
I 
Cause Analysis 
Deploy Actions 
Vital 
FoTecast Impact of 
Source: Adapted from Royal Mail Letters, Unit Planning and Performance Management 
Guidelines, 2000 
133 
Having provided a contextual setting above, in the following section I will present and discuss 
the specific details related to the applied scorecards in Royal Mail. I will discuss the scorccards 
applied to several key areas within Royal Mail, namely shareholder, custorner and employee 
applications, as well as the consideration of non-scorecard measures. 
4.1 The Delivery Unit Scorecard 
The balanced scorecard used in Royal Mail Letters has associated scorecards at three levels. 
The national scorecard is linked to scorecards for each of the 61 geographic areas that in turn 
link to smaller geographic delivery sectors. Each sector is typically comprised of'9-17 delivery 
units. Although the scorecard has associated links into both the processing and distribution I 
functions throughout the different levels, these are not explored within the conlines of this 
thesis, where the inain research focus has resided in the delivery strands of the scorecard 
shown in table 10. 
Table 10 - The Delivery Unit Scorecard 
Shareholder KPIs Customer KPIs -PIS Employee KPIs 
Mail Costs Repeat Complaints I ts S Fairness of EOS 0 
LincManager 
Pipeline Weighted Unit Cost All Due Mail delivered c ve as a Sick lea 
j Ord i nary Hours _ Delivery Time Out I - - _ 
In the scorecards' development and deployment frorn the national trials, the same format is 
used at each organisational level with the intention of giving a 'fine (#'.,; ight'ofobjcctIvcs and 
associated measures through the different layers. The ability to achicvc this throughout all 
measurement dimensions however, is seen as being restricted, due to problems associated with 
alignment of measures and monitoring systems between the difflerent organisational layers in 
the scorecard (see footnote 9). 
(Footnote 9) A good example regarding problems associated with alignment and identification of' performance outcomes resides in tile 
quality KPI where failures are only identifiable to a postcode sector, which in the majority of'cases spans a number ot'dclivery units (see 
tables 10,11,12 where actual alignment offine ol'sight Kills have been plotted and highlighted Im inflonnation). 
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In the majority of measurement dimensions, scorecard targets were imposed nationally across 
all delivery units. However, a level of flexibility was possible in a small number of 
dimensions, whereby an area could meet its assigned targets, either by allocating the same 
target to each unit or different targets to the units, so long as the overall area target was 
achieved. 
At the Leeds Area Management Team (AMT) and Leeds Delivery Sector, I applied the 
following approach: 
Shareholder Scorecard - alignment and dimensions 
Mail Costs - issued unit budget adjusted both positively and negatively in line with 
any business plan projects with unit performance measured against actual spend in the 
unit. 
Weighted Unit Costs - calculated by taking traffic (letters, packets, flats) and dividing 
by cost. The result was then uplifted by a national growth factor. Performance was 
then measured in relation to efficiency of a unit's performance against how much it cost 
to process one item of mail through the delivery unit. 
Table II- Shareholder Scorecard 
Business Level Area Level Delivery Unit Level 
Contribution (costs Ns. Total cost Mail COSIS 
Trading model income) 
Trading model volumes Traffic volume vs. Target 
vs. Target 
Pipeline "eighted unit Pipeline Weighted Unit Cost Pipeline Weighted Unit Cost 
cost 
Total cost vs. budget Cost (by type - admin /non 
staff) vs. Budget 
Customer Scorecard - Alignment and Dimensions 
All Mail Delivered - nationally imposed with standard targets of 100% assigned to all 
units to measure compliance to mail delivery standards. 
Delivery Time Out - nationally imposed with standard targets of 95% assigned to all 
units to measure conformance to the 06: 45 delivery departure time in relation to duties 
leaving the unit to their first delivery point. 
ON40monomp- 
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:1 
Repeat Complaints - nationally imposed targets into areas with different targets 
assigned to units. The level of the target assigned to a unit depended on current 
complaint levels against a unit and an assessment of the perceived capability of a unit 
to contribute to meeting the area target with achievement measured against actual 
complaints received. 
Table 12 - Customer Scorecard 
Business Level Area Level Delivery Unit Level 
% Very Satisfied with service 
provided by SD 
CSI Delivery 
CSI Collections 
I" Class (Stamp and Meter) I st Class (Stamp and Meter) 
Mailsort 2 Mailsort 2 
Presstream I Presstrearn I 
Repeat Complaints Repeat Complaints Repeal Complaints 
Compliance With Workplan Compliance NN ith Workplan : Xll due mail deli%ere( ' 
DelivervTime Out I)AN ery Time Out -- liverv'Nme Out 
ýDe 
Employee Scorecard - Alignment and Dimensions 
Sick leave as a percentage of ordinary hours - nationally imposed area targets 
applied equally across all units with performance measured in relation to current sick 
levels in a unit against issued target. 
Fairness of Line Manager - nationally imposed area targets with varying targets 
assigned to units. The level of the assigned target depends on current performance and 
an assessment of the perceived capability of a unit to contribute to meeting the area 
target. Achievement against target measured through two six monthly surveys issued 
nationally focusing on employee perceptions regarding their treatment by the line 
manager in the unit. 
Table 13 - Employee Scorecard 
Business Level Area Level Delivery Unit Level 
Employe, Relations (EOS) 
FOS - Fairness ofl, ine Manager 
FOS - Fairness of Line Manager FOS - 1, airness ot'Line 
Manager 
Sick leave as a% of Ordinary 
Hours 
Sick leave as a% of Ordinarý 
Hours 
Sick leave as a 'V,, of 
Ordinary llouri 
Days Lost Through Industrial Action I 
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Non-Scorecard measures - Alignment and Dimensions 
In the alignment of unit targets it was not possible to provide line of sight quality targets 
through the business and directly to a delivery unit due to postcode sectors failing across a 
number of different unit boundaries. I therefore decided that the overall Leeds quality targets 
would be assigned across all units. My rationale for this was that certain line of sight actions 
included in the unit scorecard underpinned quality, such as high levels of staff sickness, 
customer complaints and compliance to work plans measured through all mail delivered KPI. 
I was aware that national, area and sector improvement projects would undoubtedly emerge 
over the coming year as a consequence of service quality trends. This would involve all units 
introducing revised national or area UPBs or sector improvement initiatives. Where this 
occurred, relevant activities would, whenever possible, be tagged to appropriate elements of 
the scorecard. This changing focus in performance across measurement dimensions would not 
only be applicable to quality. It would be reasonable to expect the same level of focus and 
pressure to be applied across existing measurement dimensions and KPIs, as well as any new 
emerging areas identified as the year progressed. (See footnote 10) 
4.2 The Manager's Task 
In the unit KPIs explored in the previous sections, the delivery office managers' tasks were to 
identify and close any gaps in performance by comparing current year end performance in 
February/March 2001 against the issued targets for the start of the new financial year 
beginning in April 2001. The following table overleaf shows an example as to how this was 
achieved against each KPI. 
Footnote 10 Sections from this chapter have been influential in the development and contents of the joint paper, Managerial 
Reflections on the Deployment of Balanced Scorecards. Baughan, P. Armistead, C. Parker, D. (2002), pp 53-60 presented at 
the Ibird International Conference on Performance Measurement and Management: Research and Action, 17-19 July 2002, 
Boston, USA. 
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Table 14 - Identification Of Unit Kpi Tasks 
Issued Objective 
Measurement KPI Current Performance for New Financial Gap in Unit Task for Year 
February 2001 beginning April Performance 2001-2002 
2001 
Achieve issued budget 
1.8m 1.7m I 00k flexed positively and 
negatively in relation to 
Mails Costs L national and area 
projects 
Weighted Unit 
Cost Pence Per 9.7ppi 9.5ppi 0.2ppi As above 
Item 
Repeat Close identified gap 
Complaints 6% 4% 2% 
All due mail Close identified gap 
delivered 72% 100% 28% 
Delivery Time U Maintain current 
Out 95% 95% Nil performance 
EOS - Fairness W Close identified gap 
of Line Manager 34% 56% 221/,, 
Sick leave as a% 'E :. 11ý 
of Ordinary E 5.8% 5% 0.8% Close identified gap 
Hours W 
To support and guide the managers through this process I was required to run two standardised 
deployment workshops supported by nationally assigned performance coaches during February 
2001. 
The first exposure workshop specifically focused on initially exposing the managers to the unit 
scorecard and its associated KPIs. This interaction included explaining and enabling UPBs 
deployed to close perfonnance gaps. The opportunity was also taken to identify the barriers to 
deployment, as well as behaviour seen as important to underpin a successful deployment and 
use of the scorecard. The workshop concluded with the issuing of the unit based objectives, 
targets and identified gaps derived from the process highlighted in table II for the coming 
year. 
Individual managers were then expected to return to their units before attending the second 
deployment workshop to undertake a provisional root cause analysis within identified gaps and 
identify appropriate improvement activities linked to either national, area or local initiatives. 
The second computer based workshop required managers to build upon the initial work they 
had undertaken. This involved prioritising and inputting courses of action derived from 
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national, area and local initiatives to close performance gaps, identifying and recording 
foreseen impact, timescale for fruition and ownership of the performance improvement 
activities. Both the business and I saw the inclusion of these particular aspects in the scorecard 
as important in relation to underpinning the key considerations of accountability and 
ownership of the actions recorded. 
As these activities progressed in the action-orientated environment, the opportunity to share 
the frustrations of the day, unit best practice and previous experience was actively encouraged. 
I felt that as managers came to grips with the scorecard and worked through the process they 
could learn from each other's mistakes and check the impact and timescales they had 
proportioned to the actions from the more experienced managers in the group. On completion 
of the second deployment workshop, individual managers returned to their units, where they 
were required to reassess the workshop activities undertaken by them. This provided an 
opportunity to adjust their individual unit scorecards thus ensuring that identified actions 
supported the achievement of unit performance targets and objectives for the coming year. In 
addition this would provide a further opportunity for any remaining performance gaps to be 
closed by the co-participants. 
Finally, I reviewed each unit scorecard in conjunction with the area performance and planning 
managers, focusing on root cause analysis and activities plotted on unit scorecards to achieve 
issued targets and objectives. Plans were either agreed and signed off, or reissued to the unit 
manager for additional work to be undertaken and re-submitted prior to I't April. The agreed 
scorecards then formed the basis from which unit performance was reviewed every month for 
the coming year. 
4.3 How Prepared are the Managers for a Unit Scorecard? 
The Business Excellence Process as discussed in appendix 14, involved complete business 
units and as such can be seen as the primary foundation via the POMM for embedding 
(amongst the more senior managers at a strategic and operational level), the principles and use 
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of a balanced approach focusing on activities, results and continued improvement. This level 
of exposure in conjunction with the majority of the senior manager's involvement in the other 
deployed changes would explain the sensible decision to deploy and embed a BSC at a 
national and area level where the knowledge and skills necessary to engage with such an 
approach would be readily accessible. Additionally, the two-year gap between the 
national/area scorecard deployments and the use of a unit scorecard provided a suitable bed 
rock through which the required support could be made available and utilised for the purpose 
off enabling a successful unit deployment. My priority as one of these senior managers for the 
coming year was to provide this assistance. I therefore needed to understand the extent to 
which the managers were prepared. 
My major consideration centred on understanding the level of ability currently present in the 
management structure to support an initial entry and engagement into the scorecard cycle 
environment. As I reflected upon the drive for continued improvement, I realised that 
managers from across both sectors fell into two discrete categories. The first involved those 
that had experienced all or a large proportion of the deployed changes, which should in theory 
provide them with a breadth and depth of knowledge, as well as experience, but conversely 
more opportunities for negative emotions and experiences to be encountered. Alternatively, on 
the other side of the spectrum, their less experienced colleagues who had only been used to 
engaging with a limited number of the changes would have had fewer opportunities for similar 
experiences to emerge, as they would only be aware of the current performance and 
measurement practices. 
As discussed in the methodology, nurturing the interaction between these groups in both the 
exposure and deployment workshops has been encouraged. It 
has however not come without 
some degree of risk, as apart from the issues discussed above, 
functional conflict, or foxholes, 
which to varying degrees is continually evident after the 
MIPP process was deployed to reduce 
it, may resurface as a barrier, which I need to be aware of and pro-actively consider. 
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As I reflected on the existing level of engagement obtained outside of the functional foxholes, 
I felt confident that engagement with a scorecard would improve activities in a number of 
areas. 
Firstly, I feel that managers are well versed in the idea of customer specifications, as 
well as the use of diagnostic tools to focus on specific reasons for underperformance 
from which they are able to identify and deploy across a range of improvement 
opportunities. Having had the concepts initially deployed as part of the customer first 
workshops, more importantly however, these were embedded and expanded as a 
cultural way of working which extends through to current practice through the adoption 
of the MIPP programme. 
Secondly, measures of past and present performance established as a key part of the 
change process, have been embedded throughout the business with managers 
accustomed to working within the various dimensions. 
Finally, individuals are accustomed to having performance reviews and managed 
against the resulting measurement outcomes even such measures are not consistent or 
applied within a balanced scorecard fonnat. 
At an individual level, I think it is reasonable to assume that the existing level of performance 
focus across the business should enable a reasonable association to be made by individuals 
between previously learned and applied skills and the majority of the cycle scorecard activities 
illustrated in figure 6 on page 133., 
I see a very close similarity existing between current and fiiture practice, even if it is not 
currently consistently applied across the business against the recognised unit scorecard 
activities and format. This is not to say that I do not think problems exist for I would not be 
surprised if in certain situations a disparity between organisational focus and knowledge and 
the capability and competence of individuals to accept or engage with the scorecard was not 
present. 
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Additionally I strongly feel that two particular areas of concern clearly exist, which have not 
been adequately addressed as part of the changes discussed and as such undoubtedly will 
surface during the workshop activities and as the year progresses. 
> Firstly, individuals have very limited previous experience in relation to accurately 
understanding and conveying both the impact of the actions they have taken or intend 
to take and in turn predicting their projected effect in either an objective setting or 
monthly performance review. 
> Secondly, although individuals are used to undergoing some form of performance 
reviews via PIFs and on a monthly basis at a unit level, inconsistencies exist due to 
varying degrees of focus and application. This is particularly evident in relation to 
individuals across the business experiencing less than frequent monthly performance 
reviews, changing objectives and targets as well as measurement focus. 
At this stage I reflected on the consequences these could have my practice as well as the 
practice upon my managers. The more I thought about it the more I realised that these tensions 
may exert an undue strain in relation to nurturing and maintaining the desired environment of 
mutual trust. This in turn could lead to problems associated with individuals' understanding 
and prioritisation of activities, as well as a perceived lack of ownership and accountability for 
any outcomes emerging from the pending meetings with myself. I feel that these are all 
important considerations that can be seen to have received minimal consideration in either the 
evolving changes or subsequent guidance offered by the scorecard deployment process. I 
therefore reason that this is an area that I need to explore and resolve as part of the exposure 
workshop. 
Having discussed the specific applications of the scorecard within Royal Mail, I address the 
means in which the scorecard was initially introduced to managers. Here I will address how I 
sought to develop rapport with my managerial team, as well as my perceptions of the team's 
ability to engage with the scorecard. I also discuss the agreed performance measure behaviours 
and the emerging themes derived from the first applications of the scorecards. 
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CHAPTER 5 Managers' Initial Exposure to the Unit Scorecard 
5.1. Exposure Positioning - Developing a Rapport with Extended Managerial Team 
As I reviewed the workshop format and contents, it became apparent that other issues needed 
to be addressed. As I talked through the workshop content, I realised that I faced a number of 
barriers to deployment, which required resolution prior to the very commencement of the 
workshops. My rationale behind this conclusion stemmed from a number of discreet areas and 
personal conversations. 
I was becoming increasingly aware that managers' previous experience of differing 
performance management approaches, information download in set piece presentations and 
being managed in a threat-centred environment by previous senior managers could impact on 
or indeed potentially emerge as a barrier to achieving the desired workshop aims. This 
concern was raised most notably in an informal conversation with one of my more senior 
managers: 
"Pete, we have heard it all before. It sounds good, but my own interpretation from what you 
have said is that all Royal Mail have done is give us a system which ties managers down with 
excessive paperwork and takes us awayfrom the dayjob. My worry is that managers willjust 
go along with the process you have explained, in other words they will say what they thinkyou 
want them to say or agree to whatyou wantjust to getyou off their backs ". 
in other words, scepticism and reservations were expressed based upon the belief that 
deployment of the scorecards would actually result in more administrative duties, which 
ultimately would prevent effective working conditions. I must admit that I had always 
subsequently felt in performance reviews with my previous core of managers that this might be 
the case, but it was the first time this had been conveyed to me by a colleague. The 
consequence and impact of this conversation worried me, with my concerns being further 
heightened by one of the locally sited performance coaches who, after speaking with the 
managers, felt that: 
"ne DOMs Perception is of a process involving a lot more paperwork, adding little value to 
thejob, and leaving them less time to do thejob they should be doing (managing the ofrice). 
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Yhey see Performance Management asfurther work imposed on them, but not helping them ". 
Each conversation demonstrated that clear linkages were apparent against three of the four 
barriers to measurement previously explored and defined by Daniels (1989) 1). "Jobs cannot 
be measured" 2) "measures are hard to work with" and 3) are seen as "time consuming, 
takingpeople awayfrom other more important issues". 
As I thought the consequences of this through, I was sure that if these three were present, the 
likelihood of the remaining barrier of 'antecedent of punishment' would also be lurking 
amongst some managers' thoughts and reactions to the performance changes they were shortly 
due to encounter. I was particularly concerned for the seven managers who had not previously 
worked for me. As well as potentially harbouring these concerns, they could have their 
perceptions and worries further clouded by an uncertainty as to the nature of my own 
management approach and style. In other words, it was far safer to assume this barrier was 
present, rather than risk ignoring it, only to have it surface later. It was therefore important to 
elevate and counter these concerns so that both sets of managers were encouraged to engage 
positively in the workshop. This would therefore help to ensure maximum benefit gained from 
the interaction and reduce the potential of side tracking on to the topic of the whys, wants and 
wherefores of the scorecard. This potential side tracking problem (that if not resolved at the 
outset), I was sure could and would persist, as managers encountered varying degrees of 
individual performance pressures as the year progressed. 
In trying to put some structure to the problem, as well as identifying how best to progress, it 
became evident that the barriers I was encountering clearly fell into what Winstanly and 
Stuart-Smith (1996) classify as 'individual and mutual respect, as well as the ýprocedural 
fairness and transparency of decision making' in my forthcoming interactions with the team. 
The authors have concluded that all these afore mentioned aspects, are fundamental 
prerequisites conducive to a positive work and learning environment. 
I was aware from my review of the literature that De Waal (2002c) specifically focuses on this 
problem. Apart from providing advice as well as having objectives aligned with the business 
strategy, a clear employee perfonnance expectation from the objectives must also exist. 
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Employees should thus know how to achieve their performance objectives. In addition, 
employees should be made aware of the managerial support they can expect. 
In deciding how best to address the barriers, as well as how to nurture the environments 
addressed by Winstanly and Stuart-Smith (1996) and De Waal (2002c), I approached a couple 
of the experienced managers as well as the CMA, and asked for their advice. I discussed the 
practicalities and relevance of fostering a supportive environment with my team, and 
developed a way forward in light of their recommendations. I specifically asked for their 
support in developing and agreeing the behavioural statement/contract between their 
colleagues and myself for the coming year. I saw this as the best means to approach the 
problem. I was therefore encouraged when one of the manager's responses to this was: 
"That's a controversial idea- we have never been askedfor one of these before -I suppose it 
won't hurt to give it a try - it can only help". 
5.2 Engaging With the Co-Participants 
Encouraged by this, I decided to review not only participant's concerns, but also the issue of 
ground rules that they felt were necessary for the, successfill deployment and use of the 
scorecard. By following this approach, I hoped I would be able to forge a relationship with the 
new managers and resolve any problems as a group without jeopardising the performance 
management approach or the second workshop. I did not want to get side tracked debating 
other issues on the day and felt that agreeing upon a contract from the outset, would allow me 
to agree a pre-arranged set of behavioural standards prior to completing the scorecards. 
The development of the syndicate exercise led by the managers was not without its challenges. 
I was aware that I did not want to go into any depth regarding generating solutions, as this 
would devalue the pending deployment workshop. As a compromise and so that I could 
achieve meaningful interactions with the managers, I decided to reposition the already 
discussed measurement dimensions and performance gaps they would encounter over the 
coming year, so that the exercise in the workshop could refocus on the topic and proceed. 
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As part of the exercise, I wanted to extract participants' previous experiences engaging with 
targets, as well as identifying their concerns for the coming year. The KPIs presented by 
myself, consisted of the following PowerPoint slide extracted form the national presentation. 
Slide 5.1 Identifying Performance Target Areas 
M. B., (*..,. M- & Rýdu- b. dg,, p-d 
Wmght, d I J- Mý & Rdu,, Pmcc Pm 1- 
All I)- M. il DO- All M. il 
h- Mýli-y Ddi- l. ri.. 
Kq-, ( Mý &I 
. --d 
R"fuced I gt 
FOS Faimm., ft. i,, M-gý M-ý & E-d Ra-d I gt 
Si. k 1- % Od 11,, M- & E. c-d Rýd-d 
Qu. 1ily M- P-"ý I gt 
mom 
To promote a level of pre-work and self-reflection amongst the team before the meeting, I sent 
the following e-mail to all managers encouraging individuals to attend the exposure workshop 
and to think about how best to address this issue and as well as discuss the topic with their 
colleagues if they so wished: 
"As you are aware, we are all shortly due to enter into a balanced scorecard peýformance 
management system. I am aware that this can seem daunting 4fter speaking with some Qfyou, 
I have agreed to develop a behavioural contract, which we willjointly apply over the coming 
year. To support this, I will be running a syndicate exercise to identi any barriers and agree ify, 
the content andfiocus of how we will work together over the coming year". 
The syndicate exercise was comprised of two separate 20 minute sessions, as well as a further 
10 minute feedback and discussion session focusing on the following questions in slide 5.2: - 
ar 
-. rPiC : 
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Slide 5.2 Review used at Sector Meeting 
Review of Exposurq-ý 
Duration 10 Minutes With 15 Minute Feedback 
Firstly: - 
What do you see am the positive and negative aspect, of the Sc-rd, 
Measures and Targets for the coming year? 
Secondly: - 
What Needs to Be Done to R ... Ive or Limit the ImPact of the Issues Highlighted 
momý 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, my selected means of data capture during the 
exercises consisted of a taped transcript of the conversation, personal notes, observations of 
the conversations, reflections on the reactions of those present and flip chart feedback, 
summarised on completion of the exercise. During the exposure stages of the investigation, 
the research group (apart from myself), included 17 co-participating managers, two 
performance coaches and analysts. The views positioned emerging from these activities has 
not been identified against specific individuals, due to the observance of research ethics - 
guaranteeing anonymity of elicited responses. 
5.3 Initial Perceptions regarding the Ability to Engage with Measures 
Upon receiving feedback from the managers, I was surprised that the first issue to arise related 
to previous experiences of performance management, as well as participants' expectations of 
the new scorecard. My surprise stemmed from the fact that my initial expectations that 
participants would want to discuss their interactions with myself, were not met. Other more 
pressing issues rather, emerged. These issues relate to what De Waal (2002: 162) explains as 
the enabling managerial criteria of 'understanding, positive attitude, responsibilities, culture 
and clearfocus'. The behavioural interactions (although linked to these topics), surfaced as a 
secondary concern when we discussed how these problems needed to be resolved. 
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At an operational level, most managers perceived that the measures and their associated targets 
were imposed without consultation, with some measures being seen as unrealistic and as such 
unachievable due to uncontrollable outside influences and workloads. Managers had already 
experienced several changes in the performance management systems and expressed 
scepticism about the reality of change, in that apart from going through a structured process 
nothing really had changed in the past. The following cross-section of the more pessimistic 
views emerged: 
"In the past they've gone over the performance in the New Year, someone's sat down with you 
andsaid by the way these areyour objectivesfor this year". 
"In otheryears we'vejust received (objectives/targets)from them in thepost". 
"This is thefirst time we have seen the target areas, although there are no surprises - as no 
one has asked me what I can achieve and ifI agree with them. I would say we have not been 
involved in the setting of targets as is what normally happens ". 
"Pete, we have always had targets, nothing is different there. We are not involved andjust 
told to achieve them, when deep down we know that we cannot. No one listens to us and I am 
sure nothing is going to change with the scorecard ". 
I was however encouraged to note that negativity towards a further change in the performance 
system did not completely dominate the debate. Instances emerged where individuals 
(although somewhat sceptical) saw the potential benefits to be derived from engaging in the 
exposure and coming deployment workshop activities. The following statements emerged 
from the discussion: 
"I think it is good to have a structuredprocess, but to be honest Pete, what is to say it will be 
any differentfrom what we have had to do andput up with in the past? " 
"We see nothing new in what you have said, but it is good to go through them and know what 
our targets are before May, which is what normally happens 
"I think that's the positive thing about this year Peter- we are actually sitting down and 
talking about it ". 
I found the positive content of these discussions encouraging, as I realised that an underlying 
level of receptiveness and anticipation was present in some quarters towards the coming 
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interactions. It became apparent however that this was likely to be dampened by not only the 
intensity of the pending activities, but also the business use of the terminology 'contracting', 
which had not been previously used. Consequently, some participants felt threatened by the 
incorporation and use of this term. Two particularly expressive viewpoints summarise the 
degree of uncertainty and discomfort felt: 
"I think it's because it's new, we're a bit you know, sort of worried about it. It's a new system 
isn't it? We've not had this level offocus. Yhe other side to that is that it's thefirst time we've 
actually been contracted to do something and that is a little bit worrying". 
"Our concerns are that if we don't meet that contract at end of the year, what's the business 
going to do? "& 
The reasons underpinning the more pessimistic perceptions (as well as committing to a 
contract) were associated with a number of central occurring themes: ability to engage with the 
scorecard, confusion and negativity about the objectives and choice of measures, the 
proportioning of the target, their ability to influence performance and the impact this has on 
the bonus payment systems. From this debate, the following'statements arose: 
"Budgets are always set with no participation of us managers- if we are ever asked, it is only 
to say how many leave or sick hours we want in a particular week How can we be held 
responsible if we are not involved in setting afair budgetfor the unit to run with? From what 
I am seeing, nothing has changed". 
Similarly- 
"IfI am running below target on my sick leave last year and somebody else is running say 6% 
above target, how motivating is it to be given the same target? Is it notfairerfor the under 
performer to be given a higher target? " 
It became apparent that this dissatisfaction was not confMed to the setting of budgets, with 
criticism emerging regarding perceived unfairness of simply proportioning the same targets 
across under and over performing units alike. As with the personal comment regarding the 
sick target above, it was felt that this issue also related to both the Employee Opinion Survey 
and customer complaint KPIs. 
Those present also expressed their confusion about the choice and relevance of the measures in 
use. Participants questioned how the measures supported the business strategy. This was 
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particularly evident as discussions focused on the trade-offs between different dimensions of 
performance, where it was seen that progressing a mandatory project or initiative could 
directly impact on a local performance results. From this discussion the following views, 
which capture the level of frustration, became apparent: 
"I think that our budgetary performance is heavily impacted upon by the national decision not 
to cover statutory sickpay - certain staff take advantage and have 6 months onfullpay ". 
"Yhe national Work time learning UPB sounds good, but it does not work in a delivery office 
where staff will simply see it as stopping them getting out. In a mail centre, staff see it as a 
skivefrom work All it does in a delivery office is it makes staff late. This will cause me tofail 
my time out". 
"Nat you say about the individual performance standards sounds good in principle, but we 
don't even have any agreed standards with the union. So how are we supposed to make it 
work and enforce it? Anyone can pass a one minute test- it is achieving and maintaining the 
sorting rate that is important". 
This topic area was particularly close to managers' hearts when the discussion focused on the 
volatile subject of the EOS Fairness of Line Manager results, which managers felt employees 
might ultimately use as a reaction to a factor outside of the managers' control. As the 
discussions around this topic progressed, I was asked the following questions, which I was 
surprised had not surfaced earlier: 
"I have something I want to put to you Peter. I am normally scoring say 65% on my survey. I 
receive my next units EOS survey. At the same time as a reduction in overtime payments is 
announced. nis causes my staff to have a go at the business by marking my survey down and 
I get a 35% result. How can I be held accountablefor this? " 
"I alsojeel it is wrong if my unit always clears all its mail daily and I know its quality is good, 
but I am measured on a sharedpostcode which is also shared by an ojfIce which we all know, 
has big problems regarding not clearing, regularly due to cut offs. I think it is unfairfor my 
unit to be marked as apoorperformer and my own performance to be questioned". 
These where the most prominent instances raised, which concerned the question and resolution 
of accountability and ownership. I explained that from the emergent 
discussion areas, we 
would be addressing this subject in the second part of the syndicate exercise. One individual 
then commented: 
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"That will be interesting as I don't know what you can say - if we are not meeting our target 
what power do you have to change it? " 
In listening to this, I found myself in tacit agreement, and realised this was an issue that needed 
to be resolved without switching people off or indeed worsening existing concerns and fears 
around the impending contracting/agreement of individual scorecards. My apprehension 
related to the second part of the syndicate exercise was growing. Therefore, would the positive 
engagement I currently enjoyed with my managers, switch to dysfunctional reactions? I was 
particularly concerned that such dysfunctional reactions, namely fear, politics and 
shortcomings (as discussed by Neely et aL, 2000) would emerge. At this point however, I had 
to curtail my curiosity and wait to see to what degree, (if any), these dysfunctional reactions 
would emerge. 
As the feedback continued, it became apparent that although individuals in principle 
understood the necessity of trade-offs, they still regarded it as a personal failure on their part if 
success could not be maintained across all performance dimensions. Three comments 
particularly capture this view: 
"Although a particular issue might be a problem in a number of other units - it does not say I 
have the same problem, so why do I have to deploy what others have to? [Deployment] may 
only cause me problems afterwards" 
"I get extremelyfrustrated when I am unable to achieve a target I have been set, particularly 
when I know the cause, but I am unable to influence any outcome ". 
"I don't have a sickproblem -if I start to harass them by phoning them at home when they 
are on sick leave, what is to stop them marking me down on my survey orputting a complaint 
in against me? 
This suggested that individuals strongly felt that by reducing or changing the focus, new 
problems could occur in their own units. Participants were also concerned about their ability 
to influence performance against a particular measure when the effects of external 
contributions were perceived to override local actions within the unit. 
It became clear in the content of the debate that particularly strong feelings towards this 
resided in an individuals' perceived ability to meet the assigned 
budget with feedback 
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highlighting the following areas of concern: 
"I amjust happy to meet my budget. What benefit do Igetfor under spending? It [my budget] 
is only taken awayfrom me thefollowing year". 
"If I can claim costsfor things like elections, rather than absorbing it - it will help me in the 
short term, even though for thefollowing year it will be taken away and make my task harder 
-I might not be here then - so why worry? " 
" nat incentive do we have to put in local improvementsfor which we are notfundedfor? We 
only get questionedfor overspending later'. 
When questioned further about the perceived extent of personal impact, there emerged a 
general view that if outside influences are not present or overriding, then a personal impact 
should be achieved against complaints, sickness, EOS and the all mail and time of delivery 
targets. This was underpinned by the view that: 
"These things are directly under our control. I can speak to people who are on sick leave or 
mis-delivering andpersonally check to see thatpeople re-circulate and have cleared the mis- 
sortframe before they leave". 
As this particular part of the discussion continued, it gradually became apparent that the topic 
was inadvertently returning to the previously discussed themes of national influence, direct 
control and ability to influence work. I was becoming increasingly frustrated as I thought we 
had concluded this part of the discussion and tried to move the debate forward. I was 
however, firmly cut short and infortned that: 
"... it is all well and good talking about what we can influence- that's not the problem- it's 
what we can't thatfrustrates and winds us up the most - in other words - you might not like 
to hear this, but at times it can cause us to switch off'. 
This was not the only instance of negativity to emerge. One individual questioned what was to 
stop him from: 
-just guessing the impact of an action or just putting one down to close a gap, knowingfull 
well that it will not do what we say, just so that we complete the workshop. From what I have 
seen in thepast, this is what the nationalpeople do with their own UPBs ". 
I was conscious that the manner of my reaction to the comments could potentially set the scene 
for the coming year. If I reacted negatively, I would potentially lose the opportunity to build 
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rapport. Alternatively, if I used the content of the replies positively, I demonstrate that I was 
interested in their opinions and wanted to help. 
I therefore asked for further examples that built upon previous feedback. Common recurring 
criticisms emerged, such as underperformance in shared quality targets between delivery units, 
when both are penalised and it is well known that the performance problem is specific to only 
one party. Furthermore, frustrations were felt regarding previous experience where, for 
example; cost cutting in upstream functions, failure to clear the night mail centre or late 
transport departures could result in late vehicle arrivals. The following statements encapsulate 
the sense of frustration in such contexts whereby: 
"A repeat complaint regarding a 'wait left item' (item returned to a mail centre for return 
to the delivery office the next day as customer is out), that's not coming back to the office 
on time due to late vehicles or mail centre failures ... now that's a Mail Centre issue, so I 
couldfail a targetfor repeat complaints and its outside my control". 
Additionally: 
"Like when the Mail Centre waitsfor late network arrivals delaying our mail that they had 
earlier or don't cover their own duties so don't clear to time - thefrustrating bit is they don't 
tell us and we onlyfind out when the vehicle arrives late with too much mailfor us to sort in 
time ". 
When questioned how they felt about this, they explained that singly, or as a combination of 
events, these generated unwarranted additional pressure on a unit manager leading to 
additional costs and failures that were outside of their immediate control. Additionally, what 
was most frustrating was that in the majority of instances they are the last to learn about the 
problem, which in turn left them little or no time to adequately react or plan contingencies. 
It was felt that the coming year would see the same problems occurring, with little likelihood 
of them being actively tackled or recognised in the performance reviews. This frustration was 
summarised as: 
"I thought this was only my problem - why doesn't the business resolve this, as it is clearly 
outside ofty control? " 
153 
"ny is my performance measuredfrom what someone else does? " 
"If we can't achieve it, we want to know that people will listen to our reasons why, and not 
just blindly hit us over the headfor not achieving a target which is outside of our control or 
which we all knew we couldn't meet in thefirst place". 
The consensus was that these factors could be de-motivating, and negatively affect the degree 
of ownership and accountability accepted by individuals in the units regarding their original or 
emerging agreed (contracts) courses of action. Moreover, there was fear and resentment that 
bonus payments could be adversely affected by the system. In addition, there was fear that 
imposed improvement activities did not support any improvement in a unit and that upstream 
problems could not be addressed locally within the units. 
5.4 Agreeing Performance Behaviours 
As the syndicate activities progressed into the second session, we commenced discussing the 
topics of openness, honesty, trust and support as important factors contributing to the 
successful application of the new scorecard. This encouraged me, as similar concepts of 'trust, 
performance, information'and 'openly communication' are contained in the cultural clement 
of De Waal's (2002: 162) behavioural framework. I focused on these two particular aspects, 
where it soon emerged that those present saw each of these as coming from a completely 
different perspective to how I or De Waal (2002) originally saw them, with the meaning falling 
more into the cognitive domains of 'trust and confidence' as described by Stauss and Neuhaus 
(1997). 
It was felt that the consideration of trust and in turn openness were mutually supportive and 
directly related to the personal one to one relationship the managers had with me, as their line 
manager was seen as forming the foundation that would either 
hinder or support the 
deployment and ongoing success of the scorecard. One individual summarised his own 
concerns stating that: 
"If Ifeel I can trust you Peter, I am more likely to be open with you - if I don't, I would be 
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stupid to expose myself to any ridicule or pressure by not agreeing or going along with what 
you say or want me to do ". 
Whilst listening to this, I found myself looking around the room and noticed that the majority 
of those present were nodding or sitting up in apparent support of the comment. The message 
contained in the confines of the comment and the apparent consensus amongst fellow 
colleagues present, concerned me. My concern was felt as a result of the clear referrals to the 
states of fear and exposure of shortcomings (Neely et aL, 2000), as well as an extensive cross 
section of the emotional and behavioural traits summarised from the literature review. 
I also felt fully justified in deciding to run the syndicate exercises, as the comments provided 
further substance to the original views expressed by the experienced manager and the 
performance coach regarding concerns with scorecard engagement. It was also apparent that I 
was being provided with a valuable view from an operators' perspective regarding why some 
of the problems explored in the previous section might emerge, or already be in existence. 
At this stage in the proceedings, I recognised that the current discussion provided me with an 
appropriate inroad to begin to nurture the previously discussed states of 'individual and mutual 
respect', (Winstanly and Stuart-Smith, 1996) each of which from my experience, are integral 
components towards acquiring a degree of openness, honesty and trust in any interaction. 
To begin the debate I asked the group to explain what they felt needed to be present- the 
answer to the question that, I soon realised also addressed the element of trust was surprisingly 
simple. One individual was quite forthcoming in his view that: 
"... it all simply boils down to the question: can we trust you? We know that like us, you are 
under a lot ofpressure - but we need to know that we can trust you to take our problems on 
board. nis is the important part: to actively listen to us. "at we don't want is for you to 
simply brush aside what we say ". 
it was therefore important that the managers felt comfortable and could trust me to actively 
listen to their concerns and problems and not belittle them or apply an autocratic managerial 
style. Then, in turn, they would be more inclined to be open and honest in discussing and 
questioning performance issues, as opposed to deflecting the conversation, or agreeing to what 
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they thought I wanted to hear. A good example of this was present in one participant's 
statements whereby. 
"PI know you are going to listen to my problems constructively and help by supporting me, I 
am more likely to tell you of any impending problems that could be experienced when I agree 
actions orfollow a course ofaction in my unit". 
I asked the group if they agreed that this was the best way to foster mutual respect. The 
consensus was that such an approach would go a long way to achieving respect and alleviating 
many of the concerns about agreeing (contracting) the contents of or subsequent changes to the 
scorecard. As one individual commented: 
V also think that the term 'contract' is misleading. From what I can gather ... it is simply a 
means of agreeing what is on the scorecard when I ainfinished with it. Am I right? If that is 
the case, ifI have done it right, I don't see a problem ". 
It was also felt that respect, trust and ultimately, openness would not just happen - it would 
have to be earned from actual experience in directly working with me. I explained that I saw 
the syndicate exercise as the starting point for the development of respect, trust and rapport, to 
be subsequently observed through the coming workshops. The group agreed that this would 
seem to be a reasonable starting point. 
Despite this agreement, there was still uncertainty regarding anticipated disagreements during 
decision-making. Thus, one manager (although he agreed with the contents of the explanation 
and the consensus regarding our direction) refocused the discussions back to the problems 
associated with making difficult decisions: 
"It's very easy to say all this here but what happens when we get into a situation when a 
discussion has to be made that the other person does not agree with? Won't it all go by the 
wayside then? " 
I was not surprised that such a fair question had resurfaced. I was encouraged to see that we 
were now moving towards tackling the two remaining volatile questions of ýProcedural 
fairness' and 'transparency of decision making' (Winstanly and Stuart-Smith, 1996). Both 
these issues in union with the authors' previous two respect factors, are implicitly entwined 
with De Waal's (2002c) need for an explicit expectation from objectives, which managers 
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understand how to achieve. The importance of this interconnection, I suggest, is evident 
throughout the previous section in the chapter, particularly with regards the National and Area 
UPBs as supported by the following comment: 
"It would be a good idea for the business to explain why we are given the targets we have -I 
still cannot comprehend why it makes sense to give both under performing and over 
performing units the same targets ". 
As the debate continued, it became obvious that participants felt that past project managers 
(including myself), did not understand the impact of what they were deploying and that 
operational managers' views had not been fully considered in pulling the project or activity 
together. It was felt that: 
"All too often we are told to do something, and those telling us don't even know what the 
outcome is likely to be, or overstate what they think it will give. Is it no wonder that we 
mistrust or are reluctant to deploy activities which we do not come up with ourselves? " 
It was clear that managers' experience with performance management had generated feelings 
of mistrust and apprehension. To progress this topic, I focused the group back onto the 
question put to me during the last syndicate exercise regarding my ability to change a target. I 
decided that my best course of action was to redirect the question back to the group and ask for 
their views regarding how we could address this concern. I saw this as a more appropriate 
means for us as a team, taking joint ownership of the outcome, as opposed to simply listening 
to how I thought we should deal with the problem. 
There was joint recognition that in reality, my ability to change a national project or a target 
once set by the business would be very limited. The reason behind this centred on the 
acknowledgement that like the group, I had been issued with the same targets. The only 
difference was that unlike them, I had to manage them over a greater number of units. In 
addition, I had to address queries and potential resistance when 
discussing how the gaps where 
to be closed. As one individual explained: 
"We understand that you are restricted, but what we need is a level of common sense - it's no 
goodfollowing a course of action which we all know won't give us what we want, when we 
want it. It all comes back to what we talked about earlier - the question of trust and being 
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open and honest with each other so that we can resolve problems. I am not saying you don't 
tackle anyonefor underperformance, but it needs to be done constructively". 
This was encouraging as it indicated appreciation of certain restrictions applied to my 
management practice. I felt however, that it was unwise to simply leave this consideration 
unexplored. I needed to understand the participant's views regarding the extent to which they 
felt it was possible to deal with such situations. The need for an agreed way forward was 
becoming increasingly urgent, as we would shortly encounter problems such as these when the 
managers commenced working on their scorecards in the deployment workshop. This would 
also be a more long-term concern as the managers engaged with the scorecards throughout the 
year. 
The consensus was that when a difficult target was present, individuals should be given more 
time to close the gap. Moreover, it was felt this activity would be characterised by a degree of 
joint debate, negotiation and agreement. As the conversation continued, it was heartening to 
note that the team recognised the unsavoury topic of underperformance would also need to be 
raised. When I asked how the group felt about this, it was hoped that the same process should 
be underpinned by appropriate advice with suitable support and development opportunities. 
I saw these undertakings as important, since they indicated that individuals would be 
encouraged to openly discuss performance, rather than simply agreeing and saying what they 
felt I wanted to hear. I felt comfortable adopting this approach at this stage. I could start to 
nurture the process of my managers agreeing (contracting) to the contents of the scorecards, 
taking ownership of the scorecard and in turn, responsibility for their actions. 
I explained that I would attempt to nurture this through listening constructively to concerns 
and outlining my reasons for any decisions I made. I would also endeavour to use the 
feedback process through the levels of the scorecard to communicate deployment problems 
and identify how any changes made at unit level would support both the business plan and help 
unit managers take ownership. The question of accountability and ownership as I had hoped, 
had eventually surfaced from the group, but with reoccuning obstacles present. It was 
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generally felt, that as managers, they knew they were ultimately accountable for their units, but 
the degree of actual ownership they felt towards the activities they were required to progress, 
was to a significant degree dependant on their actual ability to influence the process. Again, 
the implications of factors considered outside of a managers' direct control and national 
projects not meeting expectations were raised: 
"We have no problems being held accountable for our actions. All we want is to be able to 
influence what it is we are supposed to be doing. Otherwise how can we reasonably be 
expected to have any ownership or be held accountable byyou? " 
The syndicate exercise concluded with a review of the outputs and suggestions from both 
sessions. This lead to the agreement of a set of behavioural standards illustrated below, which 
as reasoned, would support the deployment and use of the scorecard over the subsequent year. 
Sector Behavioural Commitment 
1. The objectives and targets are set by the organisation. As individuals, we have to accept 
that the task is there and take ownership and accountability, as we continually strive to 
achieve the task set. 
2.1 am here to support, guide and coach you to enable you to achieve the objectives and 
targets that have been set. 
3.1 pledge my personal commitment that threat-centred or autocratic approaches will not 
be perused in the deployment workshop, sign-off meeting and the performance reviews, 
as we progress through the coming year. 
4. The deployment workshop and the sign-off meeting will provide the forum by which all 
parties will clarify the issues important to them as they impact on, or affect, the issued 
objectives and targets - applying the behaviours and approaches outlined within this 
statement. 
5. Monthly Performance Reviews will be conducted, applying the behaviours and 
approaches outlined within this statement. 
6. It is essential that there is mutual trust and respect between us. Where difficult decisions 
arise, I expect us to openly debate the issue and agree a joint way forward. 
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7. At times, a joint decision will not be possible. When this occurs, I promise to explain 
the rationale behind the decision and to agree support, guidance and coaching as 
necessary. 
8.1 promise to actively and honestly represent DOM's interests at all levels 
communicating issues as they arise. 
9.1 expect you to challenge both my behaviour and approach, truthfully telling me where 
you feel I may be falling short in helping you to achieve these objectives. I promise to 
reflect on this feedback and adjust my approach as necessary. This is a two-way 
commitment, and I ask you as individuals to commit to the same undertaking. 
5.5 Reflections on Managers Initial Exposure to Unit Scorecard 
As discussed, Kaplan and Norton (1992) assert that a correctly designed scorecard should draw 
managers towards the direction of the organisation's vision. They suggest that the scorecard 
forces managers to focus on a small number of vital measures and that in turn, the scorecard 
supports a level of managerial understanding towards the inter-relationships identified in the 
scorecard. The following reflections explicitly focus on these considerations, drawing from the 
research participant's initial exposure and emotional reactions to the measures contained in the 
scorecard. It is here that there is a specific emphasis on understanding the issues to be 
addressed as I progress into the deployment workshop. 
5.5.1 Why did individuals feel as they do? 
It was apparent to me from my opening engagement with my senior managers, that initial 
barriers to deployment were present before I even approached the scorecard topic. As 
identified, these concerns fell into very well defined cognitive attitudes and feelings such as 
tying managers down, taking them away from the dayjob, ability to impact on the measures, as 
well as the view that it added little value to what they were actually doing. These afore 
mentioned concerns are closely aligned to the four barriers to deployment, as previously 
highlighted within the literature (Daniels, 1989). 
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I realised that the underlying reasons for the presence of these particular views related back to 
adverse experiences with working with targets in the past and the subsequent re-emergence of 
these emotions in the form of what Cheetham and Chivers (2001) classify through citing 
Osgood (1949) as a 'negative transfer'. This type of recall is not uncommon and can be 
explained by the recognition that emotionally laden past experiences, are more readily recalled 
than those that are more recent and emotionally impartial (Hoffman 1986, cited in Johnson and 
Zinkhan, 1991). This was clearly the case with my team, were there was an underlying central 
theme regarding ones' perceived inability to influence the set targets for the coming year. 
The precise nature of this recall can be traced back to individual attitudes (Durham et al., 
1989) to and resistance to change (Stivers and Joyce, 2000), which in turn was manifesting 
itself into a positive or negative emotional reaction (LiIjander and Standvik, 1997) to the set 
targets. Bourne (1999) recognises the existence of this type of reaction through his 
acknowledgement that when performance is measured, it ultimately focuses attention and 
behaviours. 
in relation to the research being undertaken, there was a prevailing dominance towards 
feelings of negativity with responses such as 'why change at all, lack of involvement, choice of 
the measures, alignment of targets, ability to influence the target, impact of trade offs, effect on 
bonuses' and most importantly factors seen as outside of ones' direct control being expressed. 
It was however heartening to see that some positive consensus existed in cases where 
improvement actions are directly under their control. Indeed, from previous experiences, it was 
felt an improvement outcome could be realised. 
The unbalanced spread of the identified responses, supports Hoffman's (1986) cited 
conclusions in relation to the emergence and subsequent dominance of negatively charged 
emotions and attitudes to the detriment of the more positive and neutrally uncharged feelings. 
This would explain why Neely et al., (2000: 1132) discuss the challenges and problems 
associated with the implementation of measures and the emergence of 'dysfunctional 
behaviours ". 
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it is suggested that when cultures are supportive of change, a move to an increased level of 
individual accountability may prove to be the case, but if the opposite occurs, increased 
accountability could be intimidating (Stivers and Joyce, 2000). Surprisingly, this was not the 
case with my team, who although readily accepted that they were ultimately accountable for 
their individual targets, saw the ownership of the actions as a completely separate issue. As 
my interaction continued, it became evident that the degree to which the negative barriers were 
present, had a direct correlation to concerns regarding contracting of the scorecard contents 
and/or actions and the level of ownership felt by the managers towards these actions, or the 
measurement areas selected by the business. 
The distinct impression I gained from this interaction was that the issue of ownership of the 
performance actions, when they are seen to be outside of an individual's direct control or 
influence, would ultimately be raised as a form of defence in future discussions. This would be 
particularly evident when non-achievement and accountability surfaced. It would also explain 
why some managers felt it was acceptable to simply agree a course of action with me, as 
opposed to entering into a meaningful performance debate. When I reflect on this latter 
interaction, the justification, 'well you told me to do it', readily springs to mind. 
At the time, these would not have been unusual approaches to take; as a result of having 
observed any combination of them frequently in practice and resorting to their use myself on 
occasions when difficult performance conversations were necessary with my own line 
manager. I therefore realised that this was a particular concern I needed to be aware of, as 
individuals completed their respective scorecards as part of the pending deployment and usage 
stages. 
The problem in relation to addressing these situations was that in the past it was extremely rare 
for anyone to be held personally accountable for a target, or for actions to be taken against an 
individual for the non-achievement of a target. The managers were fully aware of this fact, and 
as such, thought that nothing would change until the term contracting was raised. This 
in turn 
brings into consideration what Mooraj et aL, (1999) define as traditions and unspoken 
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informal conventions of an 'occupational culture, ' which clearly (as suggested in the 
framework), is continuing to exert levels of influence. 
The presence of these underlying influences or assumptions which Schein (1981,1984), 
deftes how we as individuals ýperceive, think andfeel' would adequately account for the 
emergence and presence of the majority of the previously discussed barriers. It would also 
explain, (if we follow Schein's psychological profiles) the following comment regarding why 
the managers felt as they did: 
"We have always had targets, nothing is different there. We are not involved andjust told to 
achieve them, when deep down we know that we can't. No one listens to us and I am sure 
nothing is going to change with the scorecard. In the past actions, we have not resolved the 
problems and all we do is try something different, which, if you pull it all together really 
raises a question. nat incentive do I really have, to do the additional work you are 
suggesting is required when I have better things to do, just to get the dayjob done? " 
As I reflected back onto the underlying reasons why these emotional and behavioural feelings 
might be present, I felt certain that the problems I was facing directly correlated back to 
adverse feelings towards the term contracting and fell into a number of specific motivational 
areas regarding individual's reactions to measures to be found in the literature. 
Stivers and Joyce (2000) discuss the need for an organisational measurement focus to 
commence at the top with appropriately aligned measures which they ftirther suggest needs to 
be underpinned by everyone's 'buy-in and commitment. Strebler et aL, (2001) specifically 
provides direction in this area explaining that there was a basic necessity for a motivational 
buy-in, to be in existence from those required to operate in the system, which they suggest is 
nurtured by an effective cascade. 
I was as part of my management practice, actively applying the latter of the enabling factors. 
As discussed however, I was experiencing a less then positive motivational buy-in from my 
team to the centrally imposed targets I was positioning. The reaction of my managers can be 
seen to closely align with Strebler et al's., (2001: xi) recognition of the possible emergence of 
this type of reaction, where it was explained that if objectives or targets appear "unfair or 
imposed, they lose their motivational impact". 
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5.5.2 Practitioner Implications Emerging from Exposure Phase 
I believe that it is possible to extract the view from the managers' preliminary exposure to the 
BSC since, the present BSC system has been effectively used for some time at the national and 
area level to support strategic alignment and organisational task. I do however consider that its 
relevance, subsequent deployment and use at a unit level is perceived as less clear or well 
defined in the eyes of those required to use it in daily operations. As a consequence, I 
consider that it is clear that the KPIs contained in the BSC appear relevant to the performance 
of the company as a whole, but when translated to a unit level, their relevance becomes 
somewhat bluffed when looked at through the eyes of operational managers. 
Consequently, my preliminary view prior to its deployment, would suggest that the unit 
scorecard has been designed to support a line of sight, regarding objectives tasks and measures 
down from the corporate level. When this is considered, it is possible to extract from the co- 
participants that this is not fully replicated back from the unit performance environment into 
the higher organisational levels. I am particularly concerned as it applies to National and Area 
UPBs/and or initiatives and what Atkinson and Holden (2000) has previously positioned as a 
necessity for understanding, whereby each layer drives subsequent lower layers. I believe the 
clear perception present is that the opposite is true, as the impact at a unit level is perceived as 
simply having been guessed at with little or no thought regarding how performance will be 
subsequently improved as well as any potential negative impact, or indeed likely expected 
timescales. 
I have already recognised and discussed (as part of my review of the skills base of frontline 
managers) that this might emerge as a problem with my managerial team. Here my concerns 
have clearly centred on the progression of areas of under performance through the eight-step 
route cause analysis and fix logic process. I am therefore somewhat surprised and concerned. 
As I feel that even through the concept, of continuous improvement and a balanced approach 
has been shown to be evolving and in place at the higher echelon's over a 13 year period. I 
believe it is possible to extract from the previously positioned opinions of the co-participants 
(in relation to national and area improvement initiatives), that they are viewed as counter 
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productive, unfocused, causing problems across other performance dimensions in their own 
right. I feel this therefore brings into question their (Lynch and Cross, 1991) 'actual 
alignment, ' usability and suitability to support any engagement at the frontline. When this is 
considered, I believe it clearly links into Mannochehri (1999: 13) previous considerations 
associated with 'confusion regarding being able to combine and reconcile both the financial 
and non-financial measures. ' I however recognised my particular problem as evidently residing 
in the same context, but within the area of National and Area influence discussed. I am sure 
this will also emerge as a finiher problem to be addressed, once the financial targets are issued 
and can be considered against the non-financial targets. 
I was particularly worried about one individual's previous remark concerning him to 
potentially 'switch off, which when viewed against the additional following comment caused 
me increased levels of unrest and concern: 
"I think they should've put thefigure that the UPB will help disclose how it is achieved and 
when and what was nationally recommended. It seams to us that what is being said is, well to 
be blunt; it is left to us to come up with it and sort it out. If they can't be bothered, how can we 
be expected to get it right? " 
Because of this, I felt that in certain instances and situations this might entice and encourage 
some individuals to adopt the same perceived mindset as they interact with and develop their 
own respective personal scorecards. I realised that this further underpinned the necessity for 
focused support and coaching to be made available in the imminent deployment. I accepted 
that I would need actively offer this support along with the experts, as part of our interactions 
with the co-participants. I recognise this as the best means through which to not only counter 
this possibility of negatively inculcated mindsets, but also in turn stimulate a positive 
interaction with the scorecards from which the process of continuous improvement could be 
encourage 
I additionally realised that from my interactions, I was able to identify a number of both 
positive and negative aspects of the impending engagement. I therefore recognised my task as 
falling into a well defined and recognised area in relation to ensuring that improvement 
contributions and actions have clear improvement expectations 
from which the means to 
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achieve them is clearly understood and applied (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b; Schneiderman, 
1999 and De Waal, 2002c) . 
As I focused on this, I was encouraged to see that individuals simultaneously displayed a high 
level of understanding regarding the complexity of interacting measures and the impact of 
other functions and processes on their own performance. I feel initial findings demonstrate that 
the impending BSC system elicit from managers both a level of objective understanding and 
dispassionate discussion, while at the same time showing an underlying turbulence of 
(Schhmenner and Vollmann, 1993: 58) 'frustration' and cynicism. I realised that at the current 
stage of my engagement with the co-participants, this was caused by past measurement 
systems and what individuals perceive as a distinct lack of control over their own destiny and 
in certain cases, ability to influence set targets. I recognised this as clearly falling onto the 
important area of what has been seen as the 'golden rule of not measuring individuals against 
something they have no control over' (Neely et al, 1997: 1136). 
I saw this as providing me with a clear and valuable indication where potential problems are 
most likely to emerge and therefore I could focus more effectively on providing the available 
support to aid the development of the personal scorecards. I think that preliminary indications 
would show that individuals feel that they can directly influence those KPIs they believed to be 
directly under their own control such as sick absence and complaints. I therefore consider that 
the likelihood of problems in engaging within these areas would be minimal, therefore 
requiring less support. Similarly, although it was felt that the same could apply to the EOS, 
(all due mail and time of delivery KPI's), it was viewed that the presence of external 
influences was more likely. I therefore believe that in conjunction with the mail and weight 
unit costs, which had not been communicated at the time of the workshop, but extracted 
from 
the co-participants, varying degrees of concern, support and coaching needs to be directly 
focused. 
I reasoned that by following this approach in conjunction with the 
behavioural work approach, 
I would be more effectively able to address previously expressed negativity. 
This negativity 
relates to individuals being able to 
identify, understand and implement improvement 
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opportunities, which they recognise and accept they can directly control and influence. I 
therefore consider that preliminary indications would suggest that when these states are present 
in a negative context, there is a direct correlation present against Stivers and Joyce's (2000: 61- 
62) earlier proposition that 'increased accountability can be seen as threatening. ' At this stage, 
I am under no illusion that consequently, this will lead to conflicts between both ownership 
and accountability felt by the co-participants towards the contents of their respective 
scorecards. This leads me to concur with Holloway (2000: 11) that managers are extremely 
self-conscious of their own performance, which I need to nurture, in order to support a positive 
outcome. 
When viewed against the previous behavioural discussions, this further substantiates my view 
that there exists both a cultural and behavioural/process triggering element of the performance 
framework. This is underpinned by my realisation that I suspect from the reactions of the co- 
participants that high levels of anxiety are present amongst some managers about having 
targets that are for the most part, seen as being (Strebler et aL, 2001: 28) 'imposed' to a greater 
or lesser extent by external factors. 
In light of the experiences gained from the initial exposure of the unit scorecard, I concur that 
it was necessary to undertake a serious of workshops to equip the unit managers to make 
effective use of the scorecard. I see this as providing an extremely important opportunity not 
only for the research, but also with regards to building the capabilities and competencies 
gained from individual's exposure to the numerous performance systems over the preceding 
years. 
I believe this activity should not necessary be taken as a criticism of the business or indeed the 
simplicity of or understanding towards the BSC and its use. This is due to my reasoning that 
its application reflects the very real issue facing the business regarding the interaction and 
interrelation between improvement activities and resulting measures at unit, area and national 
levels within and between business processes. I regard this as being further compounded by the 
functional foxholes/conflict previously evident, and which it would appear, remains a 
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behavioural. and psychological issue to be aware of and as such, seek opportunities to limit its 
impact as I progress into the deployment stage. 
As I reflected on the implications of both the behavioural and scorecard discussions, I realised 
that as far as I am aware, this was the first instance of anything of its kind and as such, I found 
myself thinking the extent of the successful of the behavioural approach. A central question 
emerged: 'Will the behavioural approach help managers to work through any encountered 
concerns and (positively) interact with and engage with their respective personal scorecards or 
will it all fall by the wayside when barriers and problems are experiencedT 
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CHAPTER 6 Development and Deployment of Scorecard 
6.1 Deployment Positioning 
The preceding engagement, regarding the scorecard and managerial task (positioned in chapter 
4), has focused on the initial concerns of the unit managers. During this interaction, I found it 
possible through the direct involvement of the co-participants to devise and provisionally agree 
a behavioural way of working to address initial concerns concerning the deployment and use of 
the scorecard. In the following discussion, I focus on the suitability of the approach alongside 
the experiences gained during the development of the co-participants' personal BSC's in 
readiness for their deployment and use in the new financial year, commencing in April. 
At this stage of the discussion, it is first necessary to position a number of formerly discussed 
themes and considerations deemed essential by both the co-participants and I. Personally, I 
encountered a situation where as stated earlier in the literature (Johnson and Zinkhan 1991: 6) 
that personal emotions and experiences both positive and negative are more readily and likely 
to resurface. I believe the benefit to be gained by following this approach resides not only in 
refreshing the reader concerning previous findings, (against which the following discussions 
are derived), but also probable issues, which could re-emerge. Consequently, I have to be 
aware of these issues in order to limit the possibility of any re-emergence. 
in relation to my managers' earlier practice, the current evidence would suggest a more 
dominant swing towards the negative aspects of the engagement. At the initial stage of my 
engagement, I recognised a similar comparison against my prior review relating to a 'negative 
transfer' (Osgood, 1949 cited in Cheetham and Chivers, 2001: 264). In the case of my team, 
this seems to reside in previous experiences with performance management and its 
manifestation regarding adverse expectations towards the impending BSC application. When I 
consider both the behavioural perspectives against recent experiences, I would suggest the later 
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negative state would most likely re-emerge as an issue to be addressed if difficulties in the 
deployment become subsequently apparent. 
6.2 Engaging with the Co-Participants 
As previously explained, I decided to revisit these (behavioural) commitments at the beginning 
of the deployment stage activities. Due to the previously expressed view, I saw this as even 
more important, as I felt it provided not only the opportunity to agree and if necessary revise 
the contents, but refresh in the minds of those present the expected way of working prior to 
commencing the deployment activities. I thought this would show that I remained receptive to 
their views and opinions, and as such, was more likely to encourage a positive interaction as 
the managers engaged with and developed their respective scorecards. 
I hoped from this that I would be able to cultivate a more meaningful debate and interaction in 
relation to jointly discussing and exploring deployment difficulties, alongside personal 
emotions and experiences acquired during the deployment workshop. I believe that in turn, 
this approach would not only provide me with numerous opportunities to adapt my practice, 
but also that of my managerial team. I considered that by taking the discussed approaches, I 
was more likely to nurture and acquire the state of 'shared understanding' (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996a: 77) within the deployment stage. I was subsequently pleased that when I raised 
the topic of the behavioural approach, the following comments where expressed: 
"It looks ok to me - as I think we said in the last session, I will be very interested in seeing it 
actually work as we go through the year". 
"it is good to understand what is expected, as I am sure we willfind ourselves referring to it 
later on ". 
I was encouraged by the content and nature of these comments, which were supported by the 
remainder of the group. As such, I felt the expressed comments authenticated the use of the 
behavioural commitment into the deployment stage by their portrayal of a level of willingness, 
towards our forthcoming working relationships. 
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As explained during the methodological positioning, my primary means of engagement with 
the co-participants resided in the use of a second sequence of reflective syndicate exercises. I 
believe the success of this approach during the initial exposure phase undertaken in February is 
evident and as such, underpins my continued use of this technique in the deployment stage in 
March. It is here that the co-participants will readily recognise the use of this technique due to 
their prior exposure in the initial stages. I regard this as an important engagement factor, 
which, (due to its familiarity and prior use), will put the co-participants at ease and continue to 
address previously discussed concerns regarding contributions to the impending discussions. 
I therefore considered the following open questions (illustrated in slide 6.1), regarding 
completion of the personal scorecards as the most suitable means of co-participant 
engagement. I thought that by following this approach, I would encourage not only personal 
and group reflections on experiences gained whilst interacting with the scorecards and the 
behavioural way of working to support this interface, but importantly areas for discussion and 
agreement regarding practitioner improvements. 
Slide 6.1 Deployment Presentation Slide 
Durnti- 15 Minutam With 10 Minute Feedback 
Fir. tly: - 
To what degree have you been able to engage with the acerecard 
and close any gaps to support your achievement of your sal, 
target.? 
Secondarily: - 
What do you feel we need to do to resolve or limit the Impact of 
the Issues -a have cf1scussed? 
Oft 
wiým 
As indicated, this was not the only means of data gathering applicable to this stage of the 
research. I needed to obtain a greater degree of depth in relation to understanding the actual 
process of engaging with and producing the respective scorecards, and from this, their 
robustness and suitability for deployment in the usage stage. 
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As previously explained, I found it possible to acquire this additional depth by applying two 
specific approaches. The first concerned a critical review and evaluation of the completed 
scorecards from the eight co-participants who had agreed to continue into the usage stage. The 
second approach involved the use of personal observations and reflections gained from both 
the performance coaches and 1, as the co-participants progressed through the deployment 
workshop producing their respective personal scorecards. As with the previous workshop, I 
have not identified specific views against individuals, due to the continuing observance of 
research ethics - guaranteeing anonymity of participant feedback (Renzetti and Lee, 1993). 
6.3 Engaging with the Unit Scorecards 
I have previously discussed and positioned in some depth both the composition of the unit 
scorecards and the managerial task in (chapter five) against which individuals during the 
exposure workshop have explored not only the KPIs and related measures but also their 
performance task and behavioural expectations for the coming year. Shortly after the 
conclusion of this event, performance gaps (appendix 6, column 6) into the new financial year 
down to a unit level, were confirmed and issued against the ADM (TO, EOS, RC and Sick), 
leaving the shareholder tasks in relation to both the MC and WUC targets still outstanding 
and remaining to be officially confirmed (See footnote 11). 
I expected that from the initial exposure intervention, individuals would as instructed during 
the intervening period undertake preparatory work in relation to identifying causes of 
underperformance against identified gaps (appendix 7) and possible improvement 
opportunities in readiness for the deployment workshop. 
would also expect that some level of cost awareness emerging from planned actions would 
form some element of this output, so their impact in cost terms could be understood and 
Footnote 11. Confirmed targets available ADM (All Due Mail), TO (Time Out), EOS (Employee Opinion Survey), RC 
(Repeat Complaints, Sick (Absence as a %). Both the MC (Mail Costs) WUC (Weighted Unit Costs) at the time were not 
available as they are based on the cumulative outtum at the end of period 12, which would not be confirmed until 
approximately 6 weeks later at the end of period 1.1 would however expect some element of cost 
impact to be included on 
the scorecards. 
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overlaid onto the shareholder elements of the scorecard once the cash targets had been issued. 
It however became increasingly apparent to us that as individuals commenced to interact with 
not only ourselves but their respective scorecards that the degree of pre-work I felt would 
occur never actually materialised. The following reasons were put forward in defence: 
"I did not have any time to do the pre-work and I am sure the others are in the same boat ". 
"You need to befair therewith that comment. Someo us did think about it" )f 
Reflecting back on the nature of these comments, I now consider that I was somewhat naive in 
believing that the co-participants would carry out the pre-work. As from my previous 
experience when any other form of pre-work has been issued, in most cases individuals 
view/perceive other tasks to be more important, and therefore opt to delay tackling the actual 
task or indeed avoid doing it altogether. Consequently, I believe that when timescales become 
increasingly constricted, the task is either completely ignored or encourages an inadequate 
level of attention affecting not only any subsequent behavioural interaction, but also the 
robustness of the produced outputs. In relation to the research undertaken, I realised this 
could apply not only to the production of the original scorecards but subsequent preparation 
and update of the scorecards during the review periods in the usage stage. I believe that the 
distinct possibility exists that if individuals adopt this approach at the initial stage the 
likelihood of it continuing into the later is increasingly more likely. 
I must admit reflecting back on this situation that if I had thought about this more or been 
conscious or even aware of this situation during the lead up too and at the very commencement 
of the workshop I would have been somewhat concerned and worried. However, in hindsight 
as the actual position became increasingly evident as we started to question and engage with 
individuals as they interacted with the scorecards I realised in this instance it did not 
significantly hinder, but actually helped individuals in relation to their understanding and 
completion. With my reasoning centring on the sobering 
fact that as individuals started with a 
blank canvas they would be less likely to be tempted to take the easy option and simply sit 
back, going along with any completed pre-work either substandard or otherwise and not 
questioning their own initial assumptions and conclusions. When this 
is considered, I was 
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encouraged to see that as the workshop proceeded this precise situation encouraged and 
nurtured general debate and banter between individuals working via the computer system on 
their respective personal scorecards. I realised that this provided me with a valuable 
opportunity to not only dispel and challenge areas of negativity, but also focus on positive 
situations, which I felt would be for the benefit of all concerned supporting a greater level of 
interaction and focus. 
Consequently, I expected that from this interaction, reasons for underperformance would be 
more fully understood from which more robust performance solutions would emerge. I was 
encouraged, when this was discussed in a reflective stance in the syndicate exercises at the end 
of the workshop to see that: 
"It is not hard is it, we already knowfrom past experience, but it was good to share the 
frustrations ". 
"We could bounce ideas of each other and identify what will and won't workfrom others who 
had used it in the past". 
I also felt that that due to the interactive nature suggested within the comments, this would 
help address areas of concern discussed with and similarly held with both the performance 
coaches and analysts. At the engagement level, these related to individuals possibly 
manipulating figures to simply close performance gaps on the scorecards. In addition, resulting 
actions were based on pure assumptions rather than a robust understanding of the underlying 
problems, where co-participants chose to worry about how to actually achieve performance 
targets at a later date. Moreover, at the computer based PMS level, the usability of the 
deployed system to support the initial and ongoing recording of root causes and actions on the 
actual scorecards during both the deployment phase and into the usage/performance review 
stages. Both of these considerations in their own right, form important areas of practitioner 
enquiry with dedicated ownership and PMS sections assigned to them in the imminent 
discussions. 
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6.3.1 Undertaking Initial Root Cause Analysis 
It became evident at the outset that individuals saw the process of identifying underlying 
reasons for underperformance as forming an important and integral part of their existing role 
on a day-to-day basis. Consequently, they did not consider reflection of underperformance as 
anything out of the ordinary to what they currently did. It was felt that this exposure and 
experience ensured that they were not only well versed in where the problem areas were, but 
also the actual reasons causing the problem in the first place. In the first instance, this 
suggested to me that focusing on areas of underperformance would not present a significant 
problem in the completion of the scorecards. This view is supported by the following 
reflections: 
"I think that isfair to say, that identifying theproblem is not the issue, as we live with it all 
the time, we already know what it is ". 
"Ae root cause analysis was not a major chore, as in most cases we already know what the 
problem is ". 
It was however becoming increasingly apparent that as individuals started to engage with their 
respective scorecard and performance gaps, difficulties started to emerge in relation to 
focusing beyond not only what was viewed as the most immediate causes, but also across 
different measurement dimensions. I realised that this was a problem that went beyond the 
less knowledgeable managers present. Some of the more experienced individuals simply 
feeling that they knew best and accepting what they saw as the problem and perceiving that 
their was no requirement to even question it or look any further for alternative reasons. Two 
particular views highlight the view I was encountering: 
"I have lived with the problem gate mail)for ages, my unit is the last on the route to get its my 
mail dropped off, so ifsomething goes wrong in distribution I will always get it late ". 
"Yhe dijfIcult bitfrom listening to the discussion and what Ifound was thinking outside of the 
measure you were looking at ". 
As I observed and interacted with those present, I realised that in certain instances this 
complacency led individuals to readily and simply apportion underperformance to what they 
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saw as a readily recognised cause they had previously or were currently encountering. It 
appeared that to varying degrees this blinkered view initially hindered any desire or perceived 
requirement to look beyond and participate in or undertake any further sub-level analysis. This 
situation, which I feel when the comments overleaf are considered, raises issues around levels 
and degrees of complacency present amongst certain factions of the co-participants as they 
commenced working on their respective scorecards. As one individual commented: 
"Well itfrustrates us. I knowfully well what it is and I can do as much route cause analysis 
and identify actions to sort out the problem, but if I can't influence it, what is the use of 
wasting all that time and effort". 
I believe these circumstances presented me with a situation that closely aligns back to the 
already familiar negative transfer encounters. I recognised these as falling into the previously 
encountered psychological barriers such as 'nothing ever changes', 'not being under ones 
direct control' and 'unable to personally influence'. In turn it appeared to the coaches and I 
that this seemed to encourage individuals to accept on face value what they see as the current 
performance problem without stopping, asking or questioning why this might be the case. I 
realised that if this approach was adopted, the robustness of the subsequent recovery actions 
which depended on accurately identifying underlying causes, would be questionable. 
I was well aware that this situation presented the first challenge for the behavioural way of 
working. I accepted that I could not just sit back and let the co-participants come up with less 
than robust causes. I therefore saw this as a good opportunity along with the support specialists 
to adopt an interventionist role, becoming actively involved via the previously discussed 
environment of general discussion and banter. During this interaction, 
identified reasons for 
underperformance where actively challenged by fellow colleagues, the specialists and myself, 
with the purpose of encouraging the identification of more robust and accurate reasons 
for 
performance gaps. I felt that by following this approach, 
individuals would be encouraged to 
contribute to the debate by sharing both best and worst practice and previous experiences, 
from which they would be able to challenge their own assumptions. As one individual 
later 
commented: 
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"I changed my mind as Ifound the general debate in the workshop of more use, as we could 
share experiences and come to better conclusions and actions ". 
I consider it is neither possible nor feasible to list all the encountered and eventually recorded 
reasons or variations for performance gaps. However, the extracted examples (illustrated 
below) are drawn from across the different KPI mix on the scorecards providing a reasonable 
overview of where support and advice was provided by colleagues, specialists (performance 
coaches/analysts) and 1. 
Examples of Root Cause Challenges: 
Simply showing lack of recruitment and/or staff wastage as a route cause without 
looking at the underlying reasons why, such as causes for wastage, skill levels or 
indeed looking beyond this into the local available employment market. 
Purely recording late receipt of mail to be delivered along with bulk arrivals into a unit 
as a reason for failure against time out and all mail delivered. This would be performed 
without looking beyond any degree to see if it was caused or impacted on by 
operational and/or staffing procedures and issues in the unit or other functional 
processes further upstream. 
Within the same related customer KPIs merely choosing to indicate delivery spans as 
excessive without focusing or questioning in any significant depth why this might be 
the case. Probable factors to be considered may include mail volumes/weight, 
operational/staffing procedures and problems in the unit or external on the delivery 
route itself. 
Solely focusing on both the positioning and use of special instructions cards and 
labelling of sorting framcs to resolve or reduce customer complaints with limited 
linkages back into the effectiveness of their use, impact of agency staff or previously 
highlighted recruitment, wastage or skills topics. 
As interactions continued into the employee EOS and sick absence sections of the 
scorecard, causes simply focused on inconsistencies in the levels of understanding, 
deployment and subsequent use off agreed business standards. It became evident that in 
some cases, superficial indications as to underlying reasons why this might be the case 
were considered, as was how causes across other KPIs might exert an influence. 
As one analyst, reflecting back on the level of engagement acquired commented: 
"It does gofurther than that as the DOMs need to not simply look at thefirstproblem but then 
ask what caused this one. so it is why, why, why. I think that they did some of this today but in 
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some cases, I had to prompt them; it's looking outside of the box. It will become better as the 
year goes on and they become better at it". 
I found myself in tacit agreement. I believed that the engagement at the stage of identifying 
problems had produced a more robust level of understanding and recording of the underlying 
root causes, an example of which is shown in appendix 7 from which appropriate recovery 
remedial actions to close the gaps could be more easily assigned. I was nevertheless aware 
that this applied to both the employee and customer performance dimensions only. 
I was however aware that this left the Shareholder dimension containing both the Mails Costs 
and Weighted Unit Costs. It was evident that as gaps across the other KPIs where identified, it 
became increasingly challenging for individuals to comprehend and quantify either a negative 
or positive cash effects against these indicators. The situation was further compounded by an 
inability, due to the un-issued budget to compare these indicators against a confirmed cash 
figure, and transpose any resulting gaps onto the shareholder element of the scorecard for 
subsequent action. 
As I reflected on the situation, I realised that I was encountering a problem that I needed too 
address at the earliest opportunity available. I believed this was not only for the benefit of the 
scorecards, but also importantly the co-participants, who I felt could as a result see it as a 
threat to their current practices and behaviour. I felt this was of a particular concern, as I 
recognised that they portrayed an extremely protective stance towards any foreseeable budget 
that would shortly be assigned to the unit. Considerations emerged such as 'how much will I 
get, how will what I want to do impact on iff, 'how will it be effected by what others do and 
will any of it be taken away from meT As three individuals later commented: 
"But it is still ... a bit counter- productive if we 
don't include the cash bit". 
"Yes, it is all well and good completing the customer and employee parts of the scorecards - 
but how on earth do you expect us to do the cash bit when we have not had our budgets 
confirmed So how are we are expected to include the budget effect when we don't even have a 
startingpoint? " 
"Well in the past we never know our budgets until we are already well into the New Year, so 
nothing has changedfrom what I can see". 
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I realised that how I reacted to this problem would provide me with the second challenge to the 
behavioural way of working. As the session continued, I agreed that as a group we needed to 
revisit this area. After discussing it with both the performance analysts and co-participants 
during the syndicate exercise, I accepted that this was a problem that needed to be resolved at 
the earliest opportunity. It would not however be possible to undertake this as part of the 
workshop due to time constraints. We therefore agreed that the best approach to take would be 
to limit its impact, upon which I stated the following: 
"I accept this is a problem but we will revisit the cash and weighted unit costs aspart of the 
firstperfomance review when we will update these sections against the issued budget and 
actualperformance ". 
6.3.2 Root Cause Analysis: its Impact on Initial Performance Gaps 
On completion of the initial stage of the workshop, the co-participants had identified relevant 
root causes applicable to their respective units and performance gaps. The next stage of the 
deployment would seek to address these causes, closing and/or exceeding the gaps through the 
use of both national initiatives and when necessary, local recovery actions. 
As the co-participants and I progressed through the route cause stage, I realised that I was 
being provided with a valuable insight into the thought process, whereby a particular direction 
might be followed, whilst others are simply rejected. As I reflected on the consequence of this, 
I realised that this was a major factor that would in all probability emerge as an influence as 
individuals sought to close the gaps. I believed that what could encourage an individual to 
reject a root cause as a reason might conversely (also when improvement actions are 
considered), cause a similar rejection to occur. In understanding this, I believe it is first 
necessary to position its emergence during the process of primary root cause analysis, which I 
feel will then contextualise its possible reoccurrence in the subsequent stage when individuals 
focus on the closure of gaps. 
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It was clearly apparent as suggested might occur in the exposure fmdings that National UPBs 
seemed to repeatedly return as a subject and dominate any interaction undertaken. I realised 
that although this applied equally to all the KPI dimensions, it was particularly dominant in 
both the EOS and Sick Absence KPIs, attracting a high level of attention away from local 
causes, being seen as probable reasons for future under performance. The following related 
views emerged: 
"We will beforced to go down this road and it will influence my EOS score ". 
""at is to stop them [GOING SICK] they getfullpay and I don't think the absence UPB is 
going to help much ". 
I was however surprised that although this was clearly a topic of concern to those present, only 
two individuals actually chose to register a negative impact from the National UPBs worsening 
their previously issued performance gap. The effected KPIs included recording a deterioration 
of 40% in one unit against the ADM target of 100% due to changes in the measurement system 
requiring mail left after the staff had departed for delivery to be recorded differently. 
Additionally (as illustrated in appendix 10), another co-participant's worsening performance of 
14.1 against repeat complaints by 2.5 due to deployment of the revised redirection policy, 
which the manager believed, would initially raise the level of complaints in the unit before the 
target of 11.5 would be achievable. When questioned as to why they chose this approach the 
following reasons emerged: 
""atIdid was said that I willfail [All Due Mail] in thefirstperiod as Iput the changes in 
and will recover later in the year". 
"The redirection UPB and the adverse effect it will have -I recorded this over the year as a 
negative impact". 
I believe this suggested that in some quarters the important consideration of cause and effect 
had been considered and included in the initial stages. Nevertheless, despite encouragement 
from both the specialists and 1, only these two co-participants had chosen to adopt this 
approach, thereby increasing their tasks in these particular dimensions, when the remainder of 
their colleagues had chosen the opposite course of action retaining their existing gaps (See 
footnote 12 overleaf). 
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I realised that this produced a degree of weakness with regards to the outputs from the first 
stage of the workshop. This was due to the fact that causes of underperformance had in the 
majority of cases been purely assessed against the current situation, and not on any future 
adverse impact that might be caused through the deployment of the National/Area/Local 
initiatives. It become evident whilst interacting with the co-participants during the route-cause 
analysis stage and subsequent reflective syndicate exercise that their existed a general 
reluctance to forecast a worsening of performance gaps. When questioned as to why this might 
be the case, the following quite diverse reasons emerged: 
"U%y should I saddle myseýf with extra work when it is not needed? " 
"No just closed the existing gap". 
Within the confines of the comments it would appear that individuals might be less than 
proactive in identifying and recording additional potential problems if they perceive that by 
worsening a performance gap, additional work might subsequently emerge. I was encouraged 
to see during my interactions with the co-participants that this was not the dominant view. II 
realised that the majority of the co-participants found it extremely uncomfortable and difficult 
to quantify and say exactly what adverse impact an initiative, which they have no experience 
of and not previously deployed, will properly exert. As a number of the co-participants later 
commented, underpinning my own observations: 
"Ijustfocused on the gaps I had. I did not worsen anything. If I thought it would not help I 
did not put anything against it ". 
"Ifound the national ones [UPBs] dijfIcult, as I am not sure or comfortable about what they 
are supposed to give me ". 
"Found it hard to understand the effect they JUPBs] would have and timescales ". 
Yootnote -12As part of the identification of existing gaps as well as the fore coming discussions focusing on assigning 
remedial actions/fixcs. Individuals were required to 
include the impact of flow through UPBs (activities not fully deployed in 
the previous year) as well as Core UPBs (mandatory to 
be deployed) and Pull UPBs (only to be deployed if they help 
pcrfomance) 
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It was clear to me that previously discussed key topics around 'understanding' and 'impact', 
along with ultimately likely 'contribution', which I had encountered on a one to one basis 
during discussions, had exerted an adverse effect on individuals. I consider that this first 
encounter within these areas ultimately took the majority of them outside of their previous 
experience and comfort zones and as such, it was difficult to encourage them as part of the 
route-cause analysis phase to commit to identify, agree and record any adverse effect. I 
believed at the time that the danger existed whereby individuals may (if the same barriers are 
encountered during the alignment of recovery actions), be encouraged to take the same 
approach and stance. This is not to say that individuals were not self-conscious or worried 
about this situation; as I strongly believe from my own observations and encounters, that co- 
participants were indeed concerned. One individual when questioned stated that: 
"Of course it does, but again it comes back to being able to understand and forecast the 
effe ct". 
I recognised that I need to positively react to this concern. In conjunction with the specialists, I 
decided that to counter this situation, an interactive style as previously applied, was still 
necessary whilst the co-participants focused on the closure of their gaps. The continued 
adoption of this approach would support practitioner practice in two very specific areas. 
Firstly, as individuals review and utilise the National UPBs and Area initiatives to close 
performance gaps, provide encouragement to those individuals who had not as part of the root 
cause analysis phase included any adverse effects to reconsider their positions and adjust their 
gaps accordingly, prior to assigning recovery actions to improve performance. Secondly, in 
conjunction with the previous consideration, I would seek to apply the same level of support 
and focus not only in the use of local activities, but also the resulting trade offs and cause and 
effects between different measurement dimensions. I 
6.3.3 Closure of Performance Gaps 
In addressing identified root causes and therefore closing perfonnance gaps and or exceeding 
issued targets, individuals were required to deploy and utilise both the core/pull National 
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UPBs and Area initiatives, underpinned if necessary by locally derived activities. As part of 
this process, individuals would firstly commence with the National UPBs, before addressing 
the Area initiatives and lastly utilising either existing or new local activities if gaps still 
remained. By following this approach it was expected from a business perspective that 
performance gaps would be closed by encouraging individuals start at the National UPBs 
logically working their way through the opportunities provided by the different layers, where: 
"You will need to develop fix actions' * You should review the 'Pull' UPBs to see if any of 
these address root causes, OR alternatively, develop a local activity that addresses the root 
cause " (Source Unit Planning Guidelines, 2001/2002: 11). 
From this, individuals would be required to transpose the outputs into two specific PMS 
formats to support performance achievement over the year. Firstly, through the use of an excel 
based Unit Planning Tool, individuals would be required to record key milestones with 
activities shown over a 52 week period with both start and completion dates against UPBs, 
Area Initiatives and Local activities, categorised with their current status (red, green, amber). 
Additionally, on the unit scorecards individuals would need to show not only the status of the 
UPBs, Area Initiatives, and Local activities, but their impact forecasted both quarterly and 
annually. The combination of both the planning tool (appendix 9) and scorecard (appendix 10) 
when included with the previously positioned RCA sheet (appendix 7) constituted the 
deployed PMS. As I have commented earlier, their usability during the deployment and 
ultimately suitability for continued use into the usage stage is considered in a later section 7.5. 
As the co-participants focused on the closure of identified performance gaps, which they 
achieved by addressing previously identified root causes, a cross-section of outcomes emerged. 
Firstly, (as previously discussed within both the Mails and Weighted Unit Cost's), as budgets 
had not been confirmed, no gaps where evident, with the co-participants being unable as well 
as reluctant to proportion any worsening impact associated with the identification of root 
causes emerging from the other (customer and employee) KPI dimensions. 
I was not surprised that during the next phase, a similar situation occurred as subsequent 
actions where assigned by the co-participants across 
both the customer and employee 
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dimensions. It was apparent that individuals retained feelings of wariness, being unable to 
recognise and provide cash linkages into the shareholder section of the scorecard and to 
forecast either a positive or a negative impact of what they planned to do. It was clear that as 
with the RCA phase, the co-participants were recalling and experiencing the already familiar 
barriers such as 'understanding', 'impact' and 'contribution', leading in turn to concerns 
regarding achievability, and ultimately, how they viewed their own personal 'accountability'. 
It appeared that as had previously occurred, when budgets are concerned, individuals become 
extremely self-protective of what they perceive as a fresh start offered by a new budget, 
worrying about the robustness of assumptions along with what may or may not inadvertently 
exert a controlling influence. 
When the following comments are considered, it would appear that if they had to resort to 
what they saw as guessing, (which increasingly surfaces as an important topic for later 
discussions across the other dimensions), in the shareholder element was Perceived as 
threatening where it was felt: 
"Ifound that bit (fix/actions & UPB impact) hard to understand and the effect it will have on 
my spending ". 
"We are putting down on the scorecard (employee and customer) what we will do, but its 
effect (costs) will only he a guess at this stage, and to be honest I don't want to get it wrong 
and be tied down to it. I think I will be more comfortable and have a better idea (impact on 
costs) as we start to see what happens ". 
I had already agreed with the co-participants that the adverse UPB influence, which had not 
been included within the RCA, would be reviewed during the first performance review. I 
realised that I needed to extend this to include the Shareholder element of the scorecard. In 
conjunction with the specialists, I was able to encourage the inclusion of fixes/actions along 
with their current categorisation regarding status, which, I realised, would support the 
subsequent insertion of the cash effects during the same review. In this undertaking, I received 
further agreement from the co-participants during the syndicate exercise, were participants 
expressed both their hopes and fears: 
"I hope so Pete but I think it will be hard as things get going ". 
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It was apparent that within both the Customer and Employee KPIs their existed a sharp 
contrast to the view the co-participants held of the Shareholders cash/budgetary KPIs with the 
co-participants conversely being willing to apportion fixes/actions and as a result forecast their 
perceived impact in the non-cash dimensions. It appeared that as the co-participants had 
confirmed gaps to focus on in relation to current verses issued targets this, encouraged the 
alignment of fixes/actions and forecasting. Whereas previously discussed, the budget which 
had not been issued did not encourage or support the identification of gaps, with the situation 
further compounded by being perceived on the other hand as a fresh start by the co- 
participants. I therefore believe that having an improvement figure upon which to focus 
encourages an interaction, which is a clear opportunity for the coming performance review 
when results will be available across the whole Scorecard. Consequently, in preparation for 
progression into the usage stage, all the co-Participants aligned fixes/actions to close existing 
gaps across both the customer and employee elements of the scorecards. There were however, 
several exceptions. 
Firstly, four instances where no actions where deemed necessary existed. These included two 
units within the All Due Mail Employee dimension, which were already meeting the target of 
100% and within the Sick Absence Customer dimension two further units achieving 2.2% and 
3.1% respectively against a target of 5% with both forecast at a 2.8% and 1.9% improvement 
against target on current performance. It was felt that in these situations as the target was 
being either met or over achieved, additional actions/fixes were not required simply to fill up 
the scorecard. I agreed with this view, but only when plans existed for the deployment of the 
national mandatory initiatives, which was the case in these instances. Furthermore, I was 
encouraged to see that in these circumstances, it was felt that managerial attention would be 
better utilised to focus on the closure of any remaining underperforming KPIs, with an 
important awareness being present amongst the co-participants concerned, that if slippage did 
occur in the future, the KPI along with appropriate fixes/actions would need to be revisited. I 
consider the following two particular prudent comments underpinning the co-participants 
views and intentions: 
"Because sickness is not (currently) a problem, why put things downjust tofill up the 
scorecard? IfIget aproblem later Ican alwaysfocus on it then andfill it out then". 
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"I am easily achieving my targets (ADM) now, so don't have to put down activities I am 
saying I will go into the year over achieving my target? " 
The second area of engagement involved two instances where performance gaps had as 
previously discussed, been widened by the co-participants as part of the RCA phase, along 
with one later occurrence were an adverse gap emerged and remained as part of the alignment 
of fixes/actions. In the first instances (as previously indicated), two KPIs in the customer 
dimension were widened due to changes required for existing procedures with 40% linked to 
changes in how mail left in the unit was measured, as well as 2.5% due to a revised redirection 
policy. As a consequence of the assigned fix logic/actions, the latter co-participant identified 
actions to achieve his issued target, closing his gap by 5.1 % with the remaining individual only 
identifying appropriate fixes/actions to achieve a limited movement of 27.5% leaving a 
remaining gap of 12.5% against his target of 100% mail to be delivered. A similar situation 
occurred during the fix/action phase in the employee dimension, whereby one of the other co- 
participants whose sick absence currently running at 6.9% against a target of 5% was only able 
to identify opportunities to close his gap by 1.9%. Consequently, this left an adverse gap of 
0.3% as his unit entered the new financial year. Please refer to appendix 6 were all gaps and 
movement are summarised. As I later discussed with the co-participants why they had chosen 
not to close their gaps, the following reasons emerged: 
"Like Isaid I don't want toput something down iflknow it won't work, hence the gap". 
"Mine is in sick like (name removed) I did not want tojust make up actions to close the 
gap 
"I still have a gap on my all mail delivered and I did not want tojust put any old thing in. IfI 
did that, I am sure you wouldpick it up later when I don't achieve it, so I am playing safe and 
saying I can't close the gap ". 
It appeared that out of the 17 co-participants who engaged in the alignment of fixes/actions, 
only 2 retained performance gaps raising concerns such as not wanting to guess or simply 
make up actions to complete the closure. I realised that I would need to review these gaps as 
part of my first performance review with the two individuals concerned. 
186 
I also consider these views, (when only two of the co-participants chose to retain a gap), could 
bring into question the robustness of the remainder of the scorecards completed during the 
session were no gaps emerged. This raised critical questions regarding the robustness of the 
outputs, which in conjunction with input from the specialists, I consider more fully in section 
7.6.1 also believe as previously discussed, that it is possible to extract from the engagement 
with the earlier RCA undertaken that individuals are uncomfortable, and not used to the 
crucial managerial skill of forecasting, which they simply view as having to guess, with the 
following opinions among many expressed: 
"Nat they are saying is right, easier to say high impact, that way itfocuses attention, but I 
think the trick that we arefinding it hard to do is put the impact accurately against the 
tagging. So in reality it is a best guess ". 
Additionally: 
"Arough the scorecards andputting actions down to close any gaps but to be honest a lot of 
the impactfrom the actions has been guessed. I don't know about the others, but Ifound it 
hard to know what will happen next week. So trying to understand 3 or 6 months down the 
road and relate this to the UPBsfrom headquarters, which Ifeel have been simply guessed at, 
regarding what they say they willprovide with regards the improvement is hard". 
I consider it is clear within, the context of the comments that yet again there exists linkages 
into 'understanding, contribution' and likely 'impact' when applied to both use and forecasting 
remaining areas of concern to the co-participants, particularly as they apply to the National 
UPBs. it is possibly by referring back to the employee and customer elements of the 
scorecards of the two co-participants who chose not to close their gaps to draw guidance as to 
how this influenced the engagement. 
As positioned earlier, I believe it was the intention of the business that individuals would 
logically work through the National UPBs, Area Initiatives and finally Local Activities to 
apportion fixes/actions. It however emerged that although this might 
have been the intent, the 
opposite occurred where National UPBs in these two 
instances were credited with a probable 
worsening performance of 42.5% and conversely local activities an 
improvement of 32.2%. 1 
consider this clearly indicates a strong reliance and 
focus on the part of the co-participants 
concerned on unit based actions to improve performance 
in preference to opportunities offered 
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at either a National or Area level. I realised that this was a trend similarly replicated 
throughout the remaining scorecards, which although it did not relate to worsening impacts 
was evident in relation to instances of actual usage by the co-participants, as well as foreseen 
improvements the co-participants expected to materialise by following the recorded course of 
action. 
Figure 7 (extracted from appendix eight) illustrates the entire breakdown. It is evident that 
National UPBs attracted 26.4%, Area Initiatives 28.9% and lastly Local Activities 44.7% 
usage, which when compared against the individual KPIs indicates dominance towards the use 
of local activities with the exception of Time Out, where a 50% high use of National UPBs is 
evident. When this is transposed into foreseen improvement impacts, the trend continues with 
the highest improvements being attributed to local activities with the exception reoccurring in 
the Time Out KPI, which retains a high dependence on the National UPBs to support 
improvements across all units by 154. Interestingly, as shown below, regarding the All Due 
Mail UPBs, the negative 17.2% impact can be directly attributed back to the co-participant 
who retained a negative gap of 12.5% on his scorecard with only three choosing to align a 
positive impact of 1,9 and 4.8 percent respectively. 
Figure 7- Usage & Impacts Of Fixes/Actions 
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At this point in the engagement I believe it is possible from these findings to assert that 
individuals are increasingly drawn to the use of local activities to the detriment of both the 
National and Area input. I appeared that they had lost confidence regarding the opportunities 
they provided and chose to rely instead on their own judgment. It became apparent that this 
outcome provided further substance to my previous discussions regarding barriers to 
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'understanding, contribution' and 'impact. ' I believe that a similar sequence of psychological 
and cognitive conflicts continued to manifest themselves, which as a consequence, encouraged 
individuals to retain their main attention and focus within areas they felt comfortable 
interacting and operating. As one individual subsequently commented: 
"Well I see its 4 key words ain't it really understanding, expectations, reality and 
accountability? " 
As I reflected on the implications of this view, it became apparent that two specific 
considerations had re-surfaced. Firstly, I realised that similar barriers had emerged as 
encountered earlier during the original exposure workshop whereby individuals found it 
extremely difficult to identify, quantify and understand what the national UPBs would 
ultimately provide. As both the specialist and I interacted with the co-participants in the 
workshop, we found it hard to quantify the expected impact. We were however extremely 
conscious of not simply providing a figure for the co-participants to work. As we accepted this 
would not only go against the agreed behavioural way of working, but reduce the degree of 
ownership and accountability the co-participants might subsequently feel and display, if what 
we suggested did not come to fruition. I accepted that this would provide yet another subject to 
be discussed at the first performance review. As a consequence, one of the specialists 
reflecting on the workshop commented that: 
"Actions might have been put together on assumptions ". 
As a result, although the co-participants had to deploy the national mandatory UpBs as one of 
their tasks, as the evidence proves they tagged limited impacts to them choosing instead to 
retain a high level of reliance on local activities. It was felt that individuals were more 
comfortable committing to local activities they had either previous experiences of, or devised 
themselves. It was seen that when this was the course of action followed, that expected 
impacts could be more robustly considered and included on the scorecards, and it was felt 
more likely achieved as they where viewed as being under their direct control and influence. 
As a number of co-participants later commented: 
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"A lot of the impact was guessed and we had to use local activities tofill in the gaps ". 
"Doing the scorecards was a bitfrustrating, as Ifound it dfficult to project the impact of the 
actions, particularly the national UPBs. Ifound it easy to say high, low or medium for the 
local ones, as in most cases we have used them in the past and know how useful they are. But I 
found the national ones difficult as I am not sure or comfortable about what they are supposed 
to give me 
"Well like we said earlier, it is all well and goodputting down actions and timescales, but it is 
hard to understand what they will give and when. I think I am ok with the local ones, but the 
national UPBs are something else ". 
"The local actions are easier to tag as I have done them before and know what I can and can It 
expectfrom them ". 
Secondly, I believe it is clear from the co-participants views that misgivings exist whereby 
previous unresolved performance problems or particular aspects of the National UPBs are seen 
as counter productive and in certain instances removed from an individual's direct control and 
influence. I believe it is clear that when this is the case, individuals are encouraged to simply 
reject their use in supporting improvements, with the following views being extracted across a 
selection of the deployed UPBs: 
"I am in a continuous state ofrecruitment which affects not only my budget but all mail 
delivered and time out". 
"Also staff askingfor annual leave in certain months so doing this (Way Forward Annual 
Leave Selection- Turning an individuals request down as no untaken slots are available) 
is going to effect how they think about me, remember it is me telling them they can't have the 
dates they want so who's EOS score is going to go down ". 
Additionally: 
"I hadproblems with the individual performance standards and trying to put against it what it 
will give me. Itfrustrates me, as I think the principle is good, but we don't have agreements on 
the sorting rates, so I know we will have a lot of arguments with the CWU and staff '. 
Moreover within the case context: 
"27ie same applies to the work time learning. I know my staff are going to hate it as they will 
see it as us managers stopping them getting out on delivery. So I expect to have similar 
arguments ". 
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I must admit what when these are considered, I would have been more comfortable if the co- 
participants had recorded an increased level of adverse effect. It however became apparent that 
apart from the limited adverse impact previously discussed and recorded as part of the RCA 
and fix/action phase, this was not the case with individuals simply choosing to record either a 
high (red), medium (amber) or low (green) impact and not assign any resulting impact. A 
situation which is clearly illustrated in appendix 10 and evident to varying degrees across all 
dimensions of the scorecards, but none more so than both sections of the Shareholder 
dimensions, is due to what I have previously discussed in relation to Shareholder 
considerations. 
6.4 Reflections on Managers Deployment of their Respective Unit Scorecards 
6.4.1 Personal Ownership 
I had decided earlier during the exposure workshop that I needed to revisit the issue of 
ownership and accountability as part of the deployment stage. This was due to the fact that this 
issue had previously surfaced as a topic of concern for both the co-participants and I. I wanted 
to see if the deployment workshop had eradicated these concerns. If this were the case, the co- 
participants would consequently feel they had both increased levels of ownership and 
accountability towards their targets, performance gaps, and recovery actions on their respective 
completed scorecards. 
Through subsequent dialogue with the co-participants, it became increasingly apparent that 
individuals continued to retain a paradoxical disparity between how they viewed 'feeling' and 
tunderstanding' that they had ownership, and in turn were accountable for the contents of the 
scorecards they had produced. I realised that in the majority of cases, participants did not view 
ownership as a major problem, as they readily accepted that they were ultimately responsible 
for the actual performance of their respective units. The issue however appeared to reside in 
the degree of accountability individuals displayed towards the targets, both present and future 
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performance gaps, and actions across two very specific areas, with the influencing factor 
residing in what they felt they could not directly influence or control. 
The first area, which heightened uncertainty in the previous sections, related to mandatory 
projects and or policies, which individuals grudgingly accepted they had to deploy, such as 
National UPBs and changes in National and Area focuses. It was thought that these could 
generate situations which they were neither able to influence nor control. Ultimately, there was 
a feeling that this would lead to poorer performance in their units, with the following reflection 
from one of the specialists gained during the workshop (along with an additional comment 
from a co-participant), highlighting the depth and severity of feelings present: 
"7here are strongfeelings from the DOMs that the EOS Fairness of Line Manager target is 
one which they have very little control over. It is only measured once a year, and can be 
significantly affected by a number of people completing the survey, as well as recent 
communications either at local or national level, conduct procedures, and (National/Area) 
policy decisions ". 
"We always get new things to deploy as the year progresses, which like the UPBs, have not 
been thought through or understood on how it impacts on the delivery units. I getfrustrated by 
this, as we end up working extra hours and sorting out theproblems with the staff. 
In a similar context, it was felt that previous experiences have shown the adverse impact that 
other functions and processes (either directly or indirectly), can exert on unit performance, 
which in the majority of cases, the recipient manager feels he is not able to directly influence 
or control. In this situation, (which they considered had always been in existence), was in their 
view not likely to change and as such, they believed that personal accountability could not be 
directly attributed towards them for something they had not been involved in, or responsible 
for, due to someone else's decisions or actions. Consequently, individuals stated: 
"I have no problem with being accountable and having ownership, but it has got to be against 
something that is achievable and I know I keep going on about it, but I need to be able to 
influence and control what is causing me a problem. I can't influence the Mail Centre, so how 
can I be held accountablefor a problem in my unit when I am not causing it? " 
"I think the main thing is ifwe think we can achieve targets and no outside influences like the 
Mail Centre are going to get in the way, then yes Ifeel I have ownership andyou can hold me 
accountable, but ifI can't improve anything because ofsomeone else's actions I think it would 
be unfair ". 
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Across both discussion areas, repeated instances relating to being able to directly control and 
influence, continually surface as triggers linked to the topic of personal accountability. It 
would seem that when individuals believe they have direct control and influence over 
something, they view personal accountability positively. Alternatively, when they believe 
direct influence or control is not possible on their part as a result they feel they should not be 
held personally accountable. I believe that when this is closely compared against the previous 
section, a direct co-correlation exists whereby individuals (through their own previously 
acquired mindsets), have been encouraged to deploy local activities in preference to those 
opportunities provided at both a National and Area level which they view as less than robust or 
thought through. This may be either a sub-conscious or conscious act on the part of the co- 
participants triggered and directly linked to a need for self-perseveration, as they feel they are 
more likely to be able to directly control and influence their destiny through perusing activities 
they have previous experience of or if necessary devised themselves. This is a personal view 
on my part, which is supported through the following statement: 
"Ijust rely on local actions as I understand them and they are mine, so Ifeel I am able to 
influence them. Don't feel that I can with the national ones as I think they are just going to 
cause me problems as they have not been well thought through ". 
I would however be naive to believe that issues around accountability will simply be resolved 
through the adoption of local activities by the co-participants. Previous experience has taught 
me that even the best-laid plans will undoubtedly be exposed to influences that had not been 
considered or present at the time of their original conception and deployment. I believe that 
the co-participants were acutely aware of this possibility, and as such still retained concerns 
regarding the recording of planned actions on the scorecard, which in certain cases some still 
viewed ambivalently, 
"I think it is a way of tying us down ". 
"I still see it as tying me down. The contracting bit still worries me, as I am sure it will be 
used to bring me to task when I don't achieve my objectives ". 
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As I reflected on the deployment engagement, I was interested to ascertain how the support 
specialists viewed the diverse and topical issue of ownership. I was interested to see that the 
specialists approached this concern from a completely different perspective, viewing the role 
the SOM undertook as part of managing performance as critical in nurturing an environment of 
ownership amongst the sector managerial team. I realised that this impartial advice offered by 
experienced individuals who had daily contact with the front line managers, provided me with 
a valuable insight were it was felt that: 
"I have concerns that unless SOMs are 100% on board with the process, it will give very little 
improvement". 
"SOMs need to ensure meetings are booked and held consistently, and need to challenge 
actions, which are 'woolly'andforecasts which are too optimistic". 
"SOMs need to ensure DOMs are notjust completing theformsfor compliance sake, but are 
tackling root causes. I think unless the SOM chases up with the DOM on Root Cause Analysis 
(RCA) each quarter, then it will not happen ". 
Strong support is requiredfrom the SOM to give DOMs the confidence to turn the monthly 
reviews aroundfrom a SOM telling the DOM what he needs to do to improve his unit, to the 
DOM telling the SOM what he is doing already to make improvements ". 
"Some DOMs will have difficulty getting to grips with the scorecards, and even more 
difficultyforecasting the impact of their actions. We need to ensure they do not waste a lot of 
time worrying and trying to be too accurate with their forecasts. A lot of support will be 
neededfrom both the SOM and Analyst in this area". 
I accepted that this provided me with a very honest insight (not only into possible practitioner 
shortcomings in relation to my role as a SOM), but also which I willingly accept as guidance 
regarding how I would need to adapt my professional practice to better support my front line 
team. I realised that by adopting this managerial style in conjunction with the agreed 
behavioural way of working, I would be better able to react to continuing concerns regarding 
the term 'contracting' and 'tying down' individuals, as well as dealing with future difficulties 
where individuals during the performance reviews might subsequently feel frustrated: 
"Well itfrustrates us and Ican do as much root cause analysis and identify actions to 
sort out the problem, but ifl can't influence it, what is the use of wasting all that time 
and effort? " 
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6.4.2 Robustness of Scorecards into the Usage Stage 
A key activity I needed to undertake shortly after the completion of the workshop (as both a 
practitioner and researcher), involved a critical review of the produced scorecards, to assess 
their suitability for subsequent usage by the co-participants. As part of this, I required a 
rounded and impartial view. I therefore reasoned that this would be more possible through the 
involvement of the support specialists and the Area Senior Analyst. I was of the opinion that 
from this involvement, not only could I identify possible improvements applicable to the 
scorecards, but also opportunities to further support the previous guidance gained from the 
specialist against my practice during the usage stage. 
As we discussed the individual's scorecards and personal experiences, it was evident the co- 
participants had approached the task in a positive manner. There was little indication of 
negativity in relation to what one of the analysts felt could have been instances where 
individuals may have simply resorted to saying, "you know the old, we can't do it". This 
resulted in all individuals exiting the workshop with produced scorecards of varying degrees of 
robustness, which closed performance gaps across the different KPI dimensions in all but the 
two previously discussed instances. Additionally, those present believed that the main initial 
benefit derived from the managers participating in the workshop was raising awareness and 
related actions: 
"I think it simplyfocused them down or raised awareness, which we built up in the workshop 
along with suitable actions, which is where I think the main activity and involvement 
happened "(Analysts). 
As we assessed the contents of each of the scorccards, it was apparent that the workshop was 
viewed by one of the specialists as providing a springboard only. As such, the co-participants 
where just developing their own capabilities and competences in the use of a BSC approach. 
The analyst clarified his position with cautious optimism: 
"Yeah as a startingpoint, mypersonal view is that its getting better, its better than it was last 
year, its not ideal, but its on the road to improvement". 
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I was encouraged by the nature of the comment and realised that I needed to expand the 
conversation further to understand the reasoning behind the expressed view along with the 
opinions of the remainder of the group. 
As a vehicle and prompt for debate, I refocused the group back onto the RCA and fixes 
contained in the produced scorecards. As we commenced to work our way through the 
contents, there was a consensus that in certain cases (due to lack of experience), the risk 
existed whereby aligned fixes might not support either a full or a partial improvement 
outcome. Thus during the conversation, one of the performance coaches commented: 
"Yes I think it is correct I had to keep questioning the DOMs as they went through their own 
scorecards". 
As we explored this further, it was felt from interacting with the co-participants that 
difficulties existed in not only isolating suitable fixes, but also identifying, understanding, 
quantifying and in turn forecasting the expected impact over a realistic timeframe. As part of 
the discussion, the following varied views emerged from the group: 
"Concerning the size of the gap and the time span individuals haveput down to close the gap, 
I don't think they have thought it through properly and the risk is that they won't achieve it". 
"Because they don't understand how to identify the impact of their actions and accurately 
forecast it, we have always done itfor them in the past". 
"I'm not convinced that we all know that an action we put in, actually delivers an 
improvement". 
"I don't think they've got the skill as being being able to say, 'this action is done in isolation 
and therefore this action has driven that change in the results, because we do so many things 
at once ". 
"Nen improvements are seen, we don't know which one of the many actions that we do day 
by day has driven that improvement". 
It was possible from the contents to extract guidance and a suitable assessment criterion, which 
as a group, we continually referred to in our review of the scorecards. On the completion of the 
review, all (apart 'from 26 of thefixes') contained on the employee and customer elements of 
the scorecards and (detailed in appendix thirteen) were deemed as "reasonable " by the review 
team. Consequently, these elements were considered fit for purpose to support improvements 
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in the relevant units. As the review continued, I realised that I was also being provided with a 
suitably robust and focused framework to underpin the previously received guidance, upon 
which I could base my impending performance reviews with the co-participants. 
I reasoned that if I followed a similar approach and framework, I could maintain a level of 
consistency, robustness and focus, as well as depth to the reviews. I considered this would 
encourage the co-participants to complete any required pre-work, allowing them to participate 
actively and constructively in the review. I also felt it would encourage individuals to fully 
consider all options before simply passing the problem up, where they might, (as one 
individual commented), be encouraged to assume: 
"I would have thought it would then be up to Pete as our SOM to point us in the right 
direction and help us close the gap ". 
I believed this would go some way to reducing the analysts concerns: 
"Yes I do and I think we will end up doing (identifying problems - causes - fixes) it for 
them ". 
"Well many of the operators find more dificulty because it's a, 'today I've got a problem 
today I've got to solve a problem' (what is happening today) rather than (an ongoing 
problem that might happen later) a week or month or 2 months ". 
"in your case, with having so many units whether or notfeasibly youV be able to go down 
sufficient details andfocus on the actual nitty gritty, because you've got so many units ". 
On the conclusion of the meeting, we agreed that as the line manager, I would relay the 
recommendations back to the co-participants using the same framework to nurture 
understanding in the next meeting. I expected the recommended changes to be progressed by 
the co-participants prior to (and confirmed as actioned), as part of the first performance review 
of the new financial year. I saw this as formalising the process of signing off the scorecards 
with my team, as well as the 'contracting' or in other terms the 'agreement of the contents' 
being concluded on a one two one basis at the review session. 
I adopted this approach as I realised that from the management meeting, the depth of focus and 
resulting areas of questioning would be fresh in the minds of the co-participants. I thought this 
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would help the co-participants and I acquire a more balanced view of the scorecards, and 
therefore increase their overall robustness and reduce the possible emergence of the analysts' 
concerns. I saw this as an important action, as I needed to include the shareholder KPIs along 
with any resulting cash/budgetary impacts resulting from the customer and employee 
dimensions, which (as previously discussed), were not available or included on the scorecards 
at the time the assessments had been undertaken. 
6.4.3 Usefulness of Computer Based Performance Management System 
As the co-participants, support specialists and I interacted with the RCA sheets and scorecards, 
it became extremely evident that problems existed which, as a group we considered if allowed 
to continue, would severely affect any resulting engagement within the usage stage. This is not 
to say that we viewed the entire system in itself as inappropriate. Individuals felt the 
activity/task listing provided to support managers and the process of RCA and alignment of 
fixes, was a valuable tool, where it was stated: 
"I thought the activity listing was a good tool as it helped me to sense check that I have 
covered everything. It is easy to get into a blinkered state and the amount of work we have 
done today makes youforget the simple things [daily and weekly tasks] you takefor granted. 
So yes, it was good". 
The problem we encountered during the deployment workshop was that we where expected to 
use 3 distinctively separate computer based systems, which where not interlinked in relation to 
the root cause analysis sheet, unit planning tool and unit scorecard. Consequently highlighted 
the complexity of having to use three separate computer programmes: 
"I think ... a lot of the programs we get given are 
difficult to complete and not professionally 
developed. If it had been you, you would only have done one sheet and it would have been 
copied across to the other ones ". 
"Gaining access to computers and the dayjob will cause usproblems. I think this system is 
too slow and takes up a lot ofspace. We need something that is simple to understand and 
complete ". 
"Hat I want is something that is easy and quick to access, rather than taking hours to open 
as would be the problem on the computers in the units", 
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It was clear that this generated an increased awareness amongst the co-participants around 
topical issues such as workload, access to computers and the complexity and difficulties 
associated with the system. I was however encouraged to see that they were not simply 
dismissing the system entirely, but requested they be provided with something that was user 
friendly and straightforward. I believe this indicated that they had accepted that some sort of 
system was indeed necessary to support their impending BSC engagements were the centrality 
of the system was acknowledged: 
"Yep... I do like the process, hut let's keep it simple so we can keep on top of it. Otherwise 
like everything else, it won't be updated and he a waste of time after a couple ofmonths ". 
I believe that to devise a possible solution, it is first necessary to understand the problems from 
which we may subsequently devise robust and agreed solutions. The first issue centred on the 
root cause analysis sheets (appendix seven), where although it supported the identification of 
root causes it became increasingly evident it was an isolated document and not linked 
electronically to either a control system (unit planning tool) or scorecard, requiring duplication 
of work on the part of the co-participants. 
Additionally, the unit-planning tool (appendix nine) similarly was viewed as an isolated 
system, based on what individuals worried could eventually be an extremely large excel 
format. Team members feared that such a sizable application would require not only 
significant input at the start of the year to record activities over a 52-week period, but 
increasing in size and complexity as the year progressed. All concerned considered this as 
extremely over complicated, and not in any way or means user friendly with the following 
prudent view forwarded: 
"The unit planning tool is a nightmare, how on earth are we expected to use that to track 
activities and update it? [ne tooU goes over 52 weeks. I would need more than an A4 printer 
to print that off. It comes back to what we have said before: it is not userfriendly ". 
With regards to the unit scorecard (appendix ten), although it was viewed by some as 
confusing, it did enable the identification of initial performance gaps and recording of initial 
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actions, status and forecasting. It was however impossible in the later instance to go below a 
quarterly forecast or record the level of depth and detail contained in the RCA sheets. This was 
deemed necessary by all concerned in relation to what would undoubtedly be additional and or 
remedial actions and root cause analysis throughout the year. The following criticisms of the 
issued scorecard emerged from the co-participants: 
"I also thought the scorecards are too complicated to support the recording of local actions. 
Ybere is no space to put anything down and the calculations are confusing". 
"[The scorecards] are too complicated and don'tfrom what I have seen, allow enough space 
to do a root cause analysis and record cause and effect'. 
"The sheet only allows you to input into quarterly columns. So it wont' allow us to do a 
monthly analysis ". 
As I reflected on the experiences and opportunities positioned, I was conscious that I wanted 
the co-participants in conjunction with the sector analysts to develop a probable working 
solution. In this way, I reasoned that such an approach would not only be workable as the co- 
participants had been involved but also fit for purpose, due to the analysts' involvement. I was 
encouraged firstly that when I put this forward as part of the syndicate exercise that one 
individual replied: 
"Why not use these scorecards [present] as the startpoint butpull something together that is 
simpler to use? " 
In addition, as the discussion focused upon the dilemma and possible solution that the 
annalists already had a similar devised format for their own use (appendix eleven), they 
believed they could adapt the format to meet the needs of the business. It was apparent that 
the system they had incorporated not only the process of root cause analysis, recovery actions 
and impact, but also supported both a monthly, quarterly and yearly effect and outcome to 
be 
included onto a excel based sheet. I also realised that an additional benefit of the suggested 
approach was that it allowed the complete recording of the review without requiring an 
additional process. In reaching a joint agreement, 
it was felt that we could: 
"Use these as the base documents and use the ones produced by [the analysts] as the review 
documents. YIese can contain the same information as the ones on your computers ". 
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"We could produce a similar format, but provide the right columns to allow monthly 
completion. But we will [sector analysts] need to continue to use the national scorecardsfor 
the quarterly impact, as it will link into the Area forecasting and performance management 
process 
I was conscious that by adopting this approach, we would be rejecting the nationally deployed 
system. Conversely I was also aware that to continue to use the deployed approaches after I 
had been exposed to the concerns of both the co-participants/analysts and shortcoming of the 
system itself, would possibly jeopardize the subsequent engagement into the usage stage. In 
addition, my relationship with the co-participants may also have been jeopardized. 
I accepted that I needed to gain support for the changes in approach I intended to follow, which 
I intentionally raised as a discussion topic at the review meeting with the sector analysts' 
support. During the meeting, the following expressions of support emerged. Firstly from the 
sector analyst: 
"The other SOMs will do something similar I think". 
As a result of the debate, the Area Senior Analyst subsequently confirmed that the use of the 
revised format would be acceptable to her as long as the following requirements continued to 
be met from the sector team. This included the continued quarterly submission of the 
nationally issued unit scorecard by the sector analysts to support the Area Scorecard 
submission. In addition, monthly updates in relation to UPB status confirmations in the units 
would continue as part of the deployment workshop and included as a discussion topic at the 
monthly performance review, with updates submitted to the Area team. 
"As long as the scorecards are completed as we use themfor the area reports and 
forecasting". 
"We can include this [monthly UPB status report to Area] in the monthly performance 
review and update a sector report so they don't have to submitfrom the units ". 
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6.4.4 Practitioner Implications Emerging from Deployment Phase 
The aim of the workshop was to examine each unit scorecard and identify gaps between 
current performance and targets. Where the gap required performance to be improved, a root 
cause analysis was made to address the reason for the gaps and an action plan drawn up. In the 
group setting extra assistance was provided to develop the analytical skills required and root 
cause analysis. 
The managers could see their problems more clearly. Also they found they had common 
problems. In some cases, managers had already done work to improve performance and were 
able to share this learning with colleagues. Overall, managers were generally encouraged by 
the new approach, seeing it as a structured, supportive and time-scale process with fewer and 
more realistic objectives. The outcome was a more robust scorecard comprising detailed root- 
cause analysis and actions directed to close existing gaps. A particular improvement was that 
managers began to address cases where actions to improve performance against one measure 
caused a trade-off with another performance target. For example, an increased sick absence 
would raise mail cost through short or long-term recruitment to cover the resulting vacancy. 
The issue was getting the managers to weigh up different options as opposed to selecting the 
easiest or most obvious one. As a result, another positive effect of the workshop was to make 
it easier to reach agreement with each unit manager to sign-off their scorecard. However, the 
unit managers demonstrated they had a better understanding of the scorecard. They were 
pleased with the intentions to work in a new way. 
Nevertheless, underlying frustrations remained as they approached the time when the scorecard 
would go live. These centred on their perceived ability to control performance directly to 
achieve targets in the different segments of the unit scorecard. They were positive about the 
repeat-complaints measure. Here they were confident that they could directly influence the 
performance of individuals for whom they were responsible. In the instance of the fairness of 
line managers, they felt they had a great influence but that the national employee satisfaction 
survey could be adversely affected by such effects as the timing of a national initiative 
imposed on the unit. The other two customer measures of all mail delivered and the MIPP 
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timeout are both heavily dependent on the smooth running of the national transport network 
and the efficiency of upstream functional process, as well as fluctuations in seasonable weather 
conditions. Similarly, the management of sick absence was seen by managers as involving 
support processes, particularly personnel in cases where national policy agreements could have 
overriding effects on performance. 
The measures that continued to generate the most debates however, were associated with costs. 
Individuals recognised that the task would be both stretching and at times difficult with most 
of the other KPIs directly impacting on the budgetary performance of the unit. Managing these 
trade-offs was recognised as difficult. However, individuals felt frustrated again about the 
impact of upstream problems and unforeseen initiatives introduced during a year at a national 
level that would not have been taken into consideration when setting the unit budget. This 
often made it very difficult to meet targets. In addition to the concerns of my managers, I had 
reservations about the responsiveness of the measurement system, in particular the 
responsiveness of feedback and feed forward processes when trying to manage emerging trade- 
offs. I was aware that any delays in providing a speedy response to these factors would 
jeopardise both the behavioural commitments made and the credibility of the whole 
measurement system. 
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ChAkER 7 Scorecard Usage 
7.1 Usage Positioning 
Following the deployment workshop over a period of nine months, the eight co-participants 
and two analysts who had agreed to continue into the usage stage provided continuous 
qualitative and quantitative feedback. I saw the purpose being not only to focus on the 
practitioner and cogitative implications of the co-participants use of the scorecards, but also 
how this subsequently affected the relationship between the co-participants and myself. It was 
reasoned that by following this joint interaction (linked to actual performance results), as well 
as drawing upon relevant commentary emerging from management meetings and performance 
reviews, practitioner practice on both sides could be supported, and more importantly 
improved, when oppoftunities were identified. 
7.2 Engaging with the Co-Participants 
To support this level of interaction, I have adopted a number of applied approaches. Firstly, I 
constructed and distributed a bi-monthly questionnaire targeted at the eight frontline co- 
participants. Secondly, I conducted two interviews with the co-participants at both the three 
and nine month stages of the research. In both instances, the two sector analysts were included. 
In each case, these activities were undertaken on the conclusion of a performance review to 
enable both experiences and feelings resulting from the engagement to be more easily recalled 
by the interviewees. 
Finally, I conducted two focus groups during the fifth and eleventh months of the research 
period. I saw these sessions as serving two very important purposes. These specifically related 
to providing not only an opportunity for the co-participants to express their feelings and 
emotions in an impartial environment, but also a suitable medium to test and further explore a 
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number of conflicting messages which subsequently emerged from both the questionnaires and 
surveys. 
7.3 Initial Insight into Practitioner Engagement 
jMy Initial Intention) It had been my intention that as part of the first performance 
review (PR) I would need to include a number of key activities which remained outstanding 
from the development and deployment stages of the individual scorecards into the delivery 
units. These tasks specifically related to reviewing not only the inclusion but progression of 
the additional recommendations (see Appendix 13), issued to the co-participants shortly after 
the robustness assessment of the completed scorecards was undertaken. 
Additionally, I not only needed to review the National UPB position (which individuals had 
made little use of as part of the workshop), but also update the scorecards to include the 
shareholder dimensions. This was necessary, as it had not been possible to undertake the 
latter, due to the budget not having been confirmed at the time. This situation was further 
compounded by a strong reluctance from the co-participants to commit to a cash impact for the 
actions recorded in either the Employee or Customer dimensions. 
(First Performance Reviewl When I agreed to commit to this process during the 
deployment workshop, it had not occurred to me that the simple process of arranging and 
undertaking a PR to complete these activities would prove so problematic. At the outset, I was 
well aware that I could only expect each manager to attend up to ten PR's when annual leave 
and sickness were taken into consideration. I did not see this as a major problem in relation to 
the first review, as all managers were scheduled to be at work. I also felt that if the owner of 
the scorecard could not attend as the year progressed, then a suitably briefed and empowered 
substitute cover manager (provided from either within the unit or acting pool), would suffice. 
I 
believed that by following this process, I would be addressing the earlier concerns of the 
analysts and co-participants in relation to PR's being booked and consistently undertaken. 
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It became apparent, however, that although attendance was to emerge as an extremely topical 
issue at an early stage of the research, it was not the most pressing concern. The immediate 
issue to be resolved as both the analysts and I prepared for the first PR centred on unforeseen 
performance system problems associated with the robustness and confirmation of actual results 
from the first performance period. Whilst we were encouraged that the budget had been 
confirmed by this stage, we were disappointed that it was still not possible to identify either 
budgetary or sick performance results from the first period (April) by the middle/end of May, 
which was well into the later part of the second period. As a result, we were concemed that 
the co-participants (already disillusioned and adversely critical towards the delayed 
confirmation of the budget during the deployment stage), would see the delay as serving to 
vindicate their concerns. 
This was particularly won-ying as the situation was further compounded in the customer 
dimensions, where both the ADM and TO results appeared to be raising concerns regarding 
their measurement focus alongside conflicting views and opinions regarding the precise 
measurement dimension. As such, we considered the initial results to be unreliable and 
confusing. It was felt that this could possibly encourage adverse feelings and reactions, 
already influenced by previous bad experience with performance management, to re-emerge, 
continue or to intensify. 
We therefore concluded that the cash situation along with these factors made their use 
questionable in the first review. It appeared that although the BSC system had been deployed, 
the measurement aspect was experiencing problems in terms of its focus and likelihood of 
supplying accurate and timely results back to the frontline from which reviews could be 
undertaken. In addition, the actual measurement focus of both the ADM and TO KPIs seemed 
to indicate limited robust pre-testing and or awareness by the business of likely problems 
associated with their use at the frontline. I found myself in agreement with a number of 
previous comments expressed by one of the performance coaches shortly after the deployment 
workshop, such as the following from an e-mail dated April 2000: 
"The process is supposed to be getting more bottom-up - yet the top can't keep up with the 
bottom - the business needs to speed up ". 
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"Rolling out (the UPPMS system) without even testing it". 
At the early usage stage, it appeared that initial evidence would support the concerns of the 
performance coach bringing into question the overall robustness of the original trials 
conducted prior to the deployment across the business. It was felt that the 100 percent target 
(measured after 2 nd deliveries had departed) implied that no letter failures on the day in 
question, for example due to late and/or mis-sorted mail being sent to another unit, would be 
allowed. When this occurred, this would lead to a recorded unit failure against the operation 
for the day in question, resulting in the suitability of the measurement criteria itself being 
challenged: 
"Let's compare Leeds City which handles (up to) 1.5 million letters a week and Bramley with 
only 25 thousand. Each is measured the same where only one letter is afailure ffor the day, 
so I] don't know how both can be compared and measured the same " (Source Al). 
Consequently, doubts were thrown on: 
"... how motivating that will befor (the City unit manager). All he has to do isfail one item 
a day (over each of the 26 operational days in a month) to fail to meet his total period 
target at all" (Source A2). 
As I discussed the situation with the analysts, we started to question the precise nature of the 
measurement. We accepted that the measure focused on mail remaining in the unit after second 
deliveries had departed at 11: 00 hrs, but found ourselves pondering the exact meaning of the 
definition. Did it imply all mail as suggested by the use of the term 'mail remaining', or did it 
only relate to mail received before the unit's latest acceptance time, such as 
05: 15 and 
scheduled last mis-sort arrivals around 10: 00 hrs? 
As a group of experienced operational practitioners and analysts, we realised that if we found 
ourselves in the situation where we were confused, 
it was reasonable to conclude that those 
required to perform the measurement itself could 
harbour similar feelings. I did not realise at 
the time that this was going to emerge as an ongoing problem, which, as a group we would 
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shortly take to the business centre via the upward feed process after the third PR, and which 
remained unresolved till the 9ffi performance period. 
As we considered our predicament as well as its impact over the remainder of the year, we 
found ourselves focusing on the results, which we realised would be required at least a week 
before any review could be undertaken. We considered that this would provide a reasonable 
amount of time to enable all parties to prepare themselves. However, it appeared from the 
current situation that once the budgetary teething problems had been resolved, the full matrix 
of scorecard results for each period would not become available until the second week of the 
subsequent performance period. This clearly placed undue pressure on all parties in relation to 
not only attending and completing the reviews over a two-week time slot, but also in that it 
required a degree of historical reflection on the part of the co-participants regarding possible 
causes. In this instance, it was unfeasible not only to undertake the Shareholder updates, but 
also to embark on any form of detailed review of performance across either the Employee or 
Customer dimensions, where recovery actions had been previously assigned. 
In addition, it was felt by the analysts and myself that it would be sensible to wait for the 
shareholder results to be provided, and for us to acquire a second set of data from across the 
other Customer and Employee dimensions. We felt that this would ensure not only a better 
understanding of performance trends, but also address our initial assumptions regarding the 
discussed measurement problems. We believed that by following this approach, more robust 
and focused actions would emerge during discussions with the co-participants. 
This decision was taken as we were conscious that we did not want to enter into what we 
hoped would be a proactive interaction, only to find ourselves changing direction the following 
month when results not only became available, but any previously revised actions based on 
incorrect or unreliable data had to be reassessed and changed. Additionally, we held concerns 
that the co-participants might (if this was not an isolated occurrence and ongoing delays along 
with frustrations regarding the way the KPI's were measured remained), might see it as an 
opportunity to deflect performance discussions. 
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Consequently, the consensus was that this could be highly destabilising and de-motivating for 
all involved. As I explored this further, it was felt that both our credibility and long-term 
relationship with the co-participants could ultimately be at stake in future PR's. As one of the 
analysts observed: 
"We need to know that the results we are supplying and discussing are accurate so that we 
can reliably support the managers andfocus on the right areas requiring improvement the 
first time round" (Source Al). 
As we discussed the suggestion, the remaining analyst supported the view with the following 
reflection: 
"I agree [that] if we don't get it right in the beginning, then they won't trust what we say in 
thefuture and we will have difficulties in getting them to commit to anything" (Source A2). 
I accepted that this was sound and sensible advice. I was however conscious that I wanted to 
involve the co-participants. By maximising their direct involvement, I would be more likely to 
gain their understanding and tolerance towards the difficulties and delays encountered. In 
addition, I felt that by following this approach I would be more likely to gain their agreement 
to what we proposed thereby limiting any adverse reactions which might occur. I also saw this 
as a suitable medium through which to check not only the assumptions of the analysts and 
myself, but also those of the co-participants, thereby providing a frontline practitioner 
interpretation. 
As I raised the issue of the delays and inconsistencies in available results with the co- 
participants during my next management meeting (22 
nd May), it was apparent from their 
reactions that they were not surprised. The co-participants had 
been somewhat sceptical that 
the new performance system, and in particular the cash/sick reporting element, would have 
been up and running in time to support the review in the first place. It was felt that previous 
experience had taught them otherwise, and they had not seen anything to suggest that the 
situation regarding the co-correlation of financial results and reporting 
from the central 
financial database would be any different. It appears that this was severely hindering not only 
their ability to accurately understand the financial effects of the actions they 
had taken, but also 
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their ability to quantify the probable cash impact of new actions they might wish to deploy as 
part of any review. 
It was, however, recognised that after a month individual managers should be able to quantify 
either a positive or a negative trend. We thought that this could be done simply by referring 
back to existing sickness or workforce levels from which additional hours used to provide 
additional duty cover would offer a general explanation of the current cash situation. I was 
encouraged by the positive outlook. However, as I had suspected from both my observations 
and those of the analysts regarding the results prior to the meeting, the focus of debate swiftly 
returned to how both the ADM and TO KPIs where measured. 
It was similarly felt that from the measurements taken to date, the ADM measure was 
extremely biased with no compensation being made for the total numbers of letters handled, 
which as previously indicated, could range from the low tens of thousands to over a million a 
week. It could be seen that it would not be valid for a failure to be simply attributed to either 
one or many hundreds of letters from this total remaining in the unit after second deliveries 
had departed. 
As I explored this in greater depth, it became apparent that situations such as these provided 
the first instance where previous concerns expressed during the workshops regarding personal 
ownership, and in turn accountability, were to resurface. It was accepted that personal 
ownership and accountability for a failure of this nature would be attributed to the unit 
managers, but only if the failure (of mail left in the unit, or deliveries departing late) was a 
direct result of operational or staffing problems in the unit itself. Conversely, it was felt that 
when this was not the case, and the failure originated from outside of the unit's area of 
influence, then feelings of personal accountability would be reduced. 
Reflecting on the meaning behind the outputs, it is clear that the triggering factor leading an 
individual to adopt this mindset not only related to where a problem originates, but also the 
perceived degree of direct personal influence and control which could potentially be utilised to 
210 
affect a performance event or outcome. This view is supported by the following comment 
from co-participant S2: 
"I am always getting [Sherburn] mail which I am due but it is continually miss-sorted to other 
delivery offices [Garforthl by the Mail Centre staff. nis then arrives back with me [in 
Sherburn] late and misses my deliveries. Yhe changes [to the machine code sort breakdown to 
improve throughput rates] were made by the Mail Centre and I was not involved". 
At this early stage of the research, I feel it is possible to ascertain from the opinions expressed 
and our limited experience to date, that both KPIs were heavily reliant on the performance of 
upstream functions fulfilling their operational commitment to the delivery units. During the 
first period when there were instances of failure, individuals were discouraged by the fact that 
they found it extremely difficult to recover the situation or exert any degree of influence over 
the functional interface causing the problem. It was felt by those present, that from 
experience, the situation would not change, and that they would continue to struggle to meet 
the targets in both the KPIs. 
Consequently, they questioned both the relevance and robustness of the actual measurement 
focus while failures occurring elsewhere would affect their operation and be directly attributed 
to them. At this stage the co-participants found the situation extremely frustrating and de- 
motivating, as a delivery unit could simply fail either one or both of its targets through no 
direct fault of their own. 
Co-participants perceived that as a result they were being put into an unfair position, whereby 
the options available to them were incompatible with the intrinsic need to provide customers 
with the level of service they had come to expect. It was thought that they needed to decide 
between keeping staff back and failing TO but achieving their ADM KPI, or alternatively 
achieving TO by letting staff leave on time, but as a consequence 
failing their ADM. 
It was argued that the choice of either option would 
have an adverse impact upon the 
remaining customer RC KPI due to consumers complaining about 
later delivery times or the 
non-arrival of letters, held up in the unit. There would also 
be further budgetary implications. 
As one co-participant explained: 
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"It is going to cost us to recover Lfrom] the situation no matter what we do, either by paying 
overtime to staff because they are late back or to pay staff to stay and sort the mail when they 
return, or get them to come in early the next morning" (Source Unknown). 
We also understood that when this additional requirement was made of the operation in the 
unit, this was not covered by the predicted costs upon which the budget was produced in the 
first place. There existed little recognition or indeed acceptance from the business that this 
might be the case, with unit managers holding the view that when they tackle the problem they 
are Rifther penalised: 
"Even if we do overspend because of this, it will be forgotten by the end of the year and it 
won't be remembered or [accountedfor, so] I won't get my bonus because of it - (Source M5). 
Taking our experiences into consideration, we can ascertain from the discussions that 
individuals are acutely tuned to the cause and effect implications of performance management 
and measurement, particularly when problems originate from outside of their area of influence 
and control. In turn, it 
_appears 
that this leads individuals to experience conflict in their 
professional practice as they strive to meet targets across different measurement dimensions 
when trade-offs in a number of performance dimensions are necessary to limit any adverse 
impact. Consequently, feelings of anxiety seem to be commonplace amongst the co- 
participants regarding how this will affect their professional practice and performance, as well 
as the perceptions held by the customer and the business when performance is reviewed at the 
year's-end. 
In coming to this initial conclusion at an early stage of the research, I am aware that it has only 
been 7 weeks since the conclusion of the deployment workshop. During this time, not only has 
the fledgling performance system experienced the teething problems discussed previously, but 
the co-participants, analysts and I have been required to develop our own skills and 
understanding in its use. When this is taken into consideration, I believe it would be incorrect 
to simply go along with the preliminary assumptions, which require further testing in the next 
performance review period to enable us to either support or dispel initial concerns. 
I was encouraged to see that the meeting outcome was to wait for the system to produce 
reliable and timely data against which a better understanding of performance trends would be 
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gained. In the meantime, the co-participants would continue to focus on their existing actions 
until the period 2 PR, when the scorecards could be effectively updated. 
In addition, as I discussed my concerns regarding actual attendance at the reviews (and my 
solution that a substitute should attend), it was reasoned that within large units with a number 
of permanent managers this should not present a significant problem. It was, however, strongly 
felt in the majority of cases that cover was inconsistent, as it would be provided via a string of 
acting managers (see footnote 13). This led to concerns expressed by the Singleton (units with 
one manager) managers regarding levels of 'knowledge, experience, skills as well as the 
ability' of the individuals concerned to cover the units. I accepted that this could present a 
problem, which I would do my best to limit by agreeing to consistently assign the same acting 
managers to the singleton units. 
To make this work effectively, I would need to agree with the unit managers assigned to cover 
the unit and release these individuals for one day, both before and after the period to be 
covered, to enable an effective handover. In addition, it was felt that after a short period these 
individuals would be well versed in the running of the unit and would therefore be able to 
provide cover at short notice during periods of sickness or absence in the future. 
The meeting concluded with the consensus that the end of year reviews, which also by default 
fell into the same monthly period, would not only have diverted attention away from the first 
review, but would also have put additional strain on available time and both the co-participants 
and my own ability to find suitable cover managers. I had not considered this particular aspect 
prior to it being raised, but I soon found myself in agreement regarding the impact it could 
potentially exert. Consequently, I made a note to raise this as a topic for discussion later in the 
year during the first Area Management strategy and deployment-planning meeting. 
Note 13 Acting Managers are drawn from the frontline postal grade, and cover substantive managers during pcriods of 
sickness and annual leave. This cover can be of either a single day or a number of weeks duration with varying pcriods in 
between, when the individuals will return to normal postal duties. 
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jPreparing for the Second Performance Review) Along with the analysts, I was 
encouraged to see that subsequently the full basket of scorecard results was available for the 
following performance period. On the other hand, I was disappointed to see that as a complete 
set, they were still not being made available until the 15'hof the month following the period in 
question. In discussions with the Area Performance Manager, I realised that the late release of 
results would remain an ongoing performance system issue throughout the year. Reflecting on 
the situation, I realised that this would severely affect our ability to complete the PRs over a 
fortnight prior to the commencement of the next performance period, as we had planned. 
I therefore came to accept that as previously suspected, I would need to extend this two-week 
period still further by a number of days prior to undertaking PRs to provide suitable 
preparation time for the analysts, the co-participants and myself. In coming to this decision, I 
was aware that as a sector we had already scheduled the review dates and that by taking this 
course of action, I would undoubtedly encounter unforeseen conflicts of schedule due to 
individuals having to make additional changes. I was willing to accept that this could result in 
a possible reduction in unit manager attendance levels at reviews, falling below what I have 
earlier laid out as the ideal number of ten meetings attended over the year. 
I realised that in either case, I was being presented with a managerial trade-off. I could either 
have unit managers supplemented when necessary by empowered general cover managers, 
who are always available but were not adequately prepared, or my preferred option mentioned 
above. Attendees who have been provided with extra time in which to become more 
adequately prepared and conversant not only with the issues in question, but also primed to 
enter into a meaningful conversation regarding the underlying root causes and the potential 
actions which might be taken to address the areas of under performance. 
(Second Performance Review) I had believed that the process agreed upon would have 
supported the completion of the reviews. However, 
it became apparent as I commenced with 
the second set of 17 scheduled PRs that barriers regarding participation remained. 
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As I interacted with the co-participants and considered their reactions, I found myself 
reflecting on the agreed attendance PR process and the number of completed reviews. It 
became evident that what had been seen as a logical solution in the intervening period quickly 
lost support as feelings of unease, apprehension and defensiveness emerged regarding 
individuals' actual commitment. In a subsequent telephone conversation, I was able to record 
the following representative view: 
"I have been thinking things through [and] I don't think (name removed) will be up to it 
(attending PR)for me as he won't be able to talk you through either the detail of what I have 
done and what I have planned for the future. I think you will just end up in an unfocused 
conversation and get it wrong " (Source MI). 
This view was prevalent, and in the majority of cases could not be changed. As a result, I 
found not only a number of substantive managers displaying varying degrees of resistance and 
reluctance to have either junior or acting managers attend in their place, but also that the 
majority of the cover managers were unwilling to put themselves forward to undertake the 
role. Consequently, three substantive co-participating managers, along with one junior cover 
manager (who I was able to persuade to cover his own multi managed unit), attended their 
respective second period reviews. This left three co-participating multi and one Singleton 
units' manager's reviews outstanding, as I was unable to identify individuals willing to attend 
the reviews, even when this was portrayed as a major personal development opportunity. 
It was possible to identify a number of surprisingly similar underlying reasons from both the 
perspective of the substantive managers, and the junior cover manager who attended the 
review, regarding why this mindset existed. In the case of the managers, there was a general 
reluctance to delegate control over something they had personally developed and felt 
responsibility for, and as such did not want others to alter its contents and focus. Furthennore, 
the fact that the cover managers had not been involved in the unit's scorecards original 
deployment meant they would be unable to comprehend the original root causes and actions 
aimed at recovery. This inability would adversely affect their confidence and competency in 
subsequent reviews. In particular, concerns were expressed that individuals would not 
understand what was currently being done to improve performance, and therefore would be 
less likely to be able to explain the reasoning behind why and how particular courses of action 
215 
were being taken or had been rejected. It was felt that this could not only lead to 
inexperienced individuals being unable to quantify why particular results had come about, and 
also to forecast probable future performance improvement against an existing or outstanding 
action. In situations such as these, it was believed that individuals could put forward 
inappropriate recommendations, or be discouraged by my input. This outcome would be 
contrary to the agreed way of working whereby commitments are made to courses of action 
which might not otherwise have been agreed upon 
I was aware from informal feedback that the junior cover manager had discussed his concerns 
with'colleagues prior to attending the PR. I therefore made a conscious decision to raise the 
issue on the conclusion of his review. It emerged that surprisingly similar areas of concern 
existed to those expressed by the unit managers. This made individuals in attendance 
uncomfortable as they felt that their own shortcomings along with their lack of experience 
could be exposed to me as a senior manager, as well as to those who owned the BSC. It was 
believed this could put them in a situation in which they could be exposed to ridicule and 
criticism on the return of the substantive manager if they did not subsequently go along with 
what had been discussed or agreed upon. The one cover manager who attended stated that: 
"I only did this as afavourfor (name removed). I am not too sure how he will react to what I 
have agreed to and given him to do, [as]for all I know I might have got it wrong. I don't know 
why or what he has done in the past or what he might have planned to do in the future" 
(Source: Junior cover manager, 21st June 2001). 
was aware that from the previously discussed telephone conversation feelings existed 
whereby substantive managers assumed that if they did not subsequently concur with the 
content of the PR, they could not be held accountable for or pressured to commit themselves to 
any decisions with which they did not agree. It was believed this would surface as an issue to 
be resolved particularly when overall performance worsened, or when, as a direct result, 
additional problems subsequently emerged. This would need to 
be considered when reviewing 
future performance due to the additional pressures placed on the substantive manager; valuable 
time, which could have been better used elsewhere, would have been wasted whilst 
inappropriate courses of action were reversed to recover from any slippage. 
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I believed it would only be correct for any bystander to assume that an attendance of fifty 
percent at this early stage was extremely disappointing, and as their direct line manager I 
strongly agreed. I was encouraged that as the research progressed, although it never actually 
achieved 100%, attendance did steadily increase to a high majority of PRs completed. This 
improvement was particularly noticeable in multi-managed units. I realised that their stable 
and experienced managerial base provided an ideal opportunity for me to dispel the unit 
managers' concerns and encourage them through close cooperation to identify and coach a 
responsible and willing individual. We achieved this by taking a number of actions. 
Firsfly, the scorecard process and PR outputs were replicated and disseminated into the 
individual reviews undertaken by the unit manager with his own team. It was believed this 
would provide depth of understanding and comprehension of not only the BSC process, but 
also unit targets, current performance and specific recovery actions across the various sections 
to address areas of under performance. It was felt that this was extremely beneficial, as was the 
case with the Singleton managers, where it was the section managers who were ultimately 
responsible in the larger units for performance and the conduct of recovery actions in their 
individuals sections. As was suspected, this exposure provided individuals with a depth of 
understanding across the unit, which over a period encouraged the more confident and 
experienced individuals to attend the PRs and feel well prepared. 
Secondly, I was conscious that I needed to build upon what was being done in the units and 
decided with the unit managers that additional support would be provided whereby individuals 
would be encouraged to accompany the unit manager during a number of PRs. This proved 
invaluable, as it allowed individuals to experience a working PR during which they were 
actively encouraged to ask questions if anything regarding the performance of the unit was 
unclear, or if anything else about the content or proceedings of the PR concerned them. I 
believe that through following this process, both the professional relationship and confidence 
of both parties would be strengthened. 
However, it proved impossible to apply the same method in the case of the Singleton units. I 
had intended for acting managers to be tagged to named units. When I tried to push forward 
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with what had been agreed, it proved impracticable and was perceived to be applying 
favouritism towards a small select group of individuals to the detriment of those who would 
remained unassigned. I therefore agreed that in the case of the small number of Singleton 
units, those which were low impact would be included in the subsequent PR, and high impact 
unit reviews would be undertaken as soon as the unit manager was available. 
lReview Outcome) As previously discussed, additional time was provided for the unit 
managers to prepare for the reviews. Nevertheless, both the analysts and myself accepted that 
some individuals might be confiised as to what was expected of them, as it was the first PR the 
managers would have encountered. In this instance, we decided we would take the lead. We 
felt that this would provide individuals with the skills and knowledge necessary to undertake 
relevant work from which they would update and submit their personal scorecards prior to 
attending ftiture PRs (see footnote 14). 
in reaching this decision, we accepted that at this time we did not have all 17 managers 
attending. On this occasion however, we believed this could possibly work to our advantage, 
as it allowed us additional time to focus our attention on those attending this particular review 
cycle. In turn, we recognized that we could provide this particular group with the necessary 
skills and the confidence which would encourage them to actually apply what they had learnt 
in their next PR. It was hoped that after having the scorecard pre-work completed, these PRs 
would progress unaided. Therefore, additional time would be freed up for the remaining 
managers, who we would be provided with the same level and intensity of support and 
encouragement. 
I judged that undertaking the initial reviews in this manner had a number of positive outcomes. 
This approach built on the previous work undertaken during the workshop activities, and as 
such, was invaluable as it further embedded knowledge and understanding. Additionally, this 
-Footnote 14 Individuals would be expected to review and update the contents of their scorecards and submit them to both the 
analyst and myself prior to attending. 17his would include not only updating the results and performance gaps but also 
underlying root cause and actions against which a reflective commentary supported 
by proposed recovery actions would need 
to be included. It was thought that this would provide the framework against which the PR would be focused by either 
agreeing and or amending the contents for the coming actions. 
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demonstrated that I was not going to apply an autocratic and dictatorial approach, but rather 
allow individuals to take direct ownership and responsibility for their personal scorecards. This 
latter point is extremely important as I believe it underpins one of the major concerns leading 
to the agreed way of working. In subsequent sections, I critically reflect on and discuss both 
the three and nine month stages of the research, as well as the ultimate success of this 
particular approach and the lessons learned from it. 
(Engaging with the KPIS) After testing and analysing the performance results, root 
causes, and recovery reactions with the fours managers who attended, it proved possible for 
both the analysts and myself to obtain a preliminary understanding as to the degree of 
engagement which had taken place. We reasoned that in all probability, replication would 
occur in the remaining units, and we therefore believed that we would acquire a valuable 
insight into performance issues likely to be similarly discussed and addressed during the third 
reviews. On a personal note, I also appreciated that I was being provided with a valuable 
opportunity to test my own practitioner skills within the PR environment, and I decided to 
question the analysts in relation to my professional practice after the second cycle had been 
completed. I received the following response: 
"To begin with you had a habit of interrupting and jumping to assumptions before the 
manager talkedyou through it. I think it was due to you having discussed a similarproblem in 
a previous review and already [having] a good idea of what the problem was. So You told the 
manager without him coming to his own conclusions" (Source A2: 26 1h June 2001). 
On reflection, it would appear that this behaviour was due to my intense enthusiasm for the 
subject. I accepted that this contrasted with my previously discussed desire not to adopt an 
autocratic or dictatorial approach. If I had continued to act in such a manner, individuals may 
well have confinned my earlier fears and reverted to a back seat mentality in future PRs. 
When I asked for advice on how to change my approach it was recommended I support 
individuals to take responsibility for their actions during the PR. I simply needed to curb and 
control my enthusiasm by "letting them think through andputforward their own explanations 
and conclusions and... then test[ing] their reasoning" (Source 
A 1: 26h June 200 1). 
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I welcomed this as a valuable lesson, and continually monitored future reviews via the bi- 
monthly surveys. It is possible that I had inadvertently adopted this approach from the 
completed reviews to identify a number of engagement and performance trends and indicators. 
Prior to commencing, we had suspected that the full and varied basket of National UPBs 
would have dominated discussions. This proved not to be the case, with only the FTD and, as 
suspected, changes to the way mail remaining in the unit is measured (MIPP UPB), continuing 
to cause concern across various dimensions of the scorecard. I found myself thinking that from 
the level of discontent felt towards the UPBs during the workshop activities, I was lucky to 
only have two emerge as problems. This situation was to remain only for a limited period, 
when the inclusion of the remaining managers in the next PR cycle exposed additional issues 
regarding the Individual Performance Standards UPB, raising to three the number of UPBs 
causing interpretation, deployment, and/or operational problems. 
To provide structure and depth to the following discussions I have examined each of the BSC 
scorecard dimensions in-turn, referring wherever necessary to both the two UPBs of concern 
as well as the impact/trade off across the different performance dimensions. Firstly, across the 
shareholder KPIs' of the eight co-participating units, only three (of which one was 
participating in the reviews) had consistently achieved their MC KPIs over the two 
performance periods. Disappointingly, as the results became known it emerged that only one 
of these units who was not attending also additionally achieved its further WUC shareholder 
target. 
it is not possible to list all the underlying reasons why there was this level of performance. A 
mixture of reasons, which I believe was partially due to forward planning and forecasting 
inexperience (such as payment of allowances, annual leave carried over from the previous year 
and unforeseen annual leave due to new entrants) were cited as reasons for overspending. The 
following extracted examples from completed PRs illustrate the problems encountered, and the 
actions taken in response: 
Root Cause D(m, q Alompm - Rid hm lisl ýw v#8popls ý81 10 ý8 pid COSI 0S. 
Aoki Papris 10 ý8 MA 10 fmfk 
(Source M2 PR Document 19th June 2001) 
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Root Cause 3 Risk ofNL carry over to be quariffed by DOM. P weeks) 
Action 3 DOM 3 weeks to be taken in Period 4. Bring details to next review session. 
Root Cause 4 New starters leave has to be honoured which w1l aflect the calandensation of budget 
Ulion I DOM Retain local monitor of new entrants annual leave which wIl impinge on budget Seek opporlunrlies to realign to reduce effect on budqet 
(Source S3 PR Document 22nd June 2001) 
In the case of M2, no remedial action was considered necessary as the cause and action had 
already been identified. However, this was not the case with S3, where it was felt that further 
encouragement was necessary; supported by the analysts, he was required to revisit his 
manpower and identify not only the effect on his budget but also opportunities to resolve the 
problem. It was reasoned that by doing this he would not only have an increased awareness of 
the problem, but also ownership of the outcome. In turn, this would provide valuable 
forecasting experience which could be applied in the future. Bearing in mind it was the 
individual's first experience of forecasting, I was comparatively comfortable with the outcome. 
This, however, was not the case in all situations. As I reflected on the reviews, I realised that in 
one particular instance involving one of his (SYs) more experienced colleagues (M5), my 
comfort zone was less reassuring. I was aware of the managers' previously expressed need to 
be able to directly control or influence an outcome. I was therefore somewhat taken aback by 
the casual manner in which particular late overtime submissions were viewed as a reason for 
underperformance by a more experienced colleague. This was one particular area they were 
directly able to influence, but it appears this situation was viewed as the norm, and it was 
simply accepted that it was difficult to resolve and therefore likely to continue to reoccur. 
Consequently, this seemed to encourage the individual concerned to adopt a defensive stance 
and take what could only have been viewed as a simple and quick way out without questioning 
all the possible causes. I believe that M5 thought it unnecessary to question the practice of 
either himself or his staff, but deemed it acceptable to deflect blame onto the distribution 
(transport) operation, who forwarded the overtime documents and/or transaction services 
(personnel) who processed them after receipt. During the PR, the following reason for 
underperformance was put forward: 
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"I know they (overtime documents) arefilled out correctly as both me and (name removed) 
check them before we send them in. They (transaction services) don't know what thev arc 
looking at" (Source M5 26"' June 200 1) 
I am not saying at this early stage that this mindset is endemic across all units, as it is not 
possible to come to such a premature conclusion from the limited evidence. Nonetheless I do 
believe that this is likely to be observable in certain instances. For example, an individual may 
feel extremely protective of his operational procedures when the professional practice of either 
himself or his staff comes under scrutiny. This may lead individuals to embrace complacency 
and encourage them to adopt a similar manner if they believe that in by doing so their own 
worries will be reduced, and my attention will be deflected away from a particular issue or 
indeed the unit on a whole. 
It was clear to me as from the above comment and previous criticisms regarding my behaviour 
that I had inadvertently been dominating the discussions. Consequently, without realising it, I 
found myself proceeding in this manner, where as shown in the following extract, my 
attention, which should initially have focused on eliminating probable unit based causes, was 
in the first instance directed away from the unit and concentrated towards personnel. 
Root Cause SuHse Gq @d nop ý@ýment ý SA @d k; tIme - comcems pioblems 0 Itamction smEs 
Adon DOM An@lýsl ic ýqfess 0 Summ Gap SA vý Nýime, DOY lo 13n jemaill donation oblrRý 
ConlRct (in rmý @I Iramcliv mces 
(Source M5 PR Document 26h June 2001) 
At this early phase, I took this as another valuable lesson. This not only increased my 
awareness of the issue in future PR encounters, but also underlined the need for the full 
participation of the co-participants, coupled with focused questioning and reflection on both 
the underlying root causes as well as recovery actions taken. In adopting this constructive and 
proactive approach, I would be able to counter the possible re-emergence of the problem. I feel 
this will ensure that discussions are held whenever necessary, focussed on the correct area of 
underperformance. 
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Regarding unit specific issues, it was also possible to isolate from the discussions two 
interrelated problem areas, which, when considered across both the Shareholder and Employee 
KPIs, highlight the dilemma individuals experience when trade-offs, both within and outside 
the unit are encountered. To understand this further, it is first necessary to understand that a 
direct correlation exists between not only the achievements of sick targets but also budgetary 
performance, which I believe is in turn supported by two of the co-participating units 
achieving both. 
It was clear from the PRs that this was due to effective and sustained internal controls in 
relation to the National UPB attendance procedure, as well as support provided to encourage 
individuals back to work. In the case of the two units concerned, this had been firmly in place 
prior to the start of the financial year in the form of in-house and conference recommendations. 
Therefore, it would seem that they were experiencing the ongoing leading effect of previous 
successes. 
I believe this was less noticeable in the remainder of the units; although they had put into 
action the relevant conference recommendations, they were encountering the lagging effect, as 
improvements had not yet come to fruition. Consequently, the operational and measurement 
effect was that units incurred additional overtime costs covering for absentees or paying for 
additional staff until those on sick leave returned, while receiving no additional funding. 
Individuals accepted this situation only grudgingly. 
It was felt that the lead-time it took to actually agree that recruitment could progress, and 
subsequently train the individual concerned, was outside of their control and influence. I 
believe that individuals perceived their own units' request as a unique priority case, requiring 
the full attention of personnel involved in both recruitment and case conference activities, 
whereas in reality, these might be only one of many requests for action, and those relating to 
higher impact units were often taking precedence. 
This was one of the main reasons why there were strong feelings towards the experienced time 
delay. This was further compounded by the local employment market. Individuals expressed 
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reservations that this could attract unsuitable candidates who are selected due to a limited 
number of applications, and even if adequately supported and trained, could subsequently 
leave. These factors were perceived to be frustrating, having a major influence on the 
budgetary performance of the unit until recruitment requests had been meet, locking the unit 
into a continuous cycle of recruitment and overspending. Individuals were anxious that if the 
latter situation occurred, it would be difficult to break the cycle and they would ultimately be 
held accountable. 
However, the problem did not solely reside in encouraging individuals back to work as in most 
cases previous experience had shown that before the full range of duties could be resumed, a 
period of either reduced duties or rehabilitation was required. As previously suggested, this 
had a distinct trade-off of a reduction in sick absence, but no immediate reduction of 
expenditure, as both the individual concerned and the means of cover, which was not funded, 
would need to be paid for. Individuals viewed this in different ways. In a limited number of 
cases, light duties had been successfully recognised as a possible means to decrease 
expenditure by utilising the rehabilitation period to replace overtime or cover additional work. 
Conversely, some individuals had in previous cases contested the wisdom of using light duties, 
seeing it as an additional and unnecessary cost. There were concerns that sul 1 work was 'tab e 
not available at the time when these individuals could attend. In addition, it was believed that 
if non-regular staff were to undertake the tasks, they would be unable to achieve the required 
standards. As had happened previously, it was believed in the latter situation that additional 
costs would be incurred in resolving any mistakes. It is possible to gain an insight into the 
concerns expressed from the following recorded root cause: 
Root Cause I Li# Dufý 41.5 hours per week now covering indoor work (no spedc dutyý 
Wion I DOM Progress via Case Conference move to Citl or Stourlon 
(Source S3 PR 22 "d June 2001) 
believe some individuals felt that by following such an approach, the operational trade-off 
was unacceptable. Not only did it put additional strain on the unit in relation to finding suitably 
productive work, but resistance could be encountered both from individuals who had become 
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accustomed to light duties and did not want to revert to normal duties, or even staff facing the 
loss of overtime opportunities. 
It had been decided earlier that to address these concerns opportunities would be sought 
whenever possible to transfer these individuals temporarily to M2, the largest unit in the 
sector. The rationale for this centred on a number of reasons; individuals would want to return 
ASAP to their units, workload was always available in the unit, centralisation of duties would 
make management and control easier, and hours transferred from the units would centralised 
costs, making monitoring and control easier. 
I believe this was a major success regarding the agreement of trade-offs for the benefit of the 
overall sector, with all units up to this point realising individual beneficial outcomes. The 
solution was, however, not without its problems. I believe the previously discussed concerns 
simply encouraged some managers to take the easy option, as we saw from S3's request for 
individuals to be assigned to M2. As shown in the extract below, it was therefore felt by M2 
that the unit had reached saturation point, which was putting at risk both industrial relations 
and the current under spend, which had reduced from f4.2k to E0.4k. 
Root Cause Polept4 nO (IR and Cash) to tAe on mofe liýlhl d6es firn olhef units 
M2 to appfoach CWIJ ýnd qee use n uni - seek opoqunities to jtýýse addqmai staf to roducR/maintair existing spRnd lcli(ýIl 
r4 -cfii 
I III DOM to ldentý sd ýbsence incuRed fTm Imsfers hm olbei Aces. 
(Source M2 PR 19'h June 2001 
It was feared that staff in M2 were aware of the reduction and would attribute this to the 
additional staff from other units, a state of affairs which could be seen to threaten the units' 
monthly bonus payment and overtime earning potential. I realised this was a trade-off, 
considered favourable by those transferring the effect, but as the outcome became clear was 
seen by the recipients as less than favourable. 
In this instance, I realised that I had a difficult decision to make. I could not simply move 
everyone back to their parent units. I believed this would result 
in an increase In spending and 
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deterioration of sick attendance as managers could be less infused to encourage staff to return. 
I was encouraged that as a result of a proactive debate this was accepted by M2, who (as an 
extremely experienced colleague who had covered my own role on occasions) recognised that 
this might be the case, and that the needs of the sector, would in this instance have to take 
priority over his own unit. It was agreed that to reduce both staff and union concerns, M2 
would need to hold a meeting in his unit. I would support this by identifying missing transfer 
costs from infori-nation provided by M2, which could be use in the discussions to reduce 
concems. 
Although these are areas of both immediate shareholder and employee considerations with 
suitable fixes, a successful trade-off had been assigned. The topics which dominated and 
generated the most concern in relation to future budgetary and customer performance clearly 
centred on the FTD UPB project and the MIPP UPB, which changed the way mail was 
measured in the unit. I was soon to realise that in subsequent reviews, as individuals gained 
confidence and improved their understanding of the case and the effects of their actions (or 
inaction), these concerns were to extend quickly to all dimensions of the BSC. 
Concerning FTD, all units had a reduction in operating hours assigned from a particular week 
in line with expected operational changes. In progressing towards these deadlines, common 
reoccurring barriers appear to have emerged. These typically related to issues such as union 
resistance, waiting for equipment (vehicles, sorting frames) or unanswered deployment 
questions submitted to the Area or National project. The following extracts highlight the 
nature of the barriers encountered: 
Root Cause 2 Umble to enp stfin FTD - issues with Me@l Relief and feduction offullime duties which need vswepný 
Moo ýTl) Tevi Feedbck ýom FTD stage 4ý 
(Source S3 PR 22nd June 2001) 
Root Cause Convepnce proýlems is a resull of M hlýý on v6clRs s6duk for FTD rnýlemen! @Iion. 
Action DOM SOM 10 qpnoicln pjocl Ims "0 tý 10 ýesow blo6aps 
(Source M5 PR 26h June 2001) 
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I found myself in agreement, thinking that this was the first evidence encountered that the 
National UPBs had not been adequately planned, or that in some cases support had not been 
provided. I could argue that I was excluded from this criticism and defend myself by pointing 
out that I was not part of the project teams. This would, however, be inappropriate on my part. 
I have a direct responsibility as the senior line manager to ensure that projects are deployed, 
and a key part of this responsibility entails providing support and dealing with barriers. In this 
instance, I believe that I had clearly neglected my duty to maintain an awareness of potential 
problems. 
I recognised from the managers' reactions that the situation was becoming increasingly 
frustrating and discouraging, as it was felt that this would remain an ongoing issue hindering 
still further their ability to engage with and involve staff. It was believed that this would limit 
the extent to which individuals could actually progress and what they could achieve. In 
addition, I concurred that if these issues remained unresolved, deployment would slip beyond 
schedule, leading to a deterioration of budgetary performance. Reflecting back on the 
discussions held during both the exposure and deployment workshops, I concluded that this 
could lead to future control or influence arguments leading to increased feelings of non- 
accountability for any resulting performance beyond the planned budgets. I understood that I 
was in a difficult situation. I could not simply belittle the National project, which as a senior 
manager, I needed to be seen to actively and vocally support. Conversely, I was conscious that 
I needed to be seen by my team to be listening to their problems sympathetically, and it was 
my intention to actively back them up. 
As the following extract illustrates, I agreed that the best course of action would be for myself 
and the Area Union Representative to visit units experiencing problems, such as S3, to try to 
resolve the issue, and also for me to apply direct pressure on the project teams for questions to 
be answered and resolved. 
other Discussions: 
_p 
nL wil a M- F1D readions of sti and CWU in una - SOM has agled Lo take up wtLk ýarq ano annin - 11 also isot P*je pa ne I 
seek oppodudes to progress wherever possible 
LqyL quy ýkrýb 
(Source S3 PR 22nd June 2001) 
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explained to the relevant unit managers that in the meantime they had to seek opportunities to 
progress whenever possible. At the time I hoped that by following this approach we would 
reduce tensions and help free up and resolve any other problems which might subsequently 
arise in the remaining units. 
Looking at the results emerging from both the ADM and TO KPIs, it became apparent that 
little movement had occurred across the units. In discussions with the co-participants attending 
the reviews, it emerged that when managers encountered problems such as late mail or 
unforeseen volumes of mail from the mail centre, or indeed staffing problems in their own 
units, they faced a professional dilemma of whether to meet their TO or ADM targets. 
Individuals had found this an uncomfortable situation to deal with. Reflecting back on their 
experiences, managers acknowledged that they gave little consideration to the volume of 
letters handled, against the total number of items failing, or indeed the reason for the failure in 
the first place. Moreover, the letters concerned might have been delivered later that same 
morning. As a result, they believed their initial fears were confirmed; for two months the 
measurement focus regarding ADM was both confusing, and when considered together in their 
present states, not mutually supportive with TO striving for 95%, and ADM requiring 
perfection at 100%. Consequently, we viewed this increasingly as both unrealistic and 
unattainable, particularly when outside influences had prevailed. Disparities existed between 
perceived ownership and accountability in relation to the trade-offs they were required to 
decide upon. Examples of this are additional costs and failing customer targets, as well as a 
potential adverse reaction from employees in the EOS survey, due to the management 
preventing them from leaving on time in order to sort late arriving letters. 
As the analysts and I reflected on this situation, we realised that our initial concerns based on 
the outcome from four reviews were apparently being vindicated. We decided that the best 
course of action was to seek clarification from the remainder of the co-participants during the 
next set of reviews. If the same concerns emerged, we would utilise the National upward feed 
process to remedy the situation. 
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7.4 Three Months into BSC Usage 
At the outset of the third cycle of PRs, I had expected that of the eight co-participants who 
attended, the four who had already received supported through a PR would have come 
prepared, leaving the remaining four to be similarly guided through their first encounter. As 
we progressed through the various PRs, I was increasingly disappointed to see that this was not 
the case, as preparation had clearly been very limited. Having been previously criticised, I now 
intended to adjust my approach and allow individuals to take the lead. However, the desired 
result was not achieved due to the fact that some participants still displayed a reluctance to 
take a more active role. As a result, the analysts and I sometimes had to resort to taking the 
lead. I gained the impression that they would come in, sit there and just look at me; I found 
myself impatiently trying to get things moving, and before knew it I was doing it for them. 
Likewise, A2 felt that some individuals consciously or sub-consciously adopted an introvert 
approach, and consequently became more withdrawn. Nevertheless, there were others who felt 
confident in expressing their beliefs. It was reasoned that individuals who displayed 
confidence in rationalising the contents of the BSC had evidently taken time to prepare for the 
PR. On the other hand, those who lacked confidence in expressing themselves demonstrated a 
lack of preparation and understanding. As one explained: 
"I think the majority will come back and not have looked at this until the day before the 
meeting and [will] not really [have] done anything. However, there are certain managers that 
would take things away and do something about it because of theirfailing on their scorecard, 
where others think I've alwaysfailed- Ican't do anything about it now" (Sourcc A2). 
From the above, it can be seen that some individuals on returning to their unit become 
disillusioned or immediately preoccupied by their daily operational responsibilities. 
Subsequently, it is assumed that the PR is put to one side only to be retrieved shortly before it 
is required for the next review. A concern, which we believed was reflected in the lack of 
requests for assistance from the analysts. As Al tells us: 
it ... one thing 
I am surprised about is the amount of phone calls we don't get asking for 
assistance, I think they are not looking at the results or the scorecards. If I was a DOM, I 
would be right on thephone asking why this happenedso Ican sort it out" (Source AI). 
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There was nevertheless a conflict of opinion between AI and A2 regarding the explanation for 
this. According to Al, managers were not seeking any support whatsoever. However, 
according to A2, managers were seeking support from their peers rather than looking for 
assistance from the analysts. It was felt that historically, support was not easily accessible, 
meaning that individuals had no option but to seek support from each other, thereby 
encouraging them to take the aforementioned approach. In order to improve the situation, both 
analysts agreed that the best thing to do was to "get back out on the ground" (A2 July 2001) 
and personally visit the units. It was felt that this approach would raise the profile of the 
analysts by making them more easily accessible and approachable. It was hoped this would 
reduce chances of individuals, if they sought advice, returning with the same set of excuses. 
Earlier discussions have already identified in some depth the degree of engagement achieved 
across various performance dimensions. My intention in the following section is to draw upon 
and expand these findings to provide an additional interpretation. 
I believe that it is necessary for us to focus on a number of points raised by the PRs. Firstly, 
although one unit had performed less well, the remaining units were still achieving their RC 
targets, this suggested that previously positioned lagging impact (4-6 weeks) of new starters 
was yet to exert an influence on the remaining units' results. 
Wt Cause I New entrants haye generated repeat compl@lnts - possible increase ;n future before tralhnýsupporl kds in 
Wiwi DOM Continue coachlnýsqpM fof all new entiants - Leqef to customers efected ýiýhliqhtiq new postmin on deiyeq) 
Source (M2 PR 18 th July 2001) 
It was felt in all cases that this would not be a major problem as it was accepted that ownership 
was there, as remedial action (training/support) was under the direct control and influence of 
the managers, and performance would ultimately recover once these started to take effect. As 
Ml tells us, repeat complaints were different because 'we can actually go to an individual and 
do something about it' (Source M I). 
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I was also pleased to see that sick absence had remained fairly static. There was a similarly 
positive outlook for the second sequence of PRs in relation to supporting and Influencing a 
decline in both short (STS) and long-term sick (LTS) absence and in turn, an impending 
reduction in associated costs. 
It was similarly felt that the discretionary issuing of attendance stages at interviews, (which the 
co-participants were responsible for undertaking), should in time, reduce figures for both 
sickness categories. Previously expressed anxieties remained regarding suitable work being 
found to support additional light duties. From an ethical and business stance, it would be more 
beneficial if the period for which individuals remained on light duties was of limited duration, 
subject to regular review. This would prevent it from simply becoming an additional ongoing 
cost and would be the most suitable course of action to support those on LTS in returning to 
their full time duties. Based on recent experiences gained prior to and since the second cycle of 
reviews, however, it was understood that this could be a slow drawn out process. The 
prevailing sentiment was that 'sick absence isn't something you can solve... overnight' 
(Source S3). 
It emerged in the M2 PR (see overleaf) that the co-participants believed they were 
encountering delays in two particular areas of assistance provided by upstream support 
functions. The first related to inaccurate and late triggering of stages issued by personnel to the 
managers. The second, resulting from either the information contained in the stage or as an 
outcome of the interview conducted by the manager, involved in delays and lack of 
progression of medical referrals made by the co-participants to the medical specialist for 
advice and support. 
Root Cause I Discrepancy on stage issuing Stage 19 sent 5 issued 55 6% 
ActionDOM DOM to conhrm number of Stages issued. Stage 22 sent 1 issued 50% 
Stage 31 sent 1 issued 100% 
Root Cause 2 Transaction Services Wure to issue timely stages 
Action DOM Upward feed 
Root Cause 3 Long term sick 
Action POIJ Attend case conference and progress medical serverance where appropp . ate. 
Source (M2 PR 18'h July 200 1) 
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In instances when this had occurred, managers expressed feelings of despair, frustration, and 
annoyance. As a consequence. it was believed that they had missed opportunities to support 
and encourage individuals back to work, or alternatively terminate employment or look to 
other solutions such as a medical severance or ill health retirement. Reflecting on the situation. 
I was reminded of my previous encounter with M5, when he had attempted to deflect my 
attention away from the unit as he appeared to be doing once more. I was aware that oil tills 
occasion, however, he was supported by M2 (my most experienced manager) and also tile 
analysts, who. believed problems existed upstream, where 'transaction services jpei-sonncl 
were] not reacting quickly enough' (Sources A I). 
Consequently, as recorded in M2's PR and shown in the upward lecd request bclow, we 
agreed that the units would correlate the infon-nation. We also agreed that I would use this in 
conjunction with the analysts' pay concerns as upward fleed to improve the support provided. 
Items for upward feed 
iý jýta rý-, i n, Slaqfý i- jed -upward feed to transactJon SOrlAcOs 
Source (M2 PR 18 th July 2001) 
In addition, I was conscious that managers had an important role to play in ensuring that 
information regarding transaction services was correct, and that actions arising froill the 
conferences were being honoured. I reasoned that the formal consideration would be addressed 
by the unit review. This left the latter case, were it was felt that tile best course ofaction was 
for managers from units experiencing problems to accompany tile at the case coni'crcticc. I was 
encouraged that this approach was deemed acceptable by the co-parucipants, as it would [lot 
only speed up individual case progression for both the manager and medical experts, but also 
help to remove inter-personal barriers between the case and unit managers. By taking this 
approach, the co-participants indicated that they were willing to become involvc(I in resolving 
situations: 
"... because in the past there's been return to work iniervicit-s... andstagcs that have nei-cr 
ever been accurate. I don't knou, vvh ,V 
but liv alwa. "s clain, that wc've done them and thel, 
(personnel function) always claim that we haven't " (Source M2). 
232 
I believe in instances where this support was forthcoming, the benefits derived from 
supporting individuals back to work, and subsequently reducing associated costs, were clear. 
In the interim since the second review cycle, it was encouraging to see that co-participants had 
taken my advice. Rather than simply moving light duties to M4 or allowing them to attend 
during less productive periods, they were now utilising them at peak operational times within 
their units. This is evident from the following PR extracts: 
I Root Cause I L# ýNs covenq Pkindion UPB 80 tef wA fo supoq un .t 
Source (S3 PR 17 th July 2001) 
Root Cause 13 Lght Duties I until end of Julý and 2 until end of Augusl. 
Action DOM Assisting kh New entrams should help reduce leavers). Time Out, and Redirection JP8 
Source (M5 PR 19 th July 200 1) 
I believe that this approach was an indication of their capability and willingness to take a much 
wider perspective in relation to cause and effect, along with the associated trade-offs within 
and across units resulting from earlier decisions. 
At a unit level, I believe that by using employees in this manner, they taken steps to reduce 
unforeseen overtime costs associated with additional workload. They also recognised 
opportunities to utilise this additional resources to provide any necessary additional support to 
new entrants at no cost. Besides leading to a cost/sickness reduction, the simple process of 
providing support for new entrants will, if controlled effectively, prove widely beneficial 
across a number of KPI dimensions. Firstly, after receiving support, it was believed that 
individuals would be more likely to complete the sorting on their duty in the allocated time. 
This would additionally allow for the extraction and reallocation back to other duties of' mis- 
sorts received before delivering the letters at the assigned departure time. It was felt that 
improvements would be realised across both the TO and ADM delivered Customer KPIs, but 
also that quality would improve subsequently and customer complaints relating to time of 
delivery and mis-delivery would be reduced. In addition, from our discussions it seems the co- 
participants had realised that after receiving the support, individuals would be less inclined to 
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I 
call in sick or leave the business prematurely, and the memory of the experience would 
encourage them to respond positively within the Employee EOS survey. 
I was pleased the opportunity to reduce the number of leavers was recognised. I realised this 
would significantly reduce pressure on an already stretched personnel recruitment process. 
Furthermore, I was also aware that this would help managers address previous concerns by 
removing them from what had been viewed as a 'frustrating' process of recruitment and 
interviewing. Additionally, by reducing requests for M2 to utilise light duties in his unit, 
colleagues recognised the barriers he was encountering, which along with my drive to transfer 
previous costs, enabled M2 to elevate the concerns of his staff. We recognised that although 
this was too late for the recently completed survey, it would prepare M2 for the meeting by 
providing suitable areas for discussion and agreement with staff. 
Root Cause 2 Long term sick transfets impact on budget cunnitly 1%- reficed requests coming through 
Actloii SOM DOM SOM to ensure Iransfers happen and variance reconled for end of par discussions PONUS) - maintain existing levels to maintain ERIR 
Source (M2 PR 18'h July 200 1) 
it was not possible to focus attention onto the impending EOS results as areas of concern 
where not 'evident' (Al, July 2001). However, in discussions individuals did express anxiety 
regarding the credibility of the results: 
"I don't give a lot of credence to the EOS scores to be honest... I think ... the , 
Cre not top (? f 
the charts in terms of my priorities, in the sense that ýf they were a genuine r(., fl('(-fion cverv 
time, yeah, I'd give a lot of credence to them, but I don't think they are - (Source M I). 
I was previously aware from the exposure workshop (see p. 150) of the probable existence of' 
this mindset. It was apparent from my interaction with my team that feelings of' unrest existed. 
As previously suspected, they believed employees would see the survey as an easy opportunity 
to express their discontent with their ongoing encounters with National (FTD/MIPP/IPS) 
initiatives by simply responding negatively to unit managers, despite them having no overall 
direct project control or influence. In addition, greater unease was felt with regard to the 
simple undertaking of their daily responsibilities, such as applying and embedding normal 
(operational/attendance/conduct) standards. As S I's comment below illustrates, concerns were 
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mounting regarding the impending results, as it was believed that a strong reactive culture was 
in existence, where some unscrupulous employees might take a similar stance, in the hope of 
changing managerial behaviour and influencing the outcome in their favour. 
"Well there's mails cost, and there ýy the FYD, sick absence... probably... the EOS, fairness of 
line manager, because... ifyou get, ifyou're issuing stages to people, the chances are they're 
not going to give you good EOS marking" (Source S 1). 
It would appear from the responses of the co-participants that this is clearly of great concern to 
the managers. From the reaction of the co-participants concerned there appears to be 
widespread fear that individual performance may in itself come under scrutiny. Subsequently it 
was felt that the results might be viewed in isolation with little thought for the underlying 
cause, which may in fact be related to the business itself. This led one individual to level 
criticism at the upper management levels: 
"Does London [the Headquarters] understand the difficulties that we are facing? "(Source 
A3). 
Reflecting on the nature of the suggested difficulties, I realised that there were two main (or 
basic? ) difficulties. The first centred on a strong belief that employees had become 
increasingly discouraged as the year progressed. Subsequently, employees were likely to vent 
this frustration by responding negatively in the pending EOS surveys. The results of the second 
PRs suggested that this was particularly true with regard to FTD. Here for example, the 
planned removal of 600hrs 1/6th of the operational budget in M3 and the reduction of full time 
duties from 27 to 15 in S3 was hindering progress. Therefore, this generated the following 
reactions from the co-participants: 
"I mean the attitude that I got back [sic] from them fstafj] was... they didn't seem to care" 
(Source Sl). 
"And now we've gone to FTD which I don't reallyfeel... is FTD. I think again we're giving 
the customers a disservice, which is switching off employees because we're taking time out of 
their duties and we're reducing duties to part time. Ais is then causing unrest " (Source M3). 
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As recorded below, MI highlighted that this had been an ongoing issue not only with the FTD 
planners, but also in discussions with staff who felt the business was simply not listening to 
their concerns and anxieties. It was agreed that as well as my intervention in relation to my 
previous commitment (period 2), 1 would meet with the FTD planners. Additional courses of 
action would be required, but their exact focus would need to be agreed upon once unit 
specific EOS results are known. 
Rom Cause 1 Stat diss appointment in Business promises 
Remedial Acton Pursue action plans and listening sessions fo0owng issue of results by SOM at sector meeting. 24th July 2001. 
Source (MI PR 25h July 2001) 
From previous discussions, it becomes apparent that the degree of enthusiasm felt towards a 
KPI is dependant on the level of control and influence which individuals felt that they had. In 
the case of the SICK and RC, I believe that although an improvement in performance cannot 
yet be observed due to the lagging effect, the outlook for the future would appear to be 
positive. Regarding EOS, however, in instances where they believe they can exert an influence 
I suspect that this may well be undermined by other factors on the national level, which they 
consider to be outside of their control. I was interested in trying to understand why individuals 
might feel the way they did, and how this influenced their attitude towards the remainder of the 
set targets. To do this, it is first necessary to consider the deployment workshop. It was felt that 
from the experience gained since the workshop, the number of under performing targets an 
individual had to focus on as well as their degree of difficulty, was a major motivational factor. 
In discussions with MI, who had entered the financial year and had already achieved four of 
his seven targets, it was stated that: 
"Out of the targets that I've been set, I've got at least 2 which I maybe don't even have to look 
at because I knowfor a. /act that we are going to achieve that target - (Source M4). 
In this instance, he believed that he should have had more challenging targets. It is interesting 
to consider whether he would have retained this mindset if he had not been in such a 
successful position, unlike his colleagues who had a greater number of under performing 
targets to concentrate on. I found myself particularly drawn to M4's personal view that when 
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individuals have their targets confirmed, they must believe at the outset that they are both 
achievable and realistic. If this is not the case, individuals may be encouraged to switch off and 
not even try to achieve them. Interestingly, another colleague, who was under achieving, 
supported this by admitting that 'if you can't achieve [a] target, then you just ignore it and go 
[onto] something else' (Source M3). I needed to explore this in greater depth. We could see 
that individuals did not just want easy targets. On the contrary, they wanted challenging yet 
realistic targets, where they could exercise direct control and influence. I believe the following 
opinions express this view: 
"I don't think we should be given easy objectives, I think we should be given achievable 
objectives. Aere's a difference between easy and achievable " (Source M3). 
"My view of .. achievable is that I can actually control the outcome of that particular area of 
development ... if it's not in my control, then the target's irrelevant to me because I can't 
control what's happened" (Source M4). 
As I reflected on my interaction with the co-participants, it was evident that throughout both 
the PRs and data collection the behaviour of individuals was extremely task orientated, and 
they took immense pride in their performance, achievements and how others perceived them as 
managers. As one put it, 'because... of my job, you know... I want to be a success' (Source: 
SI). 
Consequently, I believe individuals are self-conscious that if they work towards achieving all 
the set targets, they may achieve relatively few of them. The initial findings would suggest that 
individuals might be encouraged to focus on those targets which are achievable, as opposed to 
those which are not. The following views fiirther support this: 
"Because people willfocus on the ones that they think they can achieve rather than the ones 
that they can't" (Source M4). 
"I think it's an attitude, if you have a target that's achievable... [this] in turn makes you 
motivated" (Source: M3). 
"It's one of those things where they shrug their shoulders and think 'well we can't achieve 
it"' (Source A2). 
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I believe this was clearly the case with both the Sick and RC KPIs, which encouraged a greater 
level of focus due to the perception of a high degree of personal influence and control. 
However, I consider this not to have been the case across the TO or ADM KPIs, or indeed 
either the FTD or Individual Performance (sorting) standards National UPBs. These were 
recognised nationally as important enablers, but increasingly problematic at the local level due 
to increasing cultural resistance and deployment barriers. As previously occurred during the 
2 nd review cycle, it was felt that these were beyond the direct influence of the individual, with 
particular concerns expressed around the FTD targets, which it was felt had been simply 
imposed and overlaid against the issued budget. Consequently, the analysts believed that as 
deployment dates approached and subsequently passed with no deployment achieved, 
individuals increasingly took the view that: 
"... [the managers are] resigned to thefact there's nothing they can do about it. Yhey have no 
input in the setting of the (FTD reduction) budget" (Source Al). 
I realised that the commitment I had made during period two to move the projects forward was 
becoming increasingly important. As I reflected on the situation, I was hopeful that some 
movement would shortly materialise through the involvement of both the Area Union 
representative and myself in meetings at an area project level. I hoped these meetings would 
address my won concerns and those of the analysts and co-participants. 
There was similar frustration over the workshop activities and also the drive to introduce 
sorting standards into units. I gained the impression that individuals were acutely aware of the 
potential benefits from this initiative across both the ADM and TO KPI's, but could not 
comprehend why such an initiative would be deployed without first setting out and agreeing 
the standards with the unions (see footnote 15 overleaO. 
As a result similar to FTD, co-participants cited both cultural and union resistance as reasons 
for delays and the lack of progress. I accepted that this might be the case from my own 
discussions with the Area representative and agreed to revisit the subject with him again. I was 
unsuccessful in this case, however, as there was a reluctance to compromise the 
National 
union bargaining position by agreeing local standards with the co-participants and myself. 
The 
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co-participants believed this was a further instance whereby the business was deploying 
initiatives which were not fit for their perceived purpose to support both the TO and ADM 
KPIs. Although I did not realise it at the time, this was a stance which was to remain as a 
barrier for a number of years, and as such, highlights the deep-rooted resistance encountered 
which continues to this day in Royal Mail. 
As previously discussed, it had been my intention as part of the third sequence of reviews to 
test the original concerns, which emerged in relation to both the ADM and TO performance 
dimensions. I was not surprised that similar issues relating to both the relevance and 
achievement of the targets alongside personal ownership and accountability resurfaced as 
issues for debate. In addition, I became increasingly aware that further issues, such as staff 
despondency, fiirther compounded this problem (see footnote 16 overleao. 
In such instances, it was felt this was a direct reaction to the frustration felt by staff over the 
FTD project, which led to a further increase in expenditure to complete the effected deliveries 
and exerted additional pressure for the achievement of the ADM and TO performance targets. 
As a consequence of the varying situations encountered, it was felt again that the targets were 
not relative to one another. This led M5 to admit: 
"It's one target that I'm probably not going to be too focused on, because I know it's 
unachievable in this present climate with cut-offs and things like that " (Source M5). 
On completion of the reviews, I decided to re-examine the situation with the analysts, who 
similarly felt that the position was untenable under the circumstances. As one analyst 
explained: 
the number of expected letters an employee was to sort in 
a minute and maintain until s/he had completed their allotted sorting responsibilities. At the time of the research, no agreed 
standards existed, with employees sorting at vastly different rates. Differential sorting rates could be attributed to their frame 
of mind at the time. As such, managers had little opportunity or ability to effectively take up a challenge. 
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"100% all due mail delivered is not achievable 100% of the time. Achieving a budget where 
we've taken out 10% of their [FTD] work hours is not achievable with traffic growing the way 
it is " (Source A2). 
This was not the only problem we where now encountenng. The measurement focus was 
raising worrying questions, and it was not unusual to hear individuals claim that: 
"On all due delivery we're not even sure what the measure is. It was only yesterda, v we 
realised the measure wasn't what we thought it was " (Source AI). 
We had previously suspected this might be the case during the second review cycle, and had 
already decided that in conjunction with the analysts, I would need to take this up urgently via 
the National upward feed process (see MI performance extract overleaO. 
Root Cause 3 Inaccurate reporting due to mis-understanding of measure. 
Action SOM To check the robustness of the current reporting system. 
Source (MI PR 25h July 2001) 
on completion of the third review cycle, I found myself thinking back to the additional actions 
to emerge from the BSC sign-off back in March 2001.1 had believed prior to the period, 
during which I was only able to review 4 units, that I had made a fundamental mistake by not 
checking the additional suggestions had been actually included on the scorecards. However, as 
I went through the scorecards in detail during period three, I noticed that in the majority of 
cases individuals had resorted to similar actions in response to problems. This suggested to me 
that, as had been the case during the workshops, they felt more comfortable resorting to local 
Footnote 16. In certain instances, employees took the stance that they would not work beyond their designated duty time.,;. 
Therefore, if they left late or had what they felt was an excessive volume of mail, they would only agree to take what they 
claimed they could deliver. It was difficult for management to control the situation 
if more that one individual wanted to cut 
off. The reason for this is that with limited management resources available 
it would be unfeasible to meet all requested cut 
offs at the end of the duty hours to assess the situation. 
Also, if staff where accompanied by management to check the 
situation, staff would simply perform the 
duty in a way that would support their claimsý for example, by shutting all gates to 
extend the time it takes. However, if the manager 
had not attended, it is unlikely that this would have been the case. In such 
cases, the management's hands were tied, as employment 
law stated that individuals could not be forced to work overtime, 
and internal agreements did not sufficiently address the problem. 
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actions than relying on national initiatives. I believe the issue of personal control and influence 
had a major part to play in this regard. I also realised that once National Projects had been 
deployed, local actions in the majority of cases took over, underpinning their successful 
deployment. 
This was not the only problem we where now encountering. The measurement focus was 
raising worrying questions whereby it was felt that: 
"On all due delivery we're not even sure what the measure is. It was only yesterday we 
realised the measure wasn't what we thought it was " (Source A I). 
We had previous suspected this might be the case during the second review cycle, and had 
already decided that in conjunction with the analysts, I would need (as shown in MI 
perfonnance extract), to take this up urgently via the National upward feed process. 
Root Cause 3 Inaccurate reporling due to mis-understanding of measure. 
ýCtioll SUM To check the robustness of the current reporting system. 
Source (M I PR 25 th July 2001) 
On completion of the third review cycle, I found myself reflecting back onto the additional 
actions emerging from the BSC sign-off back in March 2001.1 had believed prior to the period 
during which I was only able to review 4 units, that I had made a fundamental mistake by not 
checking that the additional suggested actions had been actually included on the scorecards. 
However, as I went through the scorecards in detail at period three, I noticed that in the 
majority of cases individuals had resorted to similar actions to address problerns. This 
suggested to me that as was the case during the workshops, they felt more comfortable 
resorting to local actions in preference to national initiatives. I believe the issue of personal 
control and influence had a major part to play in this regard. I also realised that once National 
Projects had been deployed, local actions in the majority of cases took over, underpinning their 
successful deployment. 
7.5 Nine Months into BSC Usage 
I had hoped that by this stage individuals would actively lead and participate in the PRs. This 
hope was based on the reasoning that they had participated in several of them previously. In 
addition, they had also engaged in a fair amount of preparatory training. It became evident, 
however, that this was not the case. I only noted a marginal improvement in a little over half of 
the co-participants who had undertaken any groundwork. I believe the remainder were 
subconsciously distracted by their day job and/or consciously assigning the BSC to a drawer 
only to find that as the review day approached, they were inadequately prepared. 
Consequently, they found themselves yet again having to resort to phoning the analysts the day 
before, who noted that: 
"nat really worries me, now that we've got thisfar [is that] DOM's [are] ringing up the day 
before the review asking me what they need to do, and that's frightening. And that is 60% of 
them " (Source AI). 
This was a disappointing outcome as we had anticipated that the support which was provided 
in the intervening period would have sufficiently addressed this problem. However, it was 
evident when this support was provided that individuals were ill prepared for the visits we 
made; they were unable to locate performance information and provide details of their actions, 
along with the impact they were likely to have. Consequently, they were unable to put 
themselves in a position to actively participate in the meeting and were easily distracted, some 
of them even requesting that the meeting be adjourned or re-scheduled. As a result, there was 
very little evidence that they had either used the encounter to prepare for the coming review, or 
indeed, adjusted their efforts to make improvements within their units as a consequence of the 
meeting. We believed a familiar situation was being encountered, whereby previously 
discussed operational and behavioural distractions were re-surfacing. This situation prevailed 
in the majority of cases, and was mistakenly seen as a personal failure on the part of the 
analysts and myself. As Al revealed: 
"My intention has been to train them sufficiently, lead them out in the operation so that they 
can [review and update the BSC] by themselves [without my guidance] within a year. 
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However, I couldn't leave them... to their own devises, because... from what I see [they 
simply] can't (or won't) do it" (Source AI). 
As a consequence, the phone call for help would inevitably arrive. I was intrigued to know 
why we had received so few requests for support between the reviews, and also why the 
support which was provided through visits to the unit had so little impact. 
I was therefore surprised to learn that the support which had been provided was widely 
perceived to be 'reactive, ' rather than more ýproactive' as anticipated by the analysts and 
myself (M4,2001). 1 consider the reason for this to lie in the earlier experiences of many 
individuals with performance management. When previous senior managers arrived at a unit to 
deal with a performance related issue, it would appear to have been normal for them to hold 
the managers to account with either very limited support and encouragement, or none 
whatsoever. Consequently, we were encountering a deeply rooted emotional barrier which 
meant that in spite of the agreed behavioural way of working being recognised as an important 
addition to performance management, there remained some lingering mistrust: 
"I like the statement actually, it's afresh approach that we've never been used to before, 
there's always been this element of 'them' (senior management) and 'us, ' the cloak and 
dagger um [sic] approach " (Source M3) 
Accordingly, I believe that individuals may have unconsciously responded to our presence by 
reverting to a familiar defensive posture. As a result, a covert approach was adopted as they 
6 sometimes [found it] hard to realise that [they] were in a new environment' (Source S 1). 
I believe that in situations such as these, individuals were encouraged to fall back on the 
informal networking contacts they had established previously with their operational 
colleagues. As M3 explains; 
"I think more experienced managers tend to know their problems and they tend to know the 
appropriate people to ring to resolve their problems. So theyhave their own support" (Source 
M3). 
I decided to approach the subject of the relevance of performance management during the 
second interview stage. All interviewees readily and positively accepted 
both the BSC and PR 
as a scheduled activity and acknowledged that it 
helped them in their operational tasks, in spite 
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of the fact that it was a distraction from their dayjobs. This was supported by a senior opinion- 
former within the co-participants, who claimed that: 
"... everyone's quite happy with the type of approach that has been adopted and they're 
probably quite happy that we actually focusing on specific areas, and that give's them 
uniformity in what we're doing" (Source M2). 
When asked the same question, the analysts agreed that the approach 'makes (managers] more 
focussed on things. [It] doesn't necessarily help them deliver, but it focuses them' (Source 
Al). Taking both sets of views into consideration, I believe that it was widely accepted that we 
had been focusing on the right areas, but still had some ground to cover with regard to 
following it through to support a noticeable improvement in actual performance. It is possible 
for us to speculate as to why this might be the case in relation to practitioner activities if we 
considering the following statements: 
"Wellfirstly the DOMs aren'tprogressing and getting to the end of the action " (Source M2). 
"We have not been specific enough in [our] actions and [timescales] deadlines " (Source A2). 
"Actions [are] not being actioned [sic] " (Source Al). 
In instances where preparatory work had been undertaken, it was believed by A2 that an 
improvement in terms of both comprehension and capability could be observed during the 
intervening period between the third and ninth review. However, it was felt that in the majority 
of cases the co-participants 'understood the why, why, why but weren't so good in coming up 
with remedial action" (Source A2). 
As I reflected on the preceding comment and considered my own experiences of interaction 
with the co-participants, I found myself agreeing with the analysts. I had previously been 
criticised on two occasions for jumping in and leading the reviews, and had therefore made a 
conscious effort to address this. Nevertheless, I realised that 
from time to time it was entirely 
necessary to adopt this direct approach with those who were not prepared. 
In the case of those 
who were, my intervention in the majority of cases was restricted to the 
identification and 
clarification of improvement actions and subsequent 
forecasting. When I approached the 
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analysts as to why this might the be the case, they suggested that the reason why individuals 
inadvertently concentrated on root causes over their actions resided in both their constant close 
proximity to the problems and an inherent desire for self-preservation. As AI tell us: 
"I think initially they came up with lots and lots of things... they thought they had to justify 
themselves because Ijust think, historically that's what they've always done" (Source AI). 
Consequently, individuals appeared to become pre-occupied once the results became known 
with trying to understand and explain away reasons behind the performance gaps. We believed 
that this course of action was taken by some individuals because they felt uncomfortable, and 
were reluctant to find themselves in a position in which they would have to commit to a 
definite improvement opportunity, based purely on their own assumptions. It appeared to the 
analysts and I that this stretched some of the co-participants' comfort zones and as such, they 
turned to us to identify both the action and subsequent effect. This clearly raised doubts about 
the extent to which they would feel accountable and responsible for the proceedings. I believe 
the situation (particularly evident amongst less experienced colleagues) was compounded by 
difficulties experienced from being unable to link with any degree of accuracy a performance 
result to either an underlying cause, or an improvement activity. As Al explains, "7hey can't 
quantify as a result ofwhat they have done, or want to do, how or why an action has improved 
or could improve performance" (Source A 1). 
This situation was not confined to discreet performance KPIs. As suspected, the problem was 
vastly replicated across the various performance dimensions, with limited evidence emerging 
to suggest how we could accurately quantify how performance results and actions undertaken 
in one KPI would exert an influence across the remaining KPI dimensions. As one individual 
stated: 
"I know that bringing staff back on light duties will reduce my sick [absence] but I can't say 
at this stage how it will improve either time out or all due mail" (Source S3). 
I reflected back on the third review cycle and the cornmitrnent of co-participants to reduce sick 
and MC expenditure reduction opportunities. As mentioned earlier, these comprised of light 
duties, involvement in case conferences, issuing stages and improving cross-functional 
relationships with personnel. At the time I agreed with S3 when he stated that the problem of 
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"sick absence is not solved overnight" (seep. 231). It was evident that there was a time lag in 
the effects of employee sick leave. In spite of this, a positive outcome was foreseen due to the 
level of influence and control perceived to be in existence (see p. 236). Consequently, I had 
expected to see some level of improvement, but realised that in this case, S3's reservations had 
been correct. 
It was evident that the degree of influence and control exerted by the co-participants was 
limited. Consequently, only three of the eight units achieved the absence KPI. This marked a 
marginal improvement of only one unit since the third cycle, leading one of the under 
performing co-participants to comment that: 
"I suppose currently the biggest concern I've got is that the actions that we're taking on sick 
leave don't result in a reduction ofsick leave at the moment - (Source M I). 
Taking the above into consideration, I believe that a positive sick performance, which if 
underpinned by a successful deployment of the improvement actions mentioned above, will 
have a corresponding positive effect on MC expenditure. 
In coming to this conclusion, I am aware that some of the co-participants continued to hold 
personnel responsible for the late attendance stages and delays in the (medical) case 
conference process. However, the fact remains that three units achieved their targets. 
Therefore, I believe a constant proactive approach does achieve a positive outcome. This was 
achieved by focusing not only on those actions which you can influence, but also targeting 
those which you can't by seeking solutions to limit any adverse impact. It is possible to 
demonstrate this in the following PR extract where support is provided to personnel to ensure 
that attendance stages arrive to time. 
Action DOM I monitor and action stages as necessary (inform personnal when stages are due) 
Root Cause 22 long term sick 
Nciion DOM 2 Two members of staff irwaiting RTU interviews - w1l visit at home to support 
= still awaiting a EHS oppoirtment 
Source: M4 PR Jan 2002 
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I base my reasoning behind the cumulative performance of two units (M4 and S2), each of 
which, as highlighted in appendix six, consistently achieved their quarterly targets across both 
dimensions over the nine month period. 
I was also encouraged to note that M2 expenditure in relation to MS performance by the third 
quarter had recovered. This was partly due to refunds of medical severance, along with 
successes associated with cost transfers linked to employees on light duties taken on from 
other units. I believe that these light duties were managed effectively. In contrast, the cases of 
the remaining five units lead me to conclude that levels of control and deployment there were 
less effective. This further contributed to the adverse sick performance observed. 
It would be incorrect on my part to solely attribute MC expenditure to sick performance, as at 
this stage I believe it is only one of the two major influences I have encountered. I consider the 
other topic of discussion to clearly reside in the area of FTD, which I intend to expand upon in 
later discussions. Firstly, it is necessary to position a sequence of inter-related cause and effect 
occurrences. I believe these to be influenced not only by FTD and sick absence but also by 
operational influences, both internal and external to the unit. My reasoning behind this is that I 
have become increasingly aware that they formed the ever present cortex of behavioural or 
practitioner triggers encountered by the co-participants. 
I propose that the level of sickness in a unit has a direct impact on employee motivation and 
subsequent behaviour. The reviews have shown that regardless of whether high or low levels 
of sickness exist, there will always be staff turnover, and therefore always a need for 
recruitment, which can, as shown, take some time to be fulfilled I do however feel that high 
levels of sickness will inadvertently put additional strain on recruitment due to a resulting 
increase in the turnover of staff, which the existing reserves (based on covering annual leave 
and normal sick levels) will be unable to compensate for. Consequently, those managers 
whose units experience high levels of sickness increasingly find themselves having to rcly on 
the good will of staff to keep their units operating effectively. I would question, therefore, their 
ability to even manage effectively when faced with later and/or 
increased unforeseen volumes 
of traffic, which may require even greater efforts 
from the staff. In an already overstretched 
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service made worse by high sickness levels, a culture has emerged whereby it is assumed by 
the management that the good will of workers can always be relied upon. I believe that during 
the period of research the co-participants have come to realise that this is not the case. In 
reality, when good will is so consistently depended upon there is inevitably an adverse reaction 
amongst employees, leading increasingly to de-motivation and displays of defiance, such as 
resistance to change (FTD) and cut offs (see footnote 16 on p. 240). 
In contrast, managers not faced with the problem of high sickness levels may find that they 
only rarely have to rely on the good will of their staff. Employees in such cases are likely to be 
more highly motivated and less hostile to change, and consequently more willing to put in 
additional effort for their managers when it is required of them. I believe my assumptions are 
vindicated by the fact that those units (S2, M4 and M2) which displayed low levels of sickness 
seldom experienced instances of employees cutting off. 
I believe from the discussions, in light of both the TO and ADM results along with the 
manpower, operational and cultural issues encountered, it is plausible that I could have 
expected a corresponding adverse impact on the remaining RC customer KPI (see p. 200). 1 
was therefore surprised that this proved not to be the case, as all units, with only one exception 
(see appendix six) achieved the repeat complaint target over the entire nine month period. In 
discussions with the co-participants, similar concerns were expressed. 
As previously suggested, co-participants believed that they had only been able to exert an 
influence on the complaints for which they felt directly responsible and could control. I was 
encouraged to note that in the majority of cases previously discussed actions had been applied, 
supported when necessary by direct coaching and "counselling for individuals" (MI) who 
continued to generate complaints. In addition, I had cascaded M2's best practice into delivery 
units to underpin the results that had been achieved. I believe the results would clearly confirm 
the success of these actions. In the majority of initial complaint cases, the problems resulting 
from the number of new and employees cutting off appear to have been remedied before 
customers found it necessary to register a further complaint. 
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As the extract below illustrates, however, we should not assume that the majority of 
complaints were made in response to mis-delivery and redirection problems. 
Root Cause 1 0:, 15 i COýAp' 4`NT LCC- SH)lh 1 REPE-T 4PPIONG, SAME [1,4' 4S OPIGINAL HYPý', - 
RemediW Action Implementing Gatwick best practice - local UPEl 6 misdelivery 
STILL NEEDS EMBEDDING To DISCUSS AT 121.1 time of delivery 
9 redirection 
9 other 
Source: M3 PR Jan 2002 
I believe that the continuously poor TO and ADM results, as previously suggested (see p. 200), 
increased the likelihood of complaints related to late receipt of mail. 
I accepted that it was not possible to hold the delivery office directly responsible for lost 
letters, as mail can be held up at any number of places in the operational pipeline. 
Consequently, it was argued that in these instances it was out of the direct control of the 
individual. The situation frequently arose throughout the year whereby late or unforeseen 
volumes of mail continued to arrive from the Mail Centre. In these instances, where a failure 
occurred outside the delivery office, experience had shown that the power of those within the 
office to deal with the situation was reduced. It was argued by the co-participants that over the 
year this had had an impact on their ability to achieve both the TO and ADM. As one 
explained: 
"I getfed up as there is only so much we can do when we gel late fraffic orsful' - on W lit d 't 
expectfrom Mail Centre, it happens all the time. I have to sort the mess out when it happens 
and I get penalise. " (Source M3). 
Reflecting upon the effect this had had across the BSC, I realised that although the customer 
KPI regarding internal operational time out was affected, it was not, as M3s PR clearly shows, 
being reflected in the number of complaints about late receipt of mail. Therefore, either the 
majority of customers where not concerned about the time it took for them to receive their 
post, bringing into question the delivery specification in existence at the time, or the integrity 
of the results as show in the following extract need to be questioned. (see footnote 17 overleaf) 
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Comments DOM questioned accuracy of reported results that he had no repeat complaints - he have had at least 3 in the last month 
Period 9 actuaý, : ooks to be correct 
N, 'IYI Integrity Df ýesul'E to ce checked with Area A4ysf 
Source: M5 PR Jan 2002 
I reflected on both the results and the contents of M3s PR in relation to the delays being 
experienced with regard to embedding best practice. I was of the opinion that in some 
instances, some of the co-participants were in some doubt as to the rationale for me 
questioning positive results, especially when this was seen as something which created new 
and unnecessary work. 
From experience it was also believed that when underperformance is discussed, or when 
additional opportunities regarding ftirther savings have been mentioned, reactions are often 
defensive and impartial. The impression gained by both the analysts and myself is exemplified 
in the following comment: 
"Aey've never offered up intricate details about their operation, the 'v onl 'y want you 
to 
see[the] top level and the rest doesn't concern you, and they're not voluntary going to q/ fýr 
anything up " (Source A I). 
Consequently, it was felt that individuals either displayed a reluctance to have their operation 
subjected to close scrutiny, as this could expose operational and practitioner shortcomings, or 
reveal savings opportunities they would otherwise not have divulged. In the context of the 
previous discussions, I have highlighted numerous instances where I believe individuals 
appear to have been encouraged to deflect attention away from their unit. With regard to the 
issue of savings, I feel that one example of where problems occur is when individuals do not 
offer up details of additional opportunities due to fears that this might affect their budget the 
Footnote 17: At the time of the research the existing delivery specification required a first letter to be delivered by 07: 00 and 
last 09: 30, with a second delivery to residential premises after 11: 00. Subsequent changes were made to the regulations in 
2004 when second deliveries ceased altogether, and the times of the first and last deliveries were changed to 09: 00 and 14: 00, 
1 believe that the limited number of 'time of delivery' complaints received indicates that the majority of' customers were 
receptive to the proposed changes, and this may have influenced the strategic decision to go ahead with them. 
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-: 
following year. I was surprised during the second set of interviews that our assumptions in this 
area were further vindicated by one of the co-participants who felt that: 
"Managers may tend to do thatfor the simple reason [that] if they don't, they don't want that 
area to be noticed" and "because it may be a weakness of that particular manager, and 
people are always reluctant to actually show their weaknesses" (Source M4). 
I was subsequently disappointed that this was confirmed during the latter part of the research 
period. In a budget recovery meeting held with the Area Manager to limit the effect of the FTD 
slippage, a number of the co-participants put forward actions they had never previously 
suggested, which they now believed they could implement to reduce expenditure to support the 
Area financial position. Reflecting on this after the meeting, I realised that this was in all 
probability a bonus-influenced decision on their part. In discussions after the meeting, Al 
revealed the frustration the analysts and I felt when she asked: 
"Ny have the hours that they've offered up today not been offered [previously? ] Was it that 
it's only come to light now that they can offer them up, or was it available 3 months ago? 
(Source Al). 
As discussed on two earlier occasions, I was already aware of instances in which individuals 
had openly sought to divert blame from their unit and focus attention elsewhere. I now came to 
realise, however, that a shift had occurred whereby a significant number of the co-participants 
were achieving their aims using more secretive methods. This was detrimental in terms of the 
potential beneficial trade-offs which could have been achieved across other performance 
dimensions. I believe this course of action was influenced by managers wanting to either focus 
upon the achievement of a particular target and buffer 
it against a widening gap in 
performance, or avoid responding to a target they viewed as 
both unrealistic and non. 
achievable. By this stage I believe this had become particularly noticeable against 
both the 
ADM and National FTD UPB, where in relation to the later initiative, it was seen to be 
exerting a major influence. The co-Participants and 
I realised that over the intervening period 
between the third and ninth performance cycle 'you couldn't [think about] achieving half the 
targets until you got FTD' (Source S3). 
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This is not to say that once we had deployed FTD, achievement of the various targets across 
the BSC was guaranteed. In practice, there was a variety of outcomes. In all cases, slippage 
occurred beyond the planned deployment dates, when operating budgets were reduced. In 
conversation with the analysts it was believed that this was as a direct result of "budgets being 
set [based] on the constraints that FTD would be [subjected to] by a designated week but in reality the 
[unit managers couldn't] deliver it until many months later" (Source Al). 
in addition, past experience from both the analyst and co-participant perspectives had shown 
that when deployment had eventually been achieved FTD could "not deliver" the target (A2), 
and according to M3, that was why the unit results over the sector 'aren't improving' (Source 
M3). 
Despite at least being able to achieve a reduction in FTD operating hours, units now found 
themselves facing an additional incremental and related burden as a result of slippage. 
Consequently, I had to approach the unit managers in order to identify any necessary additional 
changes. These had to be agreed and implemented to recover the resulting NIS overspending 
associated with the intervening weeks when deployment had not been possible. In addition, 
those unit managers who only achieved a partial deployment also faced the problem of 
recovering any adverse expenditure resulting from the remaining FTD hours which had not 
been successfully reduced. The following diagram highlights the effect of the delayed FTD. 
Figure 8- Delayed FTD Impact 
Planned 
Deployment 
WK 10 
Actual 
Deployment 
WK 20 
Both full and partial will have 
to recover 10 weeks of 50hrs 
with hourage [sic] and VIC 
gaps increasing every week 
thereafter until achieved. 
FTD 
Task 50 hrs 
Full Achieved 50 firs 
Part Achieved 30 hrs 
I In addition partial 
deployments will have to 
recover 20 hr gap with 
hourage [sic] and MC gaps 
increasing every week 
thereafter until achieved 
Source: Developed from the author's encounters with the co-participants. 
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mommw-, 
I was not surprised that both the management and staff in these units reacted to the need for 
additional changes without enthusiasm. In these units, both the management and the union had 
to varying degrees successfully dealt with the issue of barriers such as the lack of support and 
the general unwillingness to become involved (see p. 230-239). As far as the staff and the 
union were concerned, deployment had basically been achieved. Therefore they had done what 
the business had asked by removing the hours from their unit. Any request for additional 
indoor sorting hours was perceived to be not only against the original FTD agreements, but 
also unreasonable in the eyes of both employees and the union. As a result, hostility towards 
any further reductions in duties or changes to duty content re-surfaced and remained in place 
as a barrier limiting what unit managers could hope to achieve. Similarly, the co-participants 
found this just as frustrating and discouraging, as they believed that barriers thought to be 
outside of their direct control and influence during the third review cycle had been dealt with, 
only to reoccur due to the additional task. This lead to the widespread complaint from the co- 
participants that they had been 'penalised... for FTD that wasn't put in place until half way 
through the year, not because of [their] own problems' (Source M2). 
In addition, it was felt that corresponding trade-offs and the effects of a reduction in additional 
costs would not only fail to recover, but possibly even adversely affect performance across a 
number of dimensions. Particular concerns existed that employees who had adopted a more 
proactive and positive attitude to change since the second review cycle, and as a result would 
have responded positively in future EOS surveys to the FTD deployment, may in actual fact 
change their views due to the need for additional hours. Additionally, within both the TO and 
ADM KPIs at no time prior to or after any introduced FTD changes had either targets been 
achieved in any unit (see Appendix 6). Consequently, the co-participants questioned the 
rationale behind an additional indoor work hour reduction. Not only would it be reasonable to 
expect performance to continue to deteriorate in each of these dimensions, but any MC work 
hours savings achieved would also be quickly counteracted by contingencies to underpin both 
of these customer KPIs. This resulted in co-participants 
feeling exasperated: "I am totally fed 
up with FTD, ' M2 exclaimed, 'and I would probably not 
focus on my own 06: 45 (time out] at 
all" (Source M2). 
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I believe the situation was made even worse in relation to those units who could not deploy. I 
had made a commitment from the third cycle of reviews to progress upward feed with regards 
to ADM and also to become directly involved in the FTD project teams, which supported the 
unit deployments being discussed. However, in a small number of cases, it emerged from the 
previously positioned area meeting that the FTD task in some units was either excessive or 
completely unfeasible, resulting in a subsequent re-adjustment of the unit target. In a small 
number of instances, therefore, either an existing target was reduced, or what had been a 
savings task for a unit was subsequently turned into an investment. In relation to the former, I 
believe this was the behavioural trigger which had encouraged the earlier situation, whereby 
both co-participants and union representatives alike highlighted previously unaddressed 
opportunities. 
As might be suspected, this situation was viewed differently according to where stakeholders 
fell within the equation. For those units which had deployed and experienced difficulties in 
meeting the issued targets, I believe this only intensified their feelings of frustration and 
discouragement. Whether rightly or wrongly, it was believed by the analysts that some 
colleagues may have made a concrete effort not to deploy, because it was 'hassle, ' as Al 
phrased it: 'it's telling the individuals that you're going to move their duties around, it's 
involving the union, it's restructuring and thinking about the whole picture, it's just additional 
work (Source Al). 
Consequently, I believe that the view from certain quarters of those who had deployed was that 
if they had taken the same stance, not only would they have been spared having to face the 
cultural and engagement barriers encountered, but they would also have acquired either a 
reduced task or been given additional hours or staff. It was reasoned that when employees 
became aware of the situation, which was made all the more unsavoury by the continuing drive 
to recover and reduce expenditure, it would become more difficult to engage the staff This, in 
turn, would put at risk what could actually be achieved in relation to an MS reduction. What is 
more, if asking for more hours to be removed did not cause employees to adopt a negative 
stance towards future EOS surveys, the knowledge that other units had a reduced task could 
prove the catalyst for them to do so. 
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With regard those units which had there targets changed. As a consequence of the meeting, the 
co-participants who were directly affected felt that the FTD targets had evidently been 
imposed without the initial involvement of the managers regarding what was actually realistic 
and ultimately achievable. This situation frustrated the co-participants involved, as M3 makes 
clear: 
"Well I'm saying [the FTD targets] were imposed on us. We didn't have any influence to 
change these targets, for example, we were issued [an FYD reduction against my] budget... 
which I objected to... I said it wouldn't work [from the outset] and there were things wanted 
changing, and [it] didn't get changed" (Source M3). 
As a result of the meeting, individuals felt that the business was now having to confirm that 
they recognised the impracticality of the previously task which had been set. For example: 
"We [unit managers] started off with ... 400 hours and... after much disappointment, arguments 
[andjjallings out with everybody, we ended up... gaining 3 duties " (Source S3). 
As was previously the case, there were concerns that relationships with employees and the 
union in the effected units may have been damaged. Consequently, it was felt that this might 
make it difficult to involve staff in future improvement activities, but also that there might be 
an adverse effect on future EOS results. I believe this concern to be fullyjustified, as out of the 
eight co-participating units, only two subsequently achieved their respective EOS targets, 
indicating that employees will, in all probability, use the survey to express their dissatisfaction 
towards managers and the business. 
Taking both outcomes into consideration, we believed this could occur as a direct result of the 
employees not only losing confidence in both the business and ourselves as their managers, 
but 
also the union, who might be perceived as having let them down. The possible consequences 
of this are apparent in the resulting EOS scores, and 
in statements such as those made by MI 
below: 
'IY7, e C9V (union) are balloting on potential strike action, and that in itself could have a 
major impact on local EOS results, that we cannot do too much about and the problems I see 
with the EOS is the local opinion... that national things affect it" (Source M 1). 
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Reflecting on the upward feed process and the outcome from the FTD changes, it would 
appear that the co-participants generally held one of two distinct view points. There were some 
who accepted the outcome when it was beneficial to them, even though there had been a 
lengthy delay. In contrast, when the outcome was viewed as unfavourable to them, other 
individuals seemed to argue that the decision was unrealistic and unachievable. It would seem 
likely that as a result, these managers had been reluctant to take on full ownership and 
accountability for either the actions or any resulting effect on performance. I believe this was 
not an isolated FTD occurrence. As explained earlier (see p. 23 8), 1 personally become directly 
involved in attempting to formalise (sorting standards) IPS for use by management in the units. 
As predicted, I was not able to achieve any success via the upward feed process as negotiations 
between higher levels of management and the union were ongoing. Although local union 
representatives recognised the need for an agreement, resistance remained as it was believed 
that any locally agreed rates would undermine national discussions. This was viewed with 
dismay by the co-participants who had always recognised that it would have been a major 
factor in helping to achieve not only MS, but also TO and ADM targets. Consequently they 
upheld their previous assertions regarding the lack of national support, and yet again 
questioned the rationale behind a national project that had been deployed without an 
agreement. 
This was not the only problem I encountered. I had also hoped that my involvement in 
negotiations for a cut off policy and a yearly Christmas agreement would have supported the 
operation. Although there were no lengthy delays, however, in both instances there were some 
who did not agree with the contents, and felt that it was being imposed upon them: 
"Christmas was a prime example where Ifelt I was forced to spend money on things that I 
didn't want to spend money on because [qjj an Area Management Team decision" (Sourcc 
M5). 
Consequently it appeared that the co-participants were of the incorrect assumption that 
"agreements had been formulated without their direct input, yet they still had to work with 
them " (M4). 
2S6 
In contrast, the opposite was the case with regard to the ADM UPB, which with its 100 percent 
nationally set target, was increasingly perceived by all parties as being totally unachievable 
(see appendix 6 and 11). As A2 commented: 
"Pie target is IOOYo. I mean, how many times in life would anyone like a target when you're 
not allowed tofail. [A] 100% target means you're not allowed tofail, [and] bearing in mind 
[there are] 365 days a year... I don't like tofail " (Source A2). 
Consequently the analysts and I had resorted yet again to the upward feed process to seek 
clarification regarding the measurement focus after the third sequence of reviews. After similar 
delays had been experiences, it eventually became apparent that, as was already suspected, the 
way the measure was taken was incorrect, even though the 100 percent target remained. This 
resulted in the analysts and I having to introduce modifications regarding when the actual 
measurements were to be undertaken. In discussions with Al it was sensed that the co- 
participants believed they were being forced into a situation whereby they had no choice but to 
take ownership, despite recognising that the target was unattainable from the outset. From 
earlier discussions it would appear that the co-participants held similar views regarding EOS 
due to the impact of national initiatives, MC expenditure in relation to the imposed nature of 
FTD, and TO with its close association with ADM. A statement from M3 is typical here: 
"We have a target of achieving 95% of all staff out on time, on first delivery, and... my 
opinion is that it's virtually impossible because of the volumes of mail that are arriving late, 
the turnover ofstaff that we have, and the equipment that we have to use " (source M3). 
In discussions with the analysts it seemed likely that the existing and the newly emerging 
unrealistic targets were having a profound negative impact on the degree of involvement from 
the co-participants. The analysts and I were of the opinion that as well as being unfeasible, 
working "towards either a wrong or a changed target had a dernotivating effect in that it caused 
co-participants to switch off' (A 1). 
During the third review cycle, we had already concluded that individuals may have bccn 
encouraged to adopt this stance (see pp. 229-232), and it now appeared that this view had been 
vindicated. I believe it is reasonable to assume from the evidence gained that when these 
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situations are encountered managers may be encouraged to focus their attention solely upon 
those targets which they feel they can achieve, to the detriment of those which they perceive to 
be beyond their control, and therefore unachievable. Comments such as the following support 
our assertions: 
"I think it'sfairly naturalfor them to look at 5 out of eight targets and say Y can do those 5' 
and concentrate on [them] and switch off[when it comes] to the 3 [others], and at the end of 
the year think they will position [sic] this with you [mysetO that they've achieved 5 eighths of 
what they've been asked to do. Now the business might say 'well it's more important that we 
address the 3 that you can't do rather than the 5 that you can "' (Source M4). 
This view was also supported by M3: 
"Because... to start with you're destined tofailure, You knowyou're not going to achieve it, so 
you're going tofocus on other areas that [you] are close to achieving, so at least you can turn 
round at the end of the year and say, right I've valued my performance ffor] this year, and I've 
achieved that target, that target, and that target, and that one's way out because I haven't 
focused [on] that because those other targets have been met" (sic] (Source M3). 
I hold that we can infer from such comments that individuals do, as previously suggested (see 
p. 230), value there own performance, and as such wish to maximise what they can ultimately 
achieve. In line with M3, I believe that individuals "do take it personally when they fail to 
achieve their targets" and may, as a consequence, seek to deflect the responsibility for any 
subsequent failures away from themselves, blaming either the "flaws in the performance 
system" (Al), or the business itself (see footnote 18). 
Consequently, it would appear that managers are reluctant to shoulder responsibility for their 
failures, preferring instead to project the blame by countering any discussion I may have held 
at a performance review by arguing that: 
-By moving the goal posts it gives people [control]... it gives them a get out clause. " 
[Thereforej "if somebody can't achieve their goal [target] then what they do is they put up 
their own defences and make their own excuses, they put their own smoke screens up " (Sourcc 
M4). 
Footnote 18: 1 believe flaws in the system relate to previously discussed considerations, such as the need to change dcploycd 
BSC, the lateness of performance results, changing measurement focus and targets once deployed. Additional wcakncss 
included delays in the responsiveness of the upward feed process along with the failure to include a bchavioural clcmcnt 
recognised as an important inclusion 
by the co-participants. It would appear that a significant dcgrcc of carryover exists 
regarding how individuals perceive the role of the 
business when these factors are considered, which I believe has bccn 
compounded by the issuing of unrealistic 100% targets perceived to 
be unobtainable by the co-participants. 
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Chapter 8 Discussions of Findings 
Through action research, the complex web of interactions between the concrete and abstract 
aspects of an implementation process has been revealed. The research sample was comprised of 
mainly experienced managers who were familiar with various measurement systems. In the 
preceding chapters I have provided a unique and critical reflective practitioner account of the 
experiences, emotions and behaviour of a managerial team as it sought to put into effect a newly 
formulated unit based BSC. It is now necessary to take this discussion further, and explore its 
full theoretical implications for the wider academic community. This is necessary in order to 
unite 'theory and practice' (Armistead and Meakins, 2007: 18) and enable a more empirical 
approach to emerge. 
8.1 Contribution - How Theoretical Knowledge Has Been Expanded 
The aim of this research was to advance understanding of how a senior manager and his team 
were able to engage with a newly introduced unit based BSC in a large network organisation. 
This was necessary as the literature generally Iacked examples of research undertaken from the 
perspective of those 'exposed to and required to use performance management and 
measurement' (Holloway 2000: 13 and Neely et al., 2000: 1131), and accounts of observed 
encounters with a BSC covering deployment and subsequent usage were scarce. 
In adopting this approach the study reaches beyond the detached and peripheral view of the 
performance enviromnent, commonly associated with previous research 
findings, as it explores 
more deeply as suggested the issue of how managers' emotions and 
behaviours evolve and how 
this impacts on their ability to engage with and react to a unit based BSC in a centrally imposcd 
performance environment. 
The explored theory has looked at the interaction between performance strategy, performance 
measurement systems and the process of 
improving actual performance. The success or failure 
of a PMS and thereby overall performance management within a 
large network organisation is 
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ultimately influenced by the behavioural and emotional responses of the managers engaging 
within the performance environment. Earlier identification of tensions and understanding and 
predicting emotional and behavioural responses that may impact negatively upon the 
implementation of and engagement with a PMS is vital. Addressing these will not only lead to a 
more confident approach to both the implementation and sustained use any PMS, but also 
encourage better strategic alignment and motivation of managers. 
In positioning the findings it is not my intention to provide a definitive account, but to offer a 
critical discussion of these contributions to theory. The value of taking such an approach not 
only provides researchers with a theoretical foundation whereby the contributions made might be 
further explored and developed, but will also in turn inform future practice, providing 
practitioners with a valuable foundation to employ when looking to improve either current and 
or future practice. 
The framework devised was then tested over a 10 month period with the adoption of a process of 
rigorous reflective collaborative inquiry. By focusing on real life experiences of those involved 
as they were exposed to, deployed and used the unit BSC, the behavioural and emotional 
outcomes were used to inform the final adjustments to the framework. As such the resulting 
theory emerged from the methods employed and was tested and validated by virtue of the 
applied interviews, surveys and focus group activities. The advantage of this was that it allowed 
the final adjustments to the original model developed from the literature to be based upon actual 
practice. 
8.1.1 Lessons to be Learned (Strategic Alignment and the Centrally Deployed PAIS) 
The findings indicate that the approach to be taken by the company is to cascade the use of the 
balanced scorecard. (Nivan, 1999) whilst attempting to keep a line of sight for the measurcs 
through the deployment and desegregation of targets (Schneiderman, 1999). Given the large size 
of the company and its scale of operations, the plan for deployment at the national, arca and unit 
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level has been implemented at what the organisation considers to be a cautious pace, with the 
first two taking two years to complete. 
It was necessary to hold a series of workshops in order to enable the unit managers to use the 
unit scorecard as intended. The decision to resort to such workshops should not necessarily be 
taken as a criticism of the complexity of the measurement system. Rather, these workshops were 
seen as a beneficial team building exercise to discuss the issues of the impending interaction and 
interrelation between measures at the unit, area and national levels within and between business 
processes. 
The type of interaction held fiirther significance, as it emerged that national enablers were poorly 
defined, in relation to their anticipated performance contribution. It also became apparent that 
there had been insufficient testing or review of the trial results prior to the deployment into the 
remaining units. Consequently some targets and measures were misunderstood, with missing 
budgetary performance targets and results hindering any ability to complete or understand the 
impact on the shareholder element of the scorecard. Furthermore it was also deemed necessary to 
introduce locally designed unit BSCs to make them more user friendly and ultimately, fit for 
purpose. As a result, the following situation which needs to be addressed emerges: 
> While managers agreed with the rationale and purpose of the BSC, they also revealed 
their own personal doubts about how the measures and targets might actually support 
unit performance, or conflict with their own goals. 
The present system is widely perceived by senior managers to be a success. Nevertheless, there 
remains some considerable anxiety at unit level regarding the apparent 
imposition of targets, 
mitigated to a greater or lesser extent by external 
factors. The possibility of discouragcmcnt 
resulting from what are perceived to 
be 'unreasonable or imposed targets' has bccn well 
documented (Strebler et aL, 2001), and has continually resurfaced throughout the research. 
Arguably this needs to be addressed if any PMS is to be effective. Despite the measures bcing 
beneficial to the performance of the company as a whole, (and being simple to maintain whcn 
translated to the unit level), their relevance remains unclear 
in the eyes of operational managers. 
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When considered in relation to the notion of strategic alignment, this aspect would appear to be 
satisfied from the corporate level perspective, but not necessarily from that of the unit managers. 
It might be argued that this is largely irrelevant, so long as the operational targets are achieved. 
In this instance however, this was not the case, where the majority of targets across all units were 
not achieved. 
It is possible to conclude from the findings that centrally imposed performance measurement 
systems elicit a level of objective understanding and dispassionate discussion from managers, 
while at the same time resulting in an underlying turbulence of frustration and cynicism caused 
by perceived lack of control over their own destiny. Consequently, when this situation occurs 
there emerges a reluctance to engage with the system. It is here that managers resort to localised 
systems in order to enable them to interact with the centrally devised system. The findings would 
indicated that while the present centrally derived PMS meets Hudson et alls., (2001) need for a 
system to be 'derived from strategy, ' its suitability regarding 'relevance, understanding and 
linking operations to strategic goals' (Hudson et aL, 2001) is not the case at the lower level of 
the BSC usage were strategy is rcalised. In its present format unit managers are unable to see or 
accept the inter-relationships, suggesting that while the scorecard was designed for line of sight 
down from the corporate level this is not the case when looking up. This indicates that counter to 
Sedecon (1999: 9) recommendations a 'common language' is not evident, and as such front-line 
managers are unable to 'understand or share' in what Schneiderman (1999: 9) suggests is their 
4contribution to the organisations' strategy. 
8.1.2 The Impact of a Centralised PMS on Front Line Managers 
it is evident that that although the co-participants viewed the nationally devised PMS with 
scepticism, acceptance was present regarding the declared need 
for a BSC, although in a revised 
format, and believed the use of a workshop to support its deployment was a suitable method on 
dissemination. By contrast, it is questionable how the workshops could in reality be perceived as 
successful, when many scorecards remained incomplete across all the performance dimensions. 
Despite this however, co-participants exhibited a greater awareness as to why targets were not 
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being met. In reality, the efficacy of what they intended to do and being able to quantify a result 
from the performance environment they encountered was less noticeable, with managers finding 
themselves continually during the exposure, deployment and usages stages relying heavily on 
local initiatives. As previously discussed, the findings suggest that the business itself was to 
some extent responsible for this situation, lacking essential prerequisites for any 'good PMSI 
deployment within the parameters of 'understanding, relevance and clearly defined and explicit' 
purposes as prescribed by Hudson et aL, (2001). This brings to the forefront the importance of 
organisations addressing encountered topical issues such as; weak evaluations of trial sites, 
contradictory, missing and or incorrect KPI information and un-quantified national enabling 
projects. 
Taking the above points into consideration, the question of how the experience actually 
improved the co-participants' practice comes into even sharper focus. Despite encountering the 
problems described here and knowing the shareholder dimensions remained incomplete, 
individuals were able to complete the workshop, and produce and deploy scorecards to close 
performance gaps. Furthermore, they still expressed a positive attitude towards the encounter as 
a whole, and the need for a scorecard throughout the research period. The generally positive 
outlook of the participants serves as an indication that the BSC and the workshop environment 
had been accepted, and that the benefits of mutual support and the sharing of ideas were widely 
recognised. This provides a valuable foundation for future work and highlights the value of such 
an approach if organisations address the previously discussed barriers. 
8.1.3 How Managers Rationalise the Performance Environment 
The research demonstrates that the way individuals view and define their behaviour in relation to 
the performance environment is influenced to a greater or lesser extent by those encounters 
(either within or outside of the PMS) which have been experienced. Actions are therefore 
directly tied to the perceived relevance and realism of either the task set or encounter 
experienced, as well as the degrees of influence and control employees' reason to be at their 
disposal. In addition, behaviour is also deflned by how employees view the negative and positive 
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aspects of either the actual or predicted environment in terms of the causes of under 
performance, trade-offs and/or consequential effects of decisions and actions. Consequently it 
became apparent that individuals were continually improving their awareness of the performance 
environment, using arguments of control and influence from which a defensive mechanism was 
adopted in an attempt to justify and rationalise their behaviour. (See footnote 19). It would appear 
that by deflecting responsibility for the failure to meet high impact or difficult targets away from 
themselves, managers were choosing to devote their time and energy towards a never-ending 
analysis of the problems and its causes, rather than drawing upon their experience and actually 
developing solutions which could be implemented. The study shows that any one of these 
factors, alone or in combination, can impact on how managers perceive the level of ownership 
and accountability they held. This clearly brings into question how senior management can react 
positively when faced with these tensions, and whether it is realistic for them to be able to bring 
within reach what is perceived by their managers as unattainable. 
My fmdings demonstrate that the ability of a senior manager to alter what are perceived to be 
externally imposed business targets is limited, although this would not Prevent senior 
management from representing the concerns of their team. The study showed that it was possible 
to support change regarding unachievable targets and the misinterpretation of measurement 
dimensions via the upward feed process, although this was not without some degree of risk. 
Firstly, findings suggest that the upward feed and response back aspects of the system that was 
in place were deficient, not in terms of the quality of the response, but with regards to its timing, 
which would without doubt have failed to satisfy Hudson et al's., (2001) desire for 'fast and 
accurate feedback. ' In addition, when resulting changes occur to already issued and achieved 
targets, and feedback regarding misinterpretation of the KPIs comes to fruition, it is apparent 
that levels of motivation to 'stimulate continuous improvement' as prescribed by both Hudson el 
aL, (2001) and De Waal (2002 a, 2002b, 2002c) are likely to be affected. In terms of the 
outcome, this is arguably dependant on whether managers perceive themselves to be winners or 
losers. 
Results indicate that a similar situation occurred regarding the impact that other functions were 
Footnote 19: The encountered perfonnance environment would include not only the cause and effect, and resulting 
trade offs, but also the consequences of actions taken either by the co-participants or others. 
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able to exert on a unit's performance, and how the co-participants in relation to influence and 
control were able to impact on this. It was hoped that the study would confirm that the 
intervention of senior management could indeed resolve the issue of trade-offs and operational 
consequences for the benefit of all. Although it was possible for senior management to resolve 
some issues when the outcome was seen as important and equally beneficial to all parties, this 
was not the case when either party perceived their own needs to be greater than those of other 
stakeholders. 
It is suggested that due to both distance and detachment, this effect intensified as management 
ascended the seniority ladder within functional management structures. It is evident from the 
study that through the use of the PMS, 'stakeholders interests, (De Waal 2002a, 2002b, 2002c) 
can be tested when difficulties emerge, and also that support for 'linking operations to strategic 
goals' (Hudson et aL, 2001) is questionable throughout the different managerial levels in a large 
network organisation. 
8.1.4 Resulting Emotional and Behavioural Reactions 
Considering the engagement as suggested in the provisional framework it is apparent that the 
performance environment as suggested contains three interlinked and cyclical areas of activity. 
These are defined as the performance strategic process, its measurement system and zone of 
engagement where the organisational task is taken on and realised by front line managers. My 
findings have shown as illustrated in 9 overleaf that throughout and between each of the 
discussed areas, a central behavioural and emotional core exists. It is within this environment, 
when an individual experiences any exposure to a situation that rationalisation of this experience 
will take place. As a result, cognitive emotions and attitudes as 
discussed are thereby generated, 
which in turn have been shown to exert an 
influence on an individual's behaviour and reactions, 
and how they view and make sense of the experienced environment. 
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Figure 9- The Behavioural And Emotional Impact On The Performance Environment 
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Considering the above, it is of value to understand how behaviour and subsequent cognitive 
states can be affected. It is proposed that two significant findings emerge from the engagement, 
supported by the surveys undertaken over the nine month research period: 
)o- Managers fully understood the set targets, agreed that they had ownership and 
accountability for the targets. In spite of the fact that the majority of' targets were not 
achieved, managers did agree that they understood how to achieve them. 
Despite such understanding and agreement, more than hall' felt the targets were in 
fact unrealistic, and therefore unachievable, irrespective of the fact that the co- 
participants saw performance management as a useful aid in helping them to focus on 
and achieve their operational tasks. 
In line with Malino and Selto (2000: 72), the co-participants 'did not object to stretching targets, 
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but in accepting such targets, they needed to be self-assured that the targets were 'attainable'. 
After exploring what appeared to be a contradictory paradox in the second focus group meeting 
during the closing stages of the research, it became clear that there was a difference between 
managers 'understanding' that they were accountable for the targets they had set, and actually 
'feeling' accountable. 
As my encounters with the co-Participants progressed, it became evident that the underlying 
reasons for this mindset were related to their perceptions of the degree to which they were 
empowered to exercise direct control and personal influence. This became an ever-increasing 
motivational factor which in certain instances influenced how individuals rationalised not only 
the performance environment they encountered, but also their reactions. Feelings of uncertainty 
and apathy subsequently emerged towards what were clearly viewed as centrally imposed and 
unrealistic targets. Employees were also discouraged by the un-quantified nature of the national 
performance targets and enablers, to achieve them as well as the impact other operational areas 
may exert.. 
As a consequence, individuals frequently expressed the view that there seemed to be little point 
in striving to achieve something which was apparently unachievable or of their making. This is 
demonstrated in the views of the co-participants which emerged during the final group setting: 
"If managers believe targets are [both] unachievable and unrealistic, they do not feel 
sufficiently motivated to meet them " (Focus Group Co-participant, January 2002). 
This is counter to what Kaplan and Norton (1992) or Schneiderman (1988,1999) would expect, 
where 'the knowledge and means of achieving' these targets, either nationally or locally, was not 
'understood. ' When this was further explored during the same session, the following valuable 
insight emerges to explain why this situation occurs: 
"Managers said there was a difference betweenfeeling accountable and understanding that they 
are accountablefor targets set without their involvement. Some do notfeel accountablefor what 
they perceive as someone else's targets but know they are accountable for achieving results" 
(Focus Group Co-participant, January 2002). 
This supported previous assertions (see page 162) that 'increased accountability can be seen as 
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threatening' (Stivers and Joyce's 2000: 61-62), and confmned initial workshop assumptions, 
further highlighted during the performance reviews, that conflicts can emerge between the level 
of ownership and the accountability felt by individuals towards the contents of their unit 
scorecards and actions. This was particularly apparent in a number of instances. It was clear from 
the outset that managers are extremely reluctant to accept either national or area projects to 
support improvements within units, and retained a preference for locally devised initiatives to 
boost performance. It appeared that individuals were not eager to hinge their own destiny on the 
success of initiatives which were not their own, choosing instead to rely on local actions which 
had been previously successful. This presented an underlying level of frustration which 
adversely affected how managers viewed the desired need for agreeing or contracting to the 
contents of their respective BSCs. 
Furthermore, in cases where the degree of difficulty increased, and the gaps to be closed were 
widened with time, or when initiatives which had been introduced failed to produce the desired 
results, feelings of disillusionment, and reduced motivation to continue to strive towards targets 
resulted. It is evident these states are increasingly evident with regard to those targets perceived 
as unachievable and unrealistic (such as FTD) and having a major impact on the achievement of 
a unit's budget, along with misunderstood (TO and ADM) KPIs. These were always viewed 
unfavourably and were open to varying upstream influences and interpretations. Thus resulted in 
the need for local action which had an impact on KPIs in terms of costs as well as adversely 
influencing the perceptions of the staff in local surveys, for which managers perceived they were 
not directly accountable. 
Throughout the research, the latter KPI continually re-surfaced as a performance dimension, 
influenced not only by local but also national initiatives for change, such as FTD and its 
subsequent target realigrunent, with targets being previously positioned as 
immovable. Strong 
cultural, emotional and behavioural triggers, whether 
dormant or active, were always present and 
increasingly emerged throughout the period of BSC usage amongst both managers and 
employees. This was particularly noticeable amongst those co-participants achieving 
FTD 
targets, who now found themselves faced with a situation whereby under achievers were having 
targets reset to make them more attainable. 
268 
Considering the situation, it becomes apparent that Neely et al's (1997) 'golden rule of not 
measuring someone against a target they have no control over' had been ignored, and also, that 
the 'behaviour likely to be displayed' by those already achieving their targets had not been 
considered when the decision was made at the national level to change targets. As a 
consequence, negative responses were encountered from co-participants, who typically 
wondered why they should 'bother'. My findings not only imply that this is applicable to the 
issuing of 100% targets where such reactions emerged, but also clearly draw attention to the 
possible effect that the 'memory of the experience' (LiIjander and Standvik 1997: 155) might 
later have on managerial and staff motivation to positively engage with targets. 
The research confirms that the effects will not be confined to the management, but will be felt by 
all employees exposed to performance improvements. As a result, both parties will arguably be 
less receptive to any future changes due to a loss of confidence in their management, and that 
this discontent will be expressed as suggested below via future employee surveys. 
, 'EoSforms [surveys] arefilled in by staff - if they're in a good or bad mood it reflects on the 
scores " (Focus Group Co-participant, January 2002). 
The discouraging impact of both 'unfair and imposed targets' has been discussed above (see 
Strebler et aL, 2001: xi). Individuals reported feeling that their hands were tied when they lost 
the power to directly control the solution of problems which arose. This was particularly evident 
when other unit or functional managers came to a decision or proceeded with an activity which 
had an adverse impact on units for which the co-participants were responsible. Further 
exploration of this issue revealed that the co-participants tended to see their own particular unit's 
difficulty as 100% of the problem. In contrast, support or other operational (processing, 
distribution and personnel) managers in a network organisation, who were responsible for 
supplying or supporting a number of units, might only see a particular unit's problem as 
forming 
only a small percentage of the overall task at 
hand. Consequently, other functional managers are 
encouraged to direct their available time and resources towards resolving what they saw as the 
problem in its entirety, often 
involving a number of different units. 
Managers generally demonstrated a clear understanding of the complexity of 
interacting 
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measures, and the impact which other functions and processes had on their own performance. 
Unfortunately, this tended to sidetrack performance discussions, as the co-participants believed 
that ultimately, they were not responsible. This would appear to support Lipe and Salterio's 
(2000: 284) assertion that the 'features of a task will generate a psychological reaction, which 
will influence any decision making process pursued by an individual'. 
8.1.5 Motivation to Improve Performance 
This clearly raises questions about the level of motivation to improve performance, and points us 
towards the desired state described by Hudson et aL, (2001) and De Waal (2002a, 2002b, 2002c) 
in which 'continuous improvement is stimulated' in the performance environment. This aspect is 
clearly satisfied by the gap analysis process in addition to the action plans for improvement. It is 
evident, however, that across the majority of KPIs, improvements did not materialise, with the 
main area of practitioner focus residing on understanding reasons behind the results and 
undertaking root cause analysis in relation to the why, why, why process. 
In addition, awareness also appeared high regarding the consequences of decisions, trade-offs 
and actions across the different performance dimensions. Despite this however, the negative 
aspect of such considerations received greater attention from the co-participants. This brings to 
the forefront Da Silveira and Slack's (2001: 949) assertion that the 'idea of trade-offs is not a 
problematic issue for practicing managers. ' Conversely, my research demonstrates that such 
trade-offs are indeed problematic and in contrast to what Kaplan and Norton (1992: 79) have 
suggested, when a negative outcome is anticipated, individuals experience difficulties in 
accepting or 'understanding interrelationships'. 
This raises a number of important consequences whereby managers may be tempted to take the 
easy option, rather than taking effective action. The 
findings suggest that individuals might 
simply identify problems, or use the 
lead-time involved to seek opportunities to shift the focus of 
attention onto other issues. It was also apparent that when 
improvements were not 'readily 
identifiable', individuals were likely to shift their focus onto those targets and improvements 
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which were easier to achieve or quantify. This was clearly demonstrated in cases where it was 
difficult to determine whether a recognised improvement could, actually be 'attributed to a given 
course of action' taken by a co-participant (Neely and Bourne 2000: 6). Such a situation is not 
unusual, having been previously recognised as a 'major weakness in organisations, with regards 
to the verification of cause-and-effect relationships' (Sedecom Consulting, 1999). 
The reactions of the co-participants strongly support the earlier positioning of Holloway's 
assertion that individuals are 'self-conscious about their own performance' (2000: 53) and 
particularly how they were viewed by others' earlier reactions, from a number of the co- 
participants, would suggest that the adoption of this particular mindset was pursued to maximise 
the number of targets which could be achieved. It could be perceived that maximising the 
number of targets achieved would be beneficial for the business; however, if these are of lower 
impact than those which are not achieved, then the value of this course of action would be highly 
debatable. 
8.1.6 How Managers Rationalised Performance Improvements 
Consequently, individuals are either consciously or sub-consciously encouraged to maximise the 
number of targets they achieve in order to build the perception among others that they were 
successful managers. This was also evident from the outcome from the workshops, whereby the 
majority of the participants chose to ffilly close performance gaps, despite realising that what 
they had said might not produce the desired outcome. A common sentiment was that 'I have 
completed my scorecard, I have done what you wanted; therefore 
I have successfully completed 
the task' - In other words, 
it would appear that many people simply felt that 'tomorrow is another 
day. 9 
This outlook goes a significant way toward explaining why managers chose to maximise target 
achievement by focusing on a 
higher number of more easily achievable targets, whilst avoiding 
the more challenging ones. The evidence suggests that this particular course of action may 
have 
been . preliminarily taken to appear more successful, and to win 
favour from the review manager, 
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thus deflecting attention away from the unit in the hope that senior management might equate 
this achievement of a high number of low impact targets with greater success. In reality the 
opposite should be the case, as those who have successfully achieved albeit a small number of 
high impact targets, should be the ones credited with bringing greater benefits to the company. 
It can be concluded from the findings that whilst mangers generally are highly motivated to 
succeed, it is essential that they move away from the belief that the number of targets achieved 
corresponds to the level of success. Rather, manager should move towards a realisation that 
success ultimately involves the achievement of the more difficult targets which are most 
beneficial for the business. In order to achieve this, there clearly needs to be a cultural shift away 
from an adversity to risk taking in order to meet targets, towards a willingness to take risks, 
possibly failing a target and learning from the experience. 
By providing a greater level of awareness of the three distinctly interlinked segments, it has been 
possible to supplement and build upon existing TMS' (Hudson et al., 2001) and 'behavioural' 
(De Waal 2002a, 2002b, 2002c) knowledge and frameworks. As the model was devised from 
actual situations and experiences, it provides an extremely useful reference tool for managers. 
When all elements of the framework are in place, effectively balanced and both emotionally and 
behaviourally accepted at all operational levels, a more sustainable application of a performance 
management and measurement system will become possible. 
8.2 Implications for Practice 
Considering that the ultimate intention of action research is to produce improvements in 
practice, it is disappointing that as far as the organisation was concerned, there was no such 
improvement. It could be argued that because the majority of the targets were not achieved, the 
research had failed to meet its overall objective, which was to improve performance. It is 
difficult however to accept that this was the case, and indeed this could be considered to be a 
somewhat narrow and short-sighted perspective, exposing the complexities and difi-Icultics of 
any action research conducted by a manager with his own team in an organisational setting. It 
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could be argued that within similar organisational settings this dilemma would undoubtedly 
resurface as an issue for any research practitioner. Although it might generally be considered 
necessary for improvements in performance to be readily quantifiable, I believe this does not 
always necessarily have to be the case. 
As has been argued, it is necessary to take a less narrow approach when evaluating why there 
was no significant improvement to practice. It is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of 
how the co-participants' experiences raised their awareness of the working environment, and 
how this affected them on a more personal level. It is within this area that potential 
improvements in practitioner understanding, and therefore future practice, are most clearly 
evident from the undertaken research. It is therefore vital that as practitioners we nurture this 
newly developed consciousness and put it to good use by addressing previously encountered 
barriers such as direct control, influence, accountability and ownership. In other words, whilst 
quantitatively measuring impacts such as raised awareness and personal insights is difficult, such 
changes are indeed positive ones that should not be overlooked. Indeed, these action research 
outcomes promise to bear further fruits in future approaches and BSC applications. Furthermore, 
in having identified several barriers to successful implementation, ftirther BSC applications may 
be pursued with managers' awareness (and anticipated solutions) for countering such barriers. 
This in turn, will hopefully lead to more substantial and ultimately measurable, desired 
outcomes. 
8.2.1 The Impact of Previous Experiences 
The findings would suggest that previous experiences with a PMS, where it was expected that 
there would be little possibility of reproach for underachievement or a failure to meet targcts 
may encourage a recall into the present situation. As a result this may influence the currcnt 
feelings and behaviours of individuals when difficulties in performance are encountered. To 
resolve this situation, the study demonstrates that organisations need to address previously 
discussed issues of control and influence, so that individuals might be encouraged to fccl they 
were accountable and had ownership. 
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The research suggests that when problems are encountered, individuals themselves need to 
invest an equal amount of energy into embracing the challenge and finding solutions; although a 
change in the underlying degree of positive opinion would be necessary for this to materialise. 
The study demonstrates that individuals generally accept the need for a scorecard. Findings also 
indicate in a shift in their outlook, from the current attitude of 'I can't and won't' to 'I can and 
will', even when the attempt leads to failure. At the outset, a behavioural way of working, seen 
as a key enabler, had been agreed upon to limit any possibility of such instances occurring. The 
way of working was continually viewed as a valuable factor in any performance process. It 
appears that when individuals' comfort zones are challenged due to entrenched thought and work 
patterns, a reversion to a previous, more familiar mode of working and behaviours occurs. 
It is clear from the findings that problems exist with regard to work culture and the resulting 
engagement, which both the business and individuals need to be aware of and address. As 
previously argued, it is evident that individuals are receptive to new ideas brought up within a 
workshop environment, and are conscious of their own performance, all of which provides a 
valuable foundation from which to build upon. This evidently presents a clear challenge for both 
senior operational and unit managers, where they must encourage and support lower level unit 
managers to take a more proactive and adventurous approach to the achievement of targets. They 
also need to persuade line managers to step back and accept that such an approach is beneficial 
for the business as well as their own personal development. 
8.2.2 Embedding Accountability and Ownership in a Centralised PMS 
It would be misplaced to purely reflect on the practice of front line managers, as in any 
interaction or experience the actions and behaviours, of a more senior reviewing manager will 
undoubtedly have some influence on the co-participants, and vice versa. 
From the study it could be seen that the positive reactions from the co-participants in the 
workshops were encouraging, as they actively participated in devising changes to the scorccard 
format to make it easier to use. Managers also approved of the behavioural work approach that 
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was advocated. Despite this, the actual application and testing of the BSC during the usage 
stages was adversely influenced by the prevailing culture. It could be argued that senior 
management had no influence on this; nevertheless, whether they accept this or not, reviewing 
managers are partly responsible, given that they are themselves part of the prevailing work 
culture. 
This assertion is supported by a number of key outcomes emerging from the undertaken 
research. It is recognised that the performance review process forms an integral part of any 
performance system. It is through this activity that the responsibility of the reviewing manager 
lies both in encouraging and supporting those managers under review. It is within this interaction 
that learning occurred. 
When difficulties emerged during review meetings, it was observed that individuals chose to 
focus on their reasons for under performance, and had very little to say regarding the actions they 
intended to take, or the impact such action was likely to have. In addition, it became increasingly 
apparent that in the majority of cases, individuals had completed little or no preparatory 
groundwork prior to the performance reviews. Cited reasons for this included other daily job 
commitments, difficulties in deciding on which courses of action to follow or in predicting what 
impact could be expected. As the researcher I could claim ignorance regarding the possibility of 
this occurring, however this would be incorrect as it originally surfaced during the workshops. 
To counter the possible reoccurrence of this situation, it was agreed with the co-participants that 
all preparation needed to be completed prior to the reviews with unit managers taking the 
lead. 
We were unable to commit ourselves on this point, however, as both the analysts and 1, despite 
increasing doubts about our approach, found ourselves going against what had been previously 
agreed, by taking control of and leading 
discussions. As a consequence of this, individuals were 
not encouraged to learn from the experience, or to 
develop the competence to lead the reviews 
themselves. Considering the findings, it is now evident that a 
fundamental mistake was made by 
allowing this situation to continue, as the problems only 
increased as the reviews proceeded. 
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The general lack of preparation among managers exposed their hesitancy in allowing themselves 
or their operation to be open to scrutiny, encouraging displays of defensiveness which hindered 
any proactive interaction. This in turn, nurtured within the reviewing managers increased 
feelings of anxiety and frustration. Consequently, if either the reviewer or the analyst failed to 
intervene, not only would the scorecards not be reviewed and updated, but further reviews 
scheduled to be undertaken on the same day would either need to be rearranged or cancelled. The 
danger is that if this route was taken, the managers affected would have become discouraged, 
due to the belief that the reviews where considered to be of low importance. 
This presents reviewing managers with a dilemma; whether to take an interventionist course of 
action or to step back and adopt a coaching approach, allowing managers to learn from their own 
mistakes. For the purpose of the research the former was adopted, although this was intended to 
be only a short-term solution, being at the time the easiest option to adopt. Unsurprisingly, the 
intervention was met with little opposition, and individuals who failed to react positively and 
proactively were eager to accept assumptions and suggestions for improvement from both the 
reviewing manager and analysts with little questioning. 
It was apparent over time that this could present problems, in that if a desired outcome did not 
materialise, individuals would believe they had a means by which to exonerate themselves, 
deflecting the blame and countering any accusation of under achievement with reactions such as 
, it was not my idea, but you told me to do it. ' Although it was intended to be a short-term 
intervention and solution, both the reviewing manager and analyst found themselves 
inadvertently becoming absorbed into a cyclical process from which it was increasingly difficult 
to escape with the reverse effect occurring. Adopting this approach encouraged complacency 
amongst the co-participants concerned, and led them to expect both the reviewing manager and 
the analysts to retain responsibility, which ultimately occurred. As a consequence, the scorccards 
affected contained a large amount of input from outside sources, and bore little resemblance to 
those originally deployed by the managers. 
in the short-term, it may have been correct to intervene, providing a quick, easy and immediate 
solution; however as the intervention continued 
it was increasingly difficult for managers to 
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accept accountability and ownership for the content of the BSCs, which they did not perceive to 
be their own. Alternatively, if what initially appeared to be the more dIfficult option and had 
adopted a more supportive and coaching stance, working through initial difficulties xvitil 
managers, individuals would, over time, have been more inclined to accept increased 
accountability and ownership of the scorecards. (see figure 10 below). 
Figure 10 - Accountability And Ownership Curve 
Decreased 
.. I . Likelihood 
Easy Controlling 
Type of Intervention - Ownership and Accountability curve Time 
Difficult Support/Coaching 
Increased 
Likelihood 
Taking the above into account, the question facing review managers concerns the type of' 
intervention which would be most appropriate for the situation encountered. If' a controlling 
approach is considered, it needs to be decided when it would be appropriate to revert to a 
supporting and coaching approach, to encourage a long-term improvement in ownership and 
accountability. it would be encouraging to be able to guarantee that increased feelings of' 
ownership and accountability would naturally follow 
if the latter course of' action is decided 
upon. However, the findings demonstrate that this may not be the case. 
Results from the study suggest that both the eight measurement system design characteristics 
positioned by Hudson et aL, (2001) and the positive 
behavioural environment suggested by De 
Waal (2002a, 2002b, 2002c) need to be continually in existence at all operational levels to 
support a positive approach to any perfon-nance management system. 
When disparities occur 
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regarding how individuals view direct control, influence and the relevance and realism of what is 
being encountered across either of the above, emotions and behaviours have been shown to be 
adversely affected to the detriment of overall performance. 
Considering the above, it is apparent from the research that actions can be taken to avoid such 
disparities. It is vital that individuals at either a national or local level 'understand' not only what 
is required of them, but also have the appropriate 'knowledge' and are able to achieve what is 
being asked and appreciate their expected 'contribution' (Kaplan and Norton 1992, 
Schneiderman 1988,1999). This level of awareness becomes increasingly more crucial when 
decisions are made and courses of action are followed, which result in performance trade-offs 
across operational boundaries. 
In an absence of the above experience has shown that an adverse result in all likelihood may 
occur. It is suggested that this will lead to reduced levels of motivation and feelings of 
disillusionment, which if not addressed at either the system or behavioural level, will in all 
probability result in managers feeling they have reduced levels of ownership and accountability. 
Referring back to the ownership and accountability curve illustrated in figure 10, as a reviewing 
manager it is acknowledged that an extended controlling intervention into any review process 
will over time in all probability lead (if not reversed) to a similar situation occurring. 
It is clear from the reactions of the co-participants that the mindscts discussed will not be 
restricted to what De Waal (2002a, 2002b, 2002c) defines as the 'starting, deployment or usages 
stages' of any performance system, as such states have been encountered across each of these 
sequential stages. This concurs with De Waal (2002a: ) in that 'although attention needs to be 
directed towards the first two stages in chronological order, it is of higher importance that an 
increased level of focus be continually maintained during the usage stage'. 
Having tested and adapted the research framework in a live situation over an extended period of 
time, it can be seen that its applicability and relevance extends far beyond simply the BSC. The 
framework offers a practitioner perspective drawing attention to the performance system and 
behavioural inter-relationships, which are likely to be present in other types of performance 
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systems. I believe that a major deficiency was revealed during the workshop, in that the 
centrally deployed PMS was shown to lack a behavioural commitment as to how we would work 
and interact together. This appears to support De Waal's (2002a, 2002b, 2002c) assertion 
regarding the need for a positive behavioural environment to sustain any PMS through its initial 
commencement, development and use. This study highlights the importance of this, and 
emphasises its value to the overall success of any PMS implementation. In addition, I am 
inclined to concur with De Waal's (2002a, 2002b, 2002c) assertion that not only does a positive 
'behavioural environment need to be in existence during the usage stage, but crucially it needs to 
be continually maintained'. 
8.3 Guidelines for Organisations 
The preceding discussions have conveyed and explored both the theoretical and practitioner 
contributions derived from the research undertaken. The following section builds upon these, 
extracting and presenting the acquired practitioner knowledge in the form of key implementation 
guidelines, from which organisations are able to draw upon. 
Organisational Challenge: The findings highlight that the biggest problem facing any 
organisational use of PMSs centres not only on encouraging and maintaining a positive 
emotional and behavioural. reaction from those managers who are exposed to it, but also on 
ensuring improvements in performance are obtainable and maintained. Importantly, Dc Waal 
(2007b: 10) similarly suggests that the main problem facing organisations resides in getting 
individuals to actually engage with and continually use the PMS to accomplish sustainable 
improvements. Consequently, in line with my own conclusions the author proposes that 
corganisations need to focus on both the 'instrumental and behavioural aspects of PM, (ibid: 10). 
This clearly brings into focus how organisations are able to achieve a more positive outcome. 
The first lesson organisations need to reflect upon centres on the sobering fact that simply 
progressing through each of the phases of deployment, cascade and usage in any PMS without 
considering the consequences of each phase and reacting accordingly, will not ultimatcly 
guarantee a successful outcome. As such it would be wrong for organisations to believe that any 
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of the phases of development, deployment, cascade and ultimately usage of a PMS are of lesser 
or greater importance than previous stages. It was evident from the research conducted that each 
phase must be designed and acted upon in such a way that it becomes a positive springboard, 
thereby proactively informing subsequent phases. As such due to the transfer effect exerted, each 
of the stages becomes of equal importance. Significantly, as has been shown in the study, along 
with more recent literature (Bititci et aL, 2006: 1344) a 'cross-functional perspective' must be 
included to reduce the likelihood of any undermining of the PMS. ' 
The PMS and Behaviours: A key recommendation emerging from these discussions, must be 
considered by organisations, whereby both the various phases of the PMS and behaviours are 
interrelated and indivisible. It can be argued from experiences gained that the two should not be 
viewed in isolation from each other but need always to be considered jointly. The importance of 
this becomes increasingly apparent as it has been shown that managerial behaviour is directly 
influenced by the PMS and how it is used to both measure and focus improvements in 
performance. The relevance of this to organisations is well documented within the literature and 
supported within the previously discussed works of both Neely et aL, (1997: 1136) and Boume 
(1999: 23). 
When this direction is considered, the study has further shown that any performance encounter 
within a PMS environment will exert both positive and negative emotional and/or attitudinal 
behavioural influences. Subsequently organisations need to be mindful that both previous and 
encountered experiences and/or triggers manifest themselves into either positive or negative 
covert or overt responsive outcomes directed towards the PMS. As discussed by Boume 
(1999: 23) this raises two fundamental questions, which need to be considered if any desired use 
of a PMS is to be both sustainable and of added value to an organisation. 
Firstly, when performance measures are introduced, what behavioural outcomes will 
emerge? 
Secondly, is the resulting behaviour acceptable? 
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The challenge facing organisations therefore resides in not only encouraging and nurturing those 
attitudes and behaviours which are positive, but also addressing and dispelling instances of 
negativity in order to encourage the emergence of improvements in performance across the 
various phases of a PMS. 
The Importance Of Getting It Right At The Outset: From the research conducted it is clear that 
whichever mindset and/or behavioural response an individual has gained from previous 
encounters, or acquires when first exposed to the PMS during the deployment and cascade stage, 
is likely to be transferable and thereby to continually resurface throughout the usage of the PMS. 
This cmphasiscs the fundamental importance of organisations getting it right at the outset, by not 
only achieving a successful and robust deployment and cascade, but also more importantly 
seeking answers as part of the development stage to the following fundamental questions, which 
are relevant across all phases: 
> How may individuals' previous experiences of PM impact either negatively or positively 
on the newly devised PMS? Have potential barriers been identified and resolved, and 
how can positive experiences be used to underpin the new PMS. 
Does the organisation clearly comprehend what it is actually striving to achieve across 
and within the various functional and cross-functional levels. A proposition previously 
raised by McCunn (1998: 34) within his 11 th commandment for organisations to address. 
> Are organisations clearly aware of how what is being asked will be achieved, its impact 
across various CSFs and KPIs, and in what timeframe changes are expected? 
> Similarly, organisations need to critically question the appropriateness of devised 
national enablers. Will they emerge as unusable due to unforeseen problems associated 
with 'detachment and/or reality' (Roest 1997: 164-165) leading to loss of motivation and 
in turn greater reliance on local initiatives, as individuals will be reluctant to hinge their 
own destiny on what is viewed as impracticable. Encouragingly however, national 
projects are more likely to be viewed positively alongside local initiatives if frontline 
managers have been not only involved in their formulation and testing but also as 
suggested by Decoene and Bruggeman (2006: 445) they are accompanied with 'limited 
comprehensive directives' regarding how to achieve them. 
)0- Have potential obstacles such as culture, functional barriers and mindsets, as well as 
capability and competence been identified and worked through, either in order to rcmove 
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them or to reduce any adverse impact they may exert towards objectives, CSFs and 
associated KPIs? 
What are the envisaged behavioural consequences of what individuals and teams are 
being asked to do? 
> Will individual managers and teams understand and concur with what is required of 
them. More importantly will they appreciate the relevance and actively accept direct 
ownership and accountability by agreeing both an outcome and the personal role they 
have to full-fill. Attaimnent of this state would nurture Sedecon's (1999: 9) need for a 
4common language' to be obtained, where indivdiuals can 'understand or share' in what 
Schneiderman (1999: 9) argues is their overall 'contribution to the organisations strategy. ' 
Can managers actually control and influence what they are being tasked with achieving. 
Positively addressing this would eliminate Neely et al's, (1997: 1136) 'golden rule 
criticism that it is pointless for organisations to measure individuals against something 
over which they have no direct control. ' 
> Finally, is the PMS fit for purpose and easy to use, with clearly defined measurement 
dimensions, CSFs and KPIs, providing not only both timely and accurate information 
which is relevant and easily understood, but also usable in that it positively informs and 
focuses action. 
When the above areas are considered their relevance to a successful outcome clearly emerges. If 
undertaken successfully this allows the opportunity for any necessary adjustments within either 
the PMS and/or its enablers, thus supporting the emergence of desired behaviours across the 
organisation prior to entering into any deployment or cascade, thereby optimising their chances 
of a successful transfer into the usage of the PMS- In applying such an approach, organisations 
need to ask themselves three fundamental questions. 
> Are the unit scorecards strategically aligned? Do the completed scorecards align 
with and support, both functionally and cross functionally, the organisation's 
strategic intentions and objectives through the various levels, without excrting a 
compromising effect? 
Are they fit for purpose? Are the underlying root causes of underpcrformance 
personally identified against each KPI and agreed by the owner. From this are 
appropriate trade offs and fixes identified, understood and again agreed with the same 
managerial owner, which both close performance gaps and are actionable with clearly 
defined timescales and importantly perceived outcomes recorded. 
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> The question ofrobustness? Do organisations genuinely have the necessary skills and 
confidence in their own abilities when testing and agreeing a course of action? As is 
shown in the research and concurred by Holloway (2000: 53) individuals are self- 
consciousness about their own performance and how it is viewed by others. In reality 
therefore, this may result in scorecard owners agreeing on a superficial level only to 
actions/outcomes, which in reality they perceive as unachievable, or deflecting and 
proportioning blame elsewhere. 
The importance of an effective and robust process of confirmation to check understanding and 
knowledge between both the reviewer and those being reviewed, cannot be under stated. If 
undertaken correctly organisations, will more likely achieve a sound foundation which supports 
progression into the usage stage, where performance via the cyclical performance review process 
will be more effectively managed. Research shows that a failure to achieve this will result in 
knowledge and understanding becoming increasingly questionable. Evidence suggests that this 
may result in some individuals displaying reduced levels of perceived ownership and 
accountability towards the contents of their respective scorecards. 
As demonstrated on the accountability and ownership curve (figure 10 p277), the challenge 
facing organisations therefore resides in determing at what point support and coaching is to some 
extent withdrawn from the perspective of the reviewer, and no longer the dominant factor in the 
completion of any scorecard or review. Adopting this approach better enables reviewing 
managers to encourage or compel individuals at the earliest opporturtity to take on ownership 
and accountability of their respective scorecards. In following this approach however, 
organisations need to be mindful of whether this behaviour is a competence and/or capability 
issue or whether in fact unmotivated individuals see extensive support from the reviewing 
manager as the easiest option, deflecting ownership away from themselves. 
This brings to the forefront the need for organisations; to be aware that both the acquirement and 
maintenance of these states and the relevance of the raised areas of questioning as suggested will 
not be solely restricted to the cascade and deployment stages, but becomes even more important 
as momentum gathers during the usage stage of the PMS. Research shows that the occurrence of 
either a positive or negative event during the usage stage in all probability may act as a catalyst, 
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altering an individual's current or earlier acquired perception of and therefore behaviour towards 
the PMS, be it in a constructive or unconstructive way. 
In addition, it is well recognised that linking rewards to measurement metrics to encourage 
desired behaviours is beneficial (Allio 2006: 263). As a result, organisations may be of the 
opinion that simply linking rewards to measurement metrics will in turn focus attention and 
therefore more likely promote improvements in overall performance. In reality however, 
organisations need to be aware that as shown this is not as simple as it may first appear, because 
as Robson (2005: 141) suggests 'such systems can cause levels of conflict'. 
Considering this further, the research concurs with the findings of Decoene and Bruggeman 
(2006: 436-444) in two significant areas. Firstly, it has been shown that extrinsic rewards will 
exert an effect whereby individuals will attribute their task motivation to the extrinsic reward, 
but do so in preference to their own intrinsic motivation. Secondly, intrinsic motivation may 
likewise be effected if extrinsic rewards are removed and/or control or influence is unattainable, 
resulting in individuals directing less effort towards the tasks they have been assigned. This 
clearly brings to the forefront three important areas for organisations to consider in any decision 
to link rewards to performance measures. 
> Firstly, it is vital as part of the development stage and prior to entering into any 
deployment and cascade, that organisations need to be clear about how linking rewards to 
performance outcomes may be perceived. In particular, attention needs to be directed at 
appreciating that desired behaviours and thereby improvements in performance can only 
be achieved if rewards and measures are linked successfully, thereby creating intrinsic 
motivation. 
> Secondly as organisations progress into the usage stage initial assumptions may emerge 
as unfounded and/or incorrect, requiring adjustments and changes not only to SCt 
objectives, but also associated reward and/or measurement metrics to support the 
attainment of strategic objectives. Organisations need to be mindful that the motivational 
outcome will be determined to a greater or lesser extent by whether individuals perceive 
themselves as either winners or losers, and how they react to these changes. 
Finally, some individuals may perceive that maximising the number of targets achieved 
would be beneficial for the business and thus 
deflect attention away from those areas 
performing less well. If the achieved targets were 
however of lower organisational 
impact than those which were not achieved, then the value of this course of action would 
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be highly debatable. 
A Final Thought For Organisations: In conclusion it is clear that the behavioural and 
emotional reactions of those managers engaging within the performance environment ultimately 
influence the success or failure of a PMS, and thereby overall performance management within a 
large network organisation. It is paramount that organisations are able to identify any tensions at 
an early developmental stage, as well as understanding and predicting any emotional and 
behavioural. reactions that may impact negatively upon the implementation of and engagement 
within a PMS. Addressing these early will not only lead to a more confident approach to both 
implementation and sustained use of any PMS by a more effective deployment and cascade, but 
also encourage better strategic alignment and motivation of managers. For this to occur however, 
it is vital that organisations address important enablers such as direct control and influence, with 
the ultimate aim of encouraging increased levels of personal accountability and ownership 
amongst those managers using the PMS. 
Finally, it is important at this point to reflect back upon the previously mentioned well- 
established fact that '70% of PM implementations are destined to failure' (Neely and Boume 
2000: 3). This astounding statement clearly brings into focus the need for organisations to 
actively accept and address the above guidelines, undoubtedly any failure to do so may cause 
them ultimately to become part of this disturbing statistic. 
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Chapter 9 Bringing My Research to a Conclusion. 
I had decided beforehand that the period of engagement would be ten months, with my decision 
being heavily influenced by the business planning phase, which would commence shortly 
thereafter. I believe that the important question of when to draw my research to a conclusion had 
to some extent already been made for me; if I had continued, the research would have been 
exposed to a completely new set of influences requiring investigation, and raised additional 
questions, such as how an engagement with a BSC would influence the business planning 
process. 
9.1 Revisiting the Research Aims 
The research centred on determing how managers react to and engage with a newly imposed 
performance management system based on the BSC, whilst also attempting to encourage a more 
positive outcome amongst the managerial team involved. In view of this three clearly defined 
research aims were established at the outset. It is now necessary to revisit each of the stated 
aims in turn, and establish the extent to which they have been achieved by summarising the 
relevant research outcomes. 
Aim 1 
To gain a deeper understanding as to how front line managers perceive and rcact 
to a new performance measurement system (PMS) based on the BSC. 
In summary, the research has shown that managers are sceptical towards the introduction of 
centrally imposed BSCs, perceiving that they will have little or no control over their own 
destiny. The research also revealed that individuals are cynical as to how imposed measures and 
targets might actually support unit performance and therefore conflict with their own personal 
goals, leading to frustration and pessimism towards the encountered PMS. 
Aim 2 
To establish those progressive attitudes and behaviours that may contribute to, or 
hinder the way in which the BSC is understood, accepted and used by managers. 
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Acknowledging that barriers do exist which have an adverse affect no how managers view and 
engage with the PMS, the research has exposed how these attitudes and behaviours can be 
influenced. The findings have shown how managers perceive the encountered performance 
envirom-nent will, dependant on the level of direct influence and control perceived to be in 
existence, exert either a positive and/or negative motivational influence, impacting in turn upon 
perceived levels of accountability and ownership. It emerged that these acquired mindsets are 
subsequently transferred to the contents and actions contained within those respective 
individuals BSCs- 
Aim 3 
To provide guidance in the form of recommended development guidelines for 
organisations to follow regarding the sustainable use of a BSC at a front line unit 
level. 
By exploring and working through the problems encountered from the perspective of those 
managers required to use the PMS, the research undertaken has provided a unique and invaluable 
insight into how managers perceive and are able to use the PMS. By drawing and reflecting 
upon these experiences it has been possible to develop and position sound recommended 
guidelines drawn from actual practice for organisations to follow, which will prove invaluable if 
sustained usage of any PMS is to be achieved successfully. 
9.2 Recommendations for Further Research - Advancement of Practitioner Practice 
My decision to end the research at this particular point does not necessarily mean I felt that the 
research in the area of performance and behaviour had reached a satisfactory conclusion. I firmly 
believe that I have made a valuable contribution to the field by building on the behavioural 
insights of others (De Waal 2002a, b, and c), yet I am aware that my work has onlyjust begun to 
scratch the surface. It would appear that a number of 
important issues remain outstanding. For 
instance: 
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>I have argued that a correlation exists between direct control and influence, and the level of 
perceived ownership of and accountability for performance targets, gaps, and the 
consequences of recovery measures. Further research is necessary in order to explore the 
insights provided, and to discover how best to resolve these conflicts from both an 
organisational and a management perspective. 
Research aimed at fin-thering understanding of how perceptions may vary and change within 
different organisational and industrial settings, and in relation to various performance 
management and measurement approaches. 
It is desirable to gain an understanding of how managers' experiences of using a unit based 
BSC over a sustained period support and influence the yearly business planning process. 
Reflecting on the outcome of the research, I find myself thinking back to my previous assertions 
regarding objectivity, and questioning who ultimately stands to benefit from my work. I believe 
that in this instance, although my work has wider academic implications, those who gained the 
most benefit were the practitioners themselves. 
At an organisational level, I believe it is reasonable to assume that the problems associated with 
BSC usage which were uncovered by this project also exist within other teams across the 
country. As a consequence, these teams may also not be meeting the targets issued, but unlike 
my own team they may lack awareness of the underlying reasons. I also feel that I gained a 
valuable insight into problems which were unknown 
by the organisation, having not been 
identified from the trials, adjusting practice whenever possible to limit the impact on my team. 
On an individual level, many positives came out of the experience which were of benefit not 
only to myself as the line manager, 
but also to the co-participants, who gained a distinct 
advantage over other colleagues who 
had not participated, becoming more aware of thcir 
performance environment. These reflections 
justify the use of action research in organisational 
settings, and I believe underperforming teams and units would 
benefit from a similar expericncc. 
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In an attempt to disseminate this knowledge, I sought opportunities to circulate and discuss my 
findings and recommendations within the organisation. However, outside of my own line 
manager, the response from my peers was disappointing, with most people displaying reluctance 
to accept advice or even acknowledge that similar problems could exist within their own teams. I 
believe the reactions encountered were a consequence of colleagues perceiving suggestions to be 
a challenge to their management skills, rather than merely an attempt to share knowledge. This, 
it would seem, is a risk faced by any research practitioner within an organisation, and raises 
issues of 'politics, power and control' (Winstanley and Stuart-Smith 1996: 69), which delayed 
the commencement of my research, and hindered my dissemination of knowledge. Although 
this was a disappointing outcome, I was encouraged by Tipping's (1998,2000: 8) observation 
that 'much of the benefits to be gained from performance measurement systems is from going 
through the process and evaluating the feedback from the users. ' Having conducted such an 
evaluation, I therefore sought other means to disseminate learning and further advance the 
knowledge of the wider theoretical and practitioner community. 
> The research was undertaken between 2001 and 2002.1 retained the same team for a 
period of a year, and subsequently managed two further teams over the next four 
years. During this period I actively sought to change my own practice, and that of my 
changing managerial team, with the benefit of my experience. 
> My initial findings were discussed during the Internal Conference on Performance 
Management and Measurement, held in 2002 in Boston USA, as part of a 
presentation on the topic of Managerial Reflections on the Deployment of Balanced 
Scorecards. I feel it is now necessary to build upon these assumptions, and I will be 
seeking an opportunity to present my more recent results at the next conference, to be 
held during 2008. 
>I intend to build upon my previously published work (Baughan et aL, 2002) by 
focusing on the key findings to emerge from the research and developing them into a 
number of journal articles to be submitted for publication over the coming year. 
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9.3 Advancing My own Professional Practice 
The question I now find myself facing centres on what the future ultimately holds for me. I have 
in the last nine months left my previous employment, the organisation upon which the research 
focused. I now view the future with optimism as I have recently commenced employment within 
the National Blood and Transfusion service as an Area Donor Services Manager for the National 
Health Service. Being involved in a further large network organisation, facing similar issues 
regarding performance management I have been given a new found opportunity to progress my 
findings and advance theoretical and practitioner knowledge still further. 
In addition, during 1997 1 gained some valuable experience when I had the opportunity to teach 
an operational management module on the part time MBA programme run by Bournemouth 
University. I intend to seek similar opportunities in the future in the North of England, which 
might allow me to further extend and disseminate knowledge. 
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Appendix One - Behavioural Statement 
Leeds Delivery Sector Performance Management 
Management Behavioural Statement 
The objectives and targets are set by the organisation - as individuals we have to accept that the 
task is there and take ownership and accountability as we continually strive to achieve the task 
set 
I am here to support, guide and coach you to enable you to achieve the objectives and targets that 
have been set 
I give a personal commitment that threat centred or autocratic approaches will not be followed in 
either the contracting meeting or the performance reviews as we progress through the coming 
year. 
The contracting meeting will provide the forum by which all parties will clarify the issues 
important to them as they impact on or effect the issued objectives and targets applying the 
behaviours; and approaches outlined within this statement 
Performance Reviews will he held monthly applying the behaviours and approaches outlined 
within this statement 
It is essential that there is mutual trust and respect between us. Where difficult decisions arise 
expect us to openly and honestly debate the issue agreeing a joint way forward. 
At times a joint decision will not be possible - when this occurs I promise to honestly explain the 
rationale behind the decision and to agree support, guidance and coaching as necessary 
I promise to actively and honestly represent DOMs interests at all levels - communicating issues 
as they arise. 
I expect you to challenge both my behaviour and approach, truthfully telling me where you feel I 
may be falling short in helping you to achieve these objectives. I promise to reflect on this 
feedback and adjust my approach as necessary. This is a two way commitment and I ask you as 
individuals to commit to the same undertaking. 
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Appendix Two - Confidentiality Statement 
Dear Colleagues 
P Baughan 
Sector Operations Manager 
Leeds Delivery 
Leeds Mail Centre 
Stourton 
Leeds 
LSIO IZA 
PL 5297 6687 
14-Feb-01 
Over the last four years I have been studying for an external qualification, which includes a research 
project focusing on a particular issue in the client organisation. The focus of this project involves a 
critical review of the objective setting and performance review process, in particular how set targets and 
objectives impact on managers. 
The aim of today's workshop is two fold: 
Firstly, the workshop has been designed to support and launch the objective setting and performance 
preview process within the Leeds Sector. 
Secondly, the outputs from the workshop will be used to influence the initial stages of the research 
process and provide research data which will support any chosen direction the research might take. 
A key stage of this involves the use of a video, which will only be used with your consent. I am fully 
aware that the video equipment might be unsettling and cause some concern to individuals, and can offer 
the following reassurances: - 
1. No individual will be placed in a situation they do not feel completely comfortable with during 
the workshop. 
2. No individual will be placed in a position of duress whilst participating in any activity that is 
videoed. 
3. No individual will be named within either the boundaries of the research or within the wider 
parameters of the organisation. 
4. The video will not be seen by any other parties or individuals in the organisation. 
A key aspect of the research entails the identification and reflection on individuals' perceptions and 
experiences as they progress with the performance management approach. To enable me to capture 
these interactions I would like to undertake 10 minute reflective feedback sessions at the end of each 
performance review. Again, I give a commitment that these discussions will be held in complete 
confidence. If you have any questions regarding either the workshop or any aspect of the research, please 
do not hesitate to contact me on the above number. 
Many thanks for your assistance 
Yours faithfully 
Peter Baughan 
SOM Leeds 
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Appendix Three - Interview Schedule 
Interview 3&9 MONTH 2001 Schedule Unit Managers 
PRELIMINARIES 
Introduction State Name 
Thank you for giving up your time to talk to me again. As you may remember, for the last 4 years I 
have been studying for an external qualification, which includes a research project focusing on 
Royal Mail. I've been looking at the objective setting and performance review process, focusing 
particularly on how issued targets and objectives affect unit managers. 
What I am interested in today, is finding out more about how you feel about the objectives and 
targets and the effects they have on you as an individual 
I'd like to focus on your views, experiences or thoughts about the objectives and targets you have 
been exposed to over the last 3/9 months and would also like to discuss any improvements you feel 
could be made. 
To support the interview copies of the behavioural statement, unit scorecard and sector objectives 
are provided. Are you comfortable with what I am going to be looking at? Do you have any 
questions so far or is there anything about the interview you ant me to explain further? 
0 Duration of Interview I Hour. 
Confidentiality - refer to Sector Behavioural Statement 
0 Use of Tape Recorder 
0 Any Questions 
INTERVIEW FOCUS (Open Questions Blue and Lead's in Black with Focus's In Rcd) 
Over the last 3 months, you've been set targets and obýjectives Im the coming ycar. What is your vicw 
of these targets and obýjectives? How do you feel about them'? 
FOcus onioAchici-ahlc Rcii-eire[Bonits - Rclcivw - L'asi 1hird -I titIct Nimid 
Why do you feel this way? 
What do you think could be improved? 1,. 'ithcr Organiýalimlalll - //I(//' 
What would you expect the outcome to be? 
Do you foresee any problems? 
How do you think these could be resolved? 
2. What would be your ovemcling concern about the targets and obýjectlvcs? 
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" Why is this your major concern? 
" What do you think could be improved? Either Orgaiii. Natimialh- - Indh iditaIll 
" What would you expect the outcome to be? 
" Do you foresee any problems? 
" How do you think these could be resolved? 
3. What do you think you are going to have to do to make sure that your individual and group targcts 
and objectives are met'? Does this cause you any concerns? Why'? Focu. N onto - Accountahilitv - 
0 ip 
9 What problems do you think could be encountered? 
How do you think these could be resolved? 01-1("(111isalitmalh - 111(lil ldlw/h 
. 11, n 
hai c to usc If you cannot - why? 
4. You havejust raised some interesting points. What bothers you most regarding being able to rneet 
your obýjectives and targets'? 
" Why have you chosen this particular Issue? 
" To what extent do you feel this is an issue for your colleagues? Why? 
" What other concerns do you think your colleagues might have? Why? 
5. You've recently taken part in a number of activities supporting the implementation of pci-forinancc 
management. For instance, workshops, and syndicate exercises, development ofsector behavioural 
statement and more recently the sign off ineeting. What are your thoughts and opinions offliese 
activities? 
" Were they relevant? 
" How could they be improved? 
" were they useful? 
6. As a sector we have now deployed performance management at a unit level, what is your current 
view of the approach'? How do you feel'? 
" What role do you feel you have to play within the approach? 
" Do you have any concerns? 
" How do you feel these could be addressed? 
7. As a sector we have developed and agreed a behaviOUral statement, what are your thoughts an(l 
opinions ofthis statement'. ' 
What concerns do you have regarding the commitments made within the statement'? 
Why? 
How do you feel it could be improved? 
8. If we reflect back over the interview is there any pai-ticular issue that conccriis ymi? 
* Why have you chosen this particular one? 
Is there anything further you would like to comment on? 
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CONCLUSIONS 
9 Do you have any questions regarding today's interview? 
* Future involvement 
As you know, the performance management approach requires monthly performance reviews to be 
undertaken, during which we'll review the achievement of the issued targets and objectives, agree 
remedial actions etc. To help me with my research, would you be willing to take part in a finiher 
interview in July. What I'd like to do in July is find out about your thoughts and experiences as you 
progressed through the performance review process between April to June. 
* Restate Confidentiality 
* Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview 
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Appendix Four - Bi Monthly Survey 
Thank you for taking the time and agreeing to complete this questionnaire, which will be issued 
to you after a monthly performance review bi-monthly over the next six month period. Please 
focus on each question in turn circling the number which best describes how you feel about each 
statement as it applied to you over the last monthly performance period and it's associated 
performance review. I am particularly interested in your own views, experiences and thoughts 
about the objectives and targets and the performance management approach currently applied. 
To enable me to identify these reflections and thoughts I have included a comments section to 
each question for you to give an overview/reflection of your marking. A section has also been 
included at the end of the questionnaire for any other comments you might wish to make. 
As previously stated you are assured of complete confidentiality. The questionnaire has an 
identification number for my own research purpose only so that completed questionnaires can be 
correlated. No one outside of my research will have access to the completed questionnaires. 
Individuals names will never be recorded or placed on the questionnaire. 
I am more than willing to answer any questions you might have and can be contacted on 5297- 
6692.1 am also available at the end of each performance review session. Once again thank you 
for agreeing to enter into this research program the results of which will identify how I can adapt 
my own practice and identify improvement opportunities regarding how objectives and targets 
link into and support the performance management approach currently employed by the 
business. 
Question (1) 1 Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't II 
Stronly 
I 
Know 
I fully understand the objectives 
and targets I have been set? 
Comments: 
Question (2) 1 Agree 
I feel that the targets and 
objectives I have been issued are 
relevant? 
Comments: 
2345 
Agree I Disagree I Disagree I Don't 
Strongly Know 
2345 
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Question (3) Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't 
Strongly Strongly Know 
The targets and objectives I have 
been set are realistic? 12345 
Comments: 
Question (4) Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't 
Strongly Strongly Know 
I feel I have ownership of the 
issued targets and objectives? 12345 
Comments: 
Question (5) Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't 
Strongly Strongly Know 
[The targets and objectives I have 
I been set are achievable? 12345 
Comments: 
Question (6) Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't 
Strongly Strongly Know_ 
I feel accountable for the targets 
and objectives I have been set? 12345 
Comments: 
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Agree 
Strond 
I understand what I need to do to 
achieve my objectives and 
targets? 
Comments: 
Agee Disagree Disagree I Don't II 
Stron2lv I Know 
2345 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't 
Strongly Strongly Know 
Question (8) 
I fully understand my role in 
Performance Management? 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't 
Question (9) Strongly Strongly Know 
Performance Management helps 
me in my managerial task? 1 2 3 4 5 
Comments: 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don't 
Question (10) Strongly Strongly Know 
The performance review was 
undertaken within the sector 12345 
behavioural. statement 
commitment? (Copy attached for 
reference) 
Comments: 
312 
Any Other Comments: 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
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Appendix Five - 57 Reasons To Work With Max Qda 2 
1. MAX is so easy to learn. 
2. It is clearly structured and has a straightforward layout with only four main windows. 
3. Code references are so well visualized - you may select colours for codes. 
4. A separate system for managing memos allows you to work so easily with all of your 
memos. 
5. It includes the Code Matrix Browser (CMB), a revolutionary tool for visual 
I representation of categories coded with different texts. 
6. It includes the Code Relation Browser (CRB), a new tool for visual representation of 
I the intersection of categories. 
7. The extended rich text format allows all kinds of embedded objects to be integrated 
such as photographs, graphics and even PowerPoint sheets and Excel objects. 
8. There are ten different memo types with different icons that allow you differentiate 
between different kinds of memos such as theory memos, code memos and so on. 
9. You can link codes to memos and use these codes to find memos. 
1 0. The weight scores allow relevant text segments to be identified. 
11. MAX is so well integrated into the world of Microsoft Office: you work with Excel 
style tables that can be sorted according to selected columns, you may export parts of 
the tables to other Windows programs by use of the Windows clipboard or even drag- 
and-drop. 
i2. It has a full text search procedure allowing you to search for a couple of words or 
strings in hundreds of texts at the same time. 
13. It allows the results of such full text searches to be coded automatically. 
14. The Colour Code procedure allows you to mark (and code) text with a selected colour 
- like you do with highlighters in your books and articles. Later on you may start to 
categorize those text passages and attach one or more of your codes. 
1 5. You can distinguish between different text groups and move a text from one text group 
to another simply by drag and drop. 
I, 6. The code system is so clear and displays the code memos. 
17. You have the best integration with SPSS and other statistics software. 
18. A project is stored in one single file that can be 
backed up or sent to other people by 
email - no complicated file structures with 
hundreds of files. 
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19. MAX has the control over all your texts - nobody can change texts or change their 
location, no complicated synchronization of different text versions is necessary. 
20. It allows you to switch into different language versions (currently available are 
English, Spanish and German). 
21. It gives special support to Arabic, Cyrillic and Greek, which means your codes can 
also be in non-westem languages. For instance you can create Arabic codes by in-vivo 
coding. 
22. The text pre-processor reads pre-coded text files and creates codes automatically. 
23. It has a non restricted trial version that makes it possible to run a realistic test with 
your own data. 
24. The texts displayed in the Document Explorer can be arranged as you like, there is no 
alphabetic sequence dictated by the software. 
25. The user who has imported a document, created a memo or coded a segment is always 
displayed in a tool tip in the Document Browser. 
26. Descriptions of a document or annotations concerning the interview can be attachcd as 
a memo beside the text's name, thus always visible and available with one click. 
27. MAX is so sparse with opening more and more Windows -a clear structure of an 
ý interface with four windows prevents you from an inflation of windows. 
28. The Codings Stripes in the Document Browser are active: you can click on them and 
_ý I delete the code attachment. 
29. The Coding Stripes move synchronized with the text when you scroll up and down 
30. A colour may be associated with every single code, the Coding Stripcs of that 
particular code are always displayed in the same colour 
3 1. You may attach a score to a coded segment indicating its relevance for your rcscarch 
question 
32. The text retrieval can be restricted to the jelevant segments"(indicatcd by the 
associated weight score). 
33. The add-on module MAXdictio offers a couple of functions for quantitativc contcnt 
- analysis. 
34. An automatic numbering of paragraphs is done when importing a text, thus making 
communication in your team easy, you always know which paragraph you arc talking 
about. 
35. You have an undo function for coding. 
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36. The text in your Document Browser is wrapped like you are used to in programs like 
Word, a whole text line is visible and no text runs out of the window. 
37. The codes in your Code System can be freely arranged according to your needs. 
38. Tool tips are displayed in your Codes System: when moving the mouse over a code the 
author and creation date shows up. 
39. You can attach a code memo to each code which states the code's definition and 
examples for the usage of this category. The code memo is always visible on the 
screen and not hidden somewhere in the depth of your data. 
40. You always see how many coded segments are available for a particular code. 
41. Tables in Excel style give you information where a code has been assigned, one click 
and the segment appears in screen. 
42. You can reduce (or enlarge) the size of a segment with one click. 
43. Your code may be arranged as you like (and not always arranged alphabetically by the 
software). 
44. Memos are not hidden anywhere in a text, but displayed in an extra column and thus 
can be identified easily. 
45. Memos have a meaningful structure with title, author, creation date and linked code ill 
different sections of the entry form. 
46. A tool tip appears when you move the mouse over a memo giving you information 
about the memo's author and showing you the first lines of the memo. 
47. Text passages that you mark in other programs like Word can be simply dragged %% idl 
the mouse into the Text Browser or into a memo. 
48. Links allow you to connect a text passage with another text passage IMIY he ill Ole 
same text or in another text. 
49. You can have hyperlinks to websites in your texts. 
50. External links can be integrated in texts thus allowing photos, or even start audio anti 
video files to be displayed 
5 1. A set of attributes (variables) can be assigned to each text. 
52. You may import a variable matrix from a statistics program such as SPSS. 
53. You may use the value of attributes as selection criteria for text retrieval. 
54. A comprehensive online tutorial is available on the website 
55. MAX has a printed introduction manual. 
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56. MAX has an extended 250 Pages PDF manual. 
MAX is the result of 15 years of development. 
Source: www. i-naxqda. com 
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Appendix 6- Initial Performance Gaps And Movement Table 
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Appendix 7- OrIjanisational Root Cause Analvsis (RCA) Sheet 
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Appendix Twelve - Survey Results 
May Jorly Sepi Nov Jan 
N % 
AgFee., StFongly Agree 100 100 100 in 
DisacIieeStroii(jIyDis, vp., p 14.3 
Agree StForigly Agree 87.5 85.7 75.0 loo. o rs 
AgFee'StFoitgly Agree 75.0 71.4 37.5 57.1 37.5 
DisaqiýeSVowjIVLPtsa(jiee 25.0 28.6 
Agr ee. -Strovigly Agf ee 62.5 71.4 15 71.4 75.0 
DtsaqieeS1ionUIyDisa(yee 
AgFee-Strougly Agree 37.5 14.3 37.5 57.1 35.5 
Agi eeSto oiigty Agi ee 100 100 100 100 17.5 
N, a - Ii m i,, t i- 11v Lli sa(li p 
Agi ee., Sti ongty Agree 100 100 87.5 85.1 17.5 
Disa(pee Stion(rly Disa(pee E; Im rnm, ffm 
Agree. -Strongly Agree 100 100 87.5 100 log 
DIS, IUI ee Sti ongiv Pisagi ee 
Agiee. StionglyAgiee 75 85.7 75 100.0 87.5 
Disa-11 ýe Sti on, Itv L)i,, I, jl ot 
AgieeStionglyAgiee 100 85.7 90.9 85.7 11111.1 
DIS, 191 op ST I -ýI I, Irv 
DoWt Mow 14 3 
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Appendix Thirteen - Leeds Scorecards Review Outcome - 16th March 2001 
Actions Requiring Further Work 
Repea City D. O. - More depth required - drill down with 
Complaints (Name Removed) by Pete - sign off or 
1: 2: 1 
Bramley D. O. - Walk log displays of issues 
- Name shame by walk (or individual) to focus 
attention 
Pudsey D. O. - Basics look sound 
Holbeck D. O. - New Manager (Name Removed) will also add 
experience/ tackle individuals 
York Road D. O. - Expand beyond counselling issue as above 
Ireland Wood D. O. - Proposals OK but when/how introduce 
MIPP- Bramley D. O. - Need more on Manpower (re: absence) - link 
Time Out - Needs better retention rather than recruitment in a 
training/coaches link to low morale (S/L) - How? 
Actions 
Chap Road D. O. - Needs to reflect increased prep time 
- Link into FTD revision possibilities 
- Drill down into specifics 
Pudsey D. O. - Accurate DODR completion of results since 
revision 
- Review manpower in light of revision and 
comments 
Holbeck D. O. - Need RCA review (Name Removed) 
- Tackle acceleration / link to firms duties 
- PHG activities elsewhere eg SD locker so not 
delay out if in Callers 
Moortown D. O. - Look for local solutions to space i. e. limit impact 
Due Mail City D. O. - Missorts large task eg M. C. on l5k missorts for 
efivere 
LS to LS 1-5 - 3: 3 0-5: 3 Oam 
Aireborough D. O. - Remove M. C. element - problem not action 
- Clari on S/L cover issues 
Harehills D. O. - Extract QofS - FTD link 
Moortown D. O. - Same as MIPP 
- Remove space reference - consider checks within 
office so no mail left around 
Sherburn D. O. - Add core standards as most units need to do. 
All - Raise issues on firm flick checks & missort framc 
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clearance after flick aim at 06: 30 - missort frame - 
Peter to pursue 
SIL Absence City D. O. - Defme which Manager (section/EL2) does what - 
accountable 
Bramley D. O. - As MIPP time out - actions 
Chap Road D. O. - Remove No LTS reduce S/L 
- Alread progressing targeting 
Hunslet D. O. - OK, looks sound 
York Road D. O. - Wrong way round - balance bulk receipts - 
counselling 
- Needs more specifics eg RTW, home visits, stages 
Aireborough D. O. - OK, looks sound 
Ireland Wood D. O. - Need actions as nothing shown 
Seacroft D. O. - Clarify 506a, otherwise OK 
Sherburn D. O. - DOM Support hours unlikely unless from within 
unit 
- Look to do home visits 
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Appendix 14 - Managers Experience Of Performance Measurement 1988 - 2001 
The starting point for my research investigates how my managers and I planned to meet the 
requirements of engaging with a unit based balanced scorecard deployed in 2001. At this point 
in the thesis however, I feel it is first desirable to position the drivers for change and to review 
Royal Mail's progressive engagement with continuous improvement and performance systems 
in the preceding thirteen years. Against this background I address the workings of a scorecard 
approach and review how exposure to these systems has adequately prepared individuals for an 
engagement with a unit scorecard. 
The following section draws from a variety of literary sources and documents published from 
within the business. Analysis is also provided through the inclusion of relevant reflections 
drawn from my own experiences working within the deployed systems in a variety of frontline 
and managerial grades. It does however need to be recognised that I was not party to some of the 
deployed systems and as such, any reflections from my part refer only to those times when I was 
party to specific deployments. 
Need for Change 
It is well documented that as Royal Mail entered the late 1980s it was starting to experience 
deterioration of its overall market share. An environmental concern further compounded by 
adverse levels of dissatisfaction amongst its customers and employees, subsequently resulted in 
a period of national industrial action in 1988 (Wood and Walker 1994; Armistead and Machin 
1998; Zairi and Whymark, 2000). 
In response to these pressures, Royal Mail Managing Director, Bill Cockburn cstablishcd the 
role of Quality Director, reporting directly to himself. Ian Raisbeck subsequently fillcd this post 
and brought six years of total quality management experience gained in the Rank Xcrox 
Corporation. 
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Mr. Raisbeck's appointment is seen as an important turning point for Royal Mail (Wood and 
Walker 1994) from which it commenced its engagement with total quality management, seen as 
the logical way forward. The commencement of this journey, recognised as a long-term process 
(Total Quality in Royal Mail, 1992; Raisbeck, 1994; Wood and Walker, 1994) taking anything 
up to a decade can be directly traced back to an important announcement made by Raisbeck in 
a Royal Mail publication titled Current States and Future Desired states (1988: 1) where he 
stated that: 
"Before we can plan a journey it is essential to know the start point and the destination. Total 
quality represents a journey for an organization and we need to know where we are now 
(Current State) and where we want to arrive (Future State) ". 
To arrive at the level of detail required, the business actively sought the involvement and input 
of a cross section of 120 managers drawn from throughout the business, who along with the 
Royal Mail Executive Committee (RMEC) were split into small focus groups of six members. 
The findings and recommendations from the sessions were published on the 24, h April 1988 
as focusing on the identification of existing weakness and strengths, areas for improvement, 
well as future desired states across six critical areas; "marketplace, management style, culture, 
management processes, operational processes and the organization ". Raisbeck recognised that 
the outputs from these sessions did not imply "a totally definitive or concurred position " of the 
business, but rather a useful contribution towards the "development of an implementation plan 
for Total Quality, " subsequently published in October of the same year. 
The very detailed nature of the contents of the April 1988 document with approximatcly 280 
bullet points makes it impractical to fidly explore in any depth the recommendations in the 
confines of this thesis. It is however possible to extract from a business pcrspcctivc the 
following high level summary of the 1988 discussions from a later Royal Mail publication 
which reviewed the position of Total Quality in (1992). 
Shortcomings; 
"A lack of structuredfeedbackfrom the majority of customers and a mechanism for acting on 
expressed customer needs ". 
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"A lack of understanding of the product range internally, and therefore, not surprisingly, 
among external customers ". 
"A poor external image and afailure to promote thepositive aspects of the business 
"The creation ofexpectations of the mail service that were not being delivered". 
Future states; 
"A well structuredproduct range based on market research ofcustomer needs 
"An effective measurement ofcustomer satisfaction and aframeworkfor acting upon it 
"Understanding by employees and customers ofallproducts and services ". 
"Customer confidence generated by the presentation ofa professional image in everythingfrom 
uniforms and vans to enquiry offices ". 
"Reliability in meeting the performance specification ofeach product, based on the needs of 
customers, withoutfailure". 
Source: Total Quality in Royal Mail (March 1992: 2). 
What particularly interests me in relation to my research is the recognition that there existed a 
distinct lack of performance awareness, measurement or involvement across the employee and 
customer dimensions. 
This does not come as any surprise to me. I was at the time a postman, and the impression I 
gained from casual observations was that the only discussions undertaken between the managers 
related to the number of actual hours used to complete a task. There was little or no observable 
understanding or linkage back to actual cash or other performance dimensions in relation to 
employees, internal customers, or most importantly, the external customer. 
There existed either consciously or subconsciously a single minded focus amongst the majority 
of managers just to get the mail through their particular part of the pipeline, with little thought 
for the impact of what they did on either the internal or ultimately, the external customer. it 
would be wrong to purely proportion this to the managerial grade. I can honestly say that wc 
(postal grade) felt the same, and we never actually experienced any involvement in, or wcrc 
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party to discussions relating to budgets, customer or employee topics or ultimately involved in 
how we could improve processes. The focus at the time in relation to the employee as far as I 
can remember, seemed to solely reside on my part in passing the new entrant sorting tests, 
which once achieved, seemed to eradicate any managerial interest in applying any follow up 
activities. 
This was not to say that measurement systems did not exist. The Letter Information System for 
reporting budgetary performance (LIS) was well established, as was the RRP traffic recording 
system, along with methods to measure mcchanised performance and utilisation of employee 
resource against workload, known as effective performance (EP). Supporting these, there was 
also an internal quality system measuring performance between the mail ccntres where letters 
arc date stamped, and delivery offices where they are made ready for delivery (Wood and 
Walker, 1994; Armistead and Machin, 1998). 
The problem with the latter system (from both an operators perspective who worked in the 
. business and customer as a recipient), was that the 
internal bias of the measure clearly did not 
bring into the equation failures outside of the measurement profile. This could include failures 
to actually clear the pillar-box by a collection driver or at the other end if the item remained in 
the delivery office, or had been subsequently mis-delivered by a post person on their walk. 
The way the system was designed would cause these potential setbacks to be overlooked and as 
far as the business was concerned, the then existing measurement points werc acceptable. This 
disparity caused a misrepresentation of the actual first class next day delivery performance to 
emerge with the business seeing the service as being 90%, but customers' own indications 
showing only a 70% achievement. Once the measurement system had been changed, the actual 
performance measurement was 74% (Armistead and Machin, 1998) clearly indicating that the 
business was not aware of its true performance and that customers were right to fccl dissatisficd. 
Interestingly, Raisbeck (1994: 14) provides an informative and honest example of this through 
his explanation that; 
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"In one case, a product (7etter) was put in a post-box and we did not collect iffor two weeks. So 
we kidded ourselves that we were giving close to 90 per cent next-day delivery". 
As I reflected back on these experiences, I was encouraged to revisit both the April 1988 focus 
group outputs and the October 1988 deployment document. A number of interesting 
performance management considerations emerged. These are not intended as a definitive 
overview, but provide a useful insight into how performance was Perceived as managed at the 
time by the focus groups and RMEC, as well as underpinning a number of the views and - 
assumptions I have previously positioned. 
I feel the extraction of these is important, as it provides both an informative and valuable set of 
criteria against which the research findings can be cross-referenced to assess the degree to 
which they have been resolved over the intervening years and ultimately through the use of the 
unit scorecard. 
At the deployment level thefollowing views can be extracted; 
> The business was criticised for not applying an integrated approach to strategic planning 
but deploying large numbers of functional initiatives with little realisation of the postal 
districts capability to implement them successfully. Subsequently positioned as a route 
cause for the existence of ineffective policy deployment and the emergcncc of 
fragmented practices. 
> It was also felt that when policies were set there was a tendency to not fully think thcm 
through regarding their impact on employees which in turn could have a less than 
'motivational impact on the workforce. 
> There was recognition that there was ineffective communications throughout the 
organization and that when objectives were actually set they did not link back to the 
business plan, or in turn were effectively cascaded through the business. 
At the engagement level; 
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It was recognised that there existed an inherently strong focus on budgets, which in turn 
could materialise into what was described as game playing by individuals. 
The monopoly surfaced in numerous guises, but was seen in many cases to be a cause 
for employees to display an inwardly focused perspective to the detriment of customers. 
Similarly, it was also viewed that the prioritization and needs of functions could be seen 
as overriding the needs of the business as a whole. 
> It was felt that there existed a predisposition for the application of a reactive as opposed 
to a proactive approach. In addition, there was a tendency to apply a crisis approach to 
management with post validation or "we act today and think tomorrow". Quite 
appropriately summarized in the feedback as "ready -fire - aim" or 'flavour of the 
month". Seen by some as a "scatter gun approach". 
> When problems emerged, the view was that there seemed to be a lack of enthusiasm to 
set aside time to tackle underlying causes. Basic root causes were therefore not 
identified. 
At the measured level; 
> Concerns existed that there was no "basic management information" and "real time 
control" systems for the districts with dominance toward upward feed of information 
nationally, rather than for use locally. 
> It was accepted that no structured method was in existence where levels of customer 
satisfaction could be identified, assessed and in turn, acted upon. 
Finally, with regards to the wayperformance is managed; 
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> It was seen that there was a tendency to be more focused on the relative than the absolute 
measures and that managers' performance was viewed as being only as good as the 
previous month's, summarized in the document as "short termfocus ". 
> It was also felt that when the topic of performance was discussed, any feedback (whether 
positive or negative) was not always undertaken in an effective manner. Additionally 
criticisms were present regarding what was seen as "management by confrontation and 
unreasonableness, " as well as "threat-centred and failure-orientated " discussions 
"with little emphasis regarding strengths ". 
It will come as no surprise, if we reflect back on the pervious two paragraphs and the messages 
conveyed in the earlier extractions from the feedback, that included in the culture bullet points 
was an opinion that there existed at the time a; 
"Focus onfailurelshoot the messenger rather than emphasis on recognition " 
The appearance of this particular type of feeling is not a singular occurrence in the text, 
appearing again in the management style section where it was felt that there existed an 
underlying: 
"Fear ofmaking mistakes or sharingproblems as have tendency to shoot the messenger " 
The level of effective performance planning, deployment and engagement present in the 1988 
document is clearly questionable with a variety of inhibiting factors, functional isation and lack 
of awareness of actual business performance across the business. In turn, exerting undue 
pressure on and influencing how individuals perceive and react to the process of performance 
measurement, its monitoring, improvement and subsequent management at this point in time, 
closely aligns with Neely et al's., (2000) portal of dysfunctional behaviours. 
The issue of 'shaping ideas' and subsequently the 'behaviours of managers' are discussed by 
Armistead et aL, (1998), who suggest that 'Quality Management' has played a considerable part 
in the way managers structure their thoughts in later years. 
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Developing a Culture of Continuous Improvement 
As previously stated, Royal Mail's approach to adopting a behavioural culture that is both 
receptive to and involved in quality management and continuous improvement, can be traced 
through a number of years and definitive stages; 
Total Quality (Customer First) 1988-1991 
> Changing how performance is measured 1988-1991 
Adapting the EFQM model 1992 
o Business Excellence 1993-1998 
o Unit Excellence 1994-1998 
Managing the Integrated Product Pipeline MIPP 1994-Present 
Post Office Management Model POMM 1999-2001 
o Balanced Scorecard 1999-Present 
It would be impractical in the time available to review each of these in any depth as their 
complexity alone would warrant any one of them having a thesis in their own right. It is 
however nevertheless important to extract the incremental form/method of changing: 
Total Quality (TQM) 
The process of total quality was committed to by the RMEC on the 26 th September 1988 with 
the positioning of a business mission statement, agreed set of values and confirmation of 
Customer First as; (Customer First The Total Quality Process For Royal Mail. 1988: i) 
"The way of working that will enable the business to achieve its mission and 
objectives ". 
To nurture this change in approach, Customer First workshops of 5 days duration were 
undertaken at the highest level of the business in January 1989 and cascaded throughout the 
different layers up to early 1991. The latter were supported by 85 Quality Support Managcrs 
recruited and trained by the business between 1989-1990, of whom 64 wcre assigncd to 
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individual postal districts to coach and provide facilitation to the management teams on the 
principle of TQM (Armistead and Machin, 1998). The workshops undertaken in a team 
environment can be seen as the first instance of exposure of the managers to the concept of 
internal and external customers and suppliers. They also asserted that the achievement of total 
quality in this inter-relationship was dependant on them achieving a "conformance to agreed 
customer requirements". To develop managerial capabilities and competencies required in the 
new performance environment the workshops aimed to; 
"Provide all employees with the knowledge, skills and understanding of 'Customer 
First'. necessary to support the change process that will result in Royal Mail becoming 
a customerfocused and cost effective business ". 
Source: The Total Quality Process for Royal Mail, Participant Workshop Manual, Customer 
First, (1990: no number). 
A major element of the interactive coaching required an improvement opportunity to be 
progressed around Royal Mail's Quality Improvement Wheel. This involved the application of 
brainstorming exercises and sharing of best practice, as well as more technical analytical tools 
and techniques such as histograms, cause and effect, Pareto and variance analysis to produce an 
improvement outcome (See figure 11). 
Figure 11 - Quality Improvement Process Wheel 
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Source: "Customer First" Quality Improvcmcnt Guide, Royal Mail (no date: 4). 
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on completion of the workshops, individuals were expected to apply the same process in their 
workplaces, consequently resulting in "hundreds of quality improvement activities " (Armistead 
et al., 1998: 41), emerging and recognized at annually held teamwork events between 1990 and 
1994. The aim of the events was to actively encourage and nurture a process of benchmarking 
and sharing of best practice, as well as knowledge between the participants and guests, thereby 
developing what can be seen as a quality network (Armistead and Machin, 1998). 
In order to ftirther embed Customer First into the organisation, over 100,000 frontline 
employees completed three-hour workshops between 1991 and 1993 focusing on the simple 
question "let's improve what you do" (Wood and Walker 1994: 20). The success of this 
involvement is evident when we consider that these frontline groups participated in the 
teamwork events for the first time in 1991. 
Changing How Performance is Measured 
To support the process of continuous improvement, a number of new measurement methods 
alongside radical changes to the existing measurement systems were deemed necessary. At the 
external customer level, this involved replacing the internal mode of measuring quality with an 
'end to end'method, whereby performance is measured from actual time of posting to time of 
delivery. Additionally, to provide further depth of analysis, a customer satisfaction index was 
introduced to gauge how effectively complaints were dealt with, underpinned by a network of 
mystery shoppers. Armistead et al., (1998: 41) reviewed the benefits of the external customer 
measurement changes where it was concluded that they more accurately "rej7ected the true 
experience of the service " provided to the customer. 
This left the internal customer interface, which (although rudimentary and ad hoc in nature) was 
not fully addressed until the introduction of in-process and cross functional measurements 
throughout the operational pipeline in 1995. A further area of measurement requiring attention, 
centred on improving employee attitudes and relations. This led to the deployment of both a 
yearly Employee Opinion Survey (EOS) to provide an input into the development of employee 
policies, and a bi-yearly Effective Leadership Feedback (ELF) survey, undertaken by employees 
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regarding their direct line manager. The ultimate aim of the latter survey was to nurture a more 
supportive management style across the organisation (Fojt, 1995 and Armistead et al., 1998) 
recognised as important for the new way of working (Anon, 1992). 
Adapting the EFQM Model 
To embed still fin-ther the concept of Customer First between 1990 and 1992, a number of 
senior managers benchmarked the use of the Malcolm Baldrige, National Quality Award in the 
USA. These visits subsequently led in 1992 to the announcement of the Business Excellence 
Process, which included the use of an internal Business Excellence Review (BER) audit based 
on the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) model. See figure 12. 
Figure 12 - Royal Mail Business Excellence Model 
The organisational structure was however seen as what has been rightly been defined as "too 
complex" (Armistead and Machin, 1998: 326) to manage in this way and slow to accept and 
adapt to change leading to a far-reaching structural change, known as Business Development 
(BD) (Armistead and Meakins, 2007: 19). These changes included reducing headquarters by 
90%, and moving from 70 to 19 business units, part of which included the realignment of the 
previous 64 postal districts into 9 operational divisions with designated distribution, processing 
and delivery vertical functions reporting directly to Divisional General Managers (DGM). 
Additional support was provided to the functions via the Quality Support Managers who were 
re-assigned as dedicated Business Process Support Managers to individual functions. This 
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Activities 50% Results 50% 
Source: Business Excellence Self-Assessment in Royal Mail. The Post Office (1993: 5). 
structure remained until 1996, when due to the emergence of functional foxholes and a 
reluctance to work together, functions were realigned to report horizontally across functional 
boundaries to an Area General Manager (AGM), who in turn reported to the DGM, providing a 
cross-functional culture that was seen as more conducive to effective work processes. 
To support the voluntary and confidential process of internal assessment, 200 senior managers 
were trained as internal assessors with the first BER review undertaken on a complete business 
unit in January 1993. The dynamics and complexity of this task, focusing on both the enabling 
activities and results of the business unit under review is clearly evident in Armistead et aL, 
(1998) who observe that this could involve up to 20,000 employees spread over a large 
geographical area. 
The highly structured nature of the reviews sought direct input from employees at different 
levels throughout the organisation, with scoring against the model undertaken, and strengths and 
areas for improvement identified and converted into a single scorecard. for deployment 
(Armistead and Machin, 1998). The problem with the business unit assessment however, was 
that beyond some interviews, it never really involved front-line employees, thereby failing to 
realise the true potential by including frontline staff in the process. This was rectified in 1994 
with the deployment of Unit Excellence (UX) which similar to the BER, was voluntary and 
confidential in nature, focusing on the same enablers and results. The difference was that 
coaches as opposed to assessors were used to lead the unit members through a sclf. assessment, 
scoring process and improvement plan. Participation however was limited in that few units 
actually participated in the approach, therefore minimising the actual impact of the plan. 
Managing the Integrated Product Pipeline (MIPP) 
In 1994, the focus shifted to an emphasis upon the internal customer via the introduction of 
MIPP. The simple philosophy behind the process was that if all internal customer and supplicr 
requirements were previously specified, agreed and measured at designated handovcr points by 
the internal customer, corrective action at the frontline could then be immediately undcrtakcn 
and any defect occurring against the specification rectified. 
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To ensure that a consistent approach was applied throughout Royal Mail, a national mapping 
exercise was undertaken at three levels to agree and define key interfaces at a cross and sub 
functional levels against which core specifications and measurement profiles would be 
observed. (See figure 13) 
Figure 13 - Integrated Product Pipeline 
Source: Royal Mail Produce Pipeline (July 1995, Version 7). 
A key element of the MIPP process focused on improvement activities at two levels. Firstly on a 
daily basis customers and suppliers were required to review the previous day's operation and the 
challenges for the coming day with the emphasis on jointly solving problems as they occurred. 
Secondly, if issues fell outside the customer/supplier capability to resolve the problem, it would 
be referred to an Interface Improvement Team (ITT). In this instance corrective action would be 
agreed upon or recommendations submitted to the Area Pipeline Group, chaired by the AGM 
for funding or a resolution. The usefulness of this means of supporting improvement is evident 
in the present form of the Pipeline Improvement Forums (PIFs), which replaced the I ITs. 
It was reasoned that this change in working practices would lead to a drastic reduction in the 
amount of work required to correct errors amounting to 10% of total costs prior to MIPP. The 
MIPP process is still very much in existence across the business, being the catalyst that helped 
expose and more importantly embed the concept of core specifications, process boundaries, in- 
process measurement, improvement and team working via daily and monthly perion-nance 
reviews. The question as whether managers applied MIPP or used the diagnostic tools deployed 
as part of Customer First to support the improvement process, is debatable (Baughan, 1996). 
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Post Office Management Model (POMM) 
Prior to researching the POMM, I had thought it inferred a model, when in fact it is simply a 
"rigorous yet flexible, way of working" (Anon, 1999) that enables Royal Mail to focus its 
direction, engage its people and in turn respond to the commercial environment. 
The principles, which can be followed through in figure 14, focus on applying a holistic method 
to management regarding the setting of the short, medium and long term direction of the 
business against which the objectives, root causes, vital actions and ultimately the benefit to the 
stakeholders needs to be understood and defined. The deployment and ongoing performance 
management of the outcomes are undertaken in a closed-loop system continually being assessed, 
updated and adjusted throughout the different levels. Importantly as part of the process, the 
engagement of people throughout the organisation is recognized as the enabling factor critical 
for the progression and achievement within the business. 
Figure 14 - Post Office Management Model (Pomm) 
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Source: Introducing the Post Office Management Model (Anon, 1999: 2) 
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The Balanced Scorecard is the selected approach deployed to manage performance in the 
closed-loop system and has been in continual use in its present form, since 1999 at the National 
and Area Levels. The deployment of the unit scorecard into front-line units commenced in 
earnest January 2001. This deployment occurred shortly after an initial series of what was seen 
by the business as successful trails undertaken in the previous year. 
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Appendix 15 - Paper Presented At Third International Conference On Performance 
Measurement, 17-19 July 2002. 
MANAGERIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF 
BALANCEDSCORECARDS 
Peter Baughan, Colin Armistead and David Parker 
Centre for Organisational Effectiveness, Bournemouth University, UK 
Abstract 
The purpose of the research was to understand and influence the reactions of a senior manager 
and his immediate team to a business scorecard-based performance management system. Action 
research was used to understand the issues of the organisation, to initiate change aimed at 
improving the situation, to evaluate these changes, and to make adjustments and further 
iterations of change as appropriate. The findings indicate that managers have a level of objective 
understanding while at the same time show an underlying turbulence of frustration and cynicism 
caused by perception of lack of control over their own destiny. 
Introduction 
There are a number of key publications explaining and expanding the notion and practice of 
balanced scorecards (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Kaplan and Norton, 1993; Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a; Kaplan and Norton, 1996b; Kaplan and Norton, 2000). The virtue of adopting a 
'portfolio of integrated performance measures' or 'balanced scorecard' makes intuitive sense. 
As does the idea that the use of scorecards can drive performance by measures designed to pull 
people toward the overall corporate vision, forcing managers to focus on the handful of 
measures that are most critical and helping managers understand, at least implicitly, many 
interrelationships. Such thinking is not unique. It is evident in other performance management 
frameworks such as those in Total Quality Management (Deming, 1986), Performance 
Measurement Questionnaire (Dixon et al, 1990) and more recently the Performance Prism 
(Neely et al, 2001). But there has been relatively little research into the effect on those exposed 
to the measurement systems (Holloway, 2000). 
While these models make intuitive sense and are appealing to senior managers they are not 
always successful in use throughout an organisation. Much of the existing literature focuses on 
the design stages for performance management systems (Neely et al, 1995,1997,2000 and 
Bourne et al, 2000) and comprehensive reviews of the literature on design characteristics 
leading to recommendations (Neely et al, 1997); summarised by Hudson et al, 2001 as: 
> Derived from strategy 
> Clearly defined with an explicit purpose 
> Relevant and easy to maintain 
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Simple to understand 
> Provide fast and accurate feedback 
> Link operations to strategic goals 
> Stimulate continuous improvement 
The issue of implementation of measurement systems has not been ignored. Previous 
investigations regarding barriers to implementation (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b) have been 
undertaken, including the development of McCunn (1998) eleven commandments for a 
successful implementation of the balanced scorecard and Sedecon Consultants 10 
Recommendations (1999). But there has been relatively little research into the effect this has 
had on those exposed to the measurement systems (Holloway, 2000). This may be because 
there seems to be limited empirical studies over an extended period exploring how 'managers at 
an operational level' reacted to the measures they were exposed to within models and 
approaches (Neely et al, 2000). In the main, existing research has remained in the domain of 
case study investigations (De Toni and Tonchia, 2001). There appears to be a lack of studies 
that investigate in detail the effect on managers and their teams. 
In the case of the implementation of performance measurement systems like the balanced 
scorecard the problems might be expected to be evident to a greater extent in large 
organisations. Here the full scale of deployment can be attempted as prescribed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1 996b). They positioned three very distinct information/measurement levels through an 
organisation, supporting their explanation through an example classified as a 'personal 
scorecard'. Within the example, at the third level individuals and teams are asked to describe 
how their own objectives would support the strategic and business unit, focusing on what 
initiatives they would pursue to meet their objectives. The process involves: 
> corporate objectives and measures 
> corporate targets into targets for each business unit 
> business unit targets interpreted by individuals and teams into their objectives 
The desired outcome is to cascade, (Niven, 1999), desegregate and 'deploy downward' 
(Schneiderman, 1999) objectives and measures to achieve a line of sight throughout the 
different scorecard levels. How managers and their teams at the unit level react will bc 
expected to have a critical effect on the overall effectiveness of the performance measurement 
system. 
Methodology 
The purpose of the research was to understand and influence the reactions of a senior managcr 
and his immediate managerial team to a balanced scorecard based performance management 
system. The main researcher was the senior operations manager in a large postal scrvicc 
responsible for 17 unit managers and their staff with overall responsibility for the 
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implementation of the scorecard system across these units. The researchers saw the 
investigation being ideally suited to action inquiry, as a methodology designed to deal with the 
complexities of social, and organisational, life in a manner that remains focussed on actionable 
results. Tranfield and Starkey (1998) provide solid motivation for the application of action 
inquiry strategies to management research, and Ellis and Kiely (2000) add structure to the 
discussion by distinguishing between four action inquiry strategies: action research, 
participatory action research, action learning and action science. Action research was considered 
the most applicable for the present research (Lewin, 1952). 
As Cunningham describes it (1993): An action researcher is a person with a scientific attitude, 
an understanding of qualitative research principles, an understanding of the dynamics of change, 
and a commitment to studying problems that are relevant in real settings. Allport endorses such 
views in phrases as 'his conviction that theories to be worth their salt must be tested in action, 
and his conviction that the social ground of mental life must be considered in virtually every 
psychological act' . It is this practical aspect of Lewin's work that the current research primarily 
draws from. It was envisioned that a number of cycles of action research would be used to 
understand the issues of the organisation being researched, to initiate change aimed at 
improving the situation, to evaluate these changes in terms of their effectiveness in the real- 
world setting, and to make adjustments and further iterations of change and evaluation as 
appropriate. 
The research group comprised the senior manager and 12 of the 17 managers as research 
participants to cover the initial exploration and understanding of the balanced scorecard system 
and its subsequent implementation. Reflection is an integral component of action inquiry, the 
process of stepping back from experience to contemplate what the experience means, with a 
view to planning further action (Daudlin, 1996). This process promotes a deeper understanding 
of the growth and development of the organisation within the context of change in behaviour of 
individuals and teams in business processes. The balanced scorecard deployed from a corporate 
business unit level and aligned through operational areas imposed a number of standard 
performance measures at a unit level. The first cycle of the research was exploratory with the 
purpose of gaining an understanding of the extent to which the managers understood and were 
able to work with the scorecard. Outcomes from this cycle would then be expected to influence 
the next cycle that investigated the process of using the scorecard. The time-scalc of the 
research reported here was approximately 9 months. 
Findings 
The findings are presented my reflections as the researcher-manager on two cycles of action 
inquiry with greater weighting being given to the first cycle. When asked to implemcnt a 
balanced scorecard approach into my operational area, which consists of 17 separate opcrational 
units, I had some concerns. I was aware that individuals' previous experiences or indecd 
engagement with performance management had at times been unfocused and disjointcd. 
Different approaches and levels of focus had been applied in varying formats throughout the 
business at operational unit level. I was aware that previous projects or indccd improvcmcnt 
initiatives had generated criticisms such comments as; "will it change anything" or "hcre wc go 
again another flavour of the month project. " Was I to expect any different reactions from my 
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own team who saw any extra work as simply distracting them away from what they perceived as 
their day job? 
Here resided my dilemma. My own DBA studies had nurtured an understandnig of the 
importance and benefits to be derived from perforinance measurement. It also ral. ýied 111y 
awareness that a large majority (Schneiderman, 1999) of perton-nancc incasurcinent 
implernentations fail, or are limited (McCunn, 1998, Neely and Bourne, 2000) in their 
effectiveness (Schneiderman 1999) or expectations. As both a researcher and practitioner I did 
not want my own team to become a further statistic in this depressing portrayal ofperforniancc 
measurement. Individuals' degree of engagement with the process is clearly a major factor that 
either supports the success or leads to it's downfall. Bourne ( 1999) provides an insight into this 
through comment that 'measuring performance explicitly focuses attention. this influences 4n 
behaviour. ' In iny own case I needed to support the emergence ofpositive bchaviours towards 
the new approach whereby individuals engaged with the scorecard in a positiý c and constructive 
way. 
Cycle I -First impression from the Unit managers about the scorecard 
The balanced scorecard used in the company had associated scorccards at three levels: the 
national scorecard was linked to scorecards for each of6l geographic areas that In U11-11 linked to 
smaller geographic units, typically there would be 20-30 units within an area. The same I*onnzit 
of scorecard was used at each level with the intention ot'giving a 'line ofsIght, through thc 
levels. The national and area scorecards had been in use for nearly two years bel'orc the process 
to introduce them at a unit level was begun. The unit scorecard consisted ofifircc sc,, nients, 
each with a number of imposed key performance indicators (KPls) and their related 
measurement dimensions. (see Table 1) 
Delivery Unit Scorecard 2001-2002 
Shareholder Customer Employee 
Mails Costs - Unit All Mail Delivered EOS Fairness off, ine 
performance against -measurement of a Manager Monitoring 
issued budget. unit's performance ofthe staffperception 
against plan. ofhow treated by line 
manager. 
Weighted Unit Costs MIPP Time Out* - Sick Absence as a 1%o of' 
The efficiency of a Measurement of a ordinary hours - The 
unit's performance unit's pcrfon-nance measurement of 
measured against how against delivery sickness levels within a 
much it cost to process speclfiication. *Man unit. 
I item of mail through aging the 
the delivery operation. Integrated Product 
Pipeline 
No of Repeat 
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Complaints - 
Measurement of 
customer 
satisfaction within 
a unit. 
Table I Unit Scorecard 
Some targets were imposed nationally on all units. In other cases, an area could meet its targets 
either by allocating the same target to each unit or different targets to the units so long as the 
overall area target was achieved. In my case the following approach was taken: 
Customer and employee measures and targets: 
All Mail Delivered and Time Out targets - nationally imposed with standard targets. The same 
targets applied across all units to ensure conformance to delivery standards. 
Fairness of Line Manager and Repeat Complaints - nationally imposed targets into areas with 
different targets assigned to units. The level of the target depended on current performance and 
an assessment of the perceived capability of a unit to contribute to meeting the area target. 
Sick Absence - nationally imposed area targets applied equally across all units. 
Shareholder measures and targets: 
Mails Cost - issued unit budget adjusted both positively and negatively in line with any 
business plan projects 
Weighted Unit Costs - this is calculated by taking traffic and dividing by cost, and the result is 
then uplifted by a national growth factor. 
Within the above KPIs the units' tasks were to close any gaps identified by comparing current 
performance against the issued target for the coming year. Individual managers would be 
expected to link their own performance to targets in the scorecard. They would achieve this 
through the identification and progression of actions they would pursue to close the gaps and 
achieve the targets they had been set. I expected that this might pose a perceived threat to 
individuals. They might be uncertain as to how to proceed and be fearful of the outcome. My 
fears began to be realised when I explained the scorecard in one of my regular management 
meetings. Individuals could see the benefits of a more focused approach that reduced the 
number of measures. But they were still concerned that when things became difficult the 
approach might fall by the wayside. 
The deployment of the scorecard into the units required each unit manager to attend a 
performance management workshop. I decided prior to this workshop to use my next 
management meeting to discuss the issue of behaviours needed for successful deployment of the 
scorecard. This would enable me to begin to resolve them without jeopardising the performance 
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management approach. I facilitated some reflective syndicate group sessions in the management 
meeting. I found issues arose that related to an individual's past experiences of performance 
management as well as their expectations of the new scorecard. Some managers perceived that 
measures and their associated targets were imposed without consultation and were unrealistic. 
In addition some targets were considered to be unachievable. 
The reasons behind these perceptions were associated with a number of themes: confusion about 
the choice of measures; their ability to influence performance and the effect on payment 
systems. Managers expressed their confusion about the choice and relevance of the measures 
compared to existing measures in use. They questioned how the measures supported the 
business strategy. This was particularly evident as discussions focused on the trade-offs between 
different dimensions of performance. 
Although individuals understood the necessity of trade-offs they still regarded it as a personal 
failure on their own part if success could not be maintained across all performance dimensions. 
As one individual commented "although a particular issue might be a problem in a number of 
other units - it does not say I have the same problem. " This suggested that individuals felt that 
by reducing or changing the focus, problems could occur in areas where previously they did not 
exist. Managers had already experienced several changes in the performance management 
systems in the recent Past and expressed scepticism about some of the new measures: 
"Iget extremelyfrustrated when lam unable to achieve a target I have been set, 
particularly when I know the cause but I am unable to influence any outcome. " 
They were also concerned about their ability to influence directly performance against a 
particular measure when the effects of external contributions were perceived to be overriding. 
For example the performance of a unit from upstream activity in the same process from 
different operational processes could have an adverse impact. 
"I thought this was only my problem - why doesn't the business resolve this as it is 
clearly outside of my control? " 
They considered that this could be de-motivating and could affect the degree of ownership and 
accountability accepted by individuals in the units. In addition there was fear that the payment 
of bonuses would be adversely affected by the system and by the upstream problems they were 
unable to influence. As the syndicate activities progressed we started to discuss issues of 
openness, honesty, trust and support being seen as important factors in making the new 
scorccard approach work. The openness of the discussion and syndicate exercises led to a joint 
development and agreement of a statement of bchavioural commitment addressing the concerns 
raised. 
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A key factor emulating from the statement was the agreed need for openness and honesty 
between all parties, as well as the use of non-threat centred management styles. It was hoped 
this would address the concerns of individual managers regarding previous experiences with 
performance management which had been conducted in a more threatening and authoritarian 
manner. As a result individuals would be encouraged to discuss performance openly and 
honestly rather than simply agreeing and saying what they felt I wanted to hear. I realised that 
this would not be a one-way process. I would need to make changes. I wanted to nurture the 
process of my managers taking ownership of the scorecard. I decided to try to nurture this 
through listening constructively to concerns. I would also try to use the feedback process 
through the levels of the scorecard to identify how any changes made at unit level would 
support both the business plan and help unit managers take ownership. 
When I tested the feedback and feed forward process through the levels considered it worked 
well to give an appropriate response but the process was slow, making it difficult for me to 
respond to questions raised in discussions with my managers. I was encouraged that when 
questioned at a later date, managers felt the scorecard approach had been successfully managed 
within the context of the behavioural commitments made between all parties. On reflection I can 
see that the robustness of the commitments supported the view of Winstanley and Stuart-Smith 
(1996) that 'four ethical principles needed to be built into the process' when 'policing 
performance. ' 
> Respect for the individual 
> Mutual respect 
> Procedural fairness 
> Transparency of decision making. 
Cycle two: Putting the unit scorecard into use 
The success of the interactive syndicate sessions encouraged me to use the same approach 
during the deployment workshops each manager was required to attend. The aim of the 
workshop was to examine each unit scorecard and identify gaps between current performance 
and targets. Where the gap required performance to be improved, a root cause analysis was 
made of the reason for the gaps and an action plan drawn up. In the group setting extra 
assistance was provided to develop the analytical skills required and root cause analysis. The 
managers could see their problems more clearly. Also they found they had common problems. 
In some case managers had already done work to improve performance and were able to share 
this learning with colleagues. Overall managers were generally encouraged by the new 
approach, seeing it as a structured, supportive and time-scale process with fewer, more realistic 
objectives. The outcome was a more robust scorecard comprising detailed root cause analysis 
and actions directed to close existing gaps. A particular improvement was that managers began 
to address cases where actions to improve performance against one measure caused a tradc-off 
with another performance target. For instance, an increased sick absence would raise mail cost 
through short or long-term recruitment to cover the resulting vacancy. The issue was getting the 
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managers to weigh up different options rather than going for the easiest one. As a result another 
positive effect of the workshop was to make it easier to reach agreement between myself and 
each unit manager to sign-off their scorecard. However the managers of the units showed they 
had a better understanding of the scorecard. They were pleased with the intentions to work in a 
new way. 
But underlying frustrations remained as they approached the time when the scorecard would go 
live. These centred on their perceived ability to control performance directly to achieve targets 
in the different segments of the unit scorecard. They were positive about the repeat-complaints 
measure. Here they were confident that they could directly influence the performance of 
individuals they were responsible for. In the instance of the fairness of line managers they felt 
they had a great influence but that the national employee satisfaction survey could be adversely 
affected by such effects as the timing of a national initiative imposed on the unit. The other two 
customer measures of all mail delivered and the MIPP timeout are both heavily dependent on 
the smooth running of the national transport network and the efficiency of upstream functional 
process, as well as fluctuations in seasonable weather conditions. Similarly the management of 
sick absence was seen by managers as involving support processes, particularly Personnel in 
cases where national policy agreements which could have overriding effects on performance. 
But the measures that continued to generate the most debates were associated with costs. 
Individuals recognised that the task would be both stretching and at times difficult with most of 
the other KPIs directly impacting on the budgetary performance of the unit. Managing these 
trade-offs was recognised as being difficult. However, individuals felt frustrated again about 
impact of upstream problems and unforeseen initiatives introduced during a year at a national 
level that would not have been taken into consideration when setting the unit budget. This often 
made it very difficult to meet targets. In addition to the concerns of my managers I had 
reservations about the responsiveness of the measurement system, in particular the 
responsiveness of feedback and feed forward processes when trying to manage emerging trade. 
offs. I was aware that any delays in providing a speedy response to these factors would 
jeopardise both the behavioural commitments made and the credibility of the whole 
measurement system. 
Over the next six months all twelve participating managers provided reflective feedback on the 
use of the scorecard within their own unit. This was done in two ways: first each individual 
completed a questionnaire after their monthly review meeting and second, two workshops were 
facilitated by a third party to discuss the use of the scorecard. The results from the 
questionnaires provided a number of conflicting messages that were explored in the workshops. 
A significant finding was that managers indicated that they fully understood the targets they had 
been set, agreed that they had ownership of these targets and felt accountable for them. They 
also agreed that they understood how to achieve their targets. But despite this, more than half 
felt the targets were unrealistic and were therefore unachievable, even though they saw 
performance management as a tool in helping them achieve their operational tasks. When this 
paradox was explored it became clear that managers perceived a difference between 'feeling' 
accountable and 'understanding' that they are accountable for the targets they had been set. 
Individuals felt that any engagement with imposed measures generated a feeling of uncertainty 
and apathy. There seemed little point in striving to achieve something that was seen as 
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unachievable. It was felt that this was particularly true in cases where the initial gaps to be 
closed were stretched or widened as time progressed, or improvement activities introduced 
failed to produce the desired effects. They considered that this was particularly evident in the 
Time Out KPI, which was always open to varying degrees of upstream influences, resulting in 
local action that impacted on KPIs for costs and staff perception. In a similar context, 
individuals said they felt their hands were tied when problems or solutions were passed outside 
of their direct control. Further exploration of this issue revealed that managers saw their own 
particular issue as 100% of the problem. In contrast support or other operational functions might 
only see solving the units request as 2% of their overall task. Consequently they directed their 
available time and resources to resolve what they saw as 100% of their own problem that could 
involve a number of different units. Instances where this might occur included local recruitment 
availability, the lead times to complete the recruitment process and the management of long 
term sickness. Managers also revealed that at times they could be tempted to take the easy 
option rather than taking action. They might simply identify problems or they might use the 
lead-time involved to get anything done to deflect any discussions or they might shift focus onto 
other issues. It was also felt that when improvements were not readily seen individuals could 
choose to deflect their focus onto those improvements which are easier to achieve. This was 
especially true when it was hard at times to quantify if a recognised improvement was actually 
attributed to a given course of action. 
All of these remain on-going issues for me to manage. The overall picture is however not as 
bleak as these findings might suggest. The application of the unit scorecard has had a major 
impact on supporting improvement activities across a number of KPIS - particularly evident in 
the customer complaint and some important quality targets that lie outside of the unit scorecard. 
Condusions 
The fffidings so far indicate that the approach taken by the company is to cascade the use of the 
balanced scorecard. (Nivan, 1999) while attempting to keep a line of sight for the measures by 
the deployment and dis-aggregation of targets (Schneiderman, 1999). Given the large size of the 
company and its scale of operations, the process of deployment through three levels, national, 
area and unit, has been cautious, with the first two taking two years to complete. 
Through action research the interacting web of the concrete and abstract aspects of an 
implementation process has been revealed. The research sample were mainly experienced 
managers who were used to measurement systems. At the same time they demonstrated an 
understanding of the complexity of interacting measures and the impact of other functions and 
processes on their own performance. The findings to-date demonstrate that performance 
measurement systems elicit from managers both a level of objective understanding and 
dispassionate discussion while at the same time showing an underlying turbulence of frustration 
and cynicism caused by a perception of lack of control over their own destiny. 
The experiences of this implementation can be examined within the framework of the design 
characteristic of a 'good' performance management system (Neely at al, 1997 and Hudson et al, 
2001). A PMS should be: 
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Derived from strategy - while the present system has been conceived at the national and area 
level to fulfil this prescription, the implication from the present findings were that this is not the 
case at the lower level of the unit scorecard. Unit managers are unable to see the relationship 
with strategy, suggesting that while the scorecard was designed for line of sight down from the 
corporate level this is not the case when 'looking up. ' 
Clearly defined with explicit purpose - the action research revealed that a paradox could arise. 
While managers were saying they could see the sense and purpose of the measures at the same 
time they were demonstrating a conflict with their own goals. 
Relevant and simple to maintain - the measures are relevant to the performance of the company 
as a whole but when translated to unit level this relevance becomes blurred when looked at 
through the eyes of operational managers. 
Simple to understand - it was necessary to undertake a series of workshops to equip the unit 
managers to use the unit scorecard. This process should not necessarily be taken as a criticism 
of the simplicity of the measurement system, it probably reflects the issues of the interaction and 
interrelation between measures at unit, area and national level within and between business 
processes. 
Provide fast and accurate feedback - the feedback and feed forward aspect of the current 
systems are wanting, not so much in the quality of the response but in timeliness. 
Link operations to strategic goals - as with the strategic alignment this aspect would seem to be 
satisfied from the corporate level perspective but not necessarily from that of the unit managers. 
We might argue this does not matter so long as the operational targets are achieved. 
Stimulate continuous improvement - this aspect is clearly satisfied by the gap analysis process 
in addition to the action plans for improvement. 
Considering this framework for a 'good' PMS, demonstrates a major deficiency. There is no 
statement that addresses the behavioural aspects that this study has demonstrated are so 
important in the overall implementation success. The present system is perceived by senior 
managers as being successful even though at the unit level there is a fairly high level of anxiety 
about having targets that are, for the most part, influenced to a greater or lesser extent by 
external factors. A good PMS must surely try to address these issues. The prcscnt work 
demonstrates the power of the action research process, of including reflection, to surfacc and 
help resolve issues. 
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